LINGUISTIC THEORIES

AND THEIR

APPLICATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

If some two hundred specialists in linguistics are brought together from a number of different countries and given the opportunity of airing their theories, can the results be expected to have any practical application to the improvement of modern language teaching? It is an open question; and perhaps it would have been more prudent to entitle this book "Linguistic Theory: has it any practical application?"

But the "Major Project — Modern Languages" of the Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe is designed, in response to the wishes of the Conference of European Ministers of Education, to stimulate the extent and improve the quality of modern language teaching in European educational establishments. It was therefore with great interest that the Council for Cultural Co-operation took note that, at a meeting of language experts organised at Stockholm under its auspices in 1963, the idea was propounded of creating an International Association of Applied Linguistics (Association Internationale de Linguistique Appliquée — AILA). This association came formally into existence at the first international congress of applied linguistics which was organised, again with the practical help of the CCC, by the Faculty of Arts of the University of Nancy in 1964.

Since then, there has been created an International Association of Publishers of Applied Linguistics (Association Internationale d'Éditeurs de Linguistique Appliquée — AIDELA), one of whose objects is to publish and distribute through commercial channels all future volumes relating to the Council for Cultural Co-operation's "Major Project — Modern Languages".

The present volume contains four of the papers prepared for the Nancy Congress, together with a number of comments contributed by persons to whom these papers had been previously communicated.

These papers were chosen for a wider distribution because they deal with aspects of linguistics deemed to have application to modern language teaching. The complete report, including papers on automatic translation, quantitative linguistics, etc., has been published by the Faculty of Arts of the University of Nancy in number 31, 1966, of its series "Annales de l'Est — Mémoires".

The Council for Cultural Co-operation is grateful to M. Bernard Pottier, President of AILA, to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Nancy, and to the contributors themselves for permission to

include these contributions in this volume of the series "Modern Languages in Europe". It is in the hope that a positive answer will be given to the question in the first paragraph of this foreword by readers whose concern it is to introduce new ideas and new techniques into modern language teaching in Europe that the decision was taken to entitle the volume "Linguistic Theories and their Application".

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CHAPTER I

Lexical structure and the teaching of vocabulary

by E. COSERIU

A — INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. This report will be limited to a systematic exposition of the problems arising out of lexical structure. We shall therefore make no attempt to offer a survey of the different theories and methods of analysis which, in one way or another, deal with the "structure" of vocabulary (lexis). Moreover, these theories and methods often have their origin in attitudes which are too dissimilar to be reduced to a common denominator. As for the bibliography, which is rapidly assuming vast proportions, we refer our readers to two well-known works by S. Ullmann (*The Principles of Semantics 2*, Glasgow-Oxford, 1957, and *Semantics*, Oxford, 1962) and to A. A. Ufimcheva (*Opyt izucheniya leksiki kak sistemy* — Moscow, 1962). A very brief but, in our opinion, extremely apt description of some of the methods of lexical analysis has recently been outlined by B. Pottier (*Vers une sémantique moderne*, TLL 2, 1, Strasbourg, 1964, pp. 110-112). See also the wider survey by Yu. D. Apresyan, *Sovremennye metody izucheniya znachenii i nekotorye problemy strukturnoi lingvistiki*, "Problemy strukturnoi lingvistiki 1963", Moscow, 1963, pp. 102-150. To these two panoramas we must add the theory of fields by J. Trier and L. Weisgerber, or, to be more exact, the whole theory of content developed by the scholars (mainly German), grouped around L. Weisgerber, a theory which seems to us to be the most important linguistic theory of lexical 'signifiés' (concepts) yet put forward, and which, without being strictly structural, is full of valuable suggestions for any structural analysis of lexis (see, for example, L. Weisgerber, *Die vier Stufen in der Erforschung der Sprachen*, Düsseldorf, 1963, and the chapter by H. Gipper, *Der Inhalt des Wortes und die Gliederung des Wortschatzes*, in the new edition of the *Duden-Grammatik*, Mannheim, 1959, pp. 392-429). Certain theoretical points, especially those concerning the justification of 'structural semantics' as opposed to traditional semantics and the various "associative" semantics, have also been dealt with in our article *Pour une sémantique diachronique structurale*, TLL, 2, 1, Strasbourg, 1964, see especially pp. 143-170.

2. In principle we shall confine ourselves here to the strictly *lexical function*, that is to say, to the primary structuration of experience by means of "words", ideally anterior to the functions necessary for the combination of words into connected speech (this does not imply, of course, that we affirm the priority (real, or genetic) of the word in relation to the sentence: the lexical function is "anterior" from the logical point of view, in the sense that it is the 'determinatum' of the categorial and grammatical functions, or, from the point of view of analysis, in the sense that it is "that which remains" when grammatical and categorial determinations have been eliminated). Consequently, there remain outside our considerations words "which are equivalent to a sentence" (interjections, affirmative and negative particles, e.g. *oui, si, non*), morphematic words (articles, prepositions, conjunctions) and categorematic words (categoreme—morpheme—; deictics or "pronouns", e.g. *moi, mon, maintenant, ici*). The only words with which we shall be concerned here will be lexematic words (in French, as in many other languages, lexeme—categoreme—morpheme), as, for example, *table, blanc, écrire, vite*. These, furthermore, will be considered only in their capacity as lexemes, that is to say as bearers of the lexical function. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty, indeed, on many occasions the impossibility, of separating in the 'signifiant' (sound-image), that which corresponds to the lexical function, from that which does not correspond to it, we shall quote as examples only whole "words" : e.g. *venir*, and not *ven*; but it will be understood that we have in mind the function which distinguishes the word *venir* from *dormir, oublier, chanter*, etc. (and also from *sommeil, oubli, chant*, etc.) and which causes it to enter a "field" where it stands in opposition to, e.g., *marcher, aller, partir, sortir, entrer* (and, in a certain sense, also to *marche, allée, départ, sortie, entrée*), and not functions such as "present", "infinitive", "intransitive" (the problem of "verb" function will be dealt with later).

It must be pointed out, however, that non-lexical words enter into certain phenomena of which we shall be speaking, such as "modification" (Span. *ahorita, mismito*) and "development" (Ger. *hierhiesig, jetzt-jetzig*), which goes to show that these phenomena go beyond lexis in the strict sense of the word.

3. Neither shall we deal with proper names which, as historically individualised lexemes, do not enter the field of lexematic oppositions. Proper nouns do, however, enter into other "lexical" phenomena, e.g. "modifications" (Ital. *Italia* —

Italietta), "development" (*un écrivain*) *français* — *un Français*; Ital. *Toscana* — *toscano* — *toscanizzare* — *toscaneggiare* — *toscanizzazione* — *toscaneggiamento*), and "derivation" (*hispanisme* — *hispaniste*).

Finally, we shall leave out of our survey the numerals, which also enter into most lexical phenomena, and even certain structures similar to "fields" (the decimal system, vigesimal system, etc.) but which constitute a completely separate class, quite different from the rest of lexis.

4. We shall employ the following conventional notation : italics for the word as a "sign", that is to say expression and content (word image + concept) : (*vieux* = the French word *vieux* as word image and concept); italics and normal inverted commas (double) for expression : ("*vieux*" = the 'signifiant' (word image) of *vieux* (vjø); inverted commas only for content : ("vieux" = the 'signifié' (concept) of *vieux*); single inverted commas for the distinctive characteristics of the content : ('vieux' = the distinctive characteristic which is to be found in the content of *vieux, vieillir, vieillesse, antique, ancien*, etc.). In the plans and diagrams, unless otherwise indicated, the 'signifié' will always be meant.

B — INTRODUCTION

1. By "lexical structure" is understood in the first place, and rightly so, the semantic configuration of lexis (= lexematic words). Even outside those circles which are in favour of placing the content (or, at least, the lexical content) beyond the frontiers of linguistics, the possibility of a genuinely structural and connected description of this configuration, analogous to phonological description and to grammar, is often looked upon with suspicion and scepticism. It is said, for example, that lexical relationships are extremely complicated and almost inextricable, that lexical structures are often very imprecise, that subjectivity plays an important part in them, that the organization of lexis is often different in different individuals of the same linguistic community. These remarks are not without foundation, but they do not all carry the same weight and, at bottom, they are, in a new form, the objections which are usually levelled against structural linguistics itself. Indeed, apart from the number of basic items to be distinguished, relationships are not, fundamentally, less complicated in grammar and in phonology than in the realm of lexis, and at the level of speech, the mass of contextual and situational variants of discourse, the mass of contextual and

situational variants discernible for a grammatical value or for a phoneme is not in itself less impressive than that of the "meanings" of a word. But one has at one's disposal in grammar the results of more than two thousand years of work and, in phonology, a precise terminology developed by phonetics and a preliminary analysis carried out with the help of phonetic scripts, which considerably facilitates our task. But in the realm of lexis, structural work has scarcely been touched upon and, for the moment, it is proceeding, as it were, in the dark. In lexicology, however, one has at least the advantage that the lexematic word is "given" in quite a different manner than the phoneme. There are available the results obtained by monolingual dictionaries and by dictionaries of synonyms and antonyms, results which are by no means to be despised. As regards the second difficulty, if many lexical structures are indeed imprecise, a structural analysis simply has to present them as they are : in phonology and in grammar one also finds well established structures, and others not so well established, which are not clear or which are undergoing modification, exceptions and deviations, etc.; but this does not constitute a basic difficulty for structural analysis, as is sometimes assumed. But one cannot assert that lexical structures are imprecise *before* a thorough and methodical analysis of them has been carried out. Subjectivity should not be neglected, as is sometimes the case, but it does not influence all the different levels of the semantic structuration of language to the same degree, and in any case, it will be necessary to ask if it is "linguistic", that is to say, if it manifests itself in the functioning of linguistic forms. Finally, with regard to the different organisation of lexical relationships in different individuals of the same linguistic community, this affects the *unity* of lexis and not its internal structuration (on the contrary, the very formulation of the difficulty *presupposes* a structuration). Consequently, the difficulty concerns the *amount* of work to be undertaken and not its *nature*. Moreover, the diversity of language is not unknown in phonology and in grammar, even at the level of common languages (e.g. in French, the distinction or lack of distinction between *"mettre"* and *"maître"*, the existence or non-existence of the "past definite" as a value opposed to the "past indefinite", *je vais aller/j'irai* or simply *je vais aller*, etc.). On the other hand, if it is certainly true that diversity of lexis is greater than phonological or grammatical diversity, mutual understanding, even in very wide communities, is also an undeniable fact, which means that at least a reasonably large section of lexis in the respective languages must offer a more or less homo-

geneous organization. Thus, in describing the lexis of a language it will be possible to establish primary (common) structures and secondary (uncommon) structures.

2. Having admitted the complexity of lexical relationships, one must start by introducing distinctions. One has to distinguish the types of relationships and establish a hierarchy amongst these types. In phonologie it has only been possible to arrive at systematic and satisfactory descriptions by establishing a strict hierarchy between that which is functional, at the level of language, and that which is not, or, to put it more precisely, between the distinctive function and other functions, and by beginning work again with the fundamental function (this does not mean that one "eliminates" or "ignores" the other functions : it is simply a question of establishing a method of research). It must be conceded that semantic determinations in the lexical domain are, at first sight, alarmingly numerous and heterogeneous : styles and strata of language, dialect variations, vocational slang and technical terminologies, stereotyped expressions, ideas and beliefs concerning things designated, recognition or lack of recognition of these same things, etymological and derivative relationships, purely material relationships between 'signifiants' etc., everything becomes interwoven into a general pattern and everything can be important in a certain context or a certain situation. Consequently, many "semantic" classifications of words are possible, according to the type of determination which is adopted as a criterion. Madame Ufimecheva, for example, following V. I. Koduchov, distinguishes in addition to "structural" (oppositive) relationships, the following lexico-semantic groupings : *a*) Objectival or "thematic" groupings (nomenclatures, "Sachgruppen"); *b*) terminological groupings; *c*) etymological groupings; *d*) lexico-grammatical groupings (verbal categories); *e*) "formational" groupings (relationships of derivation and of "conversion" of verbal category); *f*) notional or ideological groupings (cf. the "notional fields" of Matoré); *g*) semantico-syntactic groupings (cf. the "elementary fields" of W. Porzig and our "implications"); *h*) phono-semantic groupings (op. cit., p. 131 seq.); and one could add others. These groupings overlap in such a way that the same word can appear in several groupings at the same time, according to the determination envisaged. And, as a corollary, each word can, in principle, be at the centre of a network of different associations which can be extended in several directions. Because of this many "associative fields" can be almost indefinitely extended, since one can always find or imagine

contexts in which a particular association is valid. But, if one wishes to arrive at a systematic description of lexis, one cannot consider for each word that which might be important; one must consider in the first place *that which is essential* : the basic fonction without which lexis would not exist, and which must have *priority*, even from the practical point of view (e.g., when one is learning a foreign language). This requirement does not imply that we wish to deny either the value or the validity of the different points of view which are possible in lexicology (all of which, in our opinion, are justified at different levels of linguistic and extra-linguistic research). Neither does it meet the demand for a complete semantic (and pragmatic) description of each word. Its object is to establish the basis and the framework of the description of lexis as a domain of language. In order to do this one must start by distinguishing what is linguistic and what is not, what is systematic and what is extra-systematic, what is 'structurated' and what is facultative and more or less floating, what is oppositive and what is relational. The well-known example given by Ch. Bally comes to mind here (FM, 8, 1940, p. 195) : "The word "bœuf" brings to mind : (1) "vache, taureau, veau, cornes, ruminer, beugler", etc., (2) "labour, charrue, joug", etc.; (3) it can and does give rise in French to ideas of strength, endurance, patient work, but also of slowness, heaviness, and passiveness. Confronted by such an example, however, one must ask whether these associations are all equally "linguistic", and whether it is not necessary to establish a hierarchy amongst those which are in fact linguistic. The association with "vache", "taureau", "veau" is based on an oppositive relationship (these lexemes stand in opposition to the lexeme "bœuf" within a lexical field); "cornes" and "ruminer" can at best enter as distinctive characteristics into the definition of the lexeme "bœuf"; the association "bœuf"—"beugler" is a lexical "implication"; in the same manner it can perhaps be said that the association "bœuf"-"joug"; "charrue" and "labour" are an object and a "state of things" which can often be found *within the real context* of the object "bœuf" (there is no relationship between the lexemes "charrue", "labour" and the lexeme "bœuf" which is lexically necessary and definable. As for the association with the ideas of strength, endurance, etc., which have nothing linguistic about them, see C.1.3.

3. In view of the fact that similar examples of non-distinction are not uncommon in present-day lexicology and are sometimes even offered as attempts at lexical "structuration" it seems to us that a series of preliminary distinctions is necessary before

proceeding to the examination of strictly lexical structures. These distinctions are as follows : *a*) between "things" and language; *b*) "primary language" and "meta-language" ("méta-langage"); *c*) synchrony and diachrony; *d*) "technique of discourse" and "repeated discourse"; *e*) "architecture" and "structure" of language (or "historical language" and "functional language"); *f*) "system" and "standard" of language; *g*) relationships of "significance" and of "designation". We are obviously dealing with distinctions which go beyond the framework of lexis, and which any form of linguistics (and especially structural linguistics) presupposes, implies, makes explicitely or ought to make, in the study of every domain of language. But they also have to be formulated (or made explicit) for lexicology in particular; indeed, one of the methodological weaknesses of lexicology is the fact that it often considers certain phenomena to be part of lexis which, in reality, are not, and does not pause when confronted with difficulties and problems which cannot be resolved within the lexical domain.

C — PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS

1. *"Things" and Language*

1.0. The distinction between "things" and language seems easy to make in theory (indeed, it is implied in grammar, where confusions of this nature are becoming rarer), but it is often difficult in practice, in the domain of lexicology, because of the proximity between the lexical function and the reality designated by the lexemes. Consequently, one must always be on guard : on the one hand, one has constantly to distinguish, in what one is inclined to consider as the "significance", between that which is due to the knowledge of "things" as such and to the opinions (true or false) concerning things, and that which is due to language, and one must establish what structurations of the "signifié" and what "semantic" associations are due to non-linguistic analyses of objects and real states of things. On the other hand, one must be careful not to reduce linguistic structuration to the "objective" structuration of the real, e.g., by expecting to find in language the characteristics and the limits peculiar to objects. Several questions seem to us important in this connection.

1.1. First of all, the question of *terminologies*. Scientific and technical terminologies do not belong to language, nor, in consequence, to lexical structurations in the same way as do "common words". They represent uses of language for

different (and, as a rule, independent) classifications of reality or of certain sections of reality. In part, terminologies are in no way "structurated" (they are simple enumerative "nomenclatures", corresponding to deliminations in the objects) and, insofar as this is the case, their structuration does not correspond to the norms of language, but to the points of view and requirements of the respective sciences and techniques concerning the reality of the things themselves. There has, however, been a temptation to consider certain terminological structurations as exemplary "lexical fields" (indeed, they are almost always more "precise" and "clear" than the structurations of language), but, in reality, these so called "fields" arrange not linguistic "signifiés", but phenomena defined by the sciences and technology and *objects*, classes of *designata*, and, in this sense, they are *objective classifications* and not semantic structurations. For the sciences and technology, words are, in actual fact, the representatives of "things", that is to say, "significance" coincides with "designation". This is not so in the case of language. Indeed, scientific and technical delimitations are, or aim at being, delimitations in objective reality as such, and not in the intuition of reality, as is the case with linguistic structurations. For this reason terminological delimitations are precise when applied to a specific reality, and they are defined or definable by "objective" criteria, that is to say, by characteristics pertaining to "real" objects (even if these may belong to an abstract or imaginary reality, as in mathematics). Terminological "oppositions" are thus "exclusive" in accordance with the principle of contradiction (at each level of classification each term differs from all the others), whilst linguistic oppositions are very often "inclusive", that is to say, the "negative" (or "non-marked") term can include the "positive" (or "marked") term : thus "day" can act as the contrary of "night" but can also include the term "night" when meaning "day" + "night"; similarly in language the masculine gender can include the feminine ("le fiancé" + "la fiancée" = "les fiancés"), whilst in grammar "masculine" and "feminine" are naturally exclusive terms ([1]). In the sciences it is quite possible for two classes to mingle in such a way that a third results as a "product" (e.g., "rectangle" × "rhombus" = "square"), but it is inconceivable that a term should be the contrary of another, and, at the same time, include its contrary.

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[1]. In practice this fact often militates against the exact understanding of the nature of linguistic oppositions, since even for oppositions inclusive *in language*, one has to use, *in the science of language,* exclusive terms because of the requirements of any scientific terminology.

Consequently, there is no good reason for wishing, for example, to establish the "semantic structure" of the 300,000 terms in chemistry : these are "structured" from the point of view of chemistry as the "real classification", and they change their structuration with the progress of science and not because of linguistic change. Furthermore, most terminologies only belong to languages because of their 'significants' and also because of their grammatical function and because of certain relational lexical functions ("development", "derivation"). From the point of view of their 'signifié' they are, in one sense, sub-linguistic (they belong to restricted groups of people within linguistic communities) and, in another sense, they are inter-linguistic (or virtually inter-linguistic); and for this reason they can, as a rule, be translated without difficulty in any community which possesses the same sciences and techniques at the same level of development, since "translation" means in this case simply "the replacing of 'signifiants'" and not the "transposition of the 'signifiés' of one language into the 'signifiés' of another". In fact one knows the 'signifiés' of terminologies to the extent that one knows the sciences and techniques to which they correspond, and not to the extent that one knows the language : they belong to definite "spheres of discourse" and can only be defined in connection with these spheres. (Concerning this idea, cf. our article *Determinación y entorno*, "Romanistisches Jahrbuch" 7, now included in our book *Teoría del lenguaje y lingüística general,* Madrid, 1962, pp. 318-319). The same is true of certain more restricted nomenclatures (names of the months of the year and the days of the week, systems of weights and measures etc.) and also of other conventional terminologies (legal and administrative terminologies etc.) : their description and their history remain, as a rule, outside the description and history of languages as systems of significations. The graduated system of military ranks has been quoted on occasion as a typical example of a lexical field; nothing could be further from the truth : in reality we are dealing with an objective, artificial classification conventionally established by the military legislation of each country. And, naturally, the same is true of individual scientific and philosophical terminologies. It can doubtless be maintained that Aristotle, Hegel or Heidegger were able to make extensive use of the resources of the Greek and German languages respectively for their philosophical distinctions. But the distinctions in question are not semantic distinctions "of the Greek language" and "of the German language" and they can only be defined in connection with the usage of the three philosophers : what is called "the language

of Heidegger" is, from the lexicological point of view, partly the German language, partly general philosophical terminology and partly a terminology peculiar to Heidegger.

But all this is also true of popular terminologies and nomenclatures (trade terminologies, agricultural terminologies, the nomenclature "of the plough", "of the horse" etc., etc.,) and also of botanical and zoological classifications (at the level of the species) which one finds in linguistic traditions, since these too contain a traditional non-linguistic knowledge. It is true that popular classifications can differ from scientific classifications; nevertheless, they are a form of science : they are not, for example, structurations "of the French language", but classifications of popular French botany and zoology. It is known that monolingual dictionaries have difficulty in defining the terms in question, and have to resort to scientific terminology or else to descriptions and illustrations of the objects concerned. It is certain that in this case it is often difficult to separate that which is "terminological" from that which is strictly linguistic : in reality, it will not be possible to establish the precise limits except by 'structuring' explicitely in lexicology that which is 'structured' implicitly in lexis. But the important thing is to recognise that, in what is called the 'lexis' of a language, there are extensive sections which are purely "designative", and where the only "structuration" possible is enumeration, and that there are others which are 'structured', but not from the point of view of language : that there is a linguistic, *structured lexis* and a *terminological and "nomenclature" lexis*.

Doubtless it can be important to know the terminologies, above all in diachrony (etymology), since a technical term can become an everyday word and enter the semantic oppositions of language (or the reverse may be true). This is also true at the level of interpretation of texts. Similarly it is advisable to know the political and social history, the history of religions, the history of ideas and the history of material civilization, the environment and the culture of linguistic communities. Terminologies are also interesting as regards the constitution of their 'signifiants' as well as from other lexicological points of view (for example, it may be interesting to establish the degree to which technological developments have influenced the vernacular language at any given moment in the history of a language), but from the point of view of their 'signifiés', these belong to so-called 'external' linguistics : in this respect studies of terminologies and their historical development constitute, in reality, the contributions of linguistics to ethnography and the history of non-linguistic civilization. If it is to

be placed on a firm basis structural lexicology must recognise its implicit limits and leave aside terminologies and nomenclatures, reserving the right to return to these matters at a later stage in order to establish to what extent they depend upon strictly linguistic structures and reflect these structures : e.g., to what extent and in what sense sciences and philosophy have used semantic structures already in existence in languages. By leaving aside terminologies and nomenclatures, one reduces at the same time to a considerable degree what is considered to be the main "handicap" of structural lexicology, i.e. the almost unlimited number of units to be considered.

1.2. From another point of view it is necessary to distinguish knowledge of words and knowledge of things. With regard to this point, we have proposed the distinction between "linguistic zone" and "objective milieu" (Span. *ámbito*). The "zone" is the area in which a word is known and used as a linguistic sign; the "milieu" is the area in which an object (natural or otherwise, material or immaterial), is known as an element in a domain of experience or culture. A "milieu" may be more restricted than the corresponding "zone" or it may, on the other hand, include it; it may be completely outside the "zone" or it may coincide with it. These differences contribute, however, to the stylistic "resonance" of words, since, for example, any word used outside the "milieu" with which it is connected evokes this "milieu". From this point of view any word for which the "milieu" is more restricted than the "zone" (or is outside it) is "technical". Thus foreign words, used as such, for objects which are also foreign, are also "technical" words, regardless of the character they have in their language of origin (e.g., in French : *igloo, geisha, Samurai, izba, knout, samovar*, etc.) : they are related to the respective "milieux" and, moreover, they cannot be defined except in relation to these "milieux". Many badly defined connotations of words are due to this non-coincidence between "zone" and "milieu", that is to say, basically, they are due to the knowledge relationship which the speakers have with the objects designated; cf. *Determinación y entorno*, op. cit. pp. 311-313.

1.3. A third question is that of assumed associations between words, associations which, in reality, are between things and associations due to ideas and opinions concerning things. They must be carefully distinguished from genuine lexematic implications and appreciations incorporated in lexemes as distinctive characteristics (cf. C. 1.4.). Any one thing can be associated with any other thing which is always or frequently found in the same 'real' context—such as the "plough" and

the "ox" in the example given by Ch. Bally—, but this, in itself, is in no way linguistic. Similarly, it is the object "bœuf" (ox) (or its image) which gives rise to the ideas of strength, endurance etc., (and not the word *bœuf*); and it gives rise to them in the *French community* and not *in French*, as Bally says. These ideas and opinions, which may be traditional, apply precisely to "things", and not to language as such : they are a form of non-linguistic culture reflected by language. Moreover, their limits only rarely coincide with the limits of linguistic communities. On the other hand, they may be different without the 'signifiés' in question being different, or, on the contrary, identical without the 'signifiés' being so. It is by no means uncommon that in the same community the same thing should be associated with two opposite ideas, because it is thought of in two different situations. Thus, the Czech word *kos* and the Italian *merlo* denote the same bird; yet the Czechs say *to je kos* of somebody who is very cunning, whilst in Italy *è un merlo* is said most frequently of someone who is stupid, but occasionally also of someone who is cunning. Similarly, in Uruguay they say *es un caballo* of somebody who is stupid and coarse, who has no tact, who is clumsy at his job; on the contrary, in Brazil *é un cavalo* has been used for some time to describe somebody who is extremely skilful, who is a "champion" at his work; but the 'signifiés' "caballo" and "cavalo" are not different in the two countries. Inversely, the associations to which Ch. Bally draws attention are found again, for example, in Spain and in Italy, but the French 'signifié' "bœuf" is not completely identical with the 'signifiés' "buey" (Span.) and "bue" (Ital.) (e.g., when referring to meat in French one says *bœuf*, whilst in Spanish one says *vaca* and in Italian : *bue, vacca* or *manzo* according to the type).

1.4. Finally, a fourth question concerns the relationship itself between linguistic structurations and the structures of objective reality. It is often thought that subjectivity in the appreciation of things (e.g., the fact that the same thing can be "hot" for individual A and "cold" for B) or the fact that many of the structures of reality are imprecise (e.g., the fact that there are no definite limits between youth, middle age and old age) would imply subjectivity and imprecision in linguistic structurations. But this conceals an error of method and in the interpretation of the very facts which are invoked : linguistic values are conceptual values which are defined by their oppositions and their function, and not by "real" criteria and by the limits, precise or imprecise, between the phenomena of reality. First of all—and this also applies to the sciences—the

difficulty of establishing the limits between objective phenomena is not a difficulty which concerns the distinction of the corresponding concepts : on the contrary, it implies this distinction. Thus, the fact that there are no precise limits between day and night does not mean that the concepts "day" and "night" are imprecise; quite the reverse. The difficulty which arises out of objective delimitations implies that the respective concepts are perfectly clear, and that in the real state of affairs one observes the simultaneous presence of certain characteristics of day and certain charateristics of night.

Secondly, disagreements of the type : *This thing is warm. — No, it is cold* or of the type : *You are rich — No, I am poor; You are young — No, I am old* are in no way linguistic : they concern either the qualities of the things themselves (and can depend, for example, upon differences in physical sensitivity), or else opinions about things or objects and the relationships within which the objects are to be considered. Thus, they have no influence whatsoever on linguistic values, which, moreover, they presuppose. And the fact that it is easier to identify defined objects than the qualities of the objects (above all when they are relational) arises out of the nature of the things and not out of the nature of language.

Thirdly, language defines conceptually, not only that which is more or less defined from the objective point of view, but also from the point of view of "continua" (*yellow - green - blue*), relationships (*large - small*), or "continua" *and* relationships at the same time (*young - old*). It is useless, therefore, to seek to interpret linguistic structurations from the point of view of assumed structures of reality : one must start by establishing that they are not structures *of* reality but structurations *imposed on reality* by human interpretation : structures like "large", "small", "young", "old", do not exist as such in extra-linguistic reality. And the fact that they cannot be reduced to any "objective" definition, real or conventional, simply signifies that they do not involve any such definition. If, from the linguistic point of view, one cannot answer questions such as : How high must a temperature be before it is "hot"? When does old age begin?, this means that one is not dealing with distinctive characteristics peculiar to the lexemes in question.

Fourthly, linguistic distinctions have nothing to do with the precision or imprecision of real definitions (it is very possible that some semantic structurations may be *linguistically* imprecise, that is to say, badly established, but that is another question).

Thus, the objects "ladder" and "staircase" are perfectly definable in reality, but they are not distinguished linguistically in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Rumanian (*scala, escalera*) *escada, scara*). Inversely, there is no real difference between "dire" as the action of *one* subject and "dire" as a communication of content to *another* subject (the act is, in itself, the same), but Rumanian makes a strict distinction (*a zice - a spune*) : the limitation is not to be found in the "thing" but in the manner in which it is looked at. Moreover, in the sciences, too, the same things can be classified in several different ways, according to the criteria adopted, since the sciences, like language, "impose" their structurations on reality. But language is certainly not a science (although it is the necessary starting point for all science). In the sciences distinctions are "motivated" objectively, that is to say, their criteria are found in the things themselves, or they are made to coincide with objective characteristics (which may be chosen conventionally) : these are distinctions "within things". Language, on the other hand, is also "arbitrary" (that is to say, free and non-motivated from the objective point of view) so far as its semantic aspect is concerned : its distinctions may coincide with objective definitions, but this is not necessary. Thus, there is no "objective" reason why one language should distinguish *cold-tepid - warm* whilst another passes directly from "cold" to "warm" and a third distinguishes two degrees of "warm". Language *classifies* reality, but it does so in accordance with human interests and attitudes. In science the dog is classified as "carnivorous" with the lion and the tiger; and yet most languages classify him differently because the criterion is not a "natural" characteristic of the animal but a human relationship with him. It will not be surprising to find that linguistic classifications are based on criteria like : large/small (in relation to man), useful/useless, agreeable/disagreeable, dangerous/harmless. In this sense "subjectivity" is constitutive of language and is a linguistically objective fact. But one must not confuse it with subjective appreciation (individual or traditional) which is not "lexematised" (or "grammaticalised") (1).

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1. It is advisable to distinguish three types of "subjectivity" endowed with linguistic manifestation : A) a subjectivity incorporated in the lexical and grammatical systems of the language at the level of the distinctive function itself; B) a systematised but non-distinctive subjectivity outside the lexical and grammatical systems; C) a non-systematised subjectivity which is sporadic and occasional. As for subjectivity without linguistic manifestation, this exists, no doubt, but it has no interest for the linguist as such.

1.5. Yet the knowledge of things, and the ideas and opinions concerning things are not without influence on the functioning of lexis. But one must establish at what level and in what circumstances this can happen. First of all, the knowledge of things intervenes in the interpretation of compound and derived words, the defining function of which could be ambiguous (from the point of view of the system or because they contain ambiguous forms). Thus, one will normally translate the German *Strassenhändler* as "pedlar, hawker", one does not know of people who "buy and sell roads" (a possible translation from the standpoint of the system of the German language), and the element "*Stift*" in *Stiftskirche* will be translated as "foundation, convent, chapter" rather than as "peg", "pin", "nail" or "apprentice", because it is more likely that a church should be "the collegiate church" than "the nail church", "the pin or peg church" or "the apprentice church". In a more restricted milieu, for example, colloquial speech, *Wecker* will be translated as "alarm (clock)" rather than as "a person who awakens one". These determinations of the definition by "things" can lead to the 'signifié' becoming sterotyped at the level of the *standard* of language. For these same words (compound and derived) the knowledge of things intervenes constantly in translation at the systematic level; thus if one hears a sentence like : *The computer has been bought (built, broken, etc.)*, it will be understood that a machine is implied, because normally a *person* is not bought, built or broken. It is at this level that "real" contexts intervene, as far as the *probability* of words in verbal contexts is concerned : since verbal contexts express "real" contexts, there will be a reasonable probability of finding associated in the same verbal context the names of the objects "co-present" in the contexts "of things". Thus, in a text corresponding to a particular civilization, the words *plough* and *tilling* will be more likely to occur in association with the word *ox* than, for example, the words *temple* and *sacred*. This is true also of valuations and opinions concerning things : *strong as an ox, placid as an ox, heavy as an ox, patient as an ox*, etc., are probable syntagmas; but *green as an ox* is improbable, because green oxen are not known; *limpid as an ox* is improbable, because this adjective is not applied to animals; *polite as an ox, cunning (farsighted, predatory, mercenary) as an ox* are improbable, because these qualities are not attributed to oxen. Finally, a knowledge of things and the valuations and opinions regarding things are important as far as metaphorical phraseology is concerned : by virtue of these associations sayings like : *mettre la charrue devant les bœufs, mettere il carro innanzi ai buoi, il est un bœuf*

pour le travail, habló el buey y dijo mu, are in themselves more probable and more effective from the point of view of style than, for example : *mettre la charrue devant les moutons, mettere il carro innanzi ai quattordicenni, il est un canard pour le travail, habló el perro y dijo grau*. In this respect one is inclined to agree with Bally. Metaphorical sayings arise because of these associations and, furthermore, they help (as do sterotyped syntagmas) to make them traditional. In general, as regards the participation of "things" in the working of language and, consequently, in its interpretation, cf. *Determinación y entorno*, 3.2.-3.5.

2. *"Primary Language" and "Metalanguage"*

2.1. "Primary language" is language the object of which is non-linguistic reality; "metalanguage" is a language the object of which is, in its turn, a language : the "things" designated by metalanguage are elements of primary language (or, in general, of a language). Thus, *le loup a dévoré l'agneau* is primary language; *"loup" se prononce (lu)* is metalanguage. This distinction—pointed out by Saint Augustinus, developed later in the medieval doctrine of *suppositiones* and taken up by modern logic—is as important in lexicology as it is in grammar. It is often said, for example, that any "part of speech", even a morphematic word (preposition, conjunction), can act as the subject of a clause, and cases such as *le oui, le non* are described as "substantivations" of abverbs. Yet this is not true. In reality, only the substantive (noun or pronoun) can be a subject, and in the case of *le oui, le non* we are not dealing with a "substantivation" of adverbs as in Fr. *l'hier*, Span. *el aquí, el ahora*, Ital. *il domani* (furthermore, *oui* and *non* are not adverbs). What is true, however, is that *any* element of the 'signifiant' of primary language (a word, part of a word, a whole expression) can become a noun in its own right—and, consequently, a "substantive"—at the level of metalanguage ("*green* is an adjective", "*un si*", "*-ons* is an inflexional ending", "*-ment* is a suffix", "le *b*", "this *we believe that...* does not please me", etc.). Similarly, *le oui* and *le non* are the nouns in metalanguage of the expressions *oui* and *non* of primary language. This is the *metalanguage of discourse*.

2.2. It is advisable, no doubt, to establish for each language rules for the 'metalexicalisation' of 'signifiants' (since they differ, in part at least, according to the language concerned). But lexicology must make this distinction above all, in order

to exclude from its main subject the lexemes of the metalanguage of discourse. By their very nature, these remain outside all semantic structuration : they constitute unlimited nomenclatures ("*dog* is an English word", "*-lich* is a German suffix", etc., etc.), infinite series in which each element is opposed to all the others. It must be pointed out, however, that, from the diachronic point of view, elements which have arisen in the metalanguage of discourse can be adopted in primary language and can be included in the semantic oppositions of language (thus, Fr. *un sauve-qui-peut*, Span. *un distingo*, Ital. *il credo*).

2.3. The position in the case of the *metalanguage of language* is very different. Indeed, language is also a sphere of reality and experience, and as such is structured by languages. Thus, for example, *mot—parole—discours*, etc., is a metalinguistic structure of the French language; French possesses the metalinguistic opposition *langue/langage* which does not exist in German or in Russian (*Sprache, yazyk*), etc. In this sense, metalanguage is simply a sphere of the lexical structure of languages. From this same point of view, linguistics is also a metalanguage, but on a scientific level : independently of its formulation in different languages, it is a universal metalanguage, the distinctions of which do not coincide with the metalinguistic distinctions of languages. Thus, for example, in order to define the values "langue"—"parole" in French one has to examine their oppositions and their functioning in the French language (where, moreover, the semantic structure is not "langue"—"parole", since it embraces also "mot", "discours", "propos", "expression", etc.). In linguistics, on the other hand, "langue" and "parole" are defined independently of the French language, in the use which F. de Saussure makes of them or through the relationship with the reality of language itself. Certain definitions—e.g., the definitions of "mot"—are difficult in linguistics (one might even say contradictory and impossible), because one is attempting to define as terms of the universal metalanguage of linguistics, using the criteria of science (objective delimitations in the reality of "things") 'signifiés' which historically are "given" in the metalanguage of languages, and one is attempting to equate these two totally different types of structure. Yet this implies a confusion of planes of thought. The 'signifié' of the French word *"mot"* is defined in the French language (where, for example, there is a specific opposition *mot/parole* which does not exist in Italian, Spanish, Rumanian, etc.), whilst the linguistic word "mot" is defined as a "class" of

objective facts, independently of the semantic oppositions of languages. In principle, the universal "mot" of linguistics cannot be identical with the French "mot" (nor with that of any other language).

3. *Synchrony and Diachrony*

3.1. The distinction between "synchrony" and "diachrony" (or, to be more precise, between *description* and *history*) is well known in linguistics, and we shall not dwell upon it here. For details concerning all the theoretical questions which have a bearing on it we would draw the reader's attention to our work *Sincronía, diacronía e historia,* Montevideo, 1958. But there are some points concerning method which have to be stated more precisely as far as "synchronic" analysis is concerned.

3.2. The distinction in question is the first which comes to mind when considering the study of language in its historically determined forms, that is to say, in the 'ensembles' of linguistic traditions which are commonly called *languages,* and which we prefer to call *historical languages* ("French", "English", "German", etc.). These take shape (develop or "change") historically, ("diachronically") and they function "synchronically", that is to say, in relationships of simultaneity between their structures; consequently they can be studied either in their development or in the way in which they function. Thus, it is generally agreed that in order to establish ("describe") functional linguistic structures, they have to be examined at a given moment in their history, that is to say, in "synchrony" (even linguists who do not accept this distinction are unable to escape completely from its dictates). To be sure, this is also true of lexical structures. Nevertheless, the distinction between synchrony and diachrony, considered as the opposition between the working of the language and its historical development, is not simply a question of time. In this respect, it is particularly necessary to distinguish between "synchrony of structures" and "synchrony of language".

3.3. On the one hand functional structures can survive for a longer or shorter period in time, which means that their immediate synchrony goes beyond their simultaneity with other structures of language. Thus, one will find many identical lexical structures in Balzac's language and in present-day literary

French (¹). From this point of view, it is more for reasons of methodological prudence than of theoretical necessity that it is advisable to confine ones attention to a "state of language" : in order not to run the risk of attributing to the functioning of language that which belongs to change [thus, for example, *couche* also meant "bed" ("lit") in Balzac's time; similarly *boulanger le pain* is no longer used today, etc.]. The position with regard to synchrony of language is very different. To confine oneself to a given state of language is here a necessity for any connected description, not because of the frequently repeated formula "everything holds together" (which, moreover, if one applies it to historical languages is not true, and if one applies it to the internal connection of "functional languages" is, at least, open to discussion), but simply to ensure the simultaneous functioning of the structures described.

This, moreover, is the real meaning of "connected description", which does not necessarily mean the "internal arrangement of language" and, in itself, does not imply any a priori affirmation as to the nature of the internal connections of the object described. To put it quite simply, it would be pointless to mix up in the same description structures from Balzac's language (which do not exist, or which are different today) and structures from contemporary French, because this would mean that one were describing an unreal language which had never been used.

3.4. On the other hand, an historical state of language is not strictly "synchronic". Indeed, the knowledge of a language amongst those who speak it and, consequently, its working possibilities go beyond the isolated, abstract point in time. Especially in the case of languages with a great literary tradition one is always familiar with forms, constructions and oppositions which "are no longer used", but which "can be used, should the occasion arise", for example, as deliberate archaisms, or with other intentions. Thus, in French : *souvenance, val, chercher noise, nues* as opposed to *nuages, ouïr* as opposed to *entendre, ouvrer* as opposed to *travailler,* etc. And even outside literary traditions one is constantly meeting diachronic differences : one recognises the forms which speakers "still use"

1. Even if one confines oneself to "functional language" (cf. 5.1.), it is not correct to say that the *whole* language changes as one single system, and that every change modifies all the relations in this system. In actual fact, it is always partial systems which change, and their change does not affect in an immediate way the rest of the language : a partial system can change in its internal relations (between its terms) without causing its external relationships (with other partial systems) to change also. Indeed, this is what ensures the historical continuity and the very existence of language.

or that certain speakers "are beginning to use". In enquiries into dialects one often hears : "the old people still say it—the young no longer say it", or else : "that's what the young people say—we don't say it". Thus, even apart from regional differences which will be dealt with later, certain Italians, using the vernacular, make a distinction between *sentire* and *udire* (approximately like the German "fühlen"—"hören"), whilst other Italians use *sentire* exclusively : the latter consider the distinction to be "old fashioned", whilst the former some- times consider the lack of distinction to be "a regrettable innovation" (¹). Certainly, one could consider these differences as differences in the "styles of language", but this would not solve the problem, since it would, nevertheless, be a question of differentiated "styles" in the diachronic sense. The principles of analysis must, consequently, adapt themselves to the effective conditions of the state of language. Thus, it will not be said that the Italian 'signifié' "sentire" is not clear because some Italians oppose it to "udire" (furthermore, it is always a question of an inclusive opposition) and others do not : it will be recognised rather that one is dealing with two different structures co-existing in the state of language. Similarly, in literary French one structure will be worked out for "*entendre*"—"*ouïr*" and another for "*entendre*". As a rule, the description of each structure will therefore be strictly synchronic. On the other hand, the description of a state of language ("simultaneity of functional structures") will have to establish, in this case, the plurality of the "synchronies" which are implied in it, that is to say, the diachronic difference known to and used by (or useable by) the speakers. A connected and complete description implies, in this respect, that a "synchrony" selected as fundamental be described and that the other "synchronies" be recorded at the same time, that is to say, the diachronic differences co-existing in the same state of language, in all the cases in which these differences exist and function. Studies in structural diachrony often give the impression that there are abrupt transitions in a language from one structure to another : in reality, the transitions take place through the parallel coexistence in the same state of the language of diachronically "successive" structures.

1. In these cases one is always dealing with a diachrony related to a given moment in time, and, furthermore, it is not the "objective" diachrony of the historian, but the functional diachrony of the actual speakers. It is very possible that young people today say exactly what old people said fifty years ago, and vice versa. Similar oscillations are not uncommon in the history of languages. La Bruyère considered words such as *chaleureux, courtois, jovial, mensonger* as out of date, and this is not true of them today. In the same way, the Italian *sentire* in the sense of "hören" can already be found in Dante.

4. *"Technique of Discourse" and "Repeated Discourse"*

4.1. In synchrony the distinction must be made between the "technique of discourse" and "repeated discourse". "Languages" are, first and foremost, historic techniques of discourse (or of "speech"), but linguistic traditions contain far more than just the technique "of speaking" : they contain also "the already spoken", portions of 'ready-made' speech which can be used again at different levels of the concrete structuration of speech. The "technique of discourse" com- prises lexical and grammatical items (lexemes, categoremes and morphemes) and the rules for their modification and combination in the sentence, that is to say, "words" and the lexical and grammatical instruments and procedures. "Repeated discourse" comprises all that is stereotyped by tradition as "expression", "sentence" or "locution", and of which the constituent parts cannot be replaced or re-combined in accordance with the present-day rules of language. Thus, for example, "tranquille" belongs to the "technique of discours" of contemporary French. This element can be used in any combination permitted by its 'signifié', in accordance with the present-day rules of the French language : *un jeune homme tranquille, une maison tranquille, rester tranquille,* etc. On the contrary *coi* is not an element of the present-day technique of French : one can say *rester coi,* but one cannot say *un jeune homme coi, une maison coite, on est coi.* It is, consequently, an inseparable element of the expressions : *rester coi, se tenir coi,* which belong to the "repeated discourse" contained in French linguistic tradition. As explicit quotations, the items of "repeated discourse" are pieces of discourse taken up as such in new discourse. Thus they can be, in part "adaptable"; for example, in an expression such as *se moquer du tiers comme du quart* ("not to care a fig for anything or anybody") the verb can be conjugated (the fixed expression is therefore : verb "se moquer"—*du tiers et du quart*). But again, as "quota- tions" they can contain elements which are "in-comprehensible" from the point of view of present-day technique (for instance : "au *fur* et à mesure" or they can be constructed in accordance with rules which have been abolished (*sans coup férir*— "without striking a blow") and, in this sense, they are fragments of outmoded states of language, a survival of diachrony in synchrony; they can even belong, through their lexico- grammatical technique, to another "language" : cf., in verna- cular German *up ewig ungedeelt,* which is Low German, or the Latin locutions etc., used in French.

4.2. As a rule, only the manifestations of the technique of discourse can be analysed synchronically and, for this reason, the technique alone is "structurable". The different elements of stereotyped expressions are not stereotyped because they are not "commutable"; indeed, stereotyped expressions cannot be analysed, in the strict sense of the term, since they do not stand in opposition to other expressions through any part whatsoever of their constitutive elements : they have meaning, so to speak, "as a whole". Certainly no one will wish to analyse Latin or English sentences *in French*. But even if the elements of "repeated discourse" appear perfectly identifiable with elements of the "technique of discourse", grammar and structural lexicology cannot take them into account because of their non-commutability. Indeed, it cannot be said that the lexemes "chat" and "gris" are contained in the expression *la nuit tous les chats sont gris*, since its meaning cannot be deduced from the 'signifiés' of its elements and their grammatical combination (the expression does not mean that "all cats are grey during the night"). At bottom, the link between these lexemes and the expression in question is an etymological link, that is to say, diachronic (even if the etymology is evident to the speakers themselves). This becomes clear when the etymology of an expression is not obvious or when the apparently "obvious" etymology is in reality false from the historical point of view. Similarly, the lexemes "charrue" and "bœuf" are not contained in the expression *mettre la charrue devant les bœufs* in their strict sense. It is apparent, then, that the *elements* of stereotyped expressions elude all structuration, they remain outside synchronic grammar and lexicology.

4.3. This is not so in the case of *items* of "repeated discourse" as such, since these, as a whole, are partly combinable and replaceable in accordance with the rules of the "technique of discourse". In this respect it is advisable to distinguish the classes of these items, according to the extent to which they can be combined and according to the levels at which they are commutable. It seems to us, in fact, that there are three types to be distinguished, which can provisionally be called "sentence equivalents", "syntagma equivalents" and "word equivalents".

a) Certain items of "repeated discourse" (metaphorical sentences, proverbs, common sayings, maxims, "wellerisms", *refranes*) are only commutable at the level of sentences and texts, with other sentences or with whole texts. Thus, for example, *la nuit tous les chats sont gris, il y a anguille sous*

roche ("there is something in the wind"), *tant va la cruche à l'eau* (qu'à la fin elle se casse), Ital. *tanto va la gatta al lardo* (che ci lascia lo zampino), Span. *cada palo aguante su vela*. These items are, moreover, only translated at the level of sentences or texts, independently of the "transparency" of their constituent elements. They are, in reality, "texts" and fragments of texts which, when all is said and done, constitute literary documents : a form of literature (in the broad sense of the word, embracing also ideology, morals, etc.) embodied in and transmitted by linguistic tradition. Thus, "refranes" are a form of popular Spanish literature. There is no essential difference between these texts and quotations from well-known authors, apart from the fact that they are very often anonymous (but it is not unusual for them to be quotations of texts which are more or less well known, or, at least, historically identifiable). As "texts" these items are often "translated", so that they are to be found in many languages, even outside any genealogical relationship (thus, the exact equivalent of the German expression *Hier liegt der Hund begraben* is found in Rumanian : *Aici e cînele îngropat*). Thus, their study belongs, strictly speaking, to the literary sciences and to philology : linguistics cannot intrude except as an auxiliary science (e.g., with regard to the etymology of their elements). Consequently, it seems to us wrong to attribute them to lexicology. In reality they are not "lexemes" and have nothing "lexical" about them : if one were prepared to take liberties with the suffix *-eme*, they could be called "textemes" or "phrasemes". The fact that they are often recorded in language dictionaries can be justified from the practical point of view, but it is, nonetheless, a theoretical illogicality on the part of traditional lexicography. It is these items for which the general name of locutions could be reserved.

b) Other forms of "repeated discourse" are combinable within the sentence, they are commutable with syntagmas and are also interpreted at the syntagmatic level. Thus, for example, *se moquer du tiers comme du quart* can be replaced by *se moquer de tout le monde; sans coup férir* can stand in opposition to *après une dure bataille, avec de grandes difficultés*. To the same type belong : *avoir maille à partir, avoir voix au chapitre, n'être pas dans son assiette, entrer en lice, plier (ployer) sous le faix, une autre paire de manches*, etc. The term *stereotyped syntagmas* could be reserved for these items. Strictly speaking, they should not be studied in lexicology : syntagmatics should deal with them by establishing rules for their usage and their commutability with free syntagmas. But it would be necessary

to establish precise criteria to distinguish them from the third type of items.

c) This third type is formed by the items which are also combinable within the sentence, but which can be replaced by single words, which are commutable with simple words and which are understood at the strictly lexical level. Thus, for example : *sous seing privé, au fur et à mesure, en un clin d'œil, par cœur, nul est non avenu, le for intérieur, une poule mouillée, huis-clos, vis-à-vis, accorder créance*, etc.; *hacer alarde, echar en cara, a boca de jarro, hacer hincapié, sacar de quicio, ir tirando, no dar abasto*, etc. Indeed, *au fur et à mesure* is replaceable by *successivement, graduellement; une poule mouillée* can stand in opposition to *courageux; sous seing privé* can be opposed to *authentique;* the Spanish *hacer alarde, echar en cara, hacer hincapié* can be replaced by *alardear, reprochar, fundarse*, etc. These items function as lexemes and, consequently, their study belongs very definitely to lexicology; they can be called *lexical periphrases*. As far as the 'signifiant' is concerned (and here this means the etymological point of view) it can contain elements which can no longer be identified in the "technique of discourse" (*fur, vis,* even *seing*), elements which have been "falsely" identified (*non avenu*) and elements which are perfectly identifiable (*cœur,* if it is "*cor*" and not "*chorus*", *poule mouillée*), but this is of no importance in structural lexicology, since, from the point of view of content, these are complete expressions which function as lexical items, and not the elements discernible in their 'signifiants' (thus, there is no reason why dictionaries should record words which do not exist lexematically, such as *fur* or *clin*). Fundamentally, there is no difference between items of this type and forms such as *beaucoup, ajourd'hui, toujours,* in which present-day functional analysis does not recognise the words *beau, coup, jour* and *tous.*

But, as has already been said, it may be difficult to distinguish "lexical periphrases" from "stereotyped syntagmas". Commutation alone is not enough, since, in the sentence, syntagmas are often commutable with simple words, and conversely. We are inclined to consider as a "lexical paraphrase" any syntagma capable of functioning in a "lexical field" as an item in opposition to simple words. There is, however, a difference between syntagmas *able* to function as single items and those which always act in this manner (e.g., *belle-sœur, bon marché,* Ger. *kennen lernen*). One could, perhaps, distinguish the items of "repeated discourse" which are *only* commutable with syntagmas from those which are

also commutable with simple words. But it seems to us that the question cannot be decided without difficulty at the present stage in the study of structural lexicology. Provisionally, it would even be possible to bring together into a single type our two types *b*) and *c*) : the important thing for the moment is to recognise the lexical 'non-structurability' of the *elements* of "repeated discourse" and the items of the first type of this discourse.

5. *"Architecture" and "Structure" of Language*

5.1. The synchronic "technique of discourse" corresponding to a historical language is never a unitary technique. In particular, three types of internal differences can be observed in it, differences which can be more or less deep-seated : differences in geographical location or *diatopical differences;* differences between the socio-cultural strata of the linguistic community or diastratic differences; and differences between the types of expressive modality or diaphasic differences (we have adopted the first two terms from L. Flydal, "Remarques sur certains rapports entre le style et l'état de langue", *NTS* 16 (1951), pp. 240-257, and we ourselves have added the third). The more or less unitary techniques which correspond to these three types of difference (by opposition) are "local languages" and "regional languages" (*syntopical techniques*), the socio-cultural "levels" of language (*synstratic* techniques : "cultured speech", "standard speech", "popular speech", etc.) and the "styles of language" (*synphasic* techniques : "everyday speech", "solemn speech", "colloquial speech", "the speech of men", "the speech of women", etc., and, in literary language, "poetic speech", "the language of prose", etc.). But these techniques are in each case more or less homogeneous from only one point of view. That is to say, homogeneity in one sense does not imply homogeneity in the other two senses : at each point in space there will be found diastratic and diaphasic differences, for each "level of language" one will observe diatopic and diaphasic differences, and in each "style of language" there will be diatopic and diastratic differences. In this sense a historical language is never *one single* "linguistic system", but a "diasystem" : an 'ensemble' of "linguistic systems" between which there is at every stage co-existence and interference. A "technique of discourse" which is homogeneous from the three points of view, that is to say, a technique considered at a single point in space, and a single "level of language" and in a single "style of language" (a syntopic, synstratic, and synphasic technique), will be called

henceforth *functional language*. A strongly unified common language is quite close to this notion (above all as far as syntopic unity is concerned), but does not coincide with it completely.

In European languages, and probably as a general rule elsewhere, the most striking differences are the diatopic ("dialect") differences. But there are languages in which the diastratic differences are very pronounced (Persian, Japanese and Javanese) and languages in which the differences in "style of language", for the literary language, can coincide in part with diatopic differences (as in the case of the "literary dialects" of ancient Greek). As regards the diatopic differences in particular, these are recognised above all as linguistic traditions which are more or less autonomous and older than common languages ("dialects"); but such differences exist also in common languages, especially if they are used in several different countries (as in the case of French, English, German and, more especially, Spanish).

5.2. The differences in question are observed in phonology, in grammar and also in lexis (one might even say : *above all in lexis*). Thus, limiting our examples to French as a common language : *chevreton* (Auvergne) in relationship to *fromage de chèvre* (other French regions) or *petit déjeuner, déjeuner, dîner* (France) in compared with *déjeuner, dîner, souper* (Switzerland) constitute diatopic differences; *causer* or *parler—causer, laid* or *désagréable—moche, s'ennuyer—se barber, paroles* or *discours—boniments; plaisanter* or *mentir—blaguer, camarade* or *ami—copain, se vanter—crâner, protester* or *résister—rouspéter, mélancolie* or *tristesse—cafard* ("standard speech"—"popular speech") are diastratic differences; *s'enfuir* or *s'en aller—se sauver, se hâter—se dépêcher, enlever* or *ôter—ôter, début* or *commencement—commencement, infortuné* or *malheureux—malheureux, dérober* or *voler—voler* ("literary language"—"everyday language"), *s'ennuyer—s'embêter* ("everyday language"—"colloquial speech"), *mort—décédé, demeurer—être domicilié* ("everyday language"—"administrative language"), *bouche—gueule, mourir—crever* ("everyday language"—"vulgar language"), etc. are diaphasic differences. These differences can combine : *se dépêcher* (Northern French, everyday usage)—*se dévorer* (Southern French—colloquial) is a diatopic and, at the same time diaphasic difference; *crevant* ("amusant"), *filer, décamper, ficher le camp* ("se sauver"), *assommant* ("fâcheux") are examples of the "colloquial style" within "standard speech". Furthermore, differences can change their meaning according to the point of view; e.g., "popular"

forms, from the diastratic point of view, can also be "colloquial" forms, from the diaphasic point of view (thus : *copain, bouquin, cafard,* etc.).

5.3. In agreement with Flydal (art. cit. p. 244), we call the ensemble of relationships which is made up of the multiplicity of the "techniques of discourse" which co-exist in historical language : *the architecture of language*. The *structure of language*, which concerns exclusively relationships between the terms of a specific "technique of discourse" ("functional language"), must not be confused with the architecture of language. Between the terms which are "different" from the view-point of the structure of language there is *opposition;* between the terms which are "different" from the view-point of the architecture of language there is *diversity*. Thus, the fact that *ami* and *camarade* are "different" terms in standard French, (that is to say they do not mean "the same thing"), is a fact of structure, an *opposition*. On the other hand, the relationship between the terms *ami, camarade* of standard French and the term *copain* of popular (and colloquial) French is a fact of architecture of language, a *diversity* (the same is true of all the facts separated by— in the examples quoted above). In the structure of language there is, as a rule, interdependence between 'signifiant' and 'signifié' (different 'signifiant' correspond to different 'signifiés', and conversely). In the architecture of language, on the contrary, one is able to establish analogous 'signifiants' for different 'signifiés', e.g., *dîner* "Abendessen" (France)— *dîner,* "Mittagessen" (Switzerland), and analogous 'signifiés' expressed by different signifiants, e.g., "s'ennuyer" : *s'ennuyer —s'embêter—se barber*. These differences, on the other hand, are not limited to a single 'signifiant', that is to say, to the relationship *signifié—signifiant* (as happens in slang, which is usually only a parallel system of 'signifiants', in relation to the standard or popular language) : they often concern the structure itself of the 'signifié'; as will be seen in such cases as : *parler/causer—causer, paroles/discours—boniments, ami/ camarade—copain, mélancolie/tristesse—cafard, enlever/ôter— ôter, début/commencement—commencement, infortuné/malheureux —malheureux,* etc., it is the structuration itself of the contents which is different in the respective techniques, independently of the partial coincidence of expression. Strictly speaking, there is, in this respect, no essential difference between two techniques of discourse within a historical language, and two different historical languages. The difference is simply one of degree of diversity : within a historical language the

differences are less than between *this language itself* and *another historical language*, and normally they do not affect the whole phonological system, the whole grammar and the whole lexical system, but, according to individual cases, more or less extensive sections of these systems (however, between two different historical languages the differences can be less than, for example, the differences between two "dialects" of a third historical language).

Sometimes one presumes to apply the distinction "language"—"speech"—which is a distinction between "technique of discourse" and its manifestation, "discourse in action", and has nothing to do with the extension of linguistic traditions—to the internal variety of historical language (or, on the contrary, this variety is considered to be a difficulty affecting the distinction "language"—"speech"). But this is an error of method. Between *s'ennuyer* and *s'embêter, ami/camarade* and *copain, parler/causer* and *causer* alone etc., there is no difference in "speech" (manifestation of structures in discourse); there is a difference in "language", that is to say a difference in "technique of discourse". Thus, it is necessary to treat the different "techniques of discourse" of a historical language as different languages are treated, by considering them separately ([1]).

5.4. It follows that the ideal object of structural lexicology—as of any other structural description—is "functional language". Moreover, it is always a functional language which is revealed at each point in discourse (a historical language—for example "French"—cannot be converted into reality as such except in discourse : it is always manifested in the shape of one or other of the numerous functional languages of which it is comprised). But functional language has the disadvantage of never corresponding to the sum total of the discourse of any one speaker. Indeed, every speaker uses different styles of language, and, to a certain extent, knows and can give

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1. Above all, linguistic statistics leads to results which are linguistically useless, and even statistically false, because it often considers a whole historical language or a whole common language as a single "continuum". Thus, there is no sense in establishing the relative frequency of *may* as opposed to *can* in the entire English language, if the result arrived at is that *may* "can vary down to zero". In reality this means that there are at least two types of English to be distinguished : one in which the opposition *can - may* exists and in which it may be interesting to establish the proportion between the frequency of *can* and the frequency of *may* in discourse, and another type in which only *can* occurs, and in which it is absurd to establish a "proportion" between the two terms in opposition, since the opposition itself does not exist. "Zero", in this sense, is not a linguistic variable. Language is above all a system of oppositions and linguistic statistics cannot ignore this fundamental fact.

expression to techniques which are diatopically and diastratically different from his own. This does not mean, however, that structural description could be abandoned, for there is no other valid functional description. Language functions by means of oppositions, and a linguistic description cannot but be functional. Neither does this mean that one should ignore the variety of language ("structural description" certainly does not mean the "reduction" of an historical language to a single system). This simply means that every opposition must be established and described in the functional language to which it belongs, and that for each point of any sphere of language, as many descriptions must be made as there are different structures. When a "language" has to be described, it must be decided, in each case, whether its internal differentiation is such that it requires to be described as a "collection" of different languages, or if there is a reason for chosing one basic functional language and opting for a description "by layers" of all the points of its structure for which diatopic, diastratic or diaphasic differences appear in relation to the functional language chosen. Thus, when dealing with a fairly homogeneous common language (where a certain syntopic unity is assumed), one will chose within it the most general "level" (for example, "standard speech") and a fundamental "style of language" (e.g., "everyday speech"), which will be described first, and one will then describe the "diversities" in relation to this level and this style : the important thing is not to confuse the systems. And, as in the case of diachronic variety in the state of language, the differences of architecture will not be interpreted as "imprecision" of structures. The precision (or imprecision) of a structure concerns the relationships between its terms, and not its relationships "in diversity" with other structures.

6. *"System" and "Norm" of Language*

6.1. As regards the "technique of discourse" of functional language, it is important to distinguish in lexicology, as in other domains of language, four different levels : *discourse*, or the concrete manifestation of linguistic technique, and the three successive levels at which this technique itself is formalized : *norm, system* and linguistic *type*.

6.2. At the level of discourse one meets, with regard to lexical items, *lexical variants* ("meanings of words"), which may be "contextual", like variants in phonology, but also "situational", since lexis functions also in connection with non-linguistic contexts and it defines these contexts. And

it may be interesting to establish the classes of these variants. Such classes figure, moreover, at least in part, in conventional dictionaries (but the "meanings" which these dictionaries assign are not always variants : they are also items corresponding to different functional languages, to terminologies and to nomenclatures, etc.). For practical purposes (translation, the teaching of foreign languages), it would even be possible to establish classes of variants in one language corresponding to those in another language (according to the translation that the items considered require or may require). Thus, for the Italian "terra" one would establish, by comparision with Rumanian, the following classes : *a)* "region, country" *(tara)*, *b)* "the opposite of sea or, in general, of water", *terraferma (uscat)*, *c)* "world" *(lume)*, *d)* "earth, as a material" *(lut)*, and *terricaio, zolle (tarina)*, *f)* "surface underfoot" *a terra, per terra (jos, pe jos)*, *g)* other variants *(pamint)*. By comparision with German one would notice, on the contrary : *a)* "expanse of land, demarcated or not, possibly opposed to water" *(Land)*, *b)* "soil" *(Boden)*, *c)* "terrain" *(Grund)*, *d)* "world" *(Welt)*, *e)* "native land" *(Heimat)*, *f)* other variants *(Erde)*. It will be seen that only one class of variants coincides in these two cases ("world"), a class which, moreover, is not very frequent. But one can have no idea what variants could be discovered in a language by comparing it with other languages. Within one and the same language one can distinguish the classes of variants which are given by *a)* exclusive replacements (thus, in the case of "terra" : terriccio, suolo, terreno, possedimento rurale, tenuta, territorio, regione, paese, patria, etc.), by *b)* "oppositions" *(cielo, mare, acqua)* : by *c)* specific contexts *(terra e cielo, terra e mare)* and *d)* by exclusive constructions : *scendere a (in) terra*—*scendere sulla terra* (what is called "polysemy" is often only the series of variants determined by the contexts). But, in reality, it is by starting from the value of language that one establishes the classes of variants. Indeed, the operations which have just been roughly sketched are the equivalent of a structuration, however approximative, of the Italian lexical field "terra" :

cielo	mare
	acqua

TERRA				
terriccio	suolo	terreno	Possedimento ——— tenuta	territorio ——— regione ——— paese patria

And the method used, in more or less recognisable forms, is, at bottom, commutation.

On the other hand, a specific discourse (text) can be considered in itself as the object of study (and of interpretation) and, in this case, it will naturally be necessary to examine all the definitions and all the contextual relationships of the "words", including associations of all types which function in the text under review. In this sense, the lexicology of discourse is only one aspect of the "linguistics of a text" ("stylistics of speech" or, to be more exact, "semantic criticism", such as it has been defined and based on concrete research by A. Pagliaro). A whole series of associative types which one would sometimes like to consider in lexicology do not belong to "words" as lexical units, but to "words" as sections of texts, that is to say, simply to texts.

6.3. At the level of linguistic type, classes of lexical oppositions and distinctions will be observed which are peculiar to or preferred by a particular language, e.g. : preference for the substantive structuration of reality, with relatively few verbs (Persian), or, on the contrary, preference for verbal structuration, with many definitions concerning verbs and many derivatives based on verbs (classical Greek, German); preference for compound words or for syntagmatic definition (cf., German *Haupt-, Grund-, Lieblings-*, French : *principal, fondamental, favori*); lexical "regularity" or "irregularity" as regards the relationship 'signifiant'—'signifié' in connections concerning "development" and "derivation", etc.

6.4. But the distinction which seems to us essential in structural lexicology is that between *system* and *norm* of language. The *norm* includes all that which is not necessarily functional (distinctive) in the "technique of discours", but

which is nevertheless stereotyped traditionally (socially), which is common and current usage in the linguistic community. The system, on the other hand, embraces everything which is objectively functional (distinctive). The norm corresponds, more or less, to language as a "social institution"; system is language as an ensemble of distinctive functions (oppositional structures). As a corollary, norm is a formalized ensemble of traditional actualizations; it includes that which "exists" already, that which has been actualized in linguistic tradition; system, on the other hand, is an ensemble of possible actualizations : it also embraces that which has not been actualized, but which is virtually in existence, that which is "possible", that is to say, that which can be created in accordance with the functional rules of the language. For further details, see our work *Sistema, norma y habla, Montevideo*, 1952 (and *Teoría del lenguaje*, quoted above, pp. 11-113).

6.5. The problem of the lexical system will be dealt with later. For the moment, we would like to deal with certain aspects of the norm which seem to us important in lexicology.

a) The "actual" existence or non-existence of a possible lexical item from the point of view of system is, according to what has been said above, a question concerning the norm. Some years ago it was possible to say (and we ourselves heard it) : "the term *notional* does not exist in French; it is not in Larousse" (ordinary dictionaries are, in this respect, registers, at times belated, of the norm). But this was only true from the standpoint of the *norm* of French; in the system, the term "notional" was virtually in existence ("possible") : indeed, it was created as soon as it became necessary (and the latest editions of Larousse record it). In this sense, it can certainly be said that all the compound and derived words admitted by the system are virtually in existence in the "technique of discourse"; cf. *Sistema, norma y habla*, V, 4 and N.D. Arutyunova, *Ocherki po slovo-obrazovaniyu v sovremennom ispanskom yazyke*, Moscow, 1961, p. 31 and seq. Thus, it will not be surprising to find that certain developments and derivations "skip", as it were, a stage, that is to say that an existing term implies another term "non-existent" in the language : these are cases where a possibility of the system has been utilised without its being created in the norm. Thus, Lat. *barbatus* implies by its content a verb *barbare*, which, to our knowledge, has never been created. B. Pottier, *Systématique des éléments de relation*, Paris, 1962, p. 98, points out as possible in French a verb *défauteuiller*; but it would also be possible to create *défauteuille-ment* without creating the verb *défauteuiller*. Similarly, it

will be observed that the 'archilexemes' assumed by the structure of certain lexical fields do not exist as "words" in the norm. It is necessary to observe, however that there are languages in which it will be seen that the system "predominates" (Turkish, Hungarian) and others in which the norm is dominant : as, for example, the Romance languages, and in particular French where the norm is often imperative and where it is not customary to create frequently that which would be possible in the system.

b) The norm oftens intervenes to limit and fossilize 'signifiés' given by the system. Sometimes this petrification can be almost total. Thus, it is in accordance with the norm that *Hauptstadt, Hauptmann* mean "capital city" and "captain" (in the German 'system' they would mean : "principal town", "principal man"). Similarly, there is no 'systematic' reason why German, English (Ger. *das Deutsche, das Englische*) should be understood in the first place as meaning "the German language", "the English language" (compare : le beau, le vrai, *das Schöne, das Wahre*) : they are "non-variants of norm" (whilst still being "variants" from the point of view of the system).

c) The relative frequency of choice between "synonyms" (terms in neutralizable opposition) is also a fact of norm. Thus, German *aufmachen—öffnen, zumachen—schliessen* are interchangeable in most contexts, but *aufmachen, zumachen* are preferred by the norm.

d) "Lexical clichés" also belong to the norm, i.e., lexical syntagmas traditionally sterotyped but not justifiable by a distinctive necessity (the "combinations consacrated by usage" mentioned by Ch. Bally, *Traité de stylistique française*, I, p. 73). Thus, for example : *chemin de fer—voie ferrée* (but not the opposite), *un gros chagrin—une grande douleur—de graves soucis, désirer ardemment—aimer éperdument, gravement malade—grièvement blessé, une grosse boule—une grande sphère, heurter de front—cogner à la porte*, etc. In different languages one will find, for example, with reference to this point : Fr. *danger de mort*, Ital. *pericolo di morte*, but Ger. *Lebensgefahr*.

e) One fact of the norm which is particularly remarkable is the preference for the use of certain 'signifiés' in certain circumstances. This is also a traditional "petrification" of lexemes, but it is a petrification which concerns designation and not significance (however it can lead to changes of 'signifiés' in diachrony). Thus, the Uruguayans, speaking of their own country, often use the word "patria" in circumstances where, in other Spanish speaking regions, one would be more likely

to say *estado, nación, tierra, país*, etc. (even, for example, *las carreteras de la patria*), but it is precisely with the 'signifié' "patria" that they use it (when speaking of another country they naturally say *país, estado, tierra* etc.). Similarly, they often say in Uruguay *crimen* for "error", "stupidity", "improper conduct", but the 'signifié' implied is precisely "crimen" (and it is from this fact that this usage derives its "stylistic" value). In the same sense *demoiselle* does not mean "daughter" ("Tochter") in popular French. It is simply that one uses the 'signifié' "demoiselle" to designate the daughter of the person to whom one is speaking : between standard French and popular French there is, in this respect, a difference in the usage of the designation. These preferences are particularly important since they reflect social, political, cultural and other attitudes of linguistic communities : thus, at a certain level of generality of these facts will be found Monsieur Matoré's "key-words".

f) Finally, the degree of real utilization of the distinctions existing in a language is also an extremely important fact of the norm. Thus, the exact equivalents of the Rumanian *cuscru* and *guturaiu* are in Italian : *consuocero* and *corizza* (*coriza*), but *cuscru* and *guturaiu* in Rumanian are colloquial words, whilst in Italian *consuocero* is a rare word and *corizza* is even more so (for the Rumanian *am guturaiu* one will find in Italian : *ho il raffreddore di naso, mi cola il naso*, or just : *sono raffreddato*); "moment" in German is *Augenblick*, but for the French *un moment*, Ital. and Span. : *un momento* one will find in many contexts in German the adverbial determination *geschwind* ("quickly"); cf. also the relationship between Ger. *Rinder* and Fr. *bovins*. To these facts are linked the preferences concerning the verbal categories in which lexemes are expressed, preferences which can be more or less general in a language (e.g. "tendency towards substantivisation"), and at the same time specific for each particular case. Thus, for the Rumanian *fierbinte* (adj.) one will find in many contexts Fr. (*ça*) *brûle*, Ital. *scotta, brucia* (and not *brûlant, scottante, bruciante*); Span. *verdadero* corresponds to the French *vrai*, Ital *vero*, but *es verdadero* (for *c'est vrai, é vero*) is not said in Spanish : one says *es verdad* (or *es cierto*); for the German *es ist glatt*, one often finds in French *on glisse* (*ça glisse*), Ital. *si scivola;* for the French *certainement*, Ital. *certamente*, one will find in many contexts, Span. *con seguridad,* Port. *com certeza*, etc. In general, a language cannot be spoken with the system alone : it is necessary to know also the norms of application, according to the situations and the contexts.

Our enumeration is not complete, but what has been said is

sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the necessity for a lexicology of the *norm*, alongside the lexicology of the *system*. Moreover, the lexicology of the norm is partly represented by certain recent, non-structural ("configurative") lexicologies, in the first place by that of Matoré, as well as by certain aspects of "comparative stylistics".

7. *Relationships of "Significance" and Relationships of "Designation"*

7.1. These two types of relationships must be carefully distinguished in lexicology. Relationships of "significance" are relationships between the 'signifiés' of the linguistic signs (*a*) : relationships of "designation" are relationships between linguistic signs and "objects" (the "reality" to which they refer and which they "represent" in discourse), (*b*) :


As a rule, only relationships of significance are structurable; relationships of designation are not. The concrete designation (of a specific object) is a fact of "discourse", whilst the significance is a fact of "language" (technique of discourse). Thus, relationships of significance are constant (from the synchronic point of view), whilst relationships of concrete designation are inconstant (variable). Moreover, designation can be metaphorical, whilst significance is not, from the synchronic and distinctive points of view (it can be metaphorical from the etymological point of view and, consequently, in the "associative" sense, if etymology, true or false, is present in the minds of the speakers).

7.2. Indeed, the same object can be placed in several different classes, and consequently, it can be named (designated) by all the signs corresponding to these classes : this is *multiple designation*. Furthermore, it can occasionally be designated by signs which do not correspond to any of the classes in which

it is placed : this is *metaphorical designation.* Thus the same object X can be classed as "book", "work", "treatise", "thesis", "volume", etc. and, consequently, named by any one of the respective signs (multiple designation); if, on the other hand, this same object is described in French as "fleuve", "incendie", "calamité", etc., then we are dealing with a metaphorical designation. Multiple designation must not be confused with the "neutralization" of 'signifiés', which is a fact of significance. In neutralization, only the distinctive characteristics common to the neutral term and to the marked term (or marked terms if there are several of them) remain relevant; thus, if *day* is used for "day" + "night" only the distinctive characteristics of this sum remain relevant; on the other hand, in multiple designation, as in metaphorical designation, each term retains its own distinctive characteristics (*book* means "book", *work* means "work" and *river* (*fleuve*) means "river", etc.). This is seen clearly in cases where the terms used in the designation have no immediate significative relationships : no one will say that there is neutralization between *soldier, locksmith, cousin,* etc., simply because the same individual can be, at the same time, soldier, locksmith and the cousin of somebody.

7.3. The relationship between a sign and the class of objects it designates (independently of the interference of classes), can be called *designation of language,* e.g., the relationship between *book* and books, *work* and works, etc. But even in this case it is necessary to distinguish between designation and significance, since the linguistic 'signifiés' do not coincide with the classes of *designata.* Thus, Greek : *brotos* and *anthropos* designate the same class of objects (men), but they do no mean the "same thing" : *brotos* means "man as a mortal being", *anthropos* means "man as a non-animal". Similarly, Rumanian *a zice* and *a spune* designate the same class of facts (the actions of saying), but *a zice* means "the action of saying as such", whilst *a spune* means "the action of saying as communication" (In Rumanian one says : *X zice cà...,* "X says that...", but but *X îmi spune cà...,* "X tells me that..."). It could be said that in these cases there is coincidence of classes, a fact well known in logic. From the linguistic point of view, however, there is no identity between *anthropos* and *brotos, a spune* and *a zice : anthropos* and *a spune* can replace *brotos* and *a zice,* but the contrary is not true. That is to say, the relationships of significance are, in these cases, exactly the same as in the cases where there is no coincidence in designation : "anthropos" includes "brotos" and "a spune" includes "a zice" in exactly the same way as "day" includes "night" ("day" + "nuit"

= "day") and the Italian "figlio" includes "figlia" (figlio + figlia = "figli") :

anthropos	brotos

a spune	a zice

day	night

figlio	figla

All this is true also of different languages. In the comparison of languages care must be taken not to deduce an identity of significance from identity in designation, even if this be total. Sh. Hattori (*For Roman Jakobson*, The Hague, 1956, p. 210) has shown, for example, that the Japanese *me* and the Mongolian *nüdä*, whilst both designating the eye, have not the same 'signifié' : the Japanese classifies the eye as 'surface', whilst the Mongolian word classifies it as 'volume' and this comes out at the syntagmatic level (interdependence of certain adjectives). And facts of this kind are by no means uncommon in languages.

D — SUMMARY

1. *The Three Structurations of Lexis*

1.1. Lexical items being items with two sides (expression and content), their relationships admit, as a rule, three different structurations : *a)* of expression alone; *b)* of expression and content at the same time; *c)* of content alone.

1.2. A structuration of lexical expression is possible in several respects; cf. our article *Pour une sémantique diachronique,* TLL, II, 1, pp. 165-166. But structures of expression correspond to 'signifiants' in general rather than to the 'signifiants' of lexemes. There are languages where the lexical structure of the 'signifiant' can be separated from the rest of the expression; in other languages this is not possible (one can, however, establish the degree and the modalities of the material, lexico-morphematic fusion).

1.3. A parallel structuration of expression and content is possible to the extent to which lexis is materially "regular" (analogical), for example, in the domain of "derivation". One can, indeed, establish derivative types which are homogeneous

from both points of view : K. Baldinger's "semantic niches". Thus the names of fruit trees constitute in French a "semantic niche" (*pommier, poirier*), in relation to the names of fruits (*pomme, poire*). But analogical parallelism is not so general in lexis as it is in grammar; cf. *Pour une sémantique diachronique*, pp. 166-168. On the other hand, what is called "derivation", from the point of view of the 'signifiant', corresponds to very different phenomena from the point of view of content (modification, development, derivation) and, in their turn, these phenomena have only partially a constant expression.

1.4. A coherent structuration of lexis is, on the other hand, possible, with regard to relationships of content. In this respect one can distinguish, at least provisionally, five types of "structures" : lexical field, modification, development, derivation, and interdependence. The first type is "oppositional" (based on the diversity of the lexemes involved); the other types are "relational" (these are based on the identity, total or partial, of the lexemes involved). The first three types constitute the paradigmatic element of lexis; the last two constitute the syntagmatic element. We call these five types of structures *lexematic structures*. To these structures are added the grammatical determinations embodied in the lexemes (gender, number, person, aspect, transitiveness, etc.).

2. *Lexematic Structures*

2.1. *Lexical Fields*

2.1.1. A lexical field is an ensemble of lexemes linked by a common lexical value (value of the field), which they subdivide into more definite values by mutual opposition in the form of minimal lexical differences of content ("*distinctive lexematic characteristics*" or "*sèmes*"). For example, "froid" —"tiède"—"chaud"—"brûlant" is a French lexical field. The relationships between the terms within the field are analogous to the relationships of the phonemes in the vocalic or consonantal system. A field is often represented by an "archilexematic word" corresponding to its unitary value, but this is not essential to the existence of the field. Fields admit of several degrees of structuration, in the sense that a field of a certain degree can be integrated as a unit into a field of a higher degree. Values of a very general order, functioning in a series of fields (e.g., "animate", "inanimate", "person", "animal"), can be called *classèmes*, a term proposed by B. Pottier.

2.1.2. Several problems arise in the case of "classèmes". In the first place, a "classème" which functions as a *determinatum* in certain lexemes can function as a determining semanteme in other lexemes : thus, the classème "person" of the Latin "miles", "consul", "sator", "magister", etc., functions as a semanteme in the adjective "senex" ("old, for persons"). And so : at what degree of generality does an archilexeme become a "classème"? How are "classèmes" to be distinguished from grammatical determinations embodied in lexemes?

2.1.3. Other problems arise concerning the grammatical determinations themselves. They do not seem to be identical with the grammatical categories to which they correspond. Thus, the German "Mensch" is masculine in grammar and a "neuter" (un-marked) term from the lexical point of view, whilst "Mann" is masculine from both points of view; German "Weib" and "Mädchen" are neuter in grammar, but they are feminine in lexis; the lexical gender functions also in verbs (Latin, "nubor", Ital. "maritarsi", Ruman. "a se însura", "a se marita") and it is even present in languages which do not use the notion of grammatical gender (e.g., Hungarian).

2.1.4. Analogies between lexical structures and phonological structures : cf. *Pour une sémantique diachronique*, pp. 150-155.

2.1.5. Differences between lexical structures and phonological structures. There are several of these : the main ones are that in lexis there are neutralisations ("archilexemes") at very high levels of structure and that archilexemes often intersect.

2.1.6. General characteristics of fields :

a) Lexical fields are not necessarily "exhausted" by their subdivisions : a more or less large part can be left to archilexemes.

b) There is often interference between lexical fields; they do not represent a single, homogeneous classification made up of "discreet" classes, but many classifications based on different criteria.

c) Lexical fields are not fields of objects. Discussion in this connection of the French field "siège" (seat) structured by B. Pottier.

d) Lexical fields do not coincide with "conceptual fields" (these may also be terminological fields).

e) Lexical fields are not associative fields : they are in fact the opposite (lexical fields are "centripetal", in relation to "words" associative fields are "centrifugal").

2.1.7. "Signifié" and "meaning" (semantic orientation) of lexical fields.

2.1.8. Differences between languages as far as fields are concerned.

a) Languages do not structure the same "realities" (cf. Ger. "tief"/"seicht", Fr. "profond"—*peu profond, non profoud*);

b) the delimitations of the same "realities" are different (cf. Fr. "fleuve"—"rivière"—"ruisseau", Ger. "Fluss"—"Bach")

c) the principles themselves of structuration and delimitation are often different in different languages [(cf. Fr. "jouer" (du violon), Ital. "suonare" (il violino), Span. "tocar" (el violín)].

Discussion in this connection of the periphrastic possibilities : lexicalised and non lexicalised periphrases.

2.2. *Modifications*

2.2.1. Modification (or "homogeneous derivation") is a complementary determination of a whole lexeme; relationships of modification have, consequently, the formula : "lexeme A" —"lexeme A" + "det." (e.g. "voir"—"revoir"—"prévoir", etc.; "maison"—"maisonnette").

This relationship is analogous to the relationship between a phoneme and the same phoneme modified by a 'prosodeme'.

2.2.2. The 'signifiés' of modifiers are distinguished from the distinctive characteristics of lexemes in that they can be added to all the lexemes of a field and, at the same time, they go outside the limits of fields. Nevertheless, modifications can function as ulterior subdivisions within a field; thus, Ger. "hinfallen", "ausfallen", "wegfallen", "entfallen", etc. are subdivisions of "fallen".

2.2.3. The nature—lexical and grammatical—of modifications has yet to be established. It is true that a language can structure by means of modifications that which another language structures by means of lexemes (which may possibly function in different fields), but this also happens in the case of the relationships between grammar and lexis of different languages.

2.3. *Developments*

2.3.1. Development is the relationship between identical lexemes expressed by different verbal categories; its formula is, consequently, "lexeme A + Verb"—"lexeme A + Adjective"—"lexeme A + Adverb" (not necessarily in this order); for example, Span. "blanco"—"blancura"—"blanquear"— "blancamente".

2.3.2. There are two types of development : *conversion* and *transposition*. It is here that one finds one of the clearest

examples of G. Guillaume's theory of "tensions" : "conversion" is a development in "tension" without semantic graduation (generalisation) (e.g. Span. "bello"—"lo bello", "leer"—"el leer"); transposition is a development in "tension II", with semantic graduation (generalisation) (e.g. Ger. "Freund"—X— "Freundschaft", "Freundlich"—"Freundschaftlich", "Freundlichkeit"). It seems that "conversion" can only be substantive, and this is in keeping with the fact that it belongs to "tension I". From the logical point of view "transposition" precedes "conversion" : for each stage in transposition there can be conversion (e.g. "Freundlich"—"das Freundliche", "Freundschaftlich"—"das Freundschaftliche"), but a "convert" is not "transposable". Furthermore, transposition can be combined with grammatical determinations.

2.3.3. Transposition is an "orientated" relationship, in one direction, a fact which can manifest itself in discourse (and in the norm of language); cf. Span. "verdad"—"verdadero", but "falso"—"falsedad", consequently : *es verdad*, but *es falso* (not "*es verdadero*", "*es falsedad*). The meaning of transposition can easily be established when it is indicated in the 'signifiant' ("nation"—"national"—"nationality"—"nationalize"—"nationalization"); it is not so easily established when it is not marked or when the different items which have been transposed do not coincide from the material point of view. For example in a case such as :

mourir mort (S)   mortalité[1] (e.g. *tables de mortalité*)
mortel mort (Adj)
       mortel[1]   mortalité[2] (e.g. *la mortalité de l'homme*)
       tuer   mortel[2]—(mortalité[3])

Is one to suppose : "mourir"—"mort" or "mort"—"mourir"? An objective method would be necessary in this respect. In any case it is clear that it is necessary to distinguish "mortel"[1] ("qui peut mourir") from "mortel"[2] ("qui peut faire mourir"), and also "mortalité"[1] from "mortalité"[2] (and from the rare "mortalité"[3]).

2.3.4. The different successive degrees of transposition can be given the name *transpositive series* and to the transposed items of each degree that of *transpositive order*. It is not necessary for each degree in a series to be effectively 'actualized' by a "word" existing in the language : Ger. "Freundschaft" and "Freundlich" presuppose an anterior adjective which does not exist in the German norm.

2.3.5. Developments are purely categorial; consequently they belong to grammar and not to lexicology. Thus it would

be possible, in principle, to establish lexical fields with lexemes not having categorial determination (the different categorial "strata" being parallel fields). Yet, in practice, lexicology cannot ignore developments.

Indeed, languages distribute their lexis unequally in the different categorial "strata" and one category is primary for each aspect of reality which is lexematically structured, a fact which leads to profound differences at the syntagmatic level. Furthermore, the semantic graduation of the items transposed means that they are not perfectly identical as far as their lexical content is concerned: thus, the Italian "giornata d'inverno" does not mean the same thing as "giornata invernale". It is from this point of view, too, that one becomes aware of internal "gaps" in languages (gaps in one categorial stratum as compared with another).

2.4. *Derivation*

2.4.1. Derivation (from the point of view of the relationship 'signifiant'—'signifié': "heterogeneous derivation") is a combination of two lexemes (normally belonging to different fields), of which one (the one which presents itself in the 'signifiant') determines the other (the one which in the 'signifiant' is represented by the derivative suffix or by nothing at all). The formula of relationships of derivation is, consequently: "lexeme A"—"lexeme B + lexeme A". "Lexeme B" can be an archilexeme of a very general nature e.g. "agent" (Ger. "lesen"—"Leser"), or it may be an archilexeme (or a lexeme) of a particular field, e.g., "arbre", "marchand" ("pomme" —"pommier", Span. "leche"—"lechero"). Lexeme A itself may be a derivative (Span. "lechero"—lechería").

2.4.2. "Derived words" are, thus, syntagmas of content, and are synthetic in expression: from the lexematic point of view these are, at bottom, facts of expression. From this point of view, what is called "composition" is often only a derivation made explicit or, to put it more precisely, a syntagmatic synthesis of a lower degree than that of derivation; cf. Ger. *Händler* and *Handelsmann, Lehrer* and *Lehrkraft, Wächter* and *Wachmann;* Fr. orange (colour) (derivation by a zero suffix), Rumanian *Portocaliu,* German. *orangenfarbig.* The study of derivation and of composition belongs, consequently, to syntagmatics.

2.5. *Interdependence*

2.5.1. Interdependence is the relationship between two lexemes (belonging to different fields) of which one is embodied, partly or wholly, in the other, as a *distinctive characteristic*

(seme). We distinguish three types of "interdependence": *affinity, selection* and *implication.*

2.5.2. In affinity the classeme of the first lexeme functions as a distinctive characteristic in the second. Formula "A (classeme a + semes)"—"B (x + semes a). For ex., "miles" —"senex" (the classeme "person" of "miles" functions as a distinctive trait in "senex").

2.5.3. In selection it is the archilexeme of the first lexeme which functions as a distinctive characteristic in the second. Formula: "A (archiléxeme X + semes)"—"B (x + seme x)". For example, Ger. "Schiff"—"fahren" (the archilexeme "vehicle" of "Schiff" functions as a distinctive characteristic in "fahren").

2.5.4. In implication it is the whole of the first lexeme which functions as a distinctive trait in the second. Formula: "Lexeme A"—"B (x + seme A)". E.g., Ital. "cavallo"— "baio" (the lexeme "cavallo" functions as a distinctive trait in "baio": indeed, *baio* is only said of horses).

2.5.5. Lexematic interdependence manifests itself in the relationships of syntagmatic interdependence of "words" which express lexemes. In this respect, semantic interdependence must be carefully separated from "lexical clichés" of norm (cf. 2.6.5.) and interdependence determined by a knowledge of "things" (cf. 2.1.5.). Doubtless *blue* is less probable than *white* as a syntagmatic determination of *horse,* but this is not a fact of language: it is a fact which concerns horses (indeed, it is identical in all communities which do not know blue horses); on the other hand, *alezan* implies linguistically "horse", even if the horse itself is not in the context.

3. *Method*

The structural analysis of lexis must be based on strictly objective criteria of "linguistic form" ('signifiants' and their functioning). The two methods in this connection are commutation and the distributional method. Commutation can be used without distribution, but not conversely. Distribution is particularly revealing with regard to "interdependence" and thus serves, to establish classemes and archilexemes; but it is quite useless in many other cases. Commutation is not applicable to certain lexemes which seem to be organised right down at the level of distinctive characteristics (e.g. terms of colour); in general it has no meaning in relation to anything pertaining to elementary

nomenclature : here direct reference to the "things" designated seems indispensable.

4. *Teaching*

The principles concerning the teaching of vocabulary are those which flow from our "preliminary distinctions" and from the theory of lexical structure.

PREPARED INTERVENTIONS ON MR. COSERIU'S REPORT

A — Mr. BALDINGER

About ten of our colleagues would like to speak on Monsieur Coseriu's report, I shall try, therefore, to be very brief. Instead of wasting time on the compliments which Monsieur Coseriu' so richly deserves, I should like to single out three questions from among the numerous problems that ought to be discussed.

1. *Structurations of lexis*

Monsieur Coseriu distinguishes between three different structurations of lexis : (*a*) of expression alone, (*b*) of expression and content at the same time, (*c*) of content alone. This fundamental distinction is logical and obvious, 'lexical units being two-sided units'. On the level of content he distinguishes five types of structures.

oppositional type	lexical field modification development	paradigmatic element of lexis
relational types	derivation interdependence	syntagmatic element of lexis.

Let us first take the *lexical field*. By the very definition ("a lexical field is an ensemble of lexemes united by a common lexical value") Monsieur Coseriu seems to want to exclude what I call the *semasiological field*. Furthermore, the lexical field seems to correspond to what I call the *onomasiological field*.

His 'common lexical value' or 'value of the field' seems to correspond to what I call the concept. Moreover Monsieur Coseriu does not seem to distinguish clearly, either in this very brief account or in his more detailed work "Pour une sémantique diachronique structurale", between the lexical field strictly speaking (or onomasiological field) and what I should call the conceptual field (Monsieur Coseriu D. 2.1.6d. makes another distinction between lexical fields and conceptual fields). I shall explain by proposing to you a classification of structurations as I see it. My starting point is Mr. Ullmann's triangle criticised by Monsieur Coseriu in his "Sémantique diachronique" because this triangle aims at the relationship