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***Semanticity, Alterity, Creativity:
Building on Eugenio Coseriu's Legacy
(I)***

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***Semanticity, Alterity,
Creativity:***

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Table of Contents

Opening Statement

Emma TĂMĂIANU-MORITA Coseriu 100, 50, 20 – What Numbers Count (for) in a Life in Science.....	11
---	-----------

Proemial Study

Ana AGUD The Need And Paradoxes of Integral Linguistics.....	25
--	-----------

ARTICLES

I. Towards an Integral Study of Languages: Theoretical and Contrastive Perspectives

Giovanni GOBBER On Eugenio Coseriu's Theory of Word Formation.....	55
Keita IKARASHI, Ryohei NAYA An Integral Linguistic View on the Lexical Integrity Principle and its Exceptions: A Case Study of Japanese Phrasal Compounds.....	67
Michelle Denise RODRÍGUEZ CHIW ¿Qué elementos integran el concepto de norma en lingüística? Una extensión teórica del concepto coseriano de norma.....	104

Vincenzo ORIOLES	
Coseriu in chiave metalinguistica.....	118
Cristina VARGA	
Eugenio Coseriu: Insights on Terminology.....	136

II. Towards an Integral Study of Text and Discourse: Developments on Coserian Bases

Clemilton Lopes PINHEIRO, Juzelly Fernandes Barreto MOREIRA	
Surrounding Field (<i>los entornos</i>), Meaning and Multimodality: Possibilities of Eugenio Coseriu’s Text Linguistics.....	159
Lolita ZAGAEVSCHI CORNELIUS	
Some Textual Functions of Metaphors in the Novel <i>Luntrea lui Caron</i> by Lucian Blaga.....	181

III. History and Epistemology of Integral Linguistics

Marina KOSSARIK	
Precursores de Coseriu: contribución de B. de Aldrete a la filología románica	201
Araceli LÓPEZ SERENA	
On the Philosophical-Scientific Edifice of Coserian Linguistic Theory. An Epistemological Analysis of “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar”.....	229

Cristian PAȘCALĂU A Matter of Principle concerning Integral Linguistics: Man as a Cultural Being.....	257
---	------------

Book Reviews and Performance Presentations

Maria GRAJDIAN Exploring Hybridity: Kanno Yôko, Takarazuka Revue and the Subversive Dynamics of (Soft) Power in Late- Modern Japan.....	289
---	------------

<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	303
------------------------------------	------------

<i>Index of Keywords, Topics and Topic-Related Subjects</i>	313
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Opening Statement

Coseriu 100, 50, 20 – What Numbers Count (for) in a Life in Science

Emma TĂMĂIANU-MORITA
Kindai University, Osaka, Japan

1. Eugenio Coseriu (1921-2002) emerged in full force on the international scene in 1958 with a work that was to set the blueprint for the purport and overarching themes of his life-long scientific endeavors: *Sincronía, diacronía e historia. El problema del cambio lingüístico*. Katsuhiko Tanaka, one of the co-translators of the first Japanese edition (1981), himself a reputed linguist, points out in his explanatory study that this book is to be viewed not merely as a work in the field of linguistics, but rather as “an efficient weapon that enables one to deepen one’s own reflection on the fundamental issues of man, language, society and culture” (Tanaka 1981: 243¹). Tanaka and the other co-translator, Takashi Kamei, who was the first to propose the idea that Coseriu needs to be considered “a linguist of/for the 21st century”, converge in assessing the Coserian paradigm as a theoretical outlook truly ahead of its time, whose genuine reception and full development can only be effected under the aegis of a future century.

Anniversaries and commemorations inevitably prompt us to assess the lives of people in terms of numbers: not the mere quantitative gauges proffered in the guise of ‘absolute’ objectivity, but the numbers that we endow with symbolic values, in the hope that trends, paths and meanings higher than the individuals concerned will thus emerge. Fully aware that such an enterprise is

¹ All the translations from the Japanese originals are mine – E.T.-M.

nothing more than an exercise in rhetoric, let us indulge for a moment in this game of numbers, applied to the destiny of one Eugenio Coseriu, linguist by profession and *profession de foi*, born on July 27, 1921 in Mihăileni, Bessarabia (Romania), and deceased on September 7, 2002 in Tübingen, Germany.

In keeping with the fondness for threefold configurations found in Coseriu's own epistemic outlook, the following numerical triad comes to mind: 100 – 20 – 50:

- 100 years from Coseriu's birth (marked in many countries around the world by conferences and publications², such the one we now bring to the reader's attention);
- 20 years since Coseriu's death (strictly speaking, 19, but the reader will forgive the rounding up for the sake of stylistic effect);
- 50 years after Coseriu's death prophesized by Takashi Kamei as necessary for a full understanding of the true scope and far-reaching implications that Coseriu's theoretical outlook has for the entire field of the humanities.

Let us explain the last member of this numerical triad. Just before 1981, elaborating his "Translator's notes" to the Japanese edition, Takashi Kamei ventures the following prediction:

Coseriu might be a Copernicus for the linguistics of the 20th century [...] Nevertheless, Coseriu's authentic evaluation will have to come from future generations; it is obvious that it does not lie within our powers today. If we were to name a few linguists who are representative for the 20th century –

² A constantly updated map of such scientific events has been created by Johannes Kabatek and his team from the University of Zürich, and can be found at the link <https://coseriu100.info/map-coseriu100/>

although this also depends on personal preferences – then I would have to say that Coseriu, who will only reach the age of 60 in 1981 (unlike Jakobson, already much older, or Benveniste or Kuryłowicz, already passed away) is *not* a linguist representative for the 20th century. Such is the extent to which 20th-century linguistics is ‘a-historical’ (*ahistorisch*)! [...] If we ask ourselves *who* pondered truly in depth, from a philosophical and historical perspective, on the grounding principles of the inextricable relation between *language* and the *human being*, then would not today’s mainstream linguistics appear as one in which these foundations are not sought for by *anyone at all*?! To this very day Schleicher’s ghost still haunts every corner of the world. *Linguistica in absentia hominis*! Albeit in a different way from Schuchardt’s destiny, Coseriu may also appear to be a kind of marginalized heretic. Considering that it took almost half a century after Saussure’s death for his status as an unfaltering Olympus of linguistics to be established, then it may be that only the 21st century will see the day when Coseriu will be genuinely revered by all, as a giant, bright star surpassing Saussure, brought forth by our times. (Kamei 1981: 247-248; emphasis in the original)

Read in its full context, it becomes evident that Kamei’s prediction, later abridged in numerous European publications through the formula “Coseriu as a linguist *for* the 21st century”, is not intended as an encomiastic ode glossing on how much the scientific world has gained from the advent of Coseriu’s theory. Rather, it has the ring of a stark warning as to how much the scientific world stands to lose *if* Coseriu’s theory fails to be properly understood, re-valued and then assigned the place it deserves on the productive scene of linguistic research, both now and in the decades to come.

Besides the vast differences in philosophical foundations, theoretical framework and methodological point of focus between Coseriu's linguistics and many of its contemporary (rival) trends, alluded to by Kamei in the fragment quoted above, there is one more factor that places Coseriu's bid for wider recognition on a waiting list stretching into the next decades. The overpowering impact of Coseriu's genius on the people he interacted with directly, at congresses and on other professional occasions, sometimes perceived as confrontational and intimidating by the concerned parties, might sway the balance of how his work is perceived and evaluated. Aware of how crucial such contingent personal issues may become in the reality of *academia*, Kamei and other Japanese interpreters emphasize that Coseriu's genuine reception can only be expected when personal resentments and ideological biases will have faded away or become irrelevant³.

Regarded from this angle, it is undeniable that a more detached, and in this sense *objective*, assessment of Coseriu's work is bound to come long after the death of the man, and the deaths of those directly touched, in one way or another, by his powerful personality. In this we feel compelled to concur with Kamei's '50-year' time span.

There is, however, another side of the matter: science (and scholarship in general), besides being a search for "truth(s)" in its own right, validated precisely via a process of gradual but certain impersonalization, is at the same time a profession, a vocation, and a way of life. From this second viewpoint, the historical individual can become a role model for contemporary and future generations of scholars, and a personal story can morph into a biography relevant as an indelible part of the history of the

³ Numerous such testimonies and relevant bibliographical sources are analyzed in Tămăianu-Morita (2002, esp. Ch. 4 and 5).

respective scientific discipline(s). A truthful history of ideas is necessarily intertwined with the personal stories of the men and women who entertained those ideas, who engendered them, fought for them, lived through them, and sometimes – in ages past – died because of them. Perhaps honoring the 100th year from Coseriu’s birth and the 20th from his death is also a good occasion to assert that placing Coseriu’s personal destiny in such a framework would be important: not for the purpose of issuing value judgments, which, as Kamei sensibly warned, are not ours to make, but for the higher aim of reaching better comprehension.

2. It is with such considerations in mind that I borrowed part of the title of these introductory remarks from a famous scientist who might be situated at the very opposite pole from Coseriu in every respect: Richard Dawkins, with his biography *Brief Candle in the Dark. My Life in Science* (2013), who in turn borrows part of his title from another world-renowned scholar, Carl Sagan (*The Demon-Haunted World. Science as a Candle in the Dark*, 1996).

Let me sketch a few facets of the contrast between the two, just to make my point clear:

- Dawkins is firmly rooted in the natural sciences and upholds a worldview that extrapolates a radical form of deterministic causality from the realm of the natural to the realm of the social and the cultural; Coseriu resolutely defends the specificity of the cultural and the need for a different standard of “scientificity” in the case of humane sciences.
- Dawkins became famous outside his home discipline, evolutionary biology; Coseriu never really entered even the mainstream of his home discipline, linguistics, during the course of his life in the 20th

century.

- Dawkins was careful enough to record (or reconstruct and re-interpret) his personal life-path in retrospect, in the form of a best-selling autobiography; Coseriu merely sketched his far more spectacular life-path in dialogues designed and recorded by his disciples and colleagues, out of which the volume entitled “*Die Sachen sagen, wie sie sind...*”. *Eugenio Coseriu im Gespräch* (Kabatek & Murguía 1997) stands out in terms of comprehensiveness and exquisite logical articulation.
- Dawkins had a head start in his personal life and in his academic career, owing to birth and family background; Coseriu built himself from scratch, by the mere power of his prodigious intellect and magnetic personality.

And the list can go on.

However, both Dawkins and Coseriu firmly believed in their own scientific outlook and, in a sense, albeit to different degrees, subordinated their personal lives to science as the pursuit of “truth” as each of them defined it, drawing on long traditions of predecessors in their respective fields, and never losing sight of the philosophical foundations which nurtured those traditions. The felicitous formula “a life in science” is therefore appropriate to describe both scholars, and I hope our colleagues from the natural sciences will look kindly upon my recycling it here.

What kind of theoretical edifice was Coseriu striving to design and build, starting from the middle of the 20th century, and continuing at an unrelenting pace up until the very last weeks before his death?

In a nutshell: Coseriu’s project of an “integral linguistics” embraces the systematic study of all the forms and aspects of language as a cultural activity, i.e. as a free, purpose-oriented, infinite activity of meaning creation on a dimension of alterity – creation for and with the other –, as epitomized in what he defined as the three “primary essential universals of language”: semanticity, alterity, creativity. Coseriu’s work lays out the map of a vast territory to be explored: a grand design where the universal level of speaking in general, the historical level of particular languages and the individual level of discourse are all included in a coherent conceptual construction.

The dynamic diversity reflected in language varieties, the role of contexts and of all the circumstances of speech in the production and interpretation of meaning, the emphasis on taking poetic (literary) discourse as a privileged object for linguistic inquiry – since it is in it that all the sense-generating potentialities of language can be found in their full actualization –, these are just a few of the perspectives that place Coseriu at odds with some of his contemporary (20th-century) mainstream linguistic paradigms, and delineate a new path, whose success – or failure – is to be decided in the decades or centuries to come.

3. In the year 2021, which marks the centenary of Eugenio Coseriu’s birth, the journal “Concordia Discors vs Discordia Concors: Researches into Comparative Literature, Contrastive Linguistics, Cross-Cultural and Translation Strategies” dedicates two issues (no. 15 and 16) to an exploration of Coseriu’s legacy for the development of language studies in the 21st century, and to a reappraisal of his life-long endeavors towards a systematic conceptual reconstruction of humane sciences in general. In keeping with the journal’s profile, we invited contributions which adopt comparative and contrastive perspectives, aimed at

unraveling the interplay of language(s), discourse and culture.

The following open list of thematic areas and questions was initially offered for reflection and debate, in the spirit of anti-dogmatism⁴ that constituted Coseriu's own guiding principle throughout his scholarly life:

- The philosophical foundations of Coseriu's "integral linguistics", with a view to addressing a broader and more radical question: Does linguistics (still) need philosophical foundations in the 21st century?
- Critical confrontations with competing (and arguably more successful – in a hypothetical box-office ranking of institutional endorsement –) theoretical trends from 20th century linguistics
- Phenomena pertaining to the reception of Coseriu's work in diverse linguistic-cultural spaces and periods of time (ranging between poles of acceptance / rejection, in-depth comprehension / partialization, creative development / servile imitation)
- The topicality of Coseriu's theoretical and methodological outlook for the contrastive study of languages and texts
- The challenges of building the "text linguistics as a hermeneutics of textual sense" envisaged by Coseriu, and delineating its interfaces with other disciplines of textuality and discourse (such as stylistics, poetics, semiotics, discourse analysis, text pragmatics)
- Possibilities and limitations of integral text linguistics as a framework for studying poetic (literary) texts
- Coseriu's contributions to translation theory and practice, in

⁴ Along with "objectivity", "humanism", "tradition" and "public utility", "anti-dogmatism" is one of the five "principles of linguistics as a cultural science" formulated by Coseriu (see esp. Coseriu 1992 and 1999).

particular his methodological dissociation between “rational” vs “empirical” limitations of translation.

Contributions proposed by scholars from Brasil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Romania, Russia, Spain and the U.K.⁵ were selected for the two issues, covering all the areas initially proposed, and bringing together voices young and old from all the continents directly or indirectly related to Coseriu’s destiny. The common denominator of these texts is the fact that they all put forward original, critical-innovative developments starting from Coseriu’s work: in-depth exegeses and comparative vistas, proposals of new connections with other theoretical models, applications in novel contexts to a wide variety of idiomatic and discursive material. In this sense, they embody *integral linguistics* as a project in the making, as a living and growing bundle of linguistic disciplines oriented to the future.

4. Back then to the question(s) implicit in the title of this opening statement:

(i) What do numbers count in a destiny such as Coseriu’s?

and

(ii) Do numbers count, after all, in and after a life such as Coseriu’s?

The contributions included in these two issues of “Concordia Discors vs Discordia Concors” attest both to the productivity and to the topicality of Coseriu’s theoretical and methodological framework. They also evince that Coseriu embodies an epistemic and a philosophical attitude – a way of understanding man,

⁵ The order is alphabetical.

language, culture, history, freedom and creativity – that is rich, coherent and malleable, utterly rewarding when properly understood and absorbed into one’s own scholarly designs.

This is perhaps the best homage we can pay to this great mind now, in the 100th year from his birth and (only) the 20th year from his death. With a little bit of luck, the younger contributors⁶ to our journal will still be around 30 years on, around 2050, to see if Kamei’s tentative prophecy will have come to pass by then. These numbers – 100, 50, 20 – have no bearing at all on the intrinsic value of Coseriu’s work; they only set landmarks, and perhaps also time-bound goals, for us – Coseriu’s readers, interpreters, critics, followers and opponents alike.

Finally, what is perhaps most significant for those of us who might no longer be around in the 2050s to inspect the balance sheet of these (or other) numbers, is that Coseriu triumphed in the sphere of universally-relevant scientific contributions, against all the (historical) odds of his time and place of birth. No less than more visible names in both the natural and the humane sciences, perhaps even more than many, he also led a personal life filled with marvels, danger and adventure. We can only hope that Eugenio Coseriu’s “life in science”, with its great sacrifices and grand achievements, will continue to inspire and give sustenance to present and future generations of linguists, who all have to rise to the challenge of their own times.

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⁶ See the biographical notes.

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Proemial Study

The Need And Paradoxes Of Integral Linguistics

Ana AGUD

Univeristy of Salamanca, Spain

“Dear Mrs. Agud: in order to count the fingers of a hand you don’t need to begin with the theory of numbers”
(Coseriu to me, around 45 years ago)

Abstract: Coseriu’s idea of an “integral linguistics” needs a thorough reflection because it embraces two different and partly incompatible aims: to counteract the extreme fragmentation of modern linguistic research through philosophical reflection on the true nature of “language”, and to work out some coherent way of approaching linguistic research which avoids its being torn apart by the diversity of the objects constituted by linguists and linguistic schools. No new positive theory of the whole of language might overcome this disintegration. Coseriu’s efforts to enlarge the scope to include linguistic facts have to be submitted to a radical skeptical reflection on the possibility of such an overall positive theory, based on the real fact that factual speech is not the mere use of any virtual system, but an ongoing creation of sense by individuals, and also that linguistics is itself such “factual speech”: individual, historical, diffuse. Coseriu did not deliver any general theory of language, but the living example of a rich and widely comprehensive individual personality, approaching language from a critical attitude to inherited categories and methods.

Keywords: Integration vs. Disintegration, linguistic criticism, individuality and historicity, individual constitution of linguistic problems and objects.

1. Is language a problem?

Is it a problem to be solved by scientific research? Is linguistics the science whose task is to “solve” the “problem of language”?

Problems only exist as far as individuals or groups of individuals *feel*, at a certain moment, that things are not as they ought to be, or that they do not understand something they would like to understand, and they identify, by means of their usual words (be they colloquial or already scientific), the domain of reality they suppose being at the origin of the identified dysfunctionality. The problem and the approach to its solution are thus *categorized* from the very beginning within the linguistic framework of a certain national or professional language *tradition*. Sciences arise in order to solve problems previously (pre-scientifically) identified as the origin of whatever practical or intellectual discomfort. They usually begin *describing* fragments of the problematic reality, *in accordance with their previous categorization*, and trying to retrace them to “causes”. The most popular belief is that problems are solved if science identifies their causes and makes it possible to manipulate them, thus leading to unproblematic states of things.

Something becomes a problem when *subjects* feel it as such. And in some domains what is a problem for the ones is just the solution for the others. A highly topical issue is, for example, if in modern societies the “state” is the problem or the solution. On occasion of a lecture of mine at the Konstanz University I was asked how I would “solve the problem” of the Latin construction of accusative plus infinitive. I answered that I had no problem at all with this construction. Many subjective appreciations, feelings, prejudices and decisions, as well as many cultural traditions, contribute to *constitute something as a problem* to be solved, and to found a science for it. Nothing is a problem “in itself”, even less a scientific problem. Human history is full of cases where

problems and solutions have been invented from pure cultural or even scientific prejudices without any true empirical basis.

Is linguistics, or can it be, the science which solves through the scientific method whatever problems language is supposed to cause? But what kind of problem, if any, would “language” be or cause?

And finally: what problem should “integral linguistics” be the solution for? Does it have to solve the problem represented by its contrary, the actual disintegration of linguistics?

None of these questions can be faced spontaneously. Every word involved in them is the result of a long history, mostly no longer conscious, and the critical linguist cannot rely on them as if they were the names of really existing things. The whole of theoretical and empirical linguistics consists in *narratives* built with words we feel entitled to use as we do because we belong to a tradition used to using them more or less in such way. Despite an apparent consensus on them, they remain “our” words, and they get their meanings, in each case, from the whole of the context within which each of us utters them. Often enough same words prove not to be understood the same way by others.

“Language” is one of such words. “Linguistics” is another. We cannot take for granted that there are *objective linguistic problems* and reliable *scientific means* of solving them. Modern linguistics, in its many variants, is the outcome of a long history of individuals, raised within diverse academic speaking traditions, which have faced presumed problems with the help of words believed to reflect the reality of language. These are traditions of *constituting “linguistic problems” within inherited ideologies*.

As a matter of fact, only a few cultures in world’s history have *felt* language as a problem or as a set or source of problems and have developed more or less scientific strategies to “solve” it. The “grammatical solution” (the habit of describing national

tongues by means of grammars) was only invented by Indo-Iranians and Greeks, and later on continued by Arabs and others. Other cultures have not bothered to write grammars, but some have made lists of vocabularies or glossaries, which is a solution to another kind of linguistic problem. In the Indian tradition language was intensively reflected on within diverse cultural frameworks, but mostly as part of religious and philosophical systems, and this resulted in diverse ways of facing theoretically its nature and its role, from the extremely formalistic grammar of Pāṇini and his followers to the highly speculative treatise *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari. Outside the western academic disciplines bound to language, many people in different cultures, also within our own one, have reflected on their speaking and developed diverse insights into what we call “language” without feeling committed to take into account grammar or linguistics. Concerning yourself with “language” does not necessarily lead you to any kind of linguistics.

