이 글은 원문이 독일어이었으나, 독자들의 편의를 위하여 필자가 영어로 번역하였다.

The Situation in Linguistics

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0.1. The contrasts between the so-called traditional and the so-called structural (or "functional") linguistics that have been of pressing importance twenty years ago, can be considered today largely out of date. Tacitly or explicitly, the traditionalists have taken over many structuralist notions, while the structuralists, for their part, have found in the tradition preformulations of structural concepts. As to the objects of research, preferred by traditionalist or structuralists, it has become evident too that it is not a question of domains excluding one another, but rather of a hierarchy of linguistic phenomena. So historical linguists today also admit the description of language, and new valuable impulses for historical linguistics have come from language description: structuralism is—if—not exactly "historical"— at least "diachronic" as well. Moreover, the contrasts were not so deep as they seemed to be at that time. In actual fact, this was a question of the different levels of the structure of language (linguistic norm or linguistic system respectively) or of differently orientated questions (history or description of language respectively); in both cases, however, linguists were concerned with the same domain of the individual languages, of the **langues.**

0.2. The contrasts between the three trends that can be considered as characteristic of the situation in linguistics today, that is to say, those of structural-functional linguistics, of transformational-generative linguistics and of textual linguistics are much deeper; It is true that textual linguistics is younger than the two other trends, it is in its beginnings, but as to its theory, its problems and its claims, textual linguistics has to be put on the same level as the two other trends. The contrasts between these three trends are much deeper for the reason that there is no longer simply the question of problems in the domain of language (langue) coordinated or subordinated to one another, and that each of these trends claims more or less to be exclusive. Structural-functional linquistics ignores a great part of the problems, transformational-generative linguistics deals with or rejects these problems as being not linguistics; on the other hand it wants also to get to the problems of the text by means of its categories and methods.

Transformational-generative linguistics claims to replace structural-functional linguistics as a description of languages, and on the other hand, it claims to formulate, at least partly, rules for the generation and interpretation of texts. The same is true of textual linguistics with which we class also the various approaches of a linguistics that takes into account the situation as far as it considers itself as a text-orientated treatment of all linguistic questions.

0.3. We intend to elucidate in this report, on the one hand, the contrasts between the above-mentioned three trends, on the other hand, to point out the way these contrasts can (and have to) be resolved. In order to be able to do this we shall first introduce a distinction of levels of language and then formulate a set of theses concerning these levels and at the same time the three principal trends of linguistics today.

1. The distinction we need in this connection is that among **speech** in general, individual **language** *(langue)* and **text**. Language *(langage)* is indeed a universal human activity that proceeds conforming to certain historical traditions in language communities and on the other hand, individually (in a certain "situation"). Hence our distinction. Language as universal human activity is the **speech.** The historical traditions of speech being valid for language communities that are determined by a common history, are the **languages** *(langues)* (historical languages, dialects etc.). A speech act or a series of connected speech acts of an individual in a certain situation is a (spoken or written) **text**. Speech is certainly based on **langue,** but it does not only contain that which belongs to the language because it is at the same time based on the principles of thinking and on a general "knowledge of the world" (including the opinions about the "thing"). In the examples: **Frenchman are numerous, Pierre is a Frenchman, Pierre is numerous,** the last one seems to be "inadmissible". Yet not with regard to the **langue** (i.e. not as it is sometimes supposed because an adjective like *numerous* cannot be combined predicatively with a substantive like *Pierre* in English), but in language in general, and that because such an expression is logically contradictory (for it is equivalent to the assertion *a Frenchman is many Frenchmen*). Indeed, the "inadmissibility" of this kind of expressions, which has in itself nothing to do with the "incorrectness" in the **langue,** does not only concern the English language, but any language and always in the same sense. Expressions such as "the sun", "the moon", though they are not **nomina propria,** are considered to be designations of individual objects in virtue of the general "knowledge of the world"; expressions such as **as stupid as a donkey, as intelligent as a donkey** are, by virtue of the opinions about the "things", equivalent in different communities (which do not coincide with the linguistic communities). As to the text, languages are certainly realized in texts, but a text need not necessarily correspond to one language;

multilingual texts are by no means exceptional. Moreover, texts, and not the languages themselves, depend on situations, and they follow certain language independent "textual traditions": e.g. narration, report etc. are general types of texts which cannot be defined with regard to one language. Thus only texts can be "true" or "false", "adequate" or "inadequate" to certain situations, but not the languages: with the regard to one language, a text can only be "correct" or "incorrect" (i. e. conformable or not to the corresponding language tradition).

2. Our theses concerning the three linguistic levels and the three main trends in present day linguistics today are the following ones:

a) Different functional categories must be established for the three levels.

b) Each level has a special level of linguistic content ("semantic level") as its point of reference, i.e. respectively **designation, signification** and **sense.**

c) The three main trends in present day linguistics correspond to the three linguistic levels and consequently at the same time to the three semantic points of reference that have to be distinguished: i.e. transformational-generative grammar corresponds to speech in general and to designation; functional-structural linguistics to the languages and consequently to signification; and textual linguistics to the text and thereby to sense.

d) The three main trends in present-day linguistics are, so far as they do not go beyond their own domain, complementary and legitimate to the same extent.

In the following we shall give a more detailed examination and foundation of these theses.

3.1. Unfortunatly the categories of speech are often mistaken for categories of languages. Functional categories, for instance, such as agent or instrument are often related to languages, and, conversely, categories such as instrumental or plural to speech in general. In reality, any language can express categories such as agent or instrument: but by means of completely different liguistic categories. Thus, the agent, for instance, can occur in certain languages as subject (*Caesar Pompeium vicit*), as agentive (*Pompeius a Caesare victus est*) etc. The construction **with X** can express the instrument (*John cuts the bread with the knife*), but that does not mean at all that it is an instrumental, for the same construction can also express other functions of speech (e.g. *the man with the gun, John is walking with Peter*). Categories such as agent, object, instrument, plurality must therefore be strongly distinguished from categories such as agentive, objective, instrumental, plural etc. The latter exist only in the languages, and in fact only when then language in question disposes of special and specific forms to express them. For it is not necessary either that a language expresses all possible categories of speech: It is possible that some of them can be subordinated to different linguistic categories, and it is even possible that they cannot be expressed at all in a **langue** (the expression of these categories is left to

the context and to the situation of speech). Latin, for instance, expresses in **homines dicunt** plurality as plural in the noun and in the verb as well. Other languages, however, might have expressions such as: **homo homo dicere, homo dicere dicere, homines dicere, homo dictitare, homo dicunt** for the same idea; those languages would either have no plural, or would have it only in the noun, or only in the verb. And a language that could only say something like **homo dicere,** or **homo dicit,** in the same situation would not express at all plurality, i.e. it would simply leave this category to this context and to the situation of speech.

The categories of the texts are still less distinguished from those of the languages. Thus, for instance, some speak of the different possibilities of expressing the imperative; expressions such as **Du sollst gehen, Willst du gehen?** would represent such possibilities just as well. On the other hand, it is assumed that interrogative sentences express questions. But, in reality, expressions such as **Du sollst gehen, Willst du gehen?** do not express the imperative at all, which is a category of the **langue** (and which can be absent in some languages), they can only in certain texts express the request as an imperative. Thus an interrogative sentence can express under certain circumstances the question, but whether it is really a question or not must be ascertained in a text, for an interrogative sentence can also express something other than a question. And conversely, a question can also be expressed otherwise than by an interrogative sentence. The text, by the way, has also categories for which the particular language usually do not have special expressions, e.g. the answer, the reply etc. That is why the categories of languages (*langue*) such as imperative, negative, interrogative must be clearly distinguished from textual categories such as request, rejection, question, answer, reply: a text is not only made up of sentences, as usually assumed but of sentences with certain textual functions; or better, the expressions of these functions (which need not necessarily coincide with sentences) are the constituents of the texts. A text that contains only one sentence is not made up of this sentence as such, but of this sentence as expression of a certain situationally conditioned textual function, and that is why the same sentence of a **language** can assume completely different textual functions.

3.2.1. The distinction between designation, signification and sense corresponds to the levels of linguistic content that can be ascertained in every speech act. For a speech act refers to "reality", i.e. to extralinguistic facts, but it fulfills this function by means of certain linguistic categories, and the speech act includes always a textual function. Designation is the reference to extralinguistic reality or extralinguistic reality itself, be it facts or be it ideas (i. e. facts of the mind). Signification is the linguistic content in a particular language. Sense is the particular linguistic content which is expressed in a certain text by means of designation and signification

and which transcends designation and signification. Thus our above-mentioned examples of plurality and plural correspond to the same designation, but not to the same signification which appears also in the Latin constructions used for translate these functions. In the same way **Caesar Pompeium vicit, Pompeius a Caesare victus est, A is bigger than B, B is smaller than A, La porte est fermée, La porte n'est pas ouverte** designate the same extralinguistic fact, but in each case by means of different significations. Conversely, the construction **with X** can designate various things, but always by the same signification, because the different designations are not expressed linguistically, but presented by the context, the situation, and the "knowledge of the world." The same is true, e.g., of **by a real artist, by a new technique,** for there is no difference between the agent and the modality of an action is made in this case in English. The distinction between signfication and sense must be seen in a similar way. A sentence such as **Socrates is mortal** has only one linguistic signification and can be analyzed in virtue of the grammar of a particular language in one way only; its sense, however, can be completely different, it can depend, for instance, on the occurence of this sentence in a syllogism, in a poem, or in a practical situation of everyday life.

3.2.2. As to signification in particular, the following types should be distinguished:

a) **Lexical signification** that corresponds to **what** language grasps of reality; this signification is identical, for instance, in the series **warm, Wärme, erwärmen** and distinguishes this series as a whole from the series **kalt, Kälte, erkälten.**

b) **Categorial signification** that corresponds to the way how language grasps reality. It is the signification of the verbal categories: substantive, adjective, verb, adverb with all their subdivisions; thus **warm** and **Wärme** have the same lexical, but a different categorial signification: **warm** and **kalt,** on the contrary, have the same categorial, but a different lexical signification. Those words, having at the same time a lexical as well as a categorial signification, we call lexematic words (*Lexemwörter*); words, having only categorial, but no lexical signification such as **I, this, here, now,** we call categorematic words. (*Kategoremwörter*)

c) **Instrumental signification,** i.e. the signification of morphemes (words or not); for instance, **-e** in **Tisch-e** has the signification "pluralizing"; **der** in **der Mensch** has the signification "actualizing."

d) **structural** (*or "syntactic"*) **signification,** i.e. the signification that is inherent in the combination of lexematic or categorematic words with morphemes within a sentence, i.e. singular, plural, active, passive, perfective, imperfective etc.

e) **Ontic signification,** i.e. the existential value ascribed to a fact designated by a sentence

(ontic signification occurs only in sentences), such as affirmative, interrogative, imperative etc.

The distinction between structural and ontic signification of the sentence is in certain respects analogous to the distinction between the lexical and the categorial signification of the words: the structural signification of a sentence concerns the **what,** the ontic signification the ontic **how** of the corresponding section reality grasped by language; thus sentences such as **John read the book, John did not read the book, Did John read the book?** have the same structural signification. Only their ontic signification is different because different existential values are ascribed to the same fact.

3.3.1. Transformational generative grammar as it is practiced today corresponds to the level of speech and to that of designation and this against the conviction of most transformationalists who believe that they give descriptions of languages (language systems). And it makes no difference whether a syntactic structure is regarded as a deep structure which is said to "determine" the so called **meaning,** or whether it is assumed that deep structure and **meaning** coincide and one starts from a "semantic" structure in dealing with transformations. For the **meaning** the transformationalist are talking about is in both cases an extralinguistic designation, the idea as such and not the idea as it is formed in a language. The following pairs of expressions are taken to be "synonymous" and therefore to go back in each case to the same deep structure: **Caesar Pompeium vicit, Pompeius a Caesare victus est, A is bigger thanB, B is smaller than A, La porte est ouverte, La porte n'est pas fermée** etc. Such pairs have in fact / t only one and the same one designation, but they have two different structural significations. In fact, pairs of expressions of this kind are not linguistically **synonymous** (having the same signification), but only **equivalent** in so far as designation is concerned: their unity is based upon the designated fact or idea i.e. it is extralinguistic. Of course, such a unity can also be ascertained in more than two forms of expression; e.g. "**Legati venerunt ut pacem peterent, Legati venerunt qui pacem peterent, Legati venerunt pacem petentes, Legati venerunt pacem petituri, Legati venerunt, ad pacem petendam, Legati venerunt pace**ͬ **petitum,** /m **Legati de pace venerunt Legati pacis petendae causa venerunt** ect. Some constructions, on the contrary, to be "polysem" (in transformational grammar are declared) i.e. polyvalent in **meaning** as **with X** (*with the knife, with John, with joy*) or **by X** (*by a real artist, by a new technique, by the new methods*) where we have to do with different designations, but with one structural signification only. This means that everything that has the same designation is considered to be grammatically identical in spite of the difference of signification and that which has a different designation is considered to be grammatically different in spite of the identity of

to be "polysemic",

signification. Thus, in any case, designation constitutes the basis. The only discovery procedure of transformational grammar the paraphrases is also based on designation. It is true that cases like **old men and women** where we really have to do with two significations (*old men + women, old + men and women*) are also treated in transformational grammar as ambiguous; but such cases are ascribed to combinations of surface structure (Chomsky, *Topics*) and it is admitted that such cases can also be accounted for by phrase structure grammar: in fact these are simple cases of syntactic syncretism. The same can be said of examples as **they are flying planes, how good meat tastes** etc.

One may have the impression in dealing with equivalences, especially of active and passive and / the partly also of positive and negative sentences, that the corresponding expressions are also connected syntactically (i.e. in the syntax of an individual language). But also expressions as: **John is Peter's son, Peter is John's father, Aristotle was Plato's disciple, Plato was Aristotle's teacher, Er hat einen Lehrstuhl an der Universität Tübingen, Die Universität Tübingen hat ihn unter ihren Professoren** are congnitive synonyms, and even **In meinem Garten sind die Äpfel bald reif, In meinem Garten ist die Apfelblüte längst vorüber** (Ungeheuer) where it seems to be rather hopeless to try to find a common syntactic deep structure. Neither is it logical to pretend / tend that the different interpretations in cases as **by a real artist, by a new technique** have to do not with the extralinguistic designation, but with the fact that it is usual to say **a real artist painted the portrait,** but not **a new technique painted the portrait.** For these latter expressions are conditioned, as far as they are concerned, by designation and, finally, by the "knowledge of the world," i.e. by the fact that painters usually paint, but a technique as such does not. I hope it will be evident that this has nothing to do with the English language, but with speech in general.

The above-mentioned expressions of the first group are indeed equivalent in speech, whereas those of the second group are different in speech; however, not, because of the corresponding languages, with regard to these it is exactly the contrary that is true, but only because designation itself is the point of reference of speech. A grammar that establishes these identities and these differences can therefore be only a grammar of speech and not a grammar of language. Transformation rules are normally formulated for one language only. The functions of this a particular language, however, are not taken into account: different linguistic functions are identified on account of the sameness of designation, and the same linguistic functions are decomposed on account of the difference of designation: the method of transformational grammar leads from the designated idea to speech regardless of the function in a particular language: strictly speaking, it is not the question of the rules of a language, in this procedure, but of the

rules of speaking **with** a language. There is no need at all, on the other hand, for restricting oneself to **one** language, for an expression as **with the knife** (with an instrumental designation is not only equivalent to other expressions as **by means of a knife, by using a knife,** but also to Lat. **cultro,** Russ. **mŏzëm** etc. Thus we can get directly from the same idea, by passing through different transformations, to the speech in different languages. Hence the "universality" of transformational grammar which has been often pointed out and asserted: this "universality" is exactly the universality which is given through the unity of the extralinguistic world.

3.3.2 The case of structural-functional linguistics is completely different. This type of linguistics refers explicitly to the diversity of the structures of **languages** not only as far as expression, but also as far as signification is concerned. Even that structuralism that is "averse to meaning" uses the signification in an individual language as a point of reference.

Caesar Pompeum vicit and **Pompeius a Caesare victus est** are not synonymous in structural-functional linguistics, but different in signification. Structural-functional linguistics is not interested in the equivalence of expressions as **with a knife, by means of a knife, by using a knife** etc., but in the dissimilarities of different languages. It does not try to find paraphrases that can be put in for a specific use of a form, but paraphrases that can be put in for **any** use of a form, i.e. properly speaking, it tries to find definitions of the linguistic functions. Neither are expressions as **with X** ambiguous or polysemous in this grammar, they only have an indeterminated designation. The different designations of these constructions are to be interpreted from this point of view as speech variants of signification: in other words, we find out that the corresponding **langues** do no differences in these cases, but that they leave them to the situation and to the "knowledge of the world". The unity of designation that appears in transformational grammar is decomposed here if it does not correspond to **one** function in the **langue,** on the other hand, a unity which transformational grammar decomposes on account of the polyvalence of designation if this polyvalence remains within one function in the **langue.** What this grammar want to describe is the **langue** as a paradigmatic structure on different levels, not the speaking with a language which is certainly not only conditioned by the **langue;** it wants to establish how languages are structured, and not how we speak with languages.

3.3.3. Textual linguistics proper refers of course to the level of the text and consequently to the level of the **sense.** It can be either stuctural or generative, but this is only a question of representation, for the structures that it can establish are structures that are specific to texts and conditioned by the sense and not by the signification in the **langue;** the same can be said **mutatis mutandis** of their possible generation rules. By the way, not only the linguistic expressions, but also the linguistically expressed signification and designation (situations, persons

etc.) become here **signantia** i. e. the **signifiants** of a certain sense.

Nowadays, the investigation of linguistic functions that go beyond the boundaries of the sentence such as joining of sentences, anaphora, anticipation, enumeration and so forth ("transphrastic analysis") is often included in textual linguistics. But in this case the point of reference is not the text as a level of language, but the text as a level of grammatical structure in **one** particular language. Such investigations simply belong to the linguistics of the **langue,** and not to textual linguistics.

3.4. Trends in a science are complementary if the one cannot resolve the problems of the other on account of its principles, foundations and criteria, and if it cannot even set the problems in a significant way. But this is exactly the case in the trends of linguistics we are considering.

Transformational grammar, indeed, is not able to resolve the problems proper to structural functional linguistics (identification and delimitation of linguistic categories and functions as well as of the corresponding paradigms) or even to set the problems adequately. First, for the reason that in a linguistic science, the basis of which is designation, and that proceeds from designation, these categories and functions cannot appear as such. Second, for the reason that, strictly speaking, rules can only concern operations. But only the syntagmatic combinations and those processes which we call "real transformations" (which occur for instance in word formation) are operational in the language, and not the linguistic categories and functions which are oppositive values and which can only be considered as motivations of the rules of linguistic usage. Conversely, structural linguistics is neither able to resolve nor to set the problems of transformational grammar, for designation corresponds to the level of speech and not to that of language. That is why the categories of designation do not appears as unities in this kind of linguistic science unless they by chance coincide just with certain categories of the languages in question. The object of of research in transformational grammar are the speech categories, and the categories of the **langue** remain here, in the background; it is tacitly assumed that they are already given and their delimitation is left to intuition. Structural-functional grammar, on the contrary, investigates the categories and functions of the **langue,** and the speech categories are left here to intuition. The unity of designation of **with a knife, by using a knife, by means of a knife** etc. will be treated at one place together in a complete transformational grammar of a language, the construction **with X,** however, will appear there at different places, according to the equivalences that are taken into consideration. In a structural-functional grammar, on the contrary, the functional unity of **with X** will be found at one place and the respective equivalences of designation at different places. That is why the grammar

of a language must be made twice: first, as a grammar of that language as a paradigmatic system, and, second, as a grammar of the speaking by means of this language, i. e. as a system of rules for the transition from the thought content to speech act by way of the respective language. By the way, that is what Georg von der Gabelentz (in 1891 already) wanted to point out with his distinction between analytic and synthetic grammar.

Transformational grammar and structural-functional linguistics can just as little resolve the problems of textual linguistics, and that, on the one hand, for the reason that in their way of seeing the problems, they must disregard the situational dependence of the texts, and, on the other hand, for the reason that, in the text, designation and signification have the function of instruments for the expression of the sense. But textual linguistics as such cannot resolve the problems of transformational grammar and structural-functional grammar either, for in the perspective of the sense different categories of designation and signification must be often reduced to one textual function and conversely, the unity of designational and significational categories must be split up in to different textual functions. The attempts to define linguistic functions such as tense by means of textual types (such as report and narration), must be considered a failure. Besides, such a way of seeing the problems includes, as it seems to me, a vicious circle: a tense is not "narrative" for the reason that it occurs in narrations, but on the contrary, it is used in narrations because it is narrative.

4. I hope I have succeeded in demonstrating convincingly that the main trends of present day linguistics are complementary, at least in theory. The complementarity in practice, however, - that is to say, a successful collaboration of these trends - can only be achieved if we give up all claims to infringe our respective domains and to be exclusive, that is to say, if the representatives of these trends realize that they speak of the same phenomenon "language", though of different aspects of it.