The Correct and the Exemplary
JK: You have consistently stated that if the terminology is consistent with the common usage, it should not deviate much from its meaning. In your work on “Corrección idiomática” (idiomatic correctness) and various other writings, you differentiate between the concepts “correct” and “exemplary.” However, in ordinary language, “correct” is not usually used in your sense but rather in the sense of “exemplary.” Is it possible to defend this type of terminology against the general tradition?
C: First of all, it is not a matter of language usage per se but of specialized technical usage: in this case, the naive speaker also acts “as a linguist.” The speaker talks about language (rather than only using it) and evaluates it. Secondly, the naive speaker uses the term “correct” for the “correct” realization of the exemplary language in speech and for this language itself. I want to show the speakers that this is a misconception, and in doing so, I adopt their term and use it in a more meaningful way. Thirdly, the same confusion is also made by linguists (though in the opposite direction). They use the term “correct” for the ‘exemplary’ and the ‘correct’ itself. All of them speak of “correct speech.” I do follow my own terminological principle, but of course, I cannot adopt the double usage and thus the meaningless confusion.
My thesis is that the confusion stems from reducing the one to the other or vice versa. That is, one either reduces the correct to the exemplary by considering only the standard language as “correct” and all the rest as deviation and thus as “incorrect”. On the contrary, as stated by Harold Palmer or Robert Hall, –who do not recognize the exemplary at all– while reducing everything to the correct, every kind of speaking is then correct, which in a certain way is indeed true, but it does not mean that the exemplary is simply to be disregarded or even rejected. Any way of speaking is “correct” if it conforms to a specific tradition. That is true, but it does not mean that one should ignore the broader alterity. After all, for specific purposes, one does need a common language and an exemplary norm of that common language. So this tendency exists in both directions: either in such a way that the exemplary is sought for all kinds of language use; or the other way around, that the exemplary is not needed at all and that in all types of situations, any form of speech is acceptable. This “Leave your language alone!” principle is sharply criticized in my book “La corrección idiomática,” which has not yet been published.
JK: Your understanding of linguistic correctness has been published in various instances. The distinction between “correct” and “exemplary” is also mentioned in some of your works.
C: Indeed, parts of it have been silently adopted by Celso Cunha in Brazil. But only this distinction itself, not the whole justification that goes with it. My thesis is that the different language modalities are to be accounted for according to the sphere of alterity, and therefore, I consider my book to be a textbook and a manual for language teachers and teachers of national languages. Unfortunately, even the great Menéndez Pidal wanted to eradicate the Argentinian “voseo.” In “La unidad del idioma” he agrees with the measures proposed by an Argentinian minister of culture to forbid the students to use “voseo,” “incluso en el recreo,” which I think is absurd. He talks about a “uso degradado y degradante”. From a historical point of view, it could be considered a “uso degradado,” but certainly not “degradante.” It is a normal form of address for Argentinians, as is tuteo in other regions, and implies nothing but “Argentinian intimacy” and “conferring argentinity to others,” at least ad honorem.
JK: But if there are tendencies – such as the ones in Argentina – of saying that we no longer need “tuteo” at all because we have no contact with other regions – or at least those who do not have contact with other areas – you have always defended the integrity to not jeopardize the unity of the Spanish language.
C: Yes, Argentina is not alone in the Spanish-speaking world. It would be absurd to ignore “tuteo” since the core value of “voseo” is precisely the argentinity it conveys. Argentinians themselves also think of it this way and thus would not let Russians in movies speak with “voseo.”
For Gorbachov, for instance, to say “vos” to Raissa is utterly unthinkable for any Argentinian. It is inconceivable for an Argentinian that a history teacher would say that Cesar said to Bruto: “Vos también, hijo mío.” Everyone would say: “Tú también, hijo mío” because César was not Argentinian and could not be assigned an Argentinian identity. It would only be possible as a joke or ironically, or even if Roman History were to be written as in the Asterix comics, but not if it is presented as such.
JK: But, on the one hand, this is about a description that you derive from the existing norms. On the other hand, it would also be possible that linguistic change would be happening in this case or that this aspect would be discussed in the community and that not everybody would agree. Would you oppose if you observed a possible trend in Argentina to decrease the acceptance of “tuteo” and expand the use of “voseo” to new areas?
C: Well, while working on language policy and the theory of language policy, one must understand that not all trends are right. One cannot always say that there are these trends, and they must be accepted. No, that would be foolish. I do not want to acknowledge this because it disregards the very aspiration of everyone for universality while restricting this universality. Argentina is a part of the Spanish-speaking world. For everyone and every Argentinian, there is a striving for /pursuit of linguistic Panhispanism. The Argentinian, the self-aware Argentinian, also renounces to the regional, when one says: “Como decimos nosotros” or “Como solemos decir en la Argentina”. In this Panhispanic sphere, one abandons several sayings that are used back home when one is aware of, or at least suspects, that those are regional forms. There the question arises, what to use instead of those forms. Again, it is a matter of politics which Spanish is considered “the best.” Many would say: obviously, the Spanish of Spain. I do not say that. In language planning, distinctions must be made. Suppose it is Spanish of Spain that deviates from certain traditions. In that case, one has to say: “les enmedaremos la plana también a los españoles.” However, the truth is that Spain still represents the geometric center of Hispanicity. Thus, Spanish spoken in Spain still holds prestige over all the other countries. Each country would be more inclined to adopt Spanish of Spain than to adopt Mexican Spanish in Argentina or Argentinean Spanish in Mexico. Spanish of Spain is more neutral and thus is more readily acceptable, and there are no rivalries. This can also be found in other cases: when there is a need to name new things, one will ask oneself what it is called in Spain. Besides, in fact, the Spanish of Spain is much better known than what is said in this or that country in America because the Spanish of Spain belongs to all, not only to a particular region. Hence, I may know – and if I am a conscious and cultured speaker, I do know – that, for example, canilla is something we say in Río de la Plata. I possibly don’t know how the Mexicans call it; maybe they say llave del agua, which seems to be the case. But both the Uruguayan or Argentinian who say canilla and the Mexican who says llave know that in Spain they say grifo. Also, if I’m talking to a Mexican and I don’t know what he calls it, but I know that canilla is specific to Río de la Plata, I say grifo. Because grifo, he will surely understand; canilla, on the other hand, he will not. If I’m in Spain, I will obviously choose not to say pollera for falda. I even abstain from saying banana and papa, by saying plátano and patata instead, but not in Río de la Plata, where I obviously continue using banana and papa. In Spain I will even use coger in unambiguous contexts, for example, coger el autobús or coger un coche, if it cannot mean something else. However, it is the case that even in Spain, certain forms which can be recognized as regional Spanish are not incorporated into Panhispanic. One does not, as it were, accept everything as generally valid: I do not say, for example, chaval, not ese tío, not vale for así es or está bien, and that applies to a lot of forms. The Spanish do obviously say vale, but this is then recognized by other speakers as regional Spanish and not as a general form, which means that it is as “dialectal” as something that is dialectal in Peru or in Venezuela or in Río de la Plata.
JK: Yet it is often the case that the very “mistakes” of the present are innovations from a historical perspective.
C: The mere fact that a mistake may eventually become a rule does not mean that it is one already. If it is not yet considered a rule, one cannot say that it must be accepted, only because it could be a future rule. If it does become a rule, then it is different. However, as long as it is a mere deviation, it is simply not a rule. It is also not true that the more frequent occurrences correspond to the rule and the less frequent ones to the deviations. Thus, statistically and mathematically, for each rule, there need to be at least two deviations. If the occurrence of a deviation happens only once, then it is not a deviation but a different rule. For this reason, “mistakes” should actually outnumber the “Norm” or the standard form. Nonetheless, they are not regular because they deviate one way or another and they are not systematic. Likewise, one cannot draw on the fact that linguistic error can also be found in writers. If we tolerate a linguistic mistake by a great writer, this does not at all imply that we must tolerate the same error by all speakers. If someone tries to justify the incorrect use of a form by indicating that it corresponds to Cervantes’ use of this form, I would reply: “So, be Cervantes, and we will also tolerate it coming from you.” Cervantes was not Cervantes because he made this or that linguistic error. This reminds me of the story by Alphonse Allais, who talks about a man that always felt identified with great personalities because he happened to share a specific trait with them. So, he said, because he was short and chubby: “Je suis un type comme Napoléon.” Because he drank a lot of coffee, he would say: “Je suis un type comme Balzac, je bois beaucoup de café!” And as one, day I do not remember why, he gets executed and happens to be 33 years old at the time, he said: “Je suis un type comme Jésus Christ, je meurs à 33 ans!” Of course, one does not share the whole identity with someone else simply because of one correspondence.
Linguistic “correctness” is always only topical. It does neither affect the past nor the future. Not every innovation becomes a rule, but only that which becomes generalized. However, it is true, that specific “errors” are not careless mistakes but the reinterpretation of rules. There are countless examples for this in the history of language. For instance, in the subjunctive mood of certain Spanish verbs, phonetic developments created a desinence –ga, even though the -a only expresses the subjunctive mood, and the -g- belongs to the stem, as seen for example in traer: traga, later traiga.
Since this ending contrasted with a vowel ending in the indicative (in the case of traer: trae), it was interpreted as a morpheme of the subjunctive and it was also attached to other verbs with the same function. In the case of oír, oiga (instead of the older form oya) became the general norm. In haber, however, haiga is considered a mistake because it is not included in the common language and haya remains as part of it. Something similar is happening in contemporary French cases like [katrәzofisje]. In this case, there is no -z- of liaison at all, but analogically to les amis, les officiers etc. the plural form was thought to be zofficiers, that is, the z of liaison was reinterpreted as a plural morpheme. Zazie, in “Zazie dans le metro,” also constantly says zyeux instead of yeux. There is one case in which it has become the Norm in French: This z (that is, through the implementation of the liaison with êtes) serves to distinguish between singular Vous êtes Allemand [vuzεtalmã] and plural
Vous êtes Allemands [vuzεdzalmã]. The same occurs with Vous êtes Italien —Vous êtes Italiens, etc. The person reinterpreting, however, is not aware of introducing something new; instead, this person is convinced that this is a valid rule in the common, objective, and historical language.
The same is applicable to language acquisition since it is totally incorrect to assume that a child learns the language from adults as something already preestablished and that he/she gradually internalizes what adults tell him/her. The child is continuously creating rules. And if these rules are accepted –which also occurs within the language of the family– they continue to be applied. However, the child rejects the rules if he/she becomes aware that they don’t apply, thus not being accepted by others. A child who hears someone saying It rains whenever a lot of drops are falling from the sky could also say It peoples when the child sees a multitude of people. He/she will then be told that this is not the proper way to say it. It is, however, a possibility within the system created by the child. Learning is always a creative process and always requires the creation and design of hypothetical systems. Often deviations do not become rules at all and remain deviations. Thus, for example, in French, where the desinence –ons of the first-person plural is also used for the first-person singular, as in the song Sur la route de Louviers («Si je roulions carrosse comme vous je ne casserions point de cailloux»). This is also common in the vernacular French of Canada, as the writer Antonine Maillet has accurately pointed out in La Sagouine, where j’avons, je savons, etc., always occur. It already existed in the XVI century. Pierre de la Ramée even considered these forms normal and acceptable in French. Nontheless, after all those centuries, this form has not been accepted. Vaugelas already recommended je vas, tu vas, il va, and yet nowadays we say je vais, tu vas, il va. Sometimes it takes a very long time for a form to be accepted. But what interests me the most is not the duration of this long historical process but rather the motivation of the speaker. For the speaker, the motivation is always objective. He assumes, in case of a reinterpretation, that this is already the rule applied by “the others” rather than, for example, an expression introduced by him/her. The person who first said quatre-z-officiers did not do so to show the others that this is a plural form.
JK: But at least in the case of loanwords, there are cases where the speaker or even the writer deliberately creates new expressions.
C: Exactly, but also, in that case, there are things created “properly” and others that are “poorly” constructed. For instance, when a speaker becomes a linguist and thinks that the correct Galician form must be soma and not sombra because it presupposes an entirely different analogy.
JK: However, if many speakers commit this “mistake,” then it can also become a tradition.
C: Certainly, as I said, such an expression might also be accepted if it is used by a great poet, for example. Yet the question of why something is accepted and for what reason this analogy arises remains unresolved, even though the more frequent forms are said to attract less frequent forms. Initially, the forms that spread are not yet the most frequent ones but rather the least frequent. Why, for instance, did solidaridad get accepted in Spanish, even though Andrés Bello, who introduced this word in the Código Civil Chileno, had initially coined solidariedad? The answer is “proper” Spanish formation. It is precisely the well-formed form that has not prevailed.
JK: Is it even possible to find the explanation for such developments within the language itself? Don’t we have to look for “external” explanations if we don’t get anywhere with frequency etc.?
C: In this particular case, it probably should not be interpreted as a formation within Spanish, but rather as a borrowed form from French, where solidarité already existed. It is indeed true that one must look for criteria like prestige etc., in specific cases. However, it is important to assume that, with the first occurrence of a word, the word itself already exists within the language system, namely that it already belongs to other speakers. This process is what typically happens during the creation of linguistic expressions.
JK: Is it accurate to say that language policy is in fact an elitist issue? If, for example, a survey was conducted in Mexico about whether anyone knows grifo, it is most likely that among the common population there would be many people who do not know this form and who do not use it either. You have talked about “cultured people” and good writers.
C: Again, the question is at what level we are speaking. The persons who do not know grifo never speak at the level of the exemplary panhispanic and thus do not need this word at all. We would not tell them: “Careful, you need to say grifo!” If there are different registers available, then the way of speaking will be adapted to the context and the occasion of the communication. This is what we must understand, and we must convince ourselves that this is entirely normal. Certain linguistic communities came naturally to this conclusion. Interestingly, the Spanish community did not yet do so. The German one, however, is completely convinced, at least here in the south. For example, here, a very cultured person can speak a pure local dialect with his family, a more sophisticated dialect with his friends, honorary Swabian, and standard German. Back when Mr. Geckeler was my assistant, I observed how he spoke to his family, for example, and I didn’t understand a word; when he spoke to Mr. Bausch, however, I did understand that it was no longer his local dialect, but rather a kind of supra-regional Swabian. And in the middle of a conversation with his family, when he was talking to someone else, he could switch to honorary Swabian. With me, he never spoke Swabian; with me, he used to speak standard German, although with a Swabian accent.
JK: However, after all, there are also linguistic communities in which adaptation to variation is less common. The tendency towards the linguistic community is, of course, a common phenomenon. But it is also part of alterity to understand others, even if they speak differently, that their varieties can be transmitted and translated. I often come across this argument, particularly in Spain, when the speakers say that the others understand them the same, so why should they have to accommodate others?
C: That is precisely the attitude that jeopardizes linguistic integrity, and that leads to the understanding of language as an instrument and not as a modality of being, of the historical being of each one. That ” con tal que se entienda, cada cual puede hablar de cualquier modo” is terribly embarrassing. It actually means to underappreciate oneself. Every activity has its own ethics, and it is part of the ethics of language not only to speak in a way that is understood but to speak in the best possible way. Another aspect is tolerance, that is, to understand others and to try to understand them. This, too, is a norm of language, and it is valid for speaking in general. The first presupposition is that the other speaks in a reasonable matter. We do not assume that someone surely only says stupid things and that they are crazy. At least, this should not be said in advance. First, we try to interpret what is said as something adequate and whenever we do not understand something, we ask what it means and do not directly assume that it is nonsensical. There are, however, countries in which the variety arises from allogeneic groups, such as the Soviet Union or the United States, and where the tolerance for different accents and for different ways of speaking the same language is very high. In the Soviet Union or the formerly associated countries, any pronunciation can be used and understood. People try to understand because they assume that it is probably some pronunciation of some ethnic group in the community. The Georgians, for example, speak without palatalization; they always have. For instance, Stalin also spoke that way, and it is easily understandable. In the United States, it is similar. In the United States, people speak with whatever pronunciation they have. Which doesn’t mean that I can speak any way I want. What I mean is that it is compulsory to use a certain norm.
JK: You have introduced an ethical principle on the one hand, and on the other hand, some kind of restriction to it because alongside this ethical principle, there is a certain tolerance. So, could it also be considered an ethical principle that one speaks as one wants, as far as that is possible?
C: Well, this is like the anti-democratic, reactionary theory of Robert Hall, for instance, the false linguistic liberalism: everyone is allowed to speak everywhere as they like. No, one is not allowed to speak in parliament as one would in a pub. It is a great mistake to demand that one should speak the standard language at every opportunity and even in an elevated tone; by doing so, one only makes a fool of oneself. But it is no less of a crass mistake to allow familiar or vulgar language to be spoken at the higher levels of both culture and public life. This does not show respect but contempt for the speakers, and it seems to me as if one would say: “Let the colored person speak as he likes on every occasion, for he does not need the higher culture since it is us who take care of it; he can stick to his culture.” We will even say that his culture is very important – yet we keep ours. This is the typical attitude of the false liberals. Sometimes they are convinced that they really are liberal, but in fact, they are radically reactionary. It is the same when you assume that for people you don’t need the real Shakespeare but a simplified one “so that the people will understand him.” The only way to truly respect people is to present them with the real, unadulterated, genuine Shakespeare. This has been shown in the experiments that have been carried out in Italy, in Sesto San Giovanni, precisely with Shakespeare, the real Shakespeare, presented to the workers, with great success. At some points, the audience emphasized content through laughter that the director had not noticed at all. The same applies to philosophy and art: not a philosophy for housewives, but philosophy! Not art that corresponds to the so-called taste of the audience, but art! The audience is then educated to appreciate good art and so on. The opposite, that is, pseudo-liberalism, is actually a reactionary attitude, which is either actually reactionary and hypocritical or naive when its representatives assume that they do everything for the people, yet in reality, they do not. And the other tendencies you are speaking of are not tendencies of the speakers but of the false theoreticians or the speakers who become linguists. However, if they are linguists, of course, they are scientifically naive and do not know what the norms are. Another possibility is that they are opinions of politicians who do not think about the matter at all and confuse liberalism with reaction or with the same fundamentally reactionary attitude. The Russians, for example, also try to understand you if you speak differently, but they don’t think that they have to speak the same way. Tolerance for others does not mean that one renounces one’s own manner of speaking. One makes an effort to understand the others when they speak with deviations, but one would not speak that way oneself.
JK: If, for example, a Moldavian consciously spoke Romanian with another Moldavian who speaks Russian, because in doing so, he wanted to show his belief that Romanian was the more important language for him, even if the other person might understand him less well than if he spoke Russian with him, then this principle would actually be broken. Because then the highest finality is no longer to speak in the way the other understands it best; rather, a political claim is associated to one’s way of speaking.
C: Absolutely. This claim appears in my essay on language and politics, namely that motivation is always positive, but there are different types of positivity. The problem of the speaker’s attitudes in concrete linguistic relations is very complex, and I have not yet dealt with it in depth (some of it, however, is in “Corrección idiomática,” which has not yet been published). But in response to your question, I can certainly be more specific. What I said earlier – for example, “speak in such a way that the other person understands you” – concerns the choice of linguistic registers and styles within a language, not a single language. In fact, those who know more must be tolerant in this area: one cannot require a peasant who speaks only his dialect to speak the standard language. It is something different when it comes to different languages. To put it bluntly, I will identify myself with the speaker who has to decide. Therefore, even in this case, in inter-individual communication, I am naturally linguistically tolerant of foreign speakers who are in good faith. If they do not know my language, I try to speak theirs or another language that also manages to be helpful to them or to even start a conversation at all. However, this may not happen if the other person is not in good faith, if he does not want to speak my language at all and wants to impose his on me, and even less so if it is a matter of “collective behavior.” If someone has lived in my country for three years and has not learned my language because he was convinced that I must learn his; or if someone comes to my country as a sovereign or as a colonial lord and wants to impose his language on me because he considers himself superior in every respect and simply ignores and despises my language and culture, in that case I am no longer tolerant. I want to be treated as an equal, not as a servant. Needless to say, I do not expect a linguistic minority to learn my language while giving up its own. Still, I expect the minority to learn the language of the majority if that minority is linguistically imperialistic and intolerant and wants to impose its language on the majority. To be tolerant does not necessarily mean accepting linguistic intolerance, neither does it not mean submitting to linguistic imperialism and colonialism in a slavishly way. That would no longer be linguistic tolerance; it would be linguistic masochism.
Let us now go back to the “normal case,” to behavior within the same historical language. Here it does not exist a single norm, but in such a complex activity, different norms coexist at different levels. The norm is open and does not at all entail one single norm for all speakers of the community; it entails different norms and is stratified so that it all depends on the sphere of alterity within which one is speaking. That’s why I say it would be ridiculous, for example, to speak in the family the way one would speak in a university lecture. Of course, many purists would like to, but that is against the norm of speaking, the norm of the respective alterity.
JK: The question remains, however, as to where the dynamic is? If you always know what the norms are, then nothing can change. But some people want to speak in the same way in the family as in a university lecture. In reality, there is something like that – for example, the Swabians who try to speak standard German with their children because they believe that the children will then become smarter. How can be interpreted such a thing? Factors like prestige or so-called “external” influences?
C: In this case, I would say that the parents are mistaken. You already said it in that ironic tone: “they believe that,” etc. For me, they make themselves ridiculous because they speak like that. For example, I had a Swabian colleague who said that he would always speak High German in the family, too, and he spoke with a typical Swabian accent. The reasonable attitude in such a case is, in my opinion, that the parents teach the children both Swabian and standard German if they do not want to give up their regional identity.
JK: Still, you cannot say that people are wrong when this is a big movement. In Galicia, almost all mothers speak Spanish with their children. Are they all wrong then? Or is this just a possible kind of change that may or may not happen?
C: That concerns not one language, but again two languages, and the question as to why and to what end one speaks the other language. But this is a question of pedagogy and life planning, no longer of language. One speaks this other language so that the children learn this language, just as one can speak French so that they learn French, or just as my children already attended a German school in Uruguay so that they can continue later in Germany. This is something different. It is a practical question, and of course, this attitude of the Galician parents is also a practical one because it is about what language the children will later use throughout their lives. You can also teach them Galician very well if the parents know Galician. However, suppose they don’t even know Galician and you still tell them they must speak Galician and not Spanish, even though they come from Andalusia, just because they happen to live in Galicia. That is already the other side of the coin and the language policy, namely the imposition of a language. This fact is often argued with the claim that Spanish was also forced on them. But in reality, Castilian was never imposed. The first ones to start imposing Castilian on others were the French kings in the 18th century. Until then, it was a completely normal and voluntary historical process: Castilian was adopted. And it had been since the oldest Spanish documents. Castilian forms appear in the Foros de Castelo Rodrigo, and it was thought to have been due to Castilian scribes. I consider this to be wrong: it was rather the local scribes who already recognized certain forms as generally Spanish because these were already the prestige forms. For this reason, I do not agree with the current policy in some autonomous regions. Due to historical borders that are not linguistic borders and, in certain cases, may never have been, they want to impose the language of the region on Castilians who have not spoken it for generations and may never have spoken it, including those who have not spoken Valencian for generations and probably have never spoken Valencian at all. In linguistic terms, autonomy has been understood far too literally.
Excerpt from Johannes Kabatek/Adolfo Murguía: ” Die Sachen sagen, wie sie sind…”. Eugenio Coseriu im Gespräch, Tübingen: Narr 1997. JK= Johannes Kabatek; C=Eugenio Coseriu.