Since Kant we have or should have learned that *no theoretical approach to anything can be legitimated by comparison to “reality itself”*. Linguistics neither. Every systematic approach to solve problems about grasping reality can only be justified by a *prescientific, pragmatic justification* of the specific *goal* determining both the identification of something as a problem and the selection of the method to solve it, be it scientific or not.

We Westerners have inherited the habit of believing in the real existence of something “called language” and of turning this supposed “thing” into an object of cognitive approach through grammar or through its expansion into diverse kinds of linguistics. Our usual way of imagining *language as an object* is still strongly influenced by the grammatical ideology.

Besides this inherited attitude there have been in history various attempts to focus on speaking differently, which implies

to question the dominance of the grammatical ideology and its many presuppositions and implications. Maybe its widest and most systematic sceptical revision is Fritz Mauthners "*Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*" (1903).

The grammatical ideology implies that speaking is just "using" a previously existing code consisting of single pieces (words) and rules to combine them into full utterances. It also implies that this part of speaking is in some sense its real "essence", and that other elements or moments of speaking are "accidental". The highly systematic character of the grammatical component of speaking also suggests that "language", this *noun* which *resumes* the fact of speaking *sub specie substantiae*, is some kind of system with *own features and borders*, and that it can be "defined" by identifying those borders and the domains they separate it from. Within the grammatical tradition, language was supposed to variously limit with thinking or ideas, with the articulatory anatomy and physiology, with the acoustics of sounds, with the individuality of speaking subjects and their personal and social circumstances, etc. Specific research has been done for each of these neighbouring domains, and occasionally parts of them have been more or less incorporated to the notion of language itself. What language *is* in each case depends, therefore, on where *you* locate its borders to its conceptual neighbours. There is no "language in itself".

And establishing frontiers to the concept of language depends in each case on the kind of problem *you perceive* in or with language and on the kind of solution you bear in mind. The history of linguistics is the history of *how* successive generations of grammarians have felt *what* kinds of problems and how they have reacted through strict or expanded grammatical work. This history coins in each case the meanings of the linguist's words, as far as they are or become conscious, which is not always the case.

2. Linguistic pluralism

In the course of Western cultural history, the very first grammatical approach was already a pluralistic one. Aristotle had made the first purely linguistic classification of the parts of the Greek language in the framework of his overall systematic treatment of the tragedy and its components. He recovered an older tradition, documented in Plato and the sophists, of opposing names (*onómata*) to what is said about them (*rhémata*), and he completed this dichotomy into a first system of five members. By then the interest of reflecting about language already had at least *two different origins and goals*: the rhetoric education of citizens for public, political and judicial activity, which was eminently a *practical* goal, and the encyclopaedic goal of making a taxonomy of everything observable, which was eminently *theoretical*. Soon a third need gave a new impulse to grammar: the *philological* activity around the edition of classical literature.

Despite these diverse goals and interests, grammarians mostly converged in their terminology and method, and therefore a tradition arose which soon passed to Rome and was resumed by Roman grammarians. The terms of grammar had largely become disconnected from their metaphorical origins and were already *felt* as scientific terminology. The words of linguists were eventually felt as the “correct” names of really existing things, and *sermo* was presupposed as a well determined, true domain of human *reality*.

Although Coseriu repeatedly asserted that we all know *what language is*, in fact, we only *presuppose* to know it, just like, when speaking and uttering words or terms, we presuppose to know what we are speaking about. This is not always confirmed. And surely there is *no real thing* whose correct designation is “language”. This noun, the quite late romance nominalization of

the *feeling of knowing* about the true or essential nature of our speaking, has deluded nearly all theoreticians both of grammar and of what had to become the “philosophy of language”. Only few sceptical thinkers pointed to this delusion, and they never became really influential.

Once the ontological reality of something called “language” had become a common presupposition, scientists began to enlarge their perspectives on it and “discovered” (properly speaking: “constituted”) new linguistic elements, components and moments, which step by step gave rise to as many new branches of the presumed “science of language”. Even grammar, in the strict sense of the word, was revisited from new angles, and new diverse ways of making grammar appeared in the academic market. At present, the academic concern with “language” is split into a wide pluralism of theoretical approaches, research methods, descriptive models, explanation frameworks and true new objects of research. Linguistics seems to have *disintegrated*.

Although this should have shaken the original confidence about the reality of one clear common object of all kinds of approaches, the belief in a real thing called “language” did not collapse. It simply got out of focus. Linguistic pluralism seems to have finished with the *humanistic interest of understanding the true nature of speaking and its role in humanity as such*. The diverse “sciences” of language hardly communicate with each other, and the work of linguists largely relies on the faith in established or newly arisen traditions and on the belief in the ontological reality of the meanings of their words.

3. Coseriu’s critical approach

The naïve confidence in the objective existence of “language” and “linguistic problems” consolidated the presupposition that we really know about language “in itself”, and that our linguistic

concepts are mere names of real parts of speaking. There are at least two different kinds of delusion in this.

The first one is ignoring that all words, included those of linguists, are parts of the *behaviour* of a highly complex *organism*. This behaviour has diversely developed within living communities, is learned by each individual as part of its socialization, and, among other things, has developed what we call “history”. This is not only the factual development of events in time, but, above all, what we call the “consciousness” of our own development, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. We human beings experience our life in time as an individual movement from one personal state to the next, and we are *aware* of our capability of guiding this flow according to one-self’s ideas, representations, goals and interests. *The speaking species we are builds its own life horizon through its inherited patterns of speaking behaviour and through own individual modulations of such patterns.* Our objects are the outcome of complex, only partially conscious processes of categorizing reality. *They are our products* (this indisputable truth has been discredited by calling it “idealism”, which thus became some sort of insult). Their perception is guided in each case by the individual modulation of inherited and learned speaking patterns, triggered by largely unconscious emotions and interests. Although we are used to speaking and communicating *as if* our shared designations corresponded to also shared “concepts”, each individual speaks his own language and knows or inhabits his own reality. His words are the inherited names of social conventions. And, of course, this applies also to our linguistic vocabulary and concepts.

The second delusion concerns the more concrete work of grammarians and linguists, and it is the very usual *confusion between the linguistic object and our methods of approaching it* within academic life. Even though produced by us, our linguistic

objects get some kind of supra-individual consistency because of the shared history of their constitution and their written fixation, and this allows us more or less to make a difference between them and our actual methods of researching about them. When, for instance, Chomsky presented his first version of Generative Grammar, he broadly used the same terms as the traditional grammar, but he attributed to his own terms like “deep and surface structure” the same ontological consistency he did for “noun” or “verb”. Almost nobody would object to the latter, but most non-generativists reacted to the former as to pure inventions without empirical basis.

Coseriu burst into European structuralism in the fifties with a serious discussion of many ideas about language which had become of common use, and he criticised them by retracing them to formerly unnoticed *metaphysical prejudices*. Singularly he objected to the search for the “causes” of linguistic change, showing that it was based on the naïve presumption that such changes have to be the *effect* of certain *causes*. Instead, he presented the whole of language as a free activity guided by expressive goals and needs, not by causes.

Later on, Coseriu criticised many other confusions of objects and methods as well as the diverse perspectives on the objects and the different levels of the object’s conceptualization. Uncovering such confusions led him to propose *new distinctions* within the linguistic object. He began with the distinction among system, norm and speech. According to his own idea that our objects are the result of our perspectives on them, he proposed *diverse linguistics for diverse linguistic objects*. Linguistics of the system cannot be the same kind of science as linguistics of the norms or of speech. Coseriu thus seemed to have contributed to the disintegration of linguistics into diverse academic disciplines. But in his view *language remained in any case something real and*

unitary. The distinctions within it are our work. Language in itself is a complex but unitary process with many aspects we have to face distinctively.

Thus, Coseriu lastly considered the current disintegration of linguistics into many quite unrelated sciences as a relevant *problem*, and he tried to solve it through a *theoretical project of re-integrating all of them into some overall perspective*. He called this “integral linguistics”. He eventually interpreted his own linguistic production as steps towards this integral linguistics.

4. The need for integrating linguistics

As Göran Sonesson has pointed out in different publications, linguistics may be integrated in two different ways. The first one is to include linguistics as part of wider disciplines like semiotics, anthropology, sociology, communication and information sciences, etc. The other one is to unite the diverse partial sciences about linguistic objects into one. Clearly, Coseriu’s alternative belongs to the latter.

Counteracting linguistic disintegration aims to *recover a wider and more complex apprehension of the “linguistic object”*, exceeding the narrow limits of the old grammar of sentences and incorporating to the conception of language many further aspects taken into account by successive alternative approaches as well as by philosophical reflections about it. Basically, as Coseriu pointed out, linguistics should integrate

- the scientific description and explanation of the linguistic systems of the single national tongues,
- the general consideration of language at the speculative (universal) level, and
- the treatment of factual speaking as such.

Being the latter the only “real” domain linguistics focusses on, the problem is to develop a method which allows to

understand *how the idiomatic systems, the general communicative competences and the concrete speaking strategies cooperate in factual speech*. First you ought to distinguish at least these three levels, and then you ought to reconstruct the way they interact within the *only ontologically real object of linguistics: factual speech*.

As a matter of fact, if you have identified and categorized “language” from the very beginning as something split into diverse components and levels, the way back to its presumed unity will *depend conceptually on the original splitting*. In order to grasp the full complexity of human speaking as a unitary process, without being conditioned by any one-sided analytical perspective on it, it is necessary to approach it *pre-scientifically* as such *unitary process in its entire complexity*.

This was the aim of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who developed a thorough speculative reflection on this complexity in order to assign grammar its real place and role within an overall and correct understanding of human speaking. Humboldt, unlike later linguists, tried to *begin with the utmost complexity in the pre-scientific apprehension of language*. This proved to be a gigantic task which took most of his linguistic activity in his later years.

This reflection had to be *speculative or philosophical* and based on a broad *experience* of the intended object. Humboldt studied a lot of philosophy, literature and languages in order to approach his goal with due competence. A contemporary effort to grasp, from the very beginning, the real complexity of language also has to be built on this *basis*, which comprises two domains: knowing personally as many different languages and literatures as possible, and being trained in philosophical reasoning. Both competences demand considerable personal time and effort and are never really completed. To all this now it has to be added at least some competence in neural sciences, since they are

discovering many relevant elements and processes inherent to the speaking activity which linguists can no longer ignore.

Coseriu, an extremely intelligent and consequent follower of Humboldt's reflections about language, is, as far as I know, the only influential linguist of the 20th century who bothered to master all these disciplines (neural sciences came later and he didn't get familiar with them) and became the example his supporters felt committed to follow. Thus, he was in a position which enabled him to keep attentive both to the analytical perspectives and results of modern linguistics and to the Humboldtian goal of grasping the reality of human speaking in its integral complexity. Coseriu always tried to design his own methods from this general perspective. The unavoidable reductionism of concrete linguistic investigations was for him no excuse to forget the real goal of linguistic research: *a good theoretical comprehension of language*. And this is a philosophical task. Therefore, philosophy has to guide the initial constitution of linguistic objects, the design of the research methods for it, and the reflection about the results in order to integrate them into a general consistent theory.

Without such philosophical reflection on language and linguistics a true integration of the diverse branches of science bound to language cannot take place. Since their respective results are conditioned by the initial reductions which have led to constitute object and method of each kind of research, these results cannot simply be added together in order to get a general "theory of everything". It cannot be presupposed that they are compatible with each other. If, for instance, you design a method of grammatical description without taking semantics into account, and after that you develop an own semantic theory, you will not be able to join them into a both formal and semantic description.

5. The paradoxes of “integral linguistics”

No integral linguistics can arise from disintegrated research methods and goals. A *coherent theory of language* has to take into account the diversity of scientific perspectives and objects as well as a general theoretic apprehension of the true nature of human “speaking”. If this is to be achieved within linguistics, as Coseriu unequivocally tried to do, then the integral perspective must be *present and operative from the beginning*. A philosophically correct understanding of the full complexity of human speaking has to lie at the basis of the scientific diversity of models and methods, since, as Coseriu stated, “philosophy is necessary because it is the science of principles”. Only a philosophical fundament can provide linguistic work with the intellectual tools needed to avoid a hopeless fragmentation.

Coseriu engaged very soon in the task of providing linguistic research with such a speculative basis. He did so through a well-known discussion of the theoretical presuppositions underlying the current search for the “causes” of linguistic change, and he inverted its terms: language is not something which unexpectedly changes, which would need a causal explanation. It is rather a free ongoing activity guided by expressive goals and which generates continually its own systematic patterns and remains free to alter them if needed. Language is always changing because this is its nature, and it does not belong to the realm of causes but to that of finality.

This conviction underlies the whole of his later pre-scientific speculations concerning the object and the method of linguistic research. It is also the basis of his own intent of progressing towards an integrated vision of language through a *methodical integration* of the diverse research varieties and objects.

As sensible as this goal may sound, it brings nonetheless some theoretical problems I would like to highlight here.

As already stated, we can no longer trust in the real existence of anything with determined features and borders called “language”, but we have to assume that beneath his denomination there is only a *diffuse feeling* of knowing about our speaking, as well as the *pretension* of consecrating this feeling as a reliable fact and an observable object. “Language” as a whole is far more the name of an illusion than that of a fact.

But *uncountable real and observable facts are actually involved in our speaking activity and in its results.*

In order to get a real basis for an integrative research of the diverse *problems* we identify in or around our speaking, we need to identify the whole of such *facts*, which range from the finest interactions among neurons, hormones and neurotransmitters up to the great literary works of the diverse cultures. And at the macroscopic behavioural level there are at least

- more or less canonized *speaking patterns* in human communities, serving as reference to socially acceptable speaking (national tongues and others).
- fine systematizations of our speaking patterns in order to *increase* their capability of expressing new complexities, but not always equally fine and differentiated;
- from slight to gross *simplification* strategies in the factual linguistic behaviour of individuals and groups;
- quite *fixed* pieces of verbal behaviour (words, syntagms, conventional utterances...), as well as fragments of speech which *divert* from them, willingly or unwillingly, and which often lead to a change in the original reference pieces.

Furthermore:

- The verbal elements interact with other bodily actions and attitudes, and such interactions can be highly standardized, but also very individual.

- People speak for very diverse reasons and goals, ranging from mere filling the shared time with small talk to extremely conscious and painful efforts to formulate and communicate ideas or knowledge, so that the “meaning load” of linguistic utterances may vary from a nearly complete void of content to the utmost complex contents.
- Although we tend to imagine that our words and utterances bear a determined semantic content which is actually transmitted from the speaker to the hearer, there is no such transmission at all: only audible and visual signals are produced and perceived. Their presumed “semantic” content cannot be the same between sender and receiver, since it is in each case the result of a complex individual neural processing which becomes “conscious” only in part, and the relation between the conscious and the unconscious cannot be established.
- Understanding is thus no reproduction by the hearer of the intended message of the speaker. The relation among individuals who communicate linguistically is extremely variable and it is no possible object of direct observation.

Language does not “exist”. It “*happens*”, and this fact involves a not determinable amount of processes which are partly observable and partly not. Grammar and linguistics have always constituted efforts to extract from this happening *observable constants which allow a systematic description*. They focussed at first on the *formal patterns of national tongues*, which gave rise to the so called “grammar”. Much later other patterns of observable linguistic behaviour were focussed on: the meaning of the verbal pieces in their standard form, other divergent meanings and patterns (linguistic variability), behavioural constants (bodily actions and attitudes, expressive strategies), “discourse” strategies, pragmatic constants... In such cases, the “object” had to be

filtered out in order to get *average* data allowing *generalizations*. Factual historical and individual speech in its real diversity thus had to remain out of focus, and *abstractions* from it *became the real “objects” of research*.

Against the unavoidable diversification of perspectives, objects and methods these efforts had to produce, Coseriu tried a *first* integration exploring the possibilities of extending the main analytic tools of structural phonology (privative opposition, commutation, etc.) to other linguistic levels, just like many other structuralists. But unlike them, he clearly stated that this line of investigation had to *let aside many also relevant aspects of speaking*.

A *second* integrative step was to analyse factual speech and to identify within it the main strategies of speakers to turn the abstract components of national languages into concrete utterances. In his article “Determinación y entorno” he discovered a whole set of such strategies already codified. He could show that in factual speech there are also systematic means of “using” the language system which should be integrated into the structural description of each language, besides the available abstract pieces (words and syntactic rules). Further research objects like deixis, discourse markers or referentiality have broadened our knowledge of the idiomatic codifications of such speaking strategies.

In his “Textlinguistik”, Coseriu tried a *further* integrative step, expanding this analytic activity to extant texts.

Texts are *frozen speech which has actually taken place* (in my terminology: “factual speech” as opposed to “virtual” or “abstract”, whence my term “linguistics of factuality” or “*lingüística de la facticidad*”). They are strictly individual products, they are not predictable, and they represent some kind of solidification of individual and historical expressive *decisions* of their authors which cannot be retraced to any previous system.

They are composed according to the systematic possibilities of each language, but their content is unique, and, as Coseriu insisted, *about unique things there cannot be any science*.

Texts are the result of combining into a unique product not only the available system of pieces and strategies of each language within certain circumstances (geographical, social, ideological, psychological...), but also the individual memories, motivations and representations of the author. Their content is no longer a “linguistic meaning”, but their unique “*sense*”. Understanding it is an *individual hermeneutical process* without precise profiles and borders, and this understanding may generate further texts or remain a purely subjective experience.

Texts, as further possible objects of a comprehensive linguistics, set the *limit* of this notion and bring the linguist to a zone where he can no longer determine the exact nature of his work *as a linguist*. With texts, the notion of “linguistics” loses its usual determination. Dealing with the structure and sense of single texts involves linguistic as well as philological, historical, social, psychological and other perspectives and methods. And it does not make sense to try to keep them separated. It is an *integral hermeneutic activity*. Translating texts is therefore an extremely complex activity which has to integrate in principle all these possible dimensions, and to react to the singularity and uniqueness of each text or even a part of it also in an individual manner.

Contemporary “corpus linguistics” is a new attempt to recover texts for systematic research, but a text as a token among many others is just not the same as a text in its full individuality. “Corpus” is a *cumulative* notion and allows the statistical processing of whatever elements or aspects of the gathered texts. In a way, corpus linguistics is the contrary of the individual hermeneutics of the sense of single factual speech. It is not easy to

integrate under one and the same concept these two ways of dealing with texts.

Coseriu tried to integrate the “text level” into his own linguistics, looking for identifiable strategies for building literary narratives, and this is also the way generally adopted for text linguistics. But he was aware that lastly the shared linguistic strategies are just another part of the hermeneutics of the unique sense of texts.

The mere addition of single descriptions and explanations of elements and levels does not lead to their *integration into a coherent theory*. The diversity of objects and methods cannot be reduced or retraced to any unity.

The only possible integration is the kind of *synthesis* the *individual* linguist may achieve within the whole of his personality throughout his life. Coseriu had a strong feeling of being the person who had achieved the coherent integration of the whole of his linguistic experience, but he himself had to accept that “linguistics” was no longer the appropriate designation of this whole, and that at least “hermeneutics” had to be added to the equation. Coseriu’s integral linguistics was Coseriu himself, the whole of his personality. As Hegel had stated much earlier, the “concept” in its largest and most comprehensive sense proves to be identical with the individual, atomic and impenetrable personality behind it in each case.

Linguistics relies, like every science, on the *reduction* of the real complexity to certain bunches of features delineating certain “objects”. When inventing the “phoneme”, linguistics did not discover the true nature of the speaking sounds, but it created an object which responded to the manner certain linguists wanted to turn speaking into something they could manage as “scientists”. This *made sense*, but did not reflect the real. All kinds of linguistics and grammar do create their own objects. They may be

more or less properly scientific, but they cannot grasp the integrity of what we call “speaking”; because we, the speaking animals, *cannot turn ourselves into our own objects without distorting our reality.*

Our speaking ability enables us to generate all possible objects, including “speaking” itself, but not to turn our own reality into “an object”. We categorize our speaking by means of our speaking tools, which are the historical and individual outcome of the whole of our linguistically mediated human experience. Our words and ideas are mostly those of our speaking community, and speaking communities are nations as well as cultures, scientific institutions, professional circles, religious communities, social layers, cities or villages... This variety of human contexts correlates with a variety of speaking patterns and norms which converge into what each one says in each case. Their possible unity is that of the individual, of his abilities, his memories and his decisions. *It is in the individual where “language” is something “integral”.* But *its unity is unique, historical and ever changing.* There can be no science of that. In this sense there can be no “integral linguistics”.

Only: this individual historical unity *is* the real integral language we seek when trying to integrate linguistics. And it still makes sense to try to achieve an overall comprehension of our speaking ability, or rather of our speaking nature. The goal of integral linguistics is a sound project, despite its real impossibility. This is the great paradox of “integral linguistics”.

A paradox, but not a contradiction. Integral linguistics being both necessary and impossible is certainly paradoxical, but only because of a fundamental confusion between levels and kinds of intellectual reflection.

6. Negative philosophy of language and integral linguistics

Coseriu had distinguished between the general or universal level of the human ability to speak and the concrete study of historical languages. But although he had stated that linguistics has to be guided by philosophical principles, he did not recognize the relevance of any extant philosophy of language for linguistics itself, and he refused to formulate the philosophy of language underlying his own reflections on methods and objects of research. Coseriu formulated some theoretical principles he considered to be true and relevant, but he did not develop any systematic philosophy of his own linguistics. And when I tried to do so, he teased me with the sentence I reproduced at the beginning of this article.

Unfortunately, it is too late to try to discuss this issue with him. So, I will be forced to a unilateral or monologic development of the connection between a certain philosophy of language and the theoretical project of integral linguistics. This will unavoidably lead to my own conception of “integral linguistics”.

The general theory of language supporting Coseriu’s ideas had something paradoxical in it. Coseriu loved distinctions and aimed at a unitary conception. His distinctions of levels and perspectives on linguistic phenomena were meant to prevent the usual confusions between levels of reflection, in order to “liberate” concrete structural descriptions without falling into the trap of taking their objects as real discrete parts of the linguistic reality. “*To distinguish is not the same as to divide*”. From his point of view, language has to be considered as an integral reality within which scientists may introduce distinctions in order to focus on concrete problems (of the linguist). But since every concrete investigation has to focus on some problem, and, thus, to look at the whole from this one-sided perspective, the mere

accumulation of concrete investigations cannot produce an integral comprehension of the whole.

Only a consistent systematic philosophy of language might provide such a unitary perspective on it. But, again, any philosophical system has to be designed with *concepts* which are the supposed *meanings* of words, words which, in turn, are pieces of the acquired habits of speaking of each individual. No conceptual building will ever be able to grasp any reality *beyond its words* and the complex of circumstances leading to their actual use (and understanding) in each case. If we conceive philosophy as a *science of positive principles*, we will never go beyond *philosophical ideologies rooted in speaking traditions*. There is no “real” soil below the speaking traditions and their conventions.

Does this mean that there is no spiritual or mental space where a sound, coherent integral theory of human language could be formulated and constructed?

No, what this means is that the metaphysical tradition of assigning reliable conceptual meanings to our words is just a linguistic delusion in itself. Sound *speculative work* has to *keep this in mind* and to take its own words as what they really are: as *usual signals within communities*, which serve individuals *in each case* as *abbreviations of bunches of impressions, emotions, experiences and mental processes* which *provoke* or *give rise* to further impressions, experiences, emotions and mental processes of other individuals. We refer to what matters to us, be it “reality” or something else, in the framework of our acquired habits of categorizing things within our historical language or languages. *Speculative thinking does not transcend this.*

The difference between *speculative* and *objectivistic* speaking can only consist in the former’s consequent *scepticism* about our way of constituting objects and perceiving reality. We have *to*

doubt about our words while using them and our scepticism always will *remain itself linguistic*.

No philosophy offers linguists a better *positive* understanding and categorization of human language, but it may show them not to trust the inherited categories through which we have become used to thinking and speaking about our speaking (and thinking) as we do. Good philosophy is the *ongoing criticism of whatever certainties about reality we rely on* when doing linguistics or whatever other, more or less scientific effort, to grasp reality and to control our material or cultural environment. Philosophy is, for instance, when Coseriu criticises the usual grammatical ideology of imagining our speaking as the mere use or application of a previous fixed code. This pre-scientific, speculative criticism allows us to understand linguistic change as inherent to human speaking, and this understanding, in turn, allows historical and comparative analyses that *make sense* within the tradition of exploring the evolution of languages and language. It keeps linguistic work *coherent with a critical understanding both of language in general and of the linguist's own language*.

As a matter of fact, the understanding of human speaking has not made great progress since Humboldt's critical revision of the inherited linguistic metaphysics. Modern linguistic theories as well as "cognitive sciences" and even neural sciences have hardly contributed to improve our self-understanding as speaking animals. Unlike them, sceptical thinkers like partly Nietzsche and more recently Josef Simon, have really contributed to approach human language more critically and to overcome many metaphysical prejudices still dominating linguistic work. And of course, there are a lot of truly intelligent linguists who again and again approach linguistic work with an open mind and refusing to be seduced by fashions within the academic world. But good linguistics is always the outcome of a *consistently critical attitude*

towards consecrated ideologies, and this in turn can only be achieved through *historical and comparative* study of both languages and linguistic achievements.

Coseriu was vehemently against theoretical scepticism, but, paradoxically enough, he adopted a *sustained critical attitude* towards established linguistics and produced thereby ideas that have positively improved our humanistic understanding of human speaking. The productivity of his critiques and new distinctions is due mainly to his broad experience with language, linguistics and literature and to his special ability to *integrate such experiences into coherent approaches to single problems*. He eventually called his work “integral linguistics”, but I believe he failed to understand the true sense of his own “integrity”.

According to my own understanding, his linguistics was not integral in the sense of “comprising the whole” of human speaking under the “right concepts”. No scientific approach to language could achieve such positive overall comprehension. And surely a mere addition of new ways of approaching further elements or aspects of speaking would not produce it either.

A linguistic research becomes part of “integral linguistics” when it proceeds focussing on its *object not as a real part of a rightly conceptualized “whole”, but as a historical product of the linguist’s experience and imagination within his widest possible perception of language*. Its singularity, and its constitution as an object, remain “integral” if the linguist remains aware that he works within a theoretical perspective which has a *negative* nature. It does not consist in a positive general theory of what language is, but in the *concrete and progressive negation of every such positive general theory or ideology*.

“Language” is a “limit notion”. It is not the name of something real, but the name of a *negative understanding horizon*. Integrating single research objects and methods into a general

perspective on language is not subsuming it into wider and more abstract notions, lastly leading to a general unitary theory. Quite the contrary: it means the *awareness that one's own object constitution is an individual, historical achievement* whose legitimacy does not depend on a correct apprehension of the whole, but on *understanding its impossibility*, which implies refusing any "definition" of language. The individual linguist's achievements get their legitimation from his own historical and comparative experience with linguistics and language, and they may convince others of making good sense, but they cannot pretend to be "ontologically true".

They remain "individual speech", and their understanding by others also remains individual hermeneutics. One linguist's "integral linguistics" cannot be the same as another's "integral linguistics", because each linguist builds his understanding horizon on the basis of his successive concrete negations of what he perceives in each case as wrong assumptions. I learned from Coseriu to look for the widest possible understanding horizon in each case, but I had to confront myself with experiences and legacies different from his'. And instead of introducing new conceptual distinctions into the methodical framework, I concentrated on the scepticism I was led to when trying to keep "integral".

Every linguistic text is as "factual speech" as every literary text or every text, turned or not into a research object. It is as individual, historical and unpredictable as all the rest. Understanding this is individual hermeneutics. I have called this orientation "linguistics of factuality".

Understanding Coseriu's integral linguistics is thus in each case a new individual effort to integrate into one's research activity the negative perspective of the limit notion of "language" *the way one has learned to do*, and to seek intellectual progress

through *ever new concrete negations* of theoretical concepts or systems believing in their immediate access to reality itself. Unlike Coseriu, in my view integral linguistics is (like Hegel said about his “Phenomenology of the Spirit”), “ein sich vollbringender Skeptizismus”: an ongoing, progressive scepticism. Further integral linguists will have to confront themselves with other contexts and will be forced to develop their own criticism with new words coming from their own singular experiences. And lastly, we will all learn about ourselves as speaking animals through our own processing of narratives both of integral linguists and of good writers.


This is the reason why I had to begin with the “theory of words” in order to say something that makes sense within this “integral” perspective, despite Coseriu’s teasing about the “theory of numbers”.

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Articles



*I. Towards an Integral Study of
Languages: Theoretical and
Contrastive Perspectives*

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On Eugenio Coseriu's Theory of Word Formation

Giovanni GOBBER

Catholic University of Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy

Abstract: Between 1965 and 1982 Eugenio Coseriu published a series of investigations on word formation processes. In a functional perspective, he developed an innovative proposal, which moved away from traditional models and was not adequately taken into account in lexicological studies, neither in those of his time nor in those of later years. In this contribution, I intend to resume the fundamental aspects of this model, which maintains its validity and originality: in Coseriu's theory of word formation the three levels of the system, the norm and the usage interact strictly, so that both the reasons of the system and the creativity of the speakers are adequately taken into account¹.

Keywords: *word formation*, lexical semantics, system, norm, functionalism

1. Meaning and designation

Coseriu characterises his theory as a content-oriented theory of word formation (*inhaltliche Wortbildungslehre*, see Coseriu 1977). To understand what his meant by “content-oriented” and what the term *content* is taken to denote, it is necessary here to consider the distinction between meaning (*signifié, Bedeutung*) and designation (*Bezeichnung*): meaning is conceived as “le contenu donné exclusivement par la langue en tant que système de fonctions distinctives et oppositives” (Coseriu 1982: 3). Designation, on the other hand, is understood as “le rapport entre

¹ In this contribution I reconsider, with some additions and changes, the results of a research presented at the Fourth International Conference on Eugenio Coseriu's scientific legacy, organised by Vincenzo Orioles and Raffaella Bombi in Udine in 2013.

les signes et la réalité extralinguistique nommée par ceux-ci” (*ibidem*).

According to Coseriu, word formation should be considered from the point of view of meaning (*signifié*, *Bedeutung*), not from the point of view of designation (*Bezeichnung*). In fact, the system and the norm differ in their configuration and in the role that is assigned to them within his general theory. In the system Coseriu includes the processes that form so-called secondary lexemes from other lexemes (primary or secondary). The possible processes that are established by the system are then applied according to the norm, which includes socially instituted designations:

Ainsi, on interprétera normalement l’allemand *Strassenhändler* comme ‘marchand ambulant, camelot’, parce qu’on ne connaît pas de gens ‘qui vendent et achètent des rues’ (interprétation possible du point de vue du système de la langue allemande) [...] Et, dans un milieu plus restreint, par exemple, dans le langage familier, on interprétera *Wecker* comme ‘veille (montre)’ plutôt que comme ‘personne qui réveille’ (Coseriu 1966: 189).

Here Coseriu agrees with Otto Jespersen, who said that compounds express relations between notions, but do not specify the exact type of relation: “*home life*, life at home, *home letters*, letters from home, *home journey*, journey (to) home [...]” (Jespersen 1924: 310). Grammatical relations are established by the system; in compounds the content of these relations is generic. It is then up to the norm to indicate how they are applied, according to the historically developed language tendencies. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that Coseriu subscribes to a fundamental principle of structuralism, the primacy of *signifié* over designation:

Die Bezeichnung kann zwar als weitere und zusätzliche Bestimmung von Wortbildungsverfahren berücksichtigt werden, nicht aber vor der Bedeutung und als primäre (definitorische) Bestimmung (Coseriu 1977: 49).

2. Coseriu's criticism of some traditional theories

In the usual models of word formation two problematic points are pointed out by Coseriu: the former consists in the tendency to mix elements of the expression together with elements of the content; the latter is the absence of a distinction (or an imprecise distinction) between meaning (*Bedeutung*) and designation (*Bezeichnung*). In his opinion some inadequacies follow from these two elements.

The first criticism is directed primarily at German lexicology, in which two general kinds of theories can be distinguished (Weydt & Hentschel 1989: 23): one establishes the two types of composition and derivation, and the derivation is differentiated into derivation with prefixes and with suffixes; the other distinguishes composition, derivation, and prefixation.

Coseriu says that in both such kinds theories a "material" criterion, i.e. emphasis on the role of affixes (which are elements of the expression), appears together with a semantic criterion, which considers the number of lexemes involved in the formation.

He states that in this way only two basic types can be recognised: composition and derivation. But then it would be difficult to distinguish between the type represented by lexemes such as Fr. *vielliot* and the type that includes a lexeme such as Fr. noun *beauté*; nor is it possible to explain the semantic affinity between lexemes such as Fr. *chasseur*, *vendeur* and compound nouns.

According to him, the tendency to consider content and expression together also leads to the fact that formations with

prefixes are often counted among compositions and the term “verbal composition” is used for cases such as Fr. *prévoir* and *parvenir* (Coseriu 1982: 4) or Germ. *hinfallen* and Sp. *contener* (Coseriu 1977: 49). This choice is justified by recalling the similarity of prefixes to prepositions, which exist as autonomous “words” of the language (Coseriu 1982: 4). However, he notes that such “compounds” do not differ in semantic structure from other words, which are considered “derived” words. Moreover,

on a naturellement des difficultés dans le cas des prefixes qui n’existent pas en tant que mots autonomes: une formation telle que *revenir* doit-elle être attribuée à la dérivation ou à la composition? (Coseriu 1982: 4)

We said that Coseriu indicates a second critical point: the failure to distinguish between meaning (*Bedeutung*, *signifié*) and designation (*Bezeichnung*). This point emerges particularly in the treatment of so-called exocentric compounds. It should be immediately noted that, for Coseriu, compounds are only endocentric. In his view, the property of being exocentric does not regard meaning (*Bedeutung*), but designation (*Bezeichnung*), more precisely it concerns the denomination, i.e., how something is named. In fact, a compound is understood as exocentric due to the knowledge about the world and because the corresponding use is institutionalised in the norm. The exocentric compound emerges in an antonomastic designation - which is not a *signifié*, but a use of a *signifié*. Usually, such an antonomastic designation is the prevailing use (*désignation figée*). However, a non-exocentric usage is always possible: for example, the German compound *Goldhaar* is usually employed in the sense of ‘blond-haired person’ (exocentric usage), but it can also apply as ‘blond hair’ (non-exocentric usage). Let us also consider a compound such as

Germ. *Goldwaage* ‘gold scales’: it corresponds usually to *Waage für Gold* (‘scales for weighing gold’), but it can also stand for *Waage aus Gold* (‘scales made of gold’). The different interpretations are attempts to specify the semantically generic link between the “determinans” *Gold* and the “determinatum” *Waage*. According to Coseriu, with similar analyses the designation (*Bezeichnung*) is given priority over the *signifié* (*Bedeutung*). As a consequence, the functional unity of the compound is overlooked and destroyed, since different interpretations are made to correspond to different compounds: there will be two homonyms and *Goldwaage* will be recorded twice in the dictionary.

Coseriu observes that Charles Bally had also overlooked the difference between *Bedeutung* and *Bezeichnung*, and this can be understood from the pages of *Linguistique générale et linguistique française* devoted to the distinction between the functional and the semantic transposition (*transposition fonctionnelle* and *transposition sémantique*). Bally says that the former takes place exclusively in grammar, while the latter also concerns the lexicon, “par le fait que les signes changent de signification (généralement par emploi figure) en même temps que de catégorie” (Bally 1944: 116). Examples cited by Bally include the cases of *chaleur tropicale* and *végétation tropicale*: when it designates something that is ‘proper to the tropics’, *tropical* is the outcome of a functional transposition; if it stands for ‘analogous to that found in the tropics’ it is the result of a semantic transposition. Coseriu (1982: 7) does not share this view: he maintains that there is only one process of transposition, which can have different interpretations. But transposition is constituted in the system and regards the *signifié*, while interpretation occurs at the level of the norm and is concerned with the designation. He concludes that

there is only one lexematic value, and this can have multiple uses that are established in the norm.

3. A functional typology

In Coseriu's perspective, word formation can be understood adequately only if a semantic perspective is adopted, i.e. if the functional types are taken into account and not the aspects he calls "material". The latter are processes such as prefixation and suffixation, which take their name from the elements that are added to a lexical base. There is a many-to-many relationship between the functional and the material types: several material types can fit into one functional type, and several functional types can be manifested in one material type.

Coseriu does not deny the practical value of material descriptions, but he finds these descriptions theoretically inadequate, since they cannot account for the formation of words in the functional language, that is, in the system. First, a material perspective is required to identify all the processes for forming lexemes from other lexemes. But "[...] une telle étude ne pourrait pas correspondre exactement au domaine de la formation des mots" (Coseriu 1982: 7), since occasional formations (e.g., cases of univerbation such as the French words [*un*] *sauve-qui-peut*, *bonjour* or the Italian words *mantenere* < *manu tenere*, *merluzzo* < *maris lucius*) would be treated in the same way as the results of a formation process in the strict sense. Moreover, in his view a material point of view does not allow for some very productive formation processes, such as zero-suffix formations, conversions, and retroformations.

How should word formation be characterised according to Coseriu? First, it should be understood as the domain of secondary paradigmatic relations. These are relations, because they bind elements together; they are paradigmatic because they concern

relations *in absentia* (relations *in praesentia* correspond to syntagmatic relations); and they are secondary because there is no equivalence between the extremes of the relation, but rather one of them is obtained from the other by a process of formation. Coseriu states that word formation corresponds to what he calls a grammaticalisation of the primary lexicon (which can undergo further grammaticalisation). Here *grammaticalisation* is understood as the application of systematic processes of formation, by virtue of which lexical units undergo a determination of a “paragrammatical” nature and are subsequently returned to the lexicon (Coseriu 1982, Laca 1986; “grammatikähnlich” in Coseriu 1973: 52); this determination is paragrammatical insofar as it is regarded as analogous to the grammatical relations of syntax, even if it is not included in such grammatical relations.

The meaning of *paragrammatical* can be understood if we consider the role attributed to grammar. For Coseriu (1982), this is a “technique du discours”, a general *ars* (*Kunst*) that has a language-specific organisation (it is *einzelnsprachlich gestaltet*: Coseriu 1977: 78). Grammar works in a threefold perspective: 1) the “material” grammar describes the structure on the expression (e.g., the form and the arrangement of elements in the Italian word group *il mio libro* ‘my book’); 2) the “functional” grammar identifies the functions that delimit each paradigm (e.g. *mio* is in the attribute paradigm - as in the case of *il mio libro* - or in the predicate paradigm, as in the case of *il libro è mio*); 3) the “relational” grammar analyzes the relationships between paradigms that have similar functions (e.g., *Romae* vs. *in urbe Romā* for the locative function). Designation is not involved in the functional grammar nor in the material grammar. It may appear in the relational grammar, but only in part (this occurs when equivalent designations are looked for, e.g., in *Rome* and *the*

capital of Italy). It should also be noted that the grammatical functions are used at the stage of the norm with designation tasks.

The attributive function can be used - among other things - to identify an object by indicating a characteristic; such is, for example, the use of *Land* in the German word group *Haus auf dem Land* 'house in the country'; instead, in *Landhaus* 'country house' *Land* indicates a quality, but it has not necessarily an identifying function (a building that has the characteristics of a country house can also be in the center of a city). In the first case (*Haus auf dem Land*) the relation is grammatical and is attributive; in the second case it is paragrammatical and is para-attributive ("attributähnlich", see Lang 1987: 176).

To find the functional types of lexemes obtained with the processes of word formation, it is necessary to identify the changes brought about by the implicit grammaticalisation that is represented by word formation. For this purpose, two criteria are applied, which can be formulated by means of the following two questions: 1) does the implicit grammaticalisation concern only one or two basic units? 2) is the grammatical function actual or inactual?

According to the first criterion, if there are two units in the base, the functional type is the composition. Coseriu (1977) distinguishes two subtypes: one is called "lexematic composition", which corresponds to the traditional composition. It has two lexemes in the base, and one of these is the *determinatum*: e.g., *Wind* determines *Mühle* in the German compound *Windmühle* 'windmill'. The other is called "prolexematic composition": in it of the two elements of the base has the nature of a pronoun (and is also called a "prolexeme"). He considers examples that are mostly *nomina agentis* or *nomina instrumenti* formed by verbs with the use of suffixes: thus, the French noun *calculateur* results from the composition of 'generic noun

pronoun' (approximately 'someone or something') with the verb *calculer* (Coseriu 1982: 94); the German noun *Leser* comes from 'jemand oder etwas' + *lesen*, and *Wecker* is obtained from 'jemand oder etwas' + *wecken*. An argument in favour of the idea of prolexical composition is the absence of other realisations for the generic pronominal element 'jemand oder etwas' ("das als solches im Deutschen sonst nicht realisiert ist": Coseriu 1977: 55).

Prolexical composition also makes it possible to explain the similarity of meaning between cases such as the German noun *Apfelbaum* and the French *pommier*. Coseriu rejects the traditional explanation, according to which Romance languages prefer derivation (they are supposed to be *derivationfreundlich*), while Germanic languages like composition (and are therefore considered *kompositionsfreundlich*). On the other hand, he observes that we are dealing with two very close types, "précisément deux types fondamentaux de composition" (Coseriu 1982: 15) which can coexist even in the same language, as the cases of the German words *Handelsmann* and *Händler*, *Lehrer* and *Lehrkraft* show.

If, on the other hand, only one unit is given, there are two other types of word formation, the modification (*Modifikation*) and the development (*Entwicklung*), which are distinguished by means of the second criterion.

A modification is characterised by an inactual function, which is so called because the basic lexemes do not enter the process with a syntactic function (i.e. they are taken as elements of a word class and not as constituents; they are *Redeteile* and not *Satzteile*). Typical modifications are obtained by prefixation: for example, the Italian adjective *inutile* 'useless' is obtained by applying the negation prefix to the adjective *utile* 'useful'; and in the Italian verb *prevedere* 'foresee' the prefix *pre-* modifies the verb *vedere*; but it is also possible to use suffixes, as *-ezza* in the Italian noun

fanciullezza ‘childhood’ (from *fanciullo* ‘child’). In German, the suffix *-in* can be used to form the noun *Königin* ‘queen’ from *König* ‘king’, or *-heit* forms *Menschheit* ‘humanity’ from *Mensch* (which corresponds to Lat. *homo* ‘human being’) (but the noun *Falschheit* ‘falsehood’, which results from the adjective *falsch*, is not a modification: it is a development, as we will see later). Evaluative suffixes such as the Italian *-etta* in *casetta* ‘little house’ (from *casa* ‘house’) are also used in modification.

On the other hand, in the type called development the function is actual, that is, it is analogous to the relations between the constituents of the sentence, such as subject or predicate. The actual function concerns lexemes taken in their behaviour as syntagms, so that the lexeme of the base enters the formation process with a syntactic function: for example, the Italian noun *bellezza* is developed from the adjective *bello* in the use of predicate; another example: the formation of the adjective *invernale* starts from the base (*d'*)*inverno* (from *giornata d'inverno* we obtain *giornata invernale*). In a first step, Coseriu distinguished two subtypes of development, conversion and transposition (Coseriu 1966: 214). He had taken up the concept of “tension” from Gustave Guillaume and considered conversion as a development “in tension I”, i.e. without “degradation”, i.e. semantic generalisation (e.g. in Italian from the adjective *vuoto* the noun *il vuoto* is obtained), while transposition constituted a development “in tension II”, i.e. with semantic degradation or generalisation (e.g. the German adjective *freundlich* ‘friendly, courteous’, from the noun *Freund* ‘friend’). The distinction was later abandoned, perhaps for general theoretical needs: Coseriu is interested in emphasising that word formation is explained by semantic needs within the functional language: “[...] il s’agit d’exprimer des fonctions plus génériques ou des fonctions

différentes de celles qui sont exprimées dans la grammaire de la langue respective” (Coseriu 1982: 16).

4. Concluding remarks. Semiotic and social instances in word formation

Coseriu pointed out that Bally’s analysis had dealt with cases of “semantic dilution” (“semantische Verdünnung”, in Coseriu 1977: 51; “déconcentration de la signification” in Coseriu 1982: 7). This property is considered essential for understanding the general function of the secondary paradigmatic structures of the lexicon. He assumes that word formation responds to the internal semiotic dynamics of the system, which emerge in the framework of a functional typology. The needs of functional language are not to be confused with the vague 'Benennungsbedürfnis', the 'need to name' new things and events in extralinguistic reality, which is often considered an external driver, a socio-cultural factor that accounts for the expansion of a language's lexicon. The functions expressed in the secondary lexicon can cope with the need, posed by the norm, to expand the designative domain. Thus, the autonomy of the functional language gives strength to the potential of language as a social institution.

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An Integral Linguistic View on the Lexical Integrity Principle and its Exceptions: A Case Study of Japanese Phrasal Compounds*

Keita IKARASHI

Nagaoka University of Technology, Japan

Ryohei NAYA

University of Tsukuba, Japan

Abstract: Japanese has the Lexical Integrity Principle (LIP) in its system, making it impossible for syntax to get into the intra structure of morphological elements like compounds: hence, instances like *[*taihenkookyuu*]-*hoteru* ([very high.class]-hotel), where the bracketed syntactic phrase causes incorrectness. Nevertheless, we observe compounds called phrasal compounds which violate the LIP. Although such compounds have been noticed in some studies, they have not been analyzed comprehensively. Eugenio Coseriu's theory, by contrast, enables us to reveal the nature of phrasal compounds. Based on his integral linguistic theory, this paper demonstrates that phrasal compounds in Japanese can be classified into two distinct types. The first type is part of the speaker's idiomatic knowledge. Specifically, it resides in the norm of Japanese, and succeeds in evading the exclusion by the LIP. The second type is judged as being incorrect at the historical level due to the LIP, but a contextual motivation at the individual level suspends such incorrectness, making it appropriate.

Keywords: Lexical Integrity Principle, compounds, suspension (sublation), norm, system

1. Introduction

Morphological theories, particularly in the generative framework, assume the Lexical Integrity Principle (hereafter the LIP), a principle where no syntactic operation is applied to the intra

* We express our sincere gratitude to Professor Emma Tămăianu-Morita for her invaluable comments and suggestions.

structure of lexical units (see Lapointe (1980) and Anderson (1992) for its often-cited definitions; see also Botha (1981)). Therefore, the LIP implies that phrases cannot appear within morphological complexes, such as compounds. For example, the compound *blackboard* cannot accommodate a phrase such as *very black* as its left-hand element, thus rendering *[*very black*]-board not permissible (cf. Shimamura 2014: 15) (the brackets indicate a syntactic phrase and the hyphen indicates the connection between left-hand and right-hand elements of a compound). Put differently, words exclusively serve as atoms in syntax, which is responsible for phrase structuring.

Lexical integrity has served as an important litmus test for the distinction between words and phrases in both descriptive and theoretical studies. Moreover, the LIP provides the basis for theorizing about the model of grammar (Trips & Kornfilt 2017 and Bosque 2020). For the lexicalist frameworks, the LIP is a part of the motivation for hypothesizing that words and phrases are formed in distinct, autonomous generative components (Di Sciullo & Williams (1987), Anderson (1992), Ackema & Neeleman (2004) among others); words are formed in the lexicon (or the word-formation component) and then fed into syntax. If a theory does not assume two distinct realms of words and phrases, its grammatical architecture needs to ensure lexical integrity in some way (see Booi (2009) for a constructionist view on the LIP, and Morita (2020) for the analysis of certain anti-LIP compounds in Distributed Morphology). Accordingly, the LIP has intrigued morphologists and, especially, those who work on the issues related to the morphology-syntax boundary (Bosque 2020), whether one argues for or against the autonomy of morphology as a word-formation component from syntax.

With this background, a wide range of languages have been

studied in terms of the LIP, and it has been found that while most morphological phenomena follow the principle, some do not. Among the languages with both phenomena is Japanese, to which our discussion will be devoted. To begin, let us consider the Japanese compound *kookyuu-hoteru* (high.class-hotel), for instance. As with the case of the English compound observed above, the non-head constituent of this compound cannot be replaced with phrasal elements such as *taihen kookyuu* (very high.class), where *taihen* modifies *kookyuu*; [*taihen kookyuu*]-*hoteru* ([very high.class]-hotel) results in an illegitimate compound (Kageyama 2016: 491). The same intended message should be conveyed in, for example, phrasal forms like [*taihen kookyuu na*] *hoteru*, where *na* is an inflectional ending of *kookyuu da* (high.classCOP) ‘be high class’ for its prenominal form; the bracketed part serves as a phrasal modifier for the noun *hoteru*.

The brief observation given above would be enough to posit the existence of the LIP in Japanese (cf. Ito & Sugioka 2002: 7-8). Nevertheless, there are cases which look incompatible with the principle. Kageyama (1993), for example, points out that some types of the right-hand constituent of compounds allow syntax to be involved in their intra structure: *tukuri* (making) is a word which accepts phrasal elements as its left-hand constituent when used as the head of the compound. The following instances sound natural even though the phrases, indicated by the brackets, show up in the structure of the compounds:^{1,2}

¹The compounds in (1) and (2) contain *-zukuri*, a phonological variant of *tukuri*, as a result of sequential voicing, or *rendaku* in Japanese, which voices the word-initial voiceless consonant of the second constituent of a compound (see Tsujimura (2014: 56-65) for an introductory outline of this phenomenon). Sequential voicing, though not observed in all types of compounds, serves as an indication of compound-hood.

- (1) [*utukusii mati*] -*zukuri*
 beautiful town -making
 ‘construction of a beautiful town’
- (2) [*umi-no mieru ie*] -*zukuri*
 sea-GEN see house -making
 ‘to build a house from which one can see the sea’

In (1), the adjective *utukusii* modifies the noun *mati*, which creates the noun phrase (i.e. a syntactic element); this noun phrase is compounded with *zukuri*. Additionally, the bracketed constituent in (2), part of the compound, is a syntactic phrase where *umi no mieru*, as a relative clause, modifies *ie*. These examples suggest that *tukuri* (or *zukuri*), if used as the head of a compound, allows syntax operations to access lexical units, creating obvious exceptions to the LIP. These compounds, which involve the syntactic phrases in their left-hand position, are called *phrasal compounds*, the phenomenon which is our prime focus for this study.

Some previous studies have dealt with such exceptions to the LIP (cf. Kageyama 1993, 2016, Nishiyama 2015, 2017). Insightful as they are, these studies do not show us a general picture of the phenomenon. They have not, for example, fully investigated how exceptions find a way around the limitation imposed by the LIP to come into being. Of course, they show us partial answers to these kinds of issues, but they are not comprehensive, and thus remain unsatisfactory. For example, a certain type of phrasal compound remains untouched by the reason that it is supposed to be licensed not by morphological, but by extralinguistic (i.e. pragmatic or

² The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of examples in this article: ACC = accusative, COP = copula, DAT = dative, GEN = genitive, NOM = nominative, PAST = past tense, SFP = sentence final particle.

rhetorical) factors.

For one thing, this situation would stem from the theories that these previous studies adopt for analyzing the phenomenon in question. These theories are basically morphological ones, and naturally zero in on, for instance, morphological rules. Thus, they presumably cannot help but put aside phenomena involving factors such as pragmatic or rhetorical ones.

To overcome this situation and get a better understanding of exceptions to the LIP, it would be inevitable to have recourse to linguistic theories covering the speaker's creative use of linguistic expressions as well as rules of individual languages. Among such linguistic theories is, we assume, Eugenio Coseriu's integral linguistic theory. Coseriu, as a part of the tremendously wide range of his works, painstakingly segments the speaker's linguistic competence which, without his theory, would be too complicated to grasp in its overall organization. We assume that his framework shows us a way that leads to the understanding of a general picture of exceptional cases to the LIP in Japanese.

Although adopting the integral linguistic view, we rely on insights and intuitions of previous studies, which particularly provide us with a good starting point to embark on a course of analysis. Thus, the next section overviews some analyses by previous studies, particularly Kageyama's (1993) and his later work (Kageyama 2016), classifying phrasal compounds into two general types and elucidating problems that should be tackled to achieve our goal. Section 3 then introduces some of Coseriu's ideas that give us a foundation to investigate phrasal compounds. Sections 4 and 5 deal with each type, introducing other notions crucial to our analysis. While Section 4 analyzes a type of phrasal compounds of which Kageyama gives a relatively detailed analysis, the other type dealt with in Section 5 is yet to be discussed at length. Thus, Section 5 allocates more space for the

discussion on the latter type than that on the former type in Section 4. Section 6 concludes this paper.

Lastly, we will touch on the scope of our discussion. The LIP violations are observed in other morphological complexes than compounds in Japanese (cf. Kageyama 1993, 2016). The target of this paper is, however, limited to phrasal compounds to make the discussion simple. This paper seeks to introduce a fundamental view to capture exceptions to the LIP on the basis of phrasal compounds. We assume that the perspective provided below would be applicable to other LIP violation phenomena, but pursuing such a possibility is left for future research.

2. Types of Phrasal Compounds: Insights from Previous Studies

Some studies point out that the Japanese morphology follows the LIP (cf. Ito & Sugioka 2002: 7-8), but related phenomena do not seem to have created a vigorous debate, and exceptional cases to the principle, targeted in this paper, have yet to be investigated comprehensively. Despite this situation, some studies provide us with significant insights in launching a comprehensive study on the phenomenon. Here, we will scrutinize Kageyama (1993), which, to our knowledge, is the first study to analyze exceptional phenomena to the LIP in Japanese at length.³ We also touch on his later work (Kageyama 2016) that also provide us with significant insights.

While Kageyama (1993, 2016) admits that Japanese follows the LIP, he provides a wide range of compounds violating the LIP. Some of the examples Kageyama (1993: 326) shows are as

³ To our knowledge, Nishiyama (2015, 2017) is another study which investigates phrasal compounds in Japanese in detail. However, his (theory-dependent) analysis has little direct relation to our concern here (see also footnote 8). We will merely touch on Nishiyama (2015, 2017) as necessary.

follows:⁴

- (3) [*maborosi-no tyosya*] -*sagasi*
phantom-GEN author -searching
'searching for the phantom author (of a book)'
- (4) [*huruhonya-no nyooboo*] -*gorosi*
used bookstore-GEN wife -killing
'a murder of the wife of a used bookstore's owner'
- (5) [*kanemooke-no moozya*] -*atukai*
moneymaking-GEN mad -treating
'treating (a person) as lucrepath'

(Example (5) is part of a sentence Kageyama shows.)

In (3)-(5), the left-hand bracketed constituents of the compounds include the nouns with the genitive marker *no* (e.g. *maborosi-no* (phantom-GEN) in (3)), which modify the subsequent nouns (e.g. *maborosi-no tyosya* (phantom-GENauthor) in (3)). The bracketed constituents, thus, are syntactic phrases, clearly violating the LIP.

Phrasal compounds like those in (1), (2) (in Section 1) and (3)-(5) can be found or created relatively easily. The LIP, however, puts a strict limitation on the creation of these kinds of compounds. According to Kageyama (2016: 496), while non-head (i.e. left-hand) constituents “can be replaced freely and productively by other phrasal expressions,” heads of phrasal compounds are restricted. This means that phrasal compounds can normally be created only from a certain type of head elements. For example, Kageyama (1993) assumes that *tukuri* (in Section 1), *sagasi*, *korosi* (whose *rendaku* form is *gorosi*), and *atukai*, atypical head words that allow a phrasal constituent to appear in the left-hand

⁴ Kageyama (1993) also provides a variety of suffixes which can be attached to phrasal constituents. These examples, however, are out of our focus, so that they are not dealt with here. See Kageyama (1993) for details.

position. Put differently, words other than these kinds do not inherently work as a head which takes a phrasal element as its left-hand constituent. A question arising here is why this type of word, despite the LIP, tolerates a syntactic phrase as its left-hand element. Kayeyama’s (1993) answer is as follows: words like *tukuri*, *sagasi*, *kokorsi*, and *atukai* are registered in the lexicon (as part of the speaker’s linguistic competence), or “lexically designated” (Kageyama 2016: 496), as words which, by nature, allow phrasal compounds when used as a head.⁵ In other words, we may say that *X-zukuri*, for instance, is remembered by Japanese speakers as a compound where a phrasal element can occur in X.^{6,7}

This is Kageyama’s main idea in dealing with phrasal compounds. Furthermore, he, though sporadically, shows us his

⁵ Kageyama (2016: 497) regards the head word *tukuri* as “suffix-like.” We will, however, simply treat it as a word.

⁶ Kageyama (1993, 2016) also provides superficially exceptional compounds to the LIP. For example:

- (i) *titi-no* *haka* *-mairi*
 farther-GEN grave -pray
 ‘visiting my father’s grave’

At first glance, *titi-no* (my father’s) modifies *haka* (grave), making the syntactic phrase *titi-no haka*. Thus, the compound in (i) appears to be a phrasal compound. Kageyama, however, does not regard it as a genuine phrasal compound. He assumes that *titi-no* modifies not *haka*, but the compound *haka-mairi*, to represent with brackets, *titi-no [haka-mairi]* (this analysis is, in fact, compatible with our intuition). Such a modification is, according to Kageyama, feasible because of certain morpho-semantic characteristics in Japanese. If this is the case, examples like *titi-no haka-mairi* fall outside our scope of investigation since no violation occurs in the assumed structure.

⁷ Nishiyama (2017), roughly speaking, seems to pursue the same course as Kageyama. He hypothesizes the construction [_{XP} Mod X]-X for phrasal compounds, mentioning that “instantiations of this construction are independent of the mechanism for compounding” (Nishiyama 2017: 164).

insightful intuition, which should be a good starting point to figure out what type of phrasal compounds exist and how each type of compound is created. Specifically, he mentions two types of his own judgment toward phrasal compounds.

First, he shows his judgment to examples like those given in (1)-(5), saying that they are never unnatural in Japanese (Kageyama 1993: 328); in other words, they sound like common expressions in Japanese. This assessment seems to lead Kageyama to assume that words like *tukuri* are registered in the lexicon as head words of compounds which can take a phrasal element as their left-hand constituent.

While examples which sound natural to his own ears are, as shown above, analyzed to some extent, Kageyama does not provide a detailed analysis to the other type of phrasal compounds, for which he gives a different judgment from the first type. Let us first look at the following examples (cited from Kageyama (1993: 327)):

- (6) Book title:
 [kokugo-ni haitta bongo] -ziten
 national language-DAT enter.PAST Sanskrit -dictionary
 ‘Dictionary of Sanskrit words getting into Japanese’
 (ed. by Tsusho Byodo, 1978, Sankibobussyorin)
- (7) Newspaper article (the underlined part is a phrasal compound):
[24ka moyoosareta bizin-kontesuto] -kaizyoo
 24th be.held.PAST beautiful.person-contest -venue
 de tenagedan-ga bakuhatu si...
 at grenade-NOM explosion do...
 ‘A grenade has exploded at a venue of beauty contest held on 24th...’
- (8) Utterance of an animated character (the underlined part is a

phrasal compound):

kore-ga [*Masuo-niisan-no* *tottekita*
this-NOM Masuo-elder.brother-GEN collect.PAST
matutake] *-gohan* *na* *no?*
matsutake.mushroom -rice COP SFP
'Is this rice dish cooked with the matsutake mushroom
collected by Masuo?' (*Sazae-san*, aired on TV)

All of the compounds in (6)-(8) contain syntactic phrases which consist of nouns modified by relative clauses. In (6), *kokugo-ni haitta* '(which) got into the national language (i.e. Japanese)' modifies the noun *bongo* 'Sanskrit,' making the syntactic phrase *kokugo-ni haitta bongo* 'Sanskrit words which got into the national language.' This syntactic phrase then is compounded with *ziten* 'dictionary.' The resultant compound, thus, violates the LIP. In (7), *24ka moyoosareta* 'be held on 24th' serves as a relative clause attached to *bizin-kontesuto* 'beauty contest,' a compound consisting of *bizin* and *kontesuto*. The resultant noun phrase *24ka moyoosaretabin-kontesto* 'a beauty contest held on 24th' then makes a compound with *kaizyoo* 'venue.' This compound also infringes the LIP. *Matutake-gohan* 'matsutake mushroom rice' in (8) is a well-established compound. Its left-hand constituent—*matutake*—is modified by the relative clause *Masuo-niisan-no tottekita* 'that Masuo collected,' resulting in the LIP violation.

According to Kageyama (1993: 328), these examples should be treated as isolated data rooted in the specific contexts and even may sound like "a slip of the tongue." In addition, giving examples like [*kani-ryoori to onsen*]-*koosu* ([crab-dishes and hot spas]-course) 'tour for crab dishes and hot spas' (p. 496), Kageyama (2016) states that "[t]heir usage [...] seems limited to catchphrases in fliers for commercial advertisement" (p. 497).

Judging from these descriptions, Kageyama would assume that head words like those in the above examples, unlike those in (1)-(5), are not registered in the lexicon and these phrasal compounds are temporarily created, sometimes, with certain stylistic effects.

To sum up, Kageyama's analysis and his intuitions, though only sporadically mentioned in his works, tell us that there are two types of phrasal compounds. One is that they are licensed by head words which, by nature, allow a syntactic element to appear in the left-hand position (e.g. *tukuri*, *sagasi*, *korosi*, *atukai*). These words should be registered in the mental lexicon. Phrasal compounds rooted in these words are judged as fully natural as Japanese; they do not feel as if they violate the LIP even though the violation is obvious. This type of phrasal compounds can be regarded as idiomatic in the sense that we can posit idiomatic frames like *X-zukuri* where X can be a phrase. Thus, we will call them *idiomatic phrasal compounds* or idiomatic PCs. The other type of exceptions is that they sound, in some sense, awkward and isolated and, in extreme cases, are judged to be a slip of the tongue. Unlike idiomatic PCs, the second type would not be created from any head words which are lexically designated as words allowing a syntactic constituent to be in the left-hand position. This would mean that the second type is only created for some context-specific purposes, and outside such specific contexts, this type of phrasal compounds would not come into being. These compounds are, as it were, nonce words. Let us thus call the second type *nonce phrasal compounds* or nonce PCs.⁸

Now that phrasal compounds turned out to be twofold, we

⁸ Unlike Kageyama, Nishiyama (2015, 2017) mainly pays attention to the left-hand constituent of phrasal compounds, providing semantic and pragmatic conditions which are imposed in creating such a constituent. Our classification of phrasal compounds is, however, based on characteristics of their head words. Thus, we will not get into details about his analysis here.

can get into details of their nature. Specifically, we will address the following questions which the above classification of phrasal compounds gives rise to.

Question 1:

According to Kageyama, head words of idiomatic PCs are lexically designated as words which can take syntactic phrases in their non-head position. We intuitively agree with his idea. However, there seems to be room for further investigation. That is, what relationship do the LIP and idiomatic PCs, both of which are mutually exclusive by nature, establish in the Japanese language? We will reach a better understanding of their nature if we clarify how idiomatic PCs establish their positions in the language by evading the restrictions of the LIP which plays a central role in word formation.

Question 2:

Nonce PCs, unlike idiomatic PCs, do not depend on any words allowing the phrasal compound structure, and are created temporarily in individual contexts. Since they are not legitimated by the Japanese language, nonce PCs truly violate the LIP. Kageyama merely shows his intuitions without analyzing the mechanisms which bring them about. Then, what makes it possible to create nonce PCs?

We will now introduce Coseriu's integral linguistic theory to answer these questions. After introducing some basic notions of his theory in the next section, Section 4 deals with idiomatic PCs, and answers Question 1. In doing so, we rely on the distinction between *Norm* and *System* made at the individual language level. Section 5 then answers the other question, clarifying how nonce PCs are created and licensed in discourse. It develops our analysis

by introducing *Suspension* (*Aufhebung*, sublation), which takes place at the discourse level.

3. Some Fundamental Notions of Integral Linguistics for the Analysis of Phrasal Compounds

One of the most crucial aspects of Coseriu's view (particularly in analyzing phrasal compounds) is that he makes a distinction between levels of language: the universal level, the historical level, and the individual level.

As Coseriu (1985: xxviii) puts it, “the «universal» aspects apply to language in general, to everything linguistic, the «historical» aspects to the language of a particular community, the «individual» aspects to certain bits of discourse or to kinds of discourses.” He gives clues to understand these levels from observations of our daily linguistic activity (see, for example, Coseriu (2007[1988]) for more exemplifications for each level):

When we say of a child that it cannot yet speak, we obviously refer to speaking as such, not to speaking a particular language. Likewise, when listening to a dialogue between persons whom we are unable to observe and whom we do not understand, we might, for instance, conclude that these persons are engaged in an argument. [These are examples for the universal level.] If we realize that English, French, or German is being spoken, we perceive the historical level of language, and if we understand that X utters, for instance, a request, gives an order, or asks a certain question, we perceive the individual level of language as discourse. (Coseriu 1985: xxviii)

In addition to the distinction of levels of language, Coseriu also makes a threefold distinction between points of view. The first distinction should be made “between language as activity and language as the knowledge underlying this activity, as the

knowledge which is in a «concrete» and «actual» way realized in this activity” (Coseriu 1985: xxvii). Activity, however, should be understood cautiously in that it is not carried out merely within the range of existing knowledge. Coseriu’s explanation of this is as follows:

Language as activity, which, by the way, must be understood as ‘speaking and understanding,’ does not exhaust itself in the mechanical realization or application of an already existing knowledge. It is in the proper sense ἐνέργεια, *actus*, that is, a creative activity, which makes use of δύναμις, an already acquired knowledge, in order, however, always to say something new, something in one way or another unique; and to the extent to which it is creative, inasmuch as it manifests ‘facts of speech’ in the narrower sense, it goes beyond its own δύναμις and produces new, virtual knowledge, facts which can be taken over in the δύναμις for further speech acts.

(Coseriu 1985: xxvii)

In addition to this distinction, language, which is a productive activity, should also be viewed from its product (or ἔργον). More specifically:

This can be observed most clearly and directly in the case of ‘texts’; a text is nothing but the product of a speech act or of a sequence of speech acts, or, rather: these speech acts themselves as a product, which can be either retained in memory or recorded and preserved in a material, in taped, written, or printed form. (Coseriu 1985: xxvii)

Coseriu finally combines the three levels and the three points of view into nine cells, as shown below, which, for instance, enable linguists to understand natures of their research targets (the table is cited from Coseriu (1985: xxix), with modifications).

POINTS OF VIEW			
LEVELS	ἐνέργεια Activity	δύναμις Knowledge	ἔργον Product
Universal	Speaking in general	Elocutional knowledge	Totality of utterances
Historical	Concrete particular language	Idiomatic knowledge	(Abstracted particular language)
Individual	Discourse	Expressive knowledge	Text

Table 1. Levels and Points of View in Coseriu's Model of Language

Although we have the overall structure of levels of language and points of view, only some parts are relevant to our discussion (i.e. idiomatic knowledge and expressive knowledge). The next section, thus, picks up cells that are crucially related to our analysis. For explanations about the other cells, see, for example, Coseriu (1985, 2007[1988]).

4. Idiomatic PCs and the Norm at the Historical Level

Kageyama (1993) proposes that head words of idiomatic PCs like *-zukuri* (or *tukuri*) of [*utukusii mati*]-*zukuri* 'to build a beautiful town' are registered in the lexicon. In other words, idiomatic PCs can be said to reside in the speaker's knowledge on Japanese, that is, what is shown in the scheme in Section 3 as the idiomatic knowledge, the knowledge of how one speaks a particular language (see Coseriu (2007[1988]: 83)). As mentioned earlier, we assume that his basic idea is, intuitively speaking, correct. For a better understanding, however, we can go further into details about idiomatic PCs. The LIP, as shown in Section 1, works as a

morphological rule in Japanese, which indicates that this morphological principle is at the historical level (or in the idiomatic knowledge). Then, why can idiomatic PCs be registered in the lexicon without being excluded by the LIP, which, by nature, are incompatible with phrasal compounds? This section seeks to identify the relationship between idiomatic PCs and the LIP, which makes it possible for idiomatic PCs to exist in the Japanese idiomatic knowledge (Question 1 in Section 2).

The answer to this question is straightforwardly provided by Coseiru's further distinction made at the historical level. The speaker's idiomatic knowledge can be further divided into: System and Norm.⁹ See the following citation from Coseriu (1967: 39-40):

The *norm* includes all that which is not necessarily functional (distinctive) in the "technique of discourse," but which is nevertheless stereotyped traditionally (socially), which is common and current usage in the linguistic community. The system, on the other hand, embraces everything which is objectively functional (distinctive). The norm corresponds, more or less, to language as a "social institution"; system is language as an ensemble of distinctive functions (oppositional structures). As a corollary, norm is a formalized ensemble of traditional actualizations; it includes that which "exists" already, that which has been actualized in linguistic tradition; system, on the other hand, is an ensemble of possible actualizations: it also embraces that which has not been actualized, but which is virtually in existence, that which is "possible," that is to say, that which can be created in accordance with the functional rules of the language.

The distinction between system and norm enables us to go into more details about the LIP and idiomatic PCs than the point

⁹In addition to System and Norm, Coseriu makes a further distinction: Type. For Type, see Coseriu (2007[1988]).

which previous studies have reached. The LIP is a principle or morphological rule which has to be followed in creating morphological complexes like compounds. It is thus reasonable to say that the LIP constitutes an essential part of the system of Japanese. Since it exists in the system, compounds with phrasal elements in them, as previous studies admit, are considered to be generally prohibited in Japanese.

However, there is a way to slip by the restriction by the LIP: the norm. There are cases that are realized in discourse in forms the system does not expect; they are permitted by norm. Among such cases is the English word *ox*, whose plural forms would be *oxes* from the system, but in effect is *oxen*; the norm chooses *oxen* as a plural form for *ox* (Coseriu 1975: 68-69, Coseriu 2007[1988]: 269-270).

We assume that the same is true for idiomatic PCs. Idiomatic PCs disobey the LIP. Nevertheless, it does not sound as conspicuous as an anomaly (contrary to nonce PCs) with no feeling of digression from the principle (of course, we can theoretically recognize such digression).¹⁰ In other words, idiomatic PCs digress from the system but are correct realizations in discourse. This feature is similar to examples like *oxen*. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that idiomatic PCs are established in the Japanese norm—a form “which has been actualized in linguistic tradition,” or which is an earlier model used repetitively (see Coseriu (1975: 85)). The answer to Question 1 in Section 2 is, thus, as follows: the LIP works in the Japanese system, while idiomatic PCs are put in the Japanese norm.¹¹

¹⁰ See the following citation from Coseriu (2007 [1988]: 81-82) for a related explanation: “Das korrekte Sprechen fällt als solches nicht auf; es realisiert den Nullwert der bloßen Entsprechung.”

¹¹ There is another type of phrasal compounds which should be associated with the Norm. Kageyama (1993, 2016) provides us with the following example:

5. Nonce PCs as a Phenomenon at the Individual Level

5.1. General Discussion

Unlike idiomatic PCs, for which Kageyama (1993, 2016) provides us with a good foundation to identify their nature, nonce PCs have not been given enough analyses, only to find themselves designated as an isolated phenomenon, or a mere slip of the tongue. Thus, here we will allocate much more space for their investigation than in Section 4.

Unlike idiomatic PCs, nonce PCs do not consist of head words which, by nature, allow syntactic phrases to appear in the left-hand position: the left-hand syntactic constituents in (6)-(8) in Section 2 are not productively replaced by other syntactic phrases. Moreover, nonce PCs sound like, as reflected in their name, a nonce word. This indicates that nonce PCs are not a part of the idiomatic knowledge, or specifically the Norm. Thus, the norm provides nonce PCs with no foundation to elude the restriction imposed by the LIP. That is why Kageyama (1993), as shown in

-
- (i) [akai hane] -bokin
red feather -fund.raising
'a Red Feather drive for charity'

(Kageyama 2016: 495, with slight modifications)

Akai hane, the left-hand element of the compound, constitutes a phrase with *akai* modifying *hane*. Thus, the compound in (i) is, strictly speaking, a phrasal compound. However, *akai hane* is a fixed expression referring to a symbolic red feather for a certain kind of charity (see also Nishiyama (2017:164)). Although we have a similar expression, [*midori-no hane*]-*bokin* (green-GEN feather-fund.raising) 'a Green Feather drive for charity,' the left-hand element of the compound in (i) cannot be replaced freely with other phrasal expressions, such as *[*kuroi hane*]-*bokin* (black feather-fund.raising) and *[*kiiro-no hane*]-*bokin* (yellow-GEN feather-fund.raising). Unlike head words of idiomatic PCs like *tukuri*, *bokin* is not a head word which takes any phrasal element in the left-hand position. Thus, [*akai hane*]-*bokin* as a whole is assumed to exist in the norm as an idiomatic expression.

Section 2, provides us with his different judgments toward each type, according to which idiomatic PCs sound natural as Japanese while some nonce PCs sound like “a slip of the tongue.” However, it is necessary to think more carefully about the judgment on nonce PCs for greater understanding. The examples in (6)-(8) in Section 2 are from a book title, a newspaper article, and an utterance by a character of a TV cartoon. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that these expressions are created carefully and purposefully. If so, they cannot be thought to be a mere slip of the tongue. Now, a contradiction is surfacing: nonce PCs sound awkward in the sense that they violate the LIP, but for some reason, are still appropriately used in a particular context. Informally speaking, nonce PCs are ‘bad’ at the historical level, but ‘good’ at the individual level. Here, Coseriu’s classification of the speaker’s judgment is helpful to make the issue clearer.

Coseriu distinguishes three kinds of judgments, each of which corresponds to the three levels of language. See the following table (which is cited from Coseriu (1985: xxxiv) with modifications):

LEVELS	JUDGMENTS
Speaking in general (Universal)	congruent / incongruent
Concrete particular language (Historical)	correct / incorrect
Discourse (Individual)	appropriate / inappropriate

Table 2. Three Types of Judgment

The judgment corresponding to the universal level is assumed to be irrelevant, at least, to the discussion in this paper. We will thus limit ourselves to the judgments that correspond to the other two

levels: correct / incorrect and appropriate / inappropriate. “«[C]orrect» utterances are those that agree with («conform to») the corresponding idiomatic knowledge” (Coseriu 1985: xxxiv). Appropriateness, on the other hand, is considered to be “the suitable realization of [...] expressive knowledge in speech” (Coseriu 1985: xxxiv), “knowledge about how certain discourses should be constructed in certain situations” (Coseriu 1985: xxix).

Coseriu’s classification of judgment makes it possible to make the intuitive form of our characterization of nonce PCs (i.e. it is ‘bad’ at the historical level, but ‘good’ at the individual level.) into a theoretical one. That is, nonce PCs are incorrect, but appropriate. A question arising here is whether it is possible that incorrect expressions are used appropriately. The answer is yes. Take one example from Coseriu (1985: xxxv) and Coseriu (2007[1980]: 52). A native speaker might use his/her language incorrectly when talking with non-native speakers who are assumed to be unable to fully understand the speaker’s language. For instance, Coseriu (2007[1980]: 52) gives the German sentences *Du gehen?*; *du schon gegessen?*, consisting of infinitive and participle respectively. Examples like those given here are incorrect, but the incorrectness is considered to be necessary so that the non-native speakers can understand the speaker. In this sense, the examples are incorrect but regarded as appropriate. According to Coseriu, the incorrectness at the historical level is *suspended* at the individual level, so that incorrect expressions are appropriately used in the text (see Coseriu (2007[1988]: 176)). See the following citation for more detail about suspension (*Aufhebung*):

Texte folgen nicht unbedingt in jedem Punkte den Regeln einer Sprache; Abweichungen von den Regeln einer Einzelsprache sind immer möglich. Und was noch wichtiger ist: Diese Abweichungen werden in der Regel nicht als solche interpretiert, sondern sie

erscheinen als völlig annehmbar, wenn sie durch die Gestaltung des Textes oder durch eine Textfunktion motiviert sind. Es handelt sich dabei um eine sehr allgemeine Erscheinung, die man folgendermaßen formulieren könnte: Der Text kann Regeln der Einzelsprache aufheben, die dann in diesem besonderen Text nicht gelten, und zwar a) entweder schlicht wegen der traditionellen Gestaltung des betreffenden Textes oder b) aufgrund einer Motivation, die wir in dem betreffenden Text finden.

(Coseriu 2007[1980]: 50)

We are now in a position to clarify the mechanism to construct nonce PCs. As noted earlier, nonce PCs are incorrect due to the LIP, a deviation from a rule of the Japanese language. However, some contextual motivation suspends the incorrectness, making appropriate nonce PCs, or making such a deviation tolerable. This is the mechanism to create nonce PCs—the answer to the second question given in Section 2 (though still too abstract at this moment).

Thus, to reach a deeper understanding of this type of phrasal compounds, it is necessary to look into the contexts in which they appear and identify contextual motivations that ensure their appropriate use. Below, we would like to observe nonce PCs at length, revealing contextual motivations leading to suspension. Before starting with the observation, however, we should be careful not to misinterpret the role of suspension. Suspension does not eliminate incorrectness arising from the violation of the rule (it does not change incorrectness into correctness); incorrectness is still recognizable in appropriateness. See the following citation:

Das Wort *aufheben* soll hier im übrigen so verstanden werden, wie es in der Philosophie verwendet wird. “Aufgehoben” heißt also nicht etwa “eliminiert”; das Nicht-Korrekte bleibt im Angemessenen durchaus als solches erkennbar, es wird nur

to be exact. His explanation then led the comedian to create [*hobo senzyu*]-*kannon*, where *hobo* modifies *senzyu* (i.e. about one thousand arms) to make the expression accurately reflect the number of the deity's arms.

The LIP would prohibit such a modification, as observed in *[*taihen kookyuu*]-*hoteru* ([very high.class]-hotel) in Section 1, but in fact, this compound in (9) is easily accepted in this specific context, although it still sounds funny or, intuitively speaking, weird in some sense. It would be unreasonable to suppose that *X-kannon*, where *X* can be a phrase, is part of the idiomatic knowledge, because we do not know and productively create other cases where *kannon* is compounded with phrases. In this sense, [*hobo senzyu*]-*kannon* is not handled in the same way as compounds like *X-zukuri*, an idiomatic PC; it is assumed to be temporarily created in this specific context with the suspension of the incorrectness caused by the LIP violation.

The contextual motivation which triggers off the suspension would be to elicit laughs from the audience, a common job of comedians. The comedian uttering the compound supposedly wanted to accurately describe the number of the deity's arms by responding to the monk's explanation so that he could make others laugh by jokingly denying others' belief that *senzyu-kannon* is an accurate compound as a name for the deity. Furthermore, the weirdness of the compound itself, caused by the violation of the LIP, might contribute to eliciting laughs. These motivations at the individual level are assumed to suspend the deviation from the LIP at the historical level, making the incorrect compound sound appropriate.

5.2.2. Informativeness

The example in (9) is created on the basis of the well-established compound *senzyu-kannon* by adding the modifier to the left-hand

element. A similar process is observed in Kageyama's (1993) nonce PC examples given in Section 2, which are repeated below:

(10) Book title:

[*kokugo-ni haitta bongo*] *-ziten*
 national language-DAT enter.PAST Sanskrit -dictionary
 'Dictionary of Sanskrit words getting into Japanese'

(ed. by Tsusho Byodo, 1978, Sankibobussyorin)

(11) Newspaper article (the underlined part is a phrasal compound):

[*24ka moyoosareta bizin-kontesuto*] *-kaizyoo*
 24th be.held.PAST beautiful.person-contest -venue
de tenagedan-ga bakuhatu si...
 at grenade-NOM explosion do...

'A grenade has exploded at a venue of beauty contest held on 24th...'

(12) Utterance of an animated character (the underlined part is a phrasal compound):

kore-ga [*Masuo-niisan-no tottekita*
 this-NOM Masuo-elder.brother-GEN collect.PAST
matutake] *-gohan na no?*
 matsutake.mushroom -rice COP SFP

'Is this rice dish cooked with the matsutake mushroom collected by Masuo?'
 (*Sazae-san*, aired on TV)

In these examples, the compounds without the modifications of the left-hand elements are, or sound, fixed: *bongo-ziten*, *bizin-kontesuto* or *bizin-kontesuto-kaizyoo*, and *matutake-gohan*. These basic compounds, thus, would have been initially available to the addressers to convey their messages. However, we suppose that these initially-available compounds might not be satisfactory by themselves in view of the communicative purposes (although the

contexts with which Kageyama (1993) provides us are not enough to completely understand the addressers' intentions). For instance, *bongo-ziten*, with no modification, is more likely to sound as if it dealt with Sanskrit words in general, not Sanskrit words becoming Japanese. *Bongo-ziten*, as it is, would not be an appropriate title if it focuses on Sanskrit words getting into Japanese. In other words, *bongo-ziten* is less informative as the reader cannot appropriately imagine its content. The modification of the left-hand element is one of the solutions to overcome this defectiveness. Thus, ensuring informativeness of the compound is assumed to be a motivation which gives rise to the suspension in (10).¹³

The same is true for (11). (11) is from a newspaper article. Such an article would be expected to be informative enough to specify, for instance, when the event depicted happened. [*Bizin-kontesuto*]-*kaizyoo* would provide relatively enough information as it identifies the place where the incident (i.e. the explosion of a grenade) happened, but still, readers might wonder when it happened, the information which newspaper readers usually expect to be provided. This expectation is assumed to serve as a

¹³Although we checked the content of the book after knowing the title through Kageyama (1993), the interpretation and explanation in the text are based on our intuition or guess at the time of reading the book title without looking into the content (particularly the preface of the book). The author, however, seems to give the title in a different process. According to the preface of the book, the author learned Sanskrit through university lectures held by a professor with profound knowledge on related fields. At that time, the professor was regularly writing, for a magazine, papers titled "kokugo-ni haitta bongo"(Sanskrit words getting into Japanese). Impressed with the work by the professor, the author seems to have come up with the book title. If so, *kokugo-ni haitta bongo* is a fixed, idiomatic phrase for the author, and hence, it serves as, as it were, a (idiomatic) word rather than a phrase. We will, however, place importance on our interpretation in the text, not the author's (presumable) intention, because there is normally no room for readers of the book, like us, to know that *kokugo-ni haitta bongo* is an idiomatic phrase at the moment of seeing the title.

motivation which leads to the suspension of the incorrectness caused by the modification of the left-hand element, leading addressees to regard this nonce PC as appropriate.

Informational defectiveness in (12) is more obvious. *Matutake-gohan*, a quite familiar compound, would not make sense by itself in this particular context. We guess that the animation character would recognize that the food in front of him/her is matsutake mushroom rice, so that the question *Kore-ga matutake-gohan na no?* ‘Is this matsutake mushroom rice?,’ which lacks the modification for the left-hand element of the compound, would become absurd because he/she asks about what he/she already knows. Of course, if using phrases, not compounds, the speaker has a wide range of choices to ask whether the rice dish served for the speaker is cooked with the matsutake mushroom collected by Masuo. For example:

(13) [*Masuo niisan-no tottekita matutake* *de tukutta*] *gohan*
with make.PAST

Here, *detukutta* is inserted immediately after *matutake*, meaning ‘(which someone) cooked with matsutake mushroom.’ The resultant bracketed relative clause then modifies *gohan*. The overall structure in (13) is, thus, no longer a compound, but a noun phrase headed by *gohan*. But phrases like that in (13) do not seem to designate matsutake mushroom rice, but rather another kind of rice, probably because the speaker avoids the compound *matutake-gohan*, which is more than likely to be used in referring to the food in question. To avoid these problems which arise by following the tradition at the historical level, he/she is likely to have no choice but to use the already-existing compound (i.e. *matutake-gohan*) and violate the LIP with the left-hand element modified by the relative clause. This situation would motivate the

appropriate use of the incorrect phrasal compound.

5.2.3. Irony

So far, we have pointed out that joke and informativeness serve as motivations to bring about suspension. We can, however, find another contextual motivation which makes it possible to create nonce PCs. One of the authors remembers that he previously uttered a roughly similar expression to the following example:

- (14) [*notte nai basu*]-*dai-o harau ka*
ride.on not bus -fare-ACC pay.for SFP(doubt)
'I'll pay for the bus fare even though (my son) hardly used
the bus (in this month).'

He has a son who went to preschool. The school owns a bus which he used to go there. Every month, the parents paid for the bus fare. In a certain month, the son missed a lot of days of school because of a bad cold. They, however, were asked to pay for the same amount of bus fare as usual even though he had less opportunities to use the bus. When learning of this fact, the author jokingly told his wife something like that in (14) with ironic intent. The compound *basu-dai* 'bus fare' was used repeatedly in talking about bus fare in those times, so that using this compound would have been natural in this context. At the same time, however, the author wanted to put his ironic intent on the compound, coming up with example (14) with the LIP violation (*nottenai*, a relative clause, makes a noun phrase with *basu*). Normally, compounds like that in (14) will be turned down as incorrect because of the LIP, but the ironic (and humorous) intention suspends the incorrectness, making the compound in (14) sound appropriate.

5.2.4. Naming

The nonce PCs we have dealt with until now are assumed to be created by adding modifications to the left-hand elements of fixed compounds. However, nonce PCs do not always build on such fixed compounds. See the following example:

- (15) [*kozakana to aamondo*] *-senbee*¹⁴
small.fish and almond -rice.cracker
'rice cracker with small fish and almond flavor'

Without any specific contextual clue, one seems likely to interpret the sequence of the words to describe two kinds of foods, namely *kozakana* 'small fish' and *aamond-senbee* 'almond-flavor rice cracker'—a structure which has no violation of the LIP (*to* 'and' serves to coordinate the word *kozakana* and the (ordinary) compound *aamondo-senbee*). The example in (15) is, though, a name for the product of rice cracker, which forces us to regard the example in the following fashion. The coordinate conjunction *to* 'and' combines *kozakana* 'small fish' and *aamondo* 'almond,' forming the bracketed syntactic constituent *kozakana to aamondo*. This constituent then is compounded with the right-hand element *senbee* 'rice cracker,' resulting in a phrasal compound. Unlike nonce PCs like [*hobo senzyu*]-*kannon*, which contains the pre-established compound *senzyu-kannon*, the nonce PC in (15) does not rely on such a fixed compound; the entire compounding structure is newly constructed in discourse.

If one wants to avoid the LIP violation, the genitive marker *no*, for example, is available to refer to the same object: [*kozakana to aamondo no*] *senbee*, where the bracketed part is a genitive

¹⁴ A rice cracker product by *Iwatsuka Confectionery* (available as of July 4, 2021)

phrase modifying *senbee* and which is no longer a compound, but a syntactic phrase. Although this phrase is preferable as it is constructed in conformity with rules in the Japanese system, it is assumed to be less preferable as a name for the product. Bauer (2003: 135), for example, states that compounds, but not phrases, have the naming function:

Like derivatives, compounds provide names for entities, properties or actions. This is opposed to providing descriptions, which is the function of syntax. A derivative like *judo-ist* and a compound like *judo-man* both provide a name for the person concerned, as opposed to a syntactic phrase like ‘an expert in judo,’ which provides a description.

Japanese shows a similar tendency (cf. Shimamura 2014). The phrase [*kozakana to aamondo no*] *senbee* might, thus, be too descriptive to sound like a name for goods (of course, it is possible to name goods by deviating from this general tendency on purpose). There might have been two needs in creating the name for the product in question: on the one hand, the title must sound like name, not description, and, on the other hand, two distinct features of the product—*kozakana* and *aamondo*—should be expressed in one name. Since we intuitively understand these contextual demands for naming of the product, the nonce PC [*kozakana to aamondo*]-*senbee* sounds appropriate, suspending its incorrectness.

5.2.5. Peripheral Cases of Nonce PCs

The last example differs from the above examples in the structure of the left-hand constituent. This time, we will first show the example in Japanese characters:

(16) 回転しない寿司¹⁵

This expression refers to the style in which Japanese sushi restaurants serve sushi to customers. Traditionally, a sushi chef directly serves sushi to customers who sit at the bar and order what they want to eat. But recently, another style has become famous in Japan. Sushi restaurants install round conveyor belts on which small plates with sushi items on them come close, one after another, to customers sitting next to the conveyor. If they feel like trying sushi items passing in front of them, they pick them up from the conveyor belt; this style, contrary to the traditional one, does not require customers to order the sushi they want to eat (but they can order sushi items if, for example, they do not find their favorite items on the conveyor). This style is usually called 回転寿司 *kaiten-zushi* (go.round-sushi), which means that sushi items go round (on the conveyor belt).¹⁶

However, the sushi restaurant chain creating the advertising phrase in (16) has tactfully combined the traditional and the *kaiten-zushi* styles, developing a new one. The restaurant installs conveyor belts (though not round) as ordinary *kaiten-zushi* restaurants, but sushi items do not go round on the belts continuously and randomly. Instead, customers, as in traditional sushi restaurants, order items which they want to eat (but unlike traditional restaurants, customers do so with a touch-screen tablet installed to each table). Then sushi plates are brought to the

¹⁵ An advertising phrase of the sushi restaurant chain *Uobei*. The data was collected by one of the authors at one of the chain restaurants in Tsukuba city on May 14, 2019. The data is, though the design is slightly different, also on their website (<https://www.genkisushi.co.jp/uobei/store/list.php>, accessed July 5, 2021).

¹⁶ The form *zusi* occurs here because of sequential voicing, or *rendaku*, of *susi*. See the following discussion.

customers' table on conveyor belts.¹⁷ The restaurant looks like a *kaiten-zushi* restaurant, because of which the example in (16) would include the words 回転 and 寿司 in its structure, but sushi items “no longer go round” randomly on the conveyor belts, which is reflected in the phrase 回転しない *kaiten si nai* (go.round do not) ‘(something) does not go round.’ Thus, example (16) nicely reflects the notable characteristics of the new style.

In addition, we need to further consider its structural characteristic before starting to discuss the morphological aspect of the example. 回転しない寿司 provides us with two possible structures due to Chinese characters used in it: 寿司 can be pronounced in two different ways depending on the overall structure. When 寿司 is pronounced as *susi*, the example is not a compound but a syntactic noun phrase. Furthermore, in this case, *susi* has its own accent, as shown in (17), which suggests that *susi* is an independent word, not part of a compound (the location of accent is marked by “ ’ ”).

(17) [kaiten si nai] susi’ ([go.around do not] sushi)

This structure, which is not a phrasal compound but a fully legitimate noun phrase with a relative clause (i.e. *kaiten si nai*), is not relevant to our discussion. On the other hand, the other possible structure is a subject of our interest. We can also pronounce 寿司 as *zusi*, a *rendaku* form (see fn. 1), which indicates that 寿司 constitutes part of a compound. The accentuation pattern also follows ordinary phonological rules of compound, as follows:

¹⁷ More accurately, Shinkansen bullet train-style containers on conveyor belts bring sushi to customers.

(18) [kaiten si nai?]-zusi

When the head word of a compound consists of one or two mora(e), the accent of the compound is normally put on the last mora of the left-hand constituent; if such a head word has its own accent, the word loses it in compounding (Kubozono 1995). In addition to *rendaku*, the accentuation pattern suggests that the compound structure is at issue in pronouncing 寿司 as *zusi*. *Susi* is a two-mora word whose accent is originally put on the last mora, as shown in (17). However, *zusi* in (18) loses its accent. Additionally, the accent falls on the last mora of the left-hand constituent, that is, *kaiten si nai* (go.around do not)‘(something) does not go around.’

If [*kaiten si nai*]-*zusi* is a compound, the LIP violation is obvious since *kaiten si nai* is a syntactic phrase with the light verb *si* ‘do’ and the negation *nai* ‘not.’ Note in passing that this nonce PC is a quite peripheral case in phrasal compounds. According to Kageyama (2009: 518-519), the non-head constituents are “categorially limited to NPs with adjectival or other modifiers [as in, for instance, (1)-(5)], or coordinated NPs” as in (15). On the other hand, *kaiten si nai* in (16) is a verbal phrase, which makes example (16) an extremely rare nonce PC. This irregular form would be possible precisely because of nonce PCs. They would be capable of accommodating even non-NP element, such as a verbal phrase, through the power of suspension, in which contextual motivations, we assume, overcome structural irregularity as well as incorrectness.¹⁸

¹⁸ We are not sure if the sushi restaurant chain actually intends the syntactic phrasal structure or the phrasal compound structure with 回転しない寿司. At least our first interpretation at the time of encountering it is, however, the latter (of course, some may prefer the former interpretation). For one thing, the visual design made us think it to be a phrasal compound. 回転寿司 is written

We are now in a position to begin to analyze a contextual motivation to create [*kaiten s inai*]-*zusi*, a nonce PC. The new sushi restaurant style in question, as noted earlier, has two remarkable features.

The sushi restaurant looks similar to ordinary *kaiten-zusi* restaurants since it installs conveyor belts; it is, however, different from them in that sushi items on small plates do not go around on the conveyor belts randomly and continuously, but customers, as in traditional sushi restaurants, order sushi they want to eat. Using *kaiten* and *zusi* in the advertising phrase is a good tactic because these words together remind customers of the normal *kaiten-zusi* style.

Furthermore, the negation of *kaiten* with *si nai* plays a significant role in implying the big difference from this ordinary style: contrary to one's expectation, sushi items, though a kind of *kaiten-zusi* restaurant, do not go around, which we guess makes customers wonder how sushi is served and ideally attracts their interest.

The intention to bring about these rhetorical effects is

horizontally. *しない* in relatively smaller font size is then vertically inserted in between 回転 and 寿司. Because of the vertical insertion of *しない*, the distance between 回転 and 寿司 is kept to be at a minimum and thus they could still have strong semantic and structural relation (if *しない* were put horizontally, such distance would be much longer and, concomitantly, semantic and structural relation between 回転 and 寿司 might wane). Such a design led us to guess that 回転寿司, a fixed compound, serves as a base form, to which *しない* is added later; hence, 回転寿司, even though its sequence is broken into two parts by *しない*, still retains the status as a compound. Again, we do not know which structural interpretation is originally intended by the creator of the phrase. Yet, we value the fact that we, as a recipient of the message, intuitively came up with the phrasal compound structure, as in the way explained here.

assumed to give a strong motivation to suspend the incorrectness caused by the insertion of *sinai* between *kaiten* and *zusi*, thus making the compound appropriate.

6. Conclusion

The LIP, a principle where no syntactic operation is applied to the intra structure of lexical units, is established in the Japanese system, because of which, as previous studies point out, Japanese normally does not allow morphological complexes to include syntactic constituents in their structures. Closer observations, however, result in finding exceptional cases to the LIP. One of the exceptions is a phrasal compound. Although few studies have been devoted to its analysis, Kageyama (1993, 2016) provides us with precious insights for the investigation of phrasal compounds. Based on his research, we divided phrasal compounds into two general types: idiomatic phrasal compounds and nonce phrasal compounds. Both of these types are presumably difficult to be analyzed comprehensively in the frameworks previous studies adopt, as their focus is on the morphological system.

We, therefore, introduced Coseriu's integral linguistic theory, on the basis of which we developed our analysis. While the LIP is in the system, idiomatic PCs belong to the norm. Thus, they succeed in eluding the restriction by the LIP, and as a consequence, idiomatic PCs, as Kageyama (1993) notes, sound fully natural as Japanese. On the other hand, nonce phrasal compounds are incorrect at the historical level, but appropriate at the individual level. We proposed that this characteristic is attributed to the fact that they are created by suspending incorrectness through appropriateness, at the individual level. Our proposal was attested by the several examples where motivations such as joke, informativeness, and irony play crucial roles in causing suspension.

Phrasal compounds in Japanese have not been fully analyzed, and as a consequence, their general picture remains unclear. However, we demonstrated that an integral linguistic view casts new light on them, clarifying their position in the speaker's linguistic knowledge and their relation to his/her creative activity in discourse.

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**¿Qué elementos integran el concepto de norma en
lingüística? Una extensión teórica del concepto
coseriano de *norma*
(What Elements Integrate the Concept of Norm in
Linguistics? A Theoretical Extension of the Coserian
Norm)**

Michelle RODRÍGUEZ CHIW
University of Guadalajara, Mexico

Abstract: One of the theoretical legacies left by Eugenio Coseriu in works such as *Synchrony, Diachrony and History* is the establishment of a concept of norm derived from linguistic theory and applicable to the theory of language. Through this, the contributions of the same made it possible to understand the norm as an act and a product that comes from the intrinsic relationship between the individual and his language. With the present text it is desired to contribute to the theoretical extension of the Coserian concept of norm in linguistics by contrasting it with that of Luis Fernando Lara, with the aim of observing the way in which both linguistics *per se* and sociolinguistics can study this scientific term in its application in multicultural fields of study. For this, linguistic attitudes will be used to incorporate new ways of conceiving the norm in social contexts and the way in which they delimit and reduce the linguistic system.

Keywords: norm, system, linguistic attitudes, Coseriu, sociolinguistics.

Resumen: Uno de los legados teóricos que dejó Eugenio Coseriu en obras como *Sincronía, diacronía e historia* es el establecimiento de un concepto de norma, proveniente de la teoría lingüística y aplicable a la teoría del lenguaje. A través de esto, los aportes del mismo contribuyeron a entender la norma como un acto y un producto que surge de la relación intrínseca entre el individuo y su lenguaje. Con el presente texto se desea contribuir a la extensión teórica del concepto coseriano de norma en lingüística contraponiéndolo al de Luis

Fernando Lara con el objetivo de observar la forma en que, tanto la lingüística *per se*, como la sociolingüística pueden estudiar este término científico en su aplicación en campos de estudio multiculturales. Para ello se utilizarán las actitudes lingüísticas para incorporar nuevas formas de concebir la norma en los contextos sociales y la forma en que delimitan y reducen el sistema lingüístico.

Palabras clave: norma, sistema, actitudes lingüísticas, Coseriu, sociolingüística

La revisión bibliográfica de Eugenio Coseriu fue el principio de una inclinación hacia el análisis del concepto de norma y las descripciones lingüísticas posteriores hechas sobre la notable base de este lingüista. Al observar una continuidad de la teoría de Coseriu en la obra de Luis Fernando Lara —quien ha dedicado parte de sus investigaciones a desarrollar el concepto de norma y normatividad respecto a un sistema dado sobre un principio histórico— inquirí acerca de los fundamentos más representativos con la finalidad de comenzar una búsqueda que dejara entrever la morfología de la norma y su operación con relación a la sociedad, sus hablantes y el uso.

A propósito de la lectura de la teoría coseriana, aparece una de las hipótesis fundamentales de este trabajo que es observar a la actitud lingüística como parte primaria y constitutiva de la norma, además de comenzar a integrar diversos aspectos, desde el *acto* hasta el *producto* en la determinación del concepto que nos atañe y la posibilidad de un examen interdisciplinario. En continuidad con lo anterior, se realizó una exploración teórica del término que mostrara nuevas exigencias para reemprender su estudio y colocar premisas que den lugar a otros cuestionamientos e indagaciones relativos a éste. Las problemáticas decisivas se asocian con la poca flexibilidad de una teoría en lingüística que admita la observación sin particiones con carácter autónomo (como es el caso de las dicotomías) y que, asimismo, acoja el territorio de lo

social como concluyente en el estudio aplicado del lenguaje. Por consiguiente, los objetivos estarán encaminados a la comparación de Coseriu y Lara para dar razón de un concepto de norma que se aproxime a las consideraciones de más amplitud en ambos, las cuales coadyuven en la estructuración norma, a partir de la adhesión de un inventario descriptivo de sus componentes.

1. El concepto coseriano de norma lingüística

El rigor del legado de Eugenio Coseriu en la teoría lingüística ha permitido trasladar las hipótesis planteadas en una esfera metalingüística a su aplicación en la teoría del lenguaje. El caso concreto que estudiamos en el presente texto está vinculado con la teoría conceptual de la norma en lingüística *per se*, sin una pretensión, por el momento, de observar la factibilidad de su aplicación en el análisis de las lenguas naturales. Mientras tanto, podemos decir que los aspectos teóricos delimitados por el lingüista rumano en torno a este concepto serán considerados como un marco teórico para la incorporación posterior de nuevos elementos que parten de la comparación de los postulados hechos por éste y otros autores.

A manera de prolegómeno, es importante considerar que el concepto de norma incorporado en la teoría coseriana es, indiscutiblemente, una de las contribuciones, dentro del marco estructural del siglo XX, que ha permanecido hasta la actualidad debido a la nitidez de sus proposiciones, así como a la introducción de una perspectiva que, si bien sigue siendo estructural, está vinculada con la caracterización idealista que se le ha dado a Coseriu en las últimas décadas y mediante la cual se rompió un paradigma ortodoxo que imposibilitaba conjuntar una visión integral entre la diacronía y la sincronía en los estudios lingüísticos.

Ahora bien, adentrándonos en el cometido inicial, es de relevancia clarificar que, como bien se puede observar en la lectura de *Sincronía, diacronía e historia* (1978); *Sincronía, diacronía y tipología* (1968) y *Sistema, norma y habla* (1982), el presente concepto nace como una apertura a la rigidez de la oposición entre *lengua y habla* de Saussure; se efectúa una crítica y se comienza un nuevo camino para entender la delimitación descriptiva de dos términos esenciales que no son, de manera necesaria, opuestos, como se les había advertido con antelación.

La norma de Coseriu, como bien menciona Luis Fernando Lara (2009, p. 41) se ha interpretado de manera ulterior como un concepto descriptivo debido al condicionamiento estructural ya mencionado. La definición desarrollada por Coseriu se asocia con claridad a lo anterior al recurrir a la interpretación de este vocablo como lo *normal* en lugar del *deber ser*, que simbolizan las normas sociales: “hay elementos que no son *únicos y ocasionales*, sino *sociales*, es decir, *normales y repetidos* en el hablar de una comunidad” (Coseriu, 1982: 55). Bajo esta premisa y dado el hecho de que “La lengua no existe sino como sistema abstracto de actos lingüísticos comunes, o concretamente registrados o acumulados en la memoria de los individuos hablantes” (Coseriu, 1982: 13, 14), podemos disponer de información para aludir a que, aunque el mismo autor asegura que la lengua y la norma no se encuentran en el mismo plano, existe una relación intrínseca entre el funcionamiento del sistema (véase como lengua o dialectos en distintos niveles de abstracción) y la norma; ya que este último término fue definido por él como un “sistema de isoglosas” que poseen una incidencia abstracta de rasgos.

El lingüista toma en consideración la diacronía de la lengua para poder comenzar con una enmarcación de la norma. Para ello, fuera de la insistencia positivista en desvincular el pasado de un idioma con el fin de sólo atisbar su uso sincrónico, Coseriu voltea

la mirada hacia un pasado histórico y cultural que permite comprender el presente y, por lo mismo, la forma en que actúa la norma a través de lo fijado de manera tradicional en las comunidades lingüísticas.

[...] y en este sentido se puede decir que la lengua se construye diacrónicamente y funciona sincrónicamente; mas tal distinción no implica ninguna separación real, puesto que en la lengua el funcionar (“sincronía”) y el constituirse o cambiar (“diacronía”) no son *dos momentos*; sino *uno solo*. (Coseriu, 1968: 273)

En coalición con lo anterior, se vislumbra en los textos colocados a principio de este apartado, una contribución más respecto a la norma, concretamente la implicación de un *acto valorativo* cuando el individuo observa lo históricamente dado en el conjunto de hablas que, de acuerdo con Eugenio Coseriu, componen un sistema o distintos sistemas. Y, por otro lado, existe una reticencia a una perspectiva sociologizante que reduzca a este objeto de estudio a su implicación social dentro de una comunidad, puesto que esto construiría una paradoja en la teoría del lingüista, quien antepone el acto comunicativo individual al sistemático, sin que esto signifique contradecir que, cuando se habla, se habla una lengua.

[...] la norma, en cambio, es un «sistema de realizaciones obligadas» [...] consagradas social y culturalmente: no corresponde a lo que «puede decirse», sino a lo que ya «se ha dicho» y tradicionalmente «se dice» en la comunidad considerada [...] (Coseriu, 1978: 55)

No hay, entonces, para Coseriu, una norma tradicional, sino una norma de lo tradicional, la cual funciona como una abstracción de elementos “normales” que responden a los sistemas

de isoglosas mediante el conocimiento procedente del hablar de una comunidad en cada nivel de abstracción, y en donde se efectúa una valoración de lo que es “correcto” por medio de una comprobación de lo que se dice (y no de cómo se debería decir) en la propia lengua empleada. La norma, pues, existe para el rumano en un plano histórico y en uno psíquico correlacionados en tanto que ambos responden a un cúmulo de tradiciones lingüísticas de lo que se dice y se ha dicho en el hablar social de manera común dentro de sincronías sucesivas que, por supuesto, son codependientes.

2. Luis Fernando Lara y la continuación de la norma

Como parte de la continuación de la teoría lingüística en torno al concepto de norma, Luis Fernando Lara retoma las bases establecidas por autores como Bohuslav Havránek, Eugenio Coseriu y Klaus Heger sobre el mismo. Para ello, en textos como *El concepto de norma en lingüística* (1976) y *Lengua histórica y normatividad* (2009) desarrolla el esbozo de un nuevo concepto de norma que se adecúe a la visión global referida por el lingüista rumano, la cual busca unir diferentes aspectos que no sólo se ciñan a la base estructural de la ciencia del lenguaje, sino a un panorama donde el monismo de diacronía y sincronía de Coseriu pueda aportar un análisis realista que no sucumba de manera exclusiva a ideales tentativos, sino que posibiliten la apertura de una aplicación que supere los límites de la ontología ideal, correspondientes, a su vez, a la descripción lingüística de las nociones teóricas.

Uno de los elementos fundamentales en el comienzo de este acercamiento es la reiteración de los condicionamientos germinados en el estudio sincrónico de la norma en donde las intervenciones sociales e históricas eran desechadas con rigidez cientifista, por lo que, en palabras de Lara “una y otra tendencia

científica exigen un nuevo acercamiento al fenómeno con puntos de vista integrados” (Lara, 1976: 108). El lingüista mexicano enuncia, mediante palabras dichas de forma anterior por Heger y Havránek, que “la norma no es un fenómeno como el uso o el sistema, sino que su campo se sitúa sobre ellos, en un orden metalingüístico precientífico” (Lara, 1976: 108). De esta manera, localiza al concepto de norma en lo que Russell referiría como lenguaje que se dirige a las palabras, es decir, el metalenguaje, diferente, naturalmente, al plano donde el sistema y el habla subyacen.

Luis Fernando Lara parte, entonces, de que la norma es, pues, un modelo que tiene cierto grado de obligatoriedad, el cual interviene en la actualización de un sistema lingüístico a través de la selección de realizaciones que se consideran adecuadas en una comunidad debido a un desarrollo preliminar en la tradición histórico-social del mismo sistema. Como podemos percibir, ase de Coseriu la envergadura de la diacronía y la implicación de un acto valorativo que apele a la conciencia lingüística existente en los hablantes y en los profesionales de la ciencia del lenguaje. Sin embargo, éste se refiere al concepto como a un modelo y no como a un sistema en sí mismo, con realizaciones comunes.

Con el objetivo de esclarecer en qué punto se logran integrar las distintas tendencias científicas, menciona, a manera de deducción, que “no es la sociedad por sí sola la que condiciona a las normas lingüísticas, pero tampoco es el sistema lingüístico en sí mismo el que da lugar a la *norma*” (Lara, 1976: 117). Así, ratifica que lo normal es el resultado de la actualización efectuada por la norma y no a la inversa. Al considerar lo antedicho en conjunto con la premisa de que tanto para Coseriu como para el presente lingüista existe una valoración por parte del hablante, es cuando una nueva aportación es manifestada por Lara: el concepto descriptivo de norma no es más que un ideal, puesto que toda

actualización conlleva cierto grado de obligatoriedad social e histórico, carente de objetividad, lo que permite afirmar que toda norma prescribe, mediante “lo dicho”, “lo que debe decirse”.

Al tomar en cuenta lo citado en el párrafo anterior, se realiza una apertura en donde la norma lingüística (aquella vista como descriptiva) y la norma institucional (aquella vista como prescriptiva) tienen en común el puente que es, *de facto*, el grado de obligatoriedad. De este modo, Lara distingue a ambas como normas inconscientes y normas conscientes para sugerir una distinción menos tajante que las posiciones fuera de la dicotomía entre lo objetivo y lo no objetivo, lo correcto, lo incorrecto, lo científico y lo pseudocientífico, pues, como hemos podido esclarecer, no detentan tal oposición.

De manera final, en este subapartado podemos decir que la norma de Lara establece como necesaria e indisoluble una acción valorativa. Esto, dentro de la mera descripción teórica, correspondería a la teoría lingüística; no obstante, su posible práctica en el análisis de la actualización ejercida en contextos reales podría suponer un aporte a la teoría del lenguaje, por eso su verificación superaría la reflexión filosófica e, incluso, metafísica para alojarse en un espacio utilitario de uso social en donde estén implicadas otras ciencias humanas que la enriquezcan con un carácter interdisciplinario y, no por ello, menos estricto.

3. Nuevas contribuciones al concepto de norma lingüística iniciado por Coseriu

Comenzaré por considerar que nos referimos a *norma*, como lo hemos efectuado desde un comienzo, como a aquel concepto que, hasta el momento, podemos situar en una teoría lingüística de bases estructurales en donde existe una relación con otros conceptos que también contribuyen a entender —desde el análisis de una realidad en el mundo de las ideas, no en el de los hechos—

la ciencia del lenguaje. Cabe agregar que, si bien lo mencionó Hjelmslev: “Una teoría, en el sentido que empleamos, es por sí misma independiente de toda experiencia” (1971: 28), es también indispensable considerar que el objeto de estudio principal que nos atañe aquí son los textos lingüísticos que nos han proporcionado un horizonte con semejanzas y divergencias. Mediante una comparativa de los autores abordados, se abren nuevas posibilidades de acercarnos a la idea de este término empleado en la lingüística, que ambiciona a dar respuesta a contextos auténticos que traspasen la frontera entre la teoría lingüística y la teoría del lenguaje para la verificación de hipótesis concretas.

De forma subsecuente, partiré de la idea lariana de que la norma constituye un modelo de actualización con cierto grado de prescripción vinculado a un acervo histórico, cultural y, por supuesto, social, en donde colisionan el sistema lingüístico con el sistema social sin dejar de lado la característica psíquica que le atribuyó Coseriu, y la cual propicia comprender por qué Lara determina a esta clase de normas como inconscientes. Asimismo, la norma, para ambos autores, implica un acto valorativo por parte del hablante, a través del cual se lleva a cabo la actualización que hemos reiterado.

La implicación de un acto metalingüístico en donde se efectúa una evaluación nos habla de valores extrasistemáticos y, en la mayoría de las ocasiones, poco objetivos, que parten no sólo de lo tradicional, sino también de componentes como prejuicios y estereotipos que no responden a una verdad constatable, sino a una idea que se tiene del sistema, o lo que Lara (2009) definiría como idea de la lengua. Por lo anterior, es posible establecer una morfología de la norma que parta de deducciones originadas de lo que hemos estudiado y la revisión rigurosa de las apreciaciones (unas más puntuales que otras) de Eugenio Coseriu y Luis

Fernando Lara. Así pues, la configuración de la norma podría establecerse de manera tentativa como un ente tripartito compuesto por una actitud, un acto y un producto.

En primer lugar, el elemento de la *actitud* parte del hecho de que hay una recapitulación hacia la diacronía del sistema para observar qué es lo que se ha dicho, así como hacia la sincronía para percibir lo que se dice. Ante este examen perceptivo, el hablante adquiere una postura en donde confluye su conocimiento del sistema y, además, todos aquellos ápices implícitos debido a su condición de individuo social. Por lo tanto, asume una actitud lingüística, un concepto empleado en sociolingüística para referirse a una actitud social trasladada a contextos del lenguaje y en donde principios de hegemonía, estereotipos, prejuicios y arbitrariedad poseen un papel de envergadura a fin de comprender la relación entre el hablante, su lengua y su idea de la lengua. Citando de nuevo a Lara, “¿Hasta dónde es la estructura social en su totalidad la que delimita el conocimiento del mundo?” (1976: 129).

En continuidad con lo anterior, el segundo punto dentro de la morfología de la norma sería el *acto* “cuando se concreta un análisis más o menos consciente y se pone en práctica la función metalingüística en donde se valora qué es pertinente para los diferentes sistemas con distinto grado de abstracción (variantes y lengua)” (Rodríguez Chiw: 2021). Llegados aquí, es importante darle el peso que posee la realización de un análisis metalingüístico que verifique, mediante la actitud y el acervo, la manera en que se podría actualizar de manera idónea (según los parámetros instaurados en un grupo de hablantes) el sistema que emplean.

Por último, el *producto* sería el resultado de la actitud y el acto, es decir, la actualización misma reflejada en el uso. Los elementos constitutivos del uso variarían según la norma aplicada

en cada dimensión de variantes, sean éstas diastráticas, diafásicas o diatópicas. Hasta este punto, nos trasladamos de la revisión de una teoría lingüística más o menos abstracta a una teoría del lenguaje que podría adherirse a los estudios sociolingüísticos. El uso estaría supeditado ahora a la norma proveniente de una valoración social y no, de forma exclusiva, al sistema como un ente dado, con lo cual volveríamos a la concepción coseriana de que la lengua sólo existe como resultado de una serie de actos lingüísticos que, sin lugar a dudas, están condicionados de manera bilateral por todo aquello que la norma ha asentado como sistemático.

Como parte de la característica psíquica que Coseriu le atribuyó a la norma, la actitud lingüística, desde una perspectiva mentalista, comprende la base sustancial de la ejecución de la norma y el actuar normativo, debido a que las actitudes de esta clase se observan como la respuesta a una disposición mental respecto a elementos lingüísticos (usos o sistemas), mismas sobre las cuales Pérez Arreaza (2006: 107) afirma que poseen un carácter explicativo y predictivo, ya que hacen factible pronosticar el futuro de variedades y lenguas. Una actitud, favorable o no, actualiza al sistema. De alguna manera, podríamos afirmar que no se puede concebir una norma sin una actitud, lo cual da respuesta, a su vez, a este concepto como una conjunción de todos los momentos concebibles en el espacio temporal: pasado, presente y futuro. Los primeros con la certeza de ser cotejables y, el último, como un vaticinio basado en la regresión a la tradición histórica de lo lingüístico. Al cabo que la sincronía, así como el presente, son fugaces; por lo tanto, lo que pareciera sincrónico ha pasado a la diacronía y lo que solía ser una predicción, ahora puede ser el estado actual del sistema.

En definitiva, la teoría lingüística coseriana ha dejado un rico legado de premisas y conceptos desarrollados que abren

posibilidades de prolongación en el contexto del siglo XXI y sus nuevas proposiciones en torno a la ciencia del lenguaje. Entre las herencias más notables del lingüista rumano en el marco de este tema está la introducción de una armonía entre la diacronía y la sincronía, además de la sugerencia de que existe una participación apreciativa del hablante. La norma, abordada en el presente texto, posibilita comprender la estructura sobre la cual se erigieron otros conceptos elementales que muestran las relaciones lingüísticas y que, además, confluyen en una condición interdisciplinaria en la que trasluce la quimera de un análisis del sistema a través del sistema sin otras implicaciones igual de relevantes e inherentes. El monismo coseriano en cuanto a norma es una clase de resistencia científica que no olvida el antecedente filosófico y filológico del estudio del lenguaje, ya que los aúna y da razón de su dependencia.

Para concluir, el concepto de norma en lingüística es uno de los principios que todavía tienen mucho campo de estudio que explorar, pues, como vimos en líneas anteriores, tanto puede estudiarse en la teoría lingüística como en la teoría del lenguaje. Asimismo, representa un punto que esclarece las relaciones internas entre el uso y el sistema, las variantes y los usuarios, y da razón de cómo y por qué cambian las lenguas. En el caso específico del mundo panhispánico, la aplicación del concepto podría abrir un debate sobre la norma y la tradición normativa española que tanto han vertido en la percepción del español y, por lo mismo, han hecho propicias las actitudes lingüísticas más generalizadas en los países hispanohablantes, las cuales han configurado los comportamientos sistemáticos y las actualizaciones diversas.

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Coseriu in chiave metalinguistica (Coseriu in a Metalinguistic Key)

Vincenzo ORIOLES
University of Udine, Italy

Abstract: The present study aims to deal with several questions related to the frame of metalanguage, a construct that plays a crucial role in contemporary linguistic research, especially since Roman Jakobson gave to the term an amplified value compared to the original status assigned to it by the logicians. First of all, the author presents Eugenio Coseriu's original contribution to the characterization of the concept, distancing himself from Jakobson's position; emphasizing – according to its peculiar *modus operandi* – the reference to the tradition of past studies; proposing an articulated typology of metalinguistic utterances. Then an in-depth study of the metalinguistically relevant notions in Coseriu's work is given: in particular the Romanian linguist shows a preference for patterns founded on terminological three-way distribution. The conclusion focuses on the extent to which Coseriu's reflection on metalanguage and its devices have become part of his legacy to the scientific community.

Keywords: metalanguage; reflexiveness in language; terminology; history of linguistics; Eugenio Coseriu

1. Premessa. La centralità del metalinguaggio nella linguistica contemporanea

È stata la logica moderna ad introdurre la distinzione tra due livelli di linguaggio, da una parte il 'linguaggio-oggetto' e dall'altra, con un tecnicismo proposto da Alfred Tarski nel 1931, il *metalinguaggio* (traduzione dell'originaria forma polacca *metajęzyk*). Se il 'linguaggio-oggetto' ha carattere designativo per il fatto di assumere come proprio termine di riferimento la realtà esterna al linguaggio, il metalinguaggio, nell'accezione originaria codificata dai logici, è un linguaggio di secondo livello che ha la

funzione di stabilire il valore di verità e la non contraddittorietà delle affermazioni formulate in un determinato codice (può trattarsi di lingua storico-naturale o di linguaggio artificiale). Attraverso un percorso di progressiva estensione del proprio statuto¹, il metalinguaggio è passato ad indicare qualsiasi linguaggio che rifletta e compia asserzioni sul linguaggio stesso sia a livello consapevole che spontaneo. In definitiva un enunciato metalinguistico si realizza ogni qual volta il discorso sia orientato verso il codice c o d i c e e faccia del codice stesso l'oggetto della comunicazione.

2. L'apporto di Jakobson

È opinione condivisa che il progressivo transito del costruito dalla logica alla linguistica si debba essenzialmente alle figure di Louis Hjelmslev e Roman Jakobson. Se con Hjelmslev si resta ancora su un piano di forte astrazione², è soprattutto grazie al contributo di Jakobson che il concetto di 'metalinguaggio' supera la restrizione tecnica a "langue artificielle servant décrire une langue

¹ La storia della nozione, e il suo primo definirsi all'interno degli assiomi della logica formale, è ricostruita da Konrad Koerner (1995). Per una ricognizione ragionata delle valenze assunte dal costruito si rinvia alla Premessa (pp. 3-9) che introduce Orioles 2010; quanto alla specifica posizione di Coseriu sul tema del metalinguaggio cfr. anche Orioles 2017. La bibliografia citata nel presente lavoro non mira neanche lontanamente ad esaurire la vasta letteratura esistente sul tema, ma è funzionale a richiamare solo i titoli che più direttamente hanno fornito lo spunto alle considerazioni che seguono.

² La tematizzazione del metalinguaggio da parte di Louis Hjelmslev coincide con i *Fondamenti della teoria del linguaggio* (l'ediz. originale *Omkring sprogteoriens grundlaeggelse* è del 1943), in cui il linguista danese postulava la possibilità di una semiotica che incorporasse come piano del contenuto un'altra semiotica.

naturelle ...” (Dubois, s.v. *métalanguage*) assumendo una pregnanza tale da essere considerato elemento costitutivo di tutte le operazioni verbali in senso lato. Le formulazioni chiave di Jakobson sono quelle affidate a una comunicazione del 1956 (*Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem*), cui fa seguito la relazione presentata in occasione del Congresso internazionale dei linguisti tenutosi a Oslo (1957; atti pubblicati nel 1958) e infine, soprattutto, il saggio *Linguistics and Poetics* (1960) in cui Jakobson definisce i contorni della *metalingual function* nel quadro del suo modello funzionale del linguaggio. La funzione metalinguistica – osserva lo studioso – si attua ogni qual volta i parlanti vogliono assicurarsi che i loro messaggi siano stati compresi o magari chiedono spiegazioni su una parola ignota o mal capita.

Disponiamo qui di seguito in ordine cronologico i tre contributi fondazionali dello studioso.

1. (1956)

Far from being confined to the sphere of science, metalingual operations prove to be an integral part of our verbal activities (*Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem*, rist. in SW7: 117).

2. (1958)

... metalanguage, like object-language, is a part of our language behavior and thus a linguistic problem (*Typological Studies and their Contributions to the Historical Comparative Linguistics*, rist. in SW1: 523).

3. (1960)

A distinction has been made in modern logic between two levels of language, ‘object language’ speaking of objects and ‘metalanguage’ speaking of language. But metalanguage is not only a necessary scientific tool utilized by logicians and

linguists; it plays also an important role in our everyday language [...] Whenever the addresser and/or the addressee need to check up whether they use the same code, the speech is focused on the code, it performs a metalingual function. “I can’t follow you”; “What do you mean?” – asked by the addressee, or “Do you know what I mean? (*Linguistics and Poetics*, 1960: 36; rist. in SW3: 25).

2.1 La metalinguisticità riflessiva

Andando oltre Jakobson, si è nel tempo tematizzata la cosiddetta ‘metalinguisticità riflessiva’, vista come una delle proprietà costitutive delle lingue storico-naturali, tali cioè da distinguere il linguaggio umano dalla comunicazione animale e in generale dagli altri sistemi semiotici. Collegata con l’onnipotenza semiotica delle lingue, la ‘metalinguisticità riflessiva’ viene identificata, secondo l’efficace definizione di Tullio De Mauro, in “quell’uso che ... consente ai parlanti di interrogarsi e spiegarsi con le parole, circa le parole stesse e il loro senso” (De Mauro 2005: xix). Il passo successivo è stato quello di estendere la latitudine teorica del costrutto fino a comprendere quelle enunciazioni ‘ingenue’ sul linguaggio che ricadono nell’attività irriflessa etichettata da Antoine Culioli come *epilinguistica*. Va cioè messa in conto l’esistenza di “un’attività metalinguistica non cosciente del soggetto ... che interviene in tutti quei processi cognitivi di riflessione spontanea, non sistematica e non del tutto controllata, che i parlanti attivano durante l’analisi delle strutture di una certa lingua naturale” (De Palo 2016: 228-229): il riferimento va a quell’“uso continuo e informale di spiegazioni, commenti, glosse che caratterizzano il nostro parlare quotidiano” (De Mauro 2011: 161).

3. La tematizzazione del metalinguaggio da parte di Coseriu

Il metalinguaggio è anche uno dei temi cruciali della riflessione di Eugenio Coseriu che già in un intervento del 1956 (*Determinación y entorno*, 1955-1956: 54), singolarmente concomitante a quello di Jakobson, lo oppone al ‘linguaggio primario’ (sua reinterpretazione di ‘linguaggio oggetto’). Non è insolito che un determinato tipo terminologico faccia la sua apparizione pressoché simultanea presso due o più linguisti, indipendentemente l’uno dall’altro. Si tratta in genere di costrutti che, in quanto punto di addensamento di svolte concettuali ed epistemologiche, implicano il superamento di posizioni consolidate per aprire a nuove visioni e a transizioni da un ‘paradigma’ all’altro³.

La distinzione sarebbe stata organicamente enunciata due anni dopo in *Sincronía, diacronía e historia*:

... il parlare non è solo parlare di qualcosa, ma anche parlare del parlato, su ciò che è stato detto, spiegazione e chiarimento di ciò che è stato detto e, spesso, giustificazione del modo in cui è stato detto: il parlare corrente è contemporaneamente “linguaggio primario” e “metalinguaggio” (*Sincronía, diacronía e historia*, 1958; si cita dalla trad. it. del 1981, *Sincronia, diacronia e storia*, 58).

³ È questo il caso anche della nozione di *sincronia dinamica*, messa in circolo quasi all’unisono, durante gli anni Sessanta del XX secolo, da Roman Jakobson e André Martinet. Mi permetto di rinviare a *Contributo alla definizione del costrutto di ‘sincronia dinamica’*. Tra Martinet e Jakobson, in *Per la storia della linguistica*. Saggi in onore di Giorgio Graffi per il suo 70esimo compleanno, a cura di P. Cotticelli Kurras, numero speciale di «Blityri» Studi di storia delle idee sui segni e le lingue 8/1-2 (2019), 267-282.

L'antinomia ritorna in varie sedi tra cui ad esempio il cap. 12 delle *Lezioni di linguistica generale* (1973).

Una distinzione importante da fare nell'ambito della lingua e della tecnica linguistica è quella tra linguaggio e metalinguaggio. Con metalinguaggio si intende un linguaggio il cui oggetto è il linguaggio: ad esempio, il parlare delle parole, delle frasi. Il linguaggio, o per meglio dire il linguaggio primario, è un linguaggio il cui oggetto non è il linguaggio (Coseriu 1973: 133).

4. Originalità della visione teorica coseriana sul metalinguaggio

4.1 La presa di distanza da Jakobson

Va rilevato che Coseriu si dissocia da Jakobson laddove nega che si possa pensare ad una autonoma dimensione metalinguistica del linguaggio⁴. Nel respingere l'estensione del modello bühleriano delle funzioni linguistiche, Coseriu sostiene che quella 'metalinguistica' è parte della funzione denominata da Jakobson come referenziale e da Bühler come rappresentativa. Nella stessa misura in cui si può parlare delle 'cose', così è possibile che il contenuto dei nostri enunciati sia costituito dalla lingua stessa.

... la cosiddetta funzione 'metalinguistica' è un caso particolare della funzione obiettiva di designazione propria del linguaggio, della funzione 'referenziale' nella terminologia di Jakobson (Coseriu 1997: 92).

⁴ Facciamo riferimento all'ampio *Excursus* dal titolo *Roman Jakobson e l'estensione del modello bühleriano*, che si trova all'interno del § 2.1 di Coseriu 1997, 84-97.

4.2 Il ricorso alla tradizione

C'è un tema di fondo che scandisce l'intera riflessione coseriana sul linguaggio, ossia il richiamo sistematico al ruolo esercitato dalla 'tradizione' nel plasmare il pensiero moderno e il connesso ridimensionamento della discontinuità usualmente attribuita a orientamenti e costrutti che fanno parte del patrimonio novecentesco. Non fa sotto questo aspetto eccezione il metalinguaggio in rapporto al quale lo studioso romeno individua un antecedente nel pensiero tardolatino e medioevale chiamando in causa il *De Magistro* di S. Agostino e poi la dottrina delle *suppositiones* propria della logica scolastica⁵; si veda in tal senso soprattutto la *Storia della filosofia del linguaggio* (Coseriu 2010: 158-163 nell'ambito del cap. 8: Agostino).

4.3 Le articolazioni del sapere metalinguistico

Una originale distinzione praticata da Coseriu è quella che differenzia le operazioni metalinguistiche secondo due modalità (per un puntuale inquadramento cfr. Albrecht 2003).

4.3.1 Esiste in primo luogo un sapere metalinguistico universale, condiviso da ogni lingua, grazie al quale le forme linguistiche hanno un doppio statuto: qualunque elemento del linguaggio primario, oltre a designare realtà del mondo esterno, può essere cioè convertito in maniera tale da essere applicabile a

⁵ In base a tale dottrina viene operata una distinzione tra *suppositio formalis*, che sta ad indicare l'uso denotativo di un termine (come per 'Deus' in *Deus est omnipotens*), e *suppositio materialis* che ne evoca l'uso metalinguistico (quale si realizza impiegando la medesima parola 'Deus' in contesti del tipo *Deus est nomen latinum*). Nella prima la lingua è utilizzata in rapporto alla realtà extralinguistica; nella seconda si fa riferimento attraverso la lingua alla lingua stessa.

se stesso, come accade in enunciati del tipo it. “*casa* è una parola italiana”; “*casa* si pronuncia in toscano con la *s* sorda”; “*casa* ha quattro lettere”. Questa prerogativa non riguarda solo le parole ma si estende a tutte le grandezze linguistiche: dalle unità foniche (“la *b*”) a quelle morfologiche (quali le affermazioni e negazioni: “il sì” e “il no”), dagli elementi formativi (rappresentati in enunciazioni del tipo “-lich è un suffisso”) fino alle strutture sintagmatiche (“non conosco questa lingua” è l’esempio addotto da Coseriu 2010: 158). Lo studioso fa anche contestualmente notare che “per rendere riconoscibile questa forma di impiego” nella lingua scritta si ricorre di norma a particolari accorgimenti grafici.

4.3.2 Ma Coseriu postula una seconda dimensione del metalinguaggio, specifica delle singole lingue, comprendente le voci aventi pertinenza metalinguistica il cui valore oppositivo non è universale ma si definisce all’interno di una determinata lingua (ad esempio la distinzione *langue* : *langage* è ignota al tedesco e al russo che ricorrono ad un unico termine, rispettivamente *Sprache* o *jazyk*). Tali espressioni differiscono da quelle del primo tipo per il fatto di costituire grandezze stabili e costanti, non dipendenti dall’uso.

Esistono anche norme tecniche dell’uso metalinguistico proprie delle singole lingue. Così in particolare, richiamando una casistica fatta valere dallo stesso Coseriu (1973: 134-135), mentre in greco antico l’individuazione di ogni parola in quanto forma metalinguistica prevedeva il ricorso all’articolo nel genere neutro (ad es. to ἴσσιος), una delle regole del metalinguaggio in italiano è quella di adoperare le parole metalinguistiche senza articolo (si dirà pertanto “*fiume* è un sostantivo maschile”).

Per denominare questa seconda tipologia metalinguistica Coseriu si avvale dell’espressione *Metasprache der Sprache* o anche *Metasprache der einzelnen Sprachen* intendendo attraverso

tale dispositivo terminologico esplicitare come essa si radichi nelle pratiche comunicative specifiche delle singole lingue storiche⁶.

5. Il metalinguaggio della linguistica e la sua valenza storiografica

La terminologia linguistica, per la sua natura di linguaggio formalizzato, e la linguistica stessa per la sua prerogativa di descrivere e analizzare le categorie e le unità minime di una lingua storico-naturale, rappresentano la dimensione più strutturata del metalinguaggio: è stato detto che “la linguistica ha un singolare statuto epistemologico in quanto, unica fra le scienze, ha come oggetto se stessa o per meglio dire identifica oggetto e metodo d’analisi”⁷.

Si spiega così come mai, a partire dagli ultimi decenni del XX secolo, particolarmente in Francia e in Italia, l’interesse nei confronti del metalinguaggio si sia manifestato anche sotto forma

⁶ L’adozione da parte di Coseriu del binomio terminologico di cui al presente paragrafo risale, per quanto mi risulta, a Coseriu 1966, 190-191, dove figura in veste linguistica francese (*métalangage du discours* vs. *métalangage de la langue*). Per una tipologia più analitica e fine delle diverse valenze assunte dal costruito rimando ai lavori di Óscar Loureda Lamas (da ultimo 2009). Lo studioso assegna distinte denominazioni alle tre dimensioni del metalinguaggio che si manifestano in corrispondenza di ognuno dei tre livelli dell’attività linguistica fatti valere da Coseriu: al livello universale agisce il *metalinguaje*; al livello storico dei singoli idiomi la corrispondente *metalingua*; al livello individuale il *metadiscorso* (si veda in particolare lo schema di p. 328).

⁷ Il giudizio è stato espresso da A. Zamboni, *Tipologie dialettali e classificazione*, in *Linguistica storica e dialettologia*. Atti del Convegno della Società Italiana di Glottologia, Catania 3-5 ottobre 2002, a cura di S.C. Trovato, Roma, Il Calamo (“Biblioteca della Società Italiana di Glottologia” 27), 2004, 11-90; si cita dalla p. 20.

di una forte attenzione rivolta ai dispositivi terminologici⁸. Attraverso questa via, lo studio dei costrutti metalinguisticamente pertinenti diventa una operazione squisitamente storiografica protesa ad esplorare le matrici terminologiche di cui si alimenta la pratica scientifica dei linguisti, non tanto per se stesse ma in vista del nesso inscindibile che associa un determinato costrutto o termine tecnico alla teoria o modello che gli soggiace. Ogni scelta nomenclatoria non è mai neutra ma è sempre correlata con il ‘paradigma’ che l’ha ispirata, e si chiarisce rispetto a un quadro di sensibilità culturali che formano una fitta trama di connessioni e di opzioni proprie di una determinata epoca.

Al di là cioè dell’inventariazione dei dispositivi nomenclatori, ciò che conta è da una parte delimitarne lo statuto in sincronia e

⁸In Francia si può far decorrere questa istituzionalizzazione disciplinare dalla pubblicazione del volume *Le Métalangage* di Josette Rey-Debove (1978) cui fanno seguito gli studi e gli interventi di Sylvain Auroux e Bernard Colombat. A quest’ultimo studioso in particolare si deve il coordinamento di un progetto mirato alla costituzione di un *Dictionnaire de la terminologie linguistique* e di un *Corpus des textes linguistiques fondamentaux*. Un passaggio importante, come punto di coagulo e sede di riflessione su tale linea di indagini può essere fatto coincidere con il Colloque international di Grenoble sul tema *Métalangage et terminologie linguistique* (14-16 mai 1998), i cui atti sono apparsi nel 2001: si veda la segnalazione dell’evento, e della linea progettuale da cui esso muoveva, da parte di R. Bombi, «Incontri Linguistici» 25 (2002), 213-214. Per l’Italia va ricordata la sequenza dei programmi scientifici di rilevanza nazionale (noti con l’abbreviazione PRIN) avviati dalla metà degli anni Novanta del XX secolo, con *primum movens* Cristina Vallini: per una ricostruzione dello spirito informatore del network cfr. Bombi - Orioles 2019; per una sintetica informazione sulle attività messe in campo da tali progetti basti qui rimandare al sito <<http://www.orioles.it/progetti.htm>>. Proprio da un progetto PRIN (alludo a *Metalinguaggio della linguistica. Modelli e applicazioni*, che aveva avviato la sua attività nel 2011) prese le mosse, per impulso del gruppo di ricerca che lo formava e in particolare delle sedi di Udine e Milano, l’idea di organizzare a Udine il quarto convegno di linguistica coseriana i cui atti sono richiamati in bibliografia come Orioles – Bombi 2015.

dall'altra ripercorrerne gli sviluppi in diacronia. È stata infatti rilevata una doppia 'intraducibilità' del metalinguaggio della linguistica⁹ : a) una intraducibilità orizzontale, operante nell'ambito del medesimo 'stato di lingua' e dovuta al fatto che “i fenomeni riconosciuti da taluni ... indirizzi possono essere inesistenti per altri” e che una prospettiva elaborata in un indirizzo può rivelarsi del tutto impraticabile nei termini di un altro; b) una intraducibilità verticale, legata alle rivoluzioni scientifiche e alla connessa discontinuità, che “di fatto inibisce l'accesso alle vecchie teorie ed alle evidenze stesse dei vecchi dati”¹⁰. Sulla stessa lunghezza d'onda si colloca la raccomandazione di Koerner di adottare, ogni qual volta si descrivano “linguistic concepts, ideas or theories of earlier periods in the study of language”, un approccio

which does not misrepresent the meaning or intention of a given author while at the same trying to make the reflections of past epochs in the discipline accessible to the present-day practitioner in the field (Koerner 1987: 13).

6. Coseriu e il metalinguaggio della linguistica

Alla luce di una così marcata attenzione rivolta alla *metalinguisticità*, non sorprende in Coseriu il rigore e la scrupolosa cura riposta nello strutturare in modo serrato e stringente i tipi terminologici pensati per dare un 'nome' alle

⁹ Il rilievo è di Raffaele Simone, che lo sviluppa nel testo della relazione *Sull'utilità e il danno della storia della linguistica* presentata al Convegno della Società Italiana di Glottologia tenutosi a Verona nel 1999 (Simone 2001, 47-48).

¹⁰ Riporto qui una felice formulazione ripresa dal contributo *Rivoluzioni scientifiche e ricadute terminologiche* proposto da Cristina Vallini in occasione del Convegno *Dal 'Paradigma' alla Parola* (Vallini 2001, 73).

categorie costitutive della sua costruzione teorica. Va del resto a questo proposito ricordato che “la théorie du langage de Coseriu est un grand édifice bien structuré, une sorte de ‘système ou tout se tien’” (Albrecht 2012: 290) e che, non diversamente da altre figure di linguisti che hanno segnato la storia della linguistica, lo studioso romeno si mostra attento a esibire “un apparato di definizioni che deve legittimare la sistemazione da lui assegnata a ciascuno degli elementi da lui definiti, e le operazioni sono presentate esplicitamente in modo da essere verificabili a ogni tappa del procedimento”¹¹.

Un segno tangibile del vivo interesse di Coseriu per la coerenza del suo sistema concettuale e terminologico è dato dall’approntamento di una sorta di vademecum plurilingue la cui edizione a stampa è stata curata da José Polo (Coseriu - Polo 2007): si tratta di una preziosa lista dei “Wichtigere Begriffe und Termini/Conceptos y términos más importantes” che ritornano nell’opera di Coseriu e che ad avviso dello studioso spagnolo è stata stesa dopo il 1985. Per ciascuno di essi, suddivisi per blocchi tematici, l’Autore si preoccupava di codificare i corrispettivi interlinguistici nelle diverse versioni linguistiche in cui veniva usualmente edita la sua produzione (spagnolo, tedesco, francese: spiace che sia assente l’italiano) formulando “algunas orientaciones prácticas ... en relación con la traducción de sus estudios a diversas lenguas, con especial atención al francés, así como algunas normas en cuanto a la utilización de determinados rasgos lingüísticos generales (evitar parónimos interlingüísticos distorsionadores) y estilísticos en la edición de sus obras” (Coseriu – Polo 2007: 247)¹².

¹¹ L’osservazione appartiene a Émile Benveniste (1971: 17).

¹² Un altro indizio è la cura con cui Coseriu redige gli indici tematici che chiudono spesso le sue opere; si veda a titolo esemplificativo l’accurato *Indice*

6.1 L'idioletto metalinguistico di Coseriu

È noto che le grandi figure della linguistica vengono ricordate non solo per i concetti chiave ma anche per le parole-guida che rappresentano la ricaduta visibile dei loro modelli di analisi: ogni linguista ha da questo punto di vista delle personali propensioni al punto che si potrebbe parlare di idioletti metalinguistici. Se in particolare guardiamo alle scelte di Coseriu, balza subito agli occhi una differenza rispetto a Saussure: se infatti il Ginevrino era incline ai dualismi concettuali, Coseriu esibisce invece una predilezione verso strutture terminologiche fondate su uno schema ternario caratterizzabile come “hegeliano” (lo fa notare Ramat 2015: 25). Basti qui ricordare l'articolazione dell'attività linguistica in tre *piani* denominati rispettivamente *universal*, *histórico*, *individual*; menzioniamo poi il modello tripartito, ideato per evocare la variazione che attraversa i sistemi linguistici, formato dagli assi *diatopico*, *diastratico*, *diafasico*; ed ancora lo schema a tre elementi formato da *sistema*, *norma* e *parlare* elaborato come superamento dell'antinomia saussuriana tra *langue* e *parole* (in veste linguistica spagnola la triade concettuale suona come *sistema*, *norma* y *habla*).

7. Conclusioni. Il lascito terminologico di Coseriu

Il consenso che arride alla proposta teorica di uno studioso si misura anche attraverso il recepimento dei costrutti e dei tipi terminologici che ne sono espressione nelle pratiche metalinguistiche della comunità scientifica. Possiamo senz'altro affermare che, se la densità del modello coseriano resta

de materias y términos, posto in appendice alle *Lecciones de lingüística general* (Coseriu 1999: 329-343).

certamente elevata tra i suoi diretti continuatori, in molti altri casi i suoi tecnicismi sono entrati in circolo sotto forma di patrimonio collettivo, a volte quasi irriflesso, senza esplicito richiamo al loro onomaturgo. Ó. Loureda Lamas e R. Meisterfeld, autori di uno dei profili biografici e commemorativi pubblicati dopo la scomparsa del maestro romeno, colgono con efficacia questa disseminazione allorquando sottolineano che molte nozioni coseriane “forman parte de la cultura general de la lingüística, aunque esta familiaridad haya provocado a veces el olvido de su procedencia y, lo que es más importante, del edificio teórico en el que se encuentran” (Loureda Lamas – Meisterfeld 2007: 270).

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Eugenio Coseriu: Insights on Terminology

Cristina VARGA

Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Catholic University of l'Ouest, Angers, France

Abstract: Known for his extensive linguistic work and for his complex linguistic theoretical system, Eugenio Coseriu debates on different occasions the problematics of terminology as a secondary topic in different studies. Under the influence of the increasing visibility of terminology as a discipline, Coseriu's ideas on terminology published in the 1970s and 1980s have been used as a theoretical framework in terminology research and are quoted in several terminological studies.

This article aims to explore and systematize all ideas about terminology put forward in Coserian studies, answering the following questions: in which articles does Coseriu state his ideas about terminology? What are the main Coserian views on terminology? Which of Eugenio Coseriu's statements about terminology come close to current theories of terminology?

Our research is intended to provide a comprehensive inventory of Coserian statements about terminology and, in particular, about the place of terminology in the author's linguistic work.

Keywords: terminology, integral linguistics, Eugenio Coseriu, terminology creation, terminology theory.

Introduction

Many studies and scholars mention Eugenio Coseriu as one of the most important linguists of the 20th century, with a vast linguistic oeuvre and important theoretical contributions in various fields of linguistics. He is particularly recognised for his comprehensive linguistic theory, *Integral Linguistics*, for his encyclopaedic knowledge of classical, Romance and Slavic languages, and for his contributions to Romance linguistics studies. This broad theoretical framework also includes smaller studies discussing

topics such as translation theory and terminology, areas that have become highly visible in research in recent decades.

Although terminology is considered a discipline nowadays, it would be wrong to consider that Eugenio Coseriu dealt with terminology in this context, as can be seen from various studies. In the Coserian texts where terminology is referred to, the author is not dealing with a discipline but with terminology in the general sense of the term. Therefore, we can speak neither of a theory of terminology nor of terminology as a discipline in the context of Coserian linguistics. What can be said, however, is that Eugenio Coseriu enunciates ideas and theoretical distinctions about terminologies and nomenclatures that are necessary within the framework of integral linguistics and structural semantics. These ideas, because they are recurrently mentioned and described in depth, can give us an overview of the Coserian perception of terminology.

There are several reasons why we believe that a thorough and structured knowledge of the Coserians' ideas about terminology is necessary. First, the fact that some linguists have misperceived the subject and have come to claim that Eugenio Coseriu excludes terminology from the field of semantics (Niederehe 1974, 84-112) or that terminology is for Coseriu a mere nomenclature that is not part of natural language and is of no interest to linguists (Cabr  2015, 13).

As Coseriu himself states (Coseriu 1987, 175), this is a misunderstanding. Surprisingly, even though it was explained in 1987, the misperception continues to persist, thus Teresa Cabr 's (2015, 13) comments reflect it in an interview.

Another reason why we believe that a systematic presentation of the ideas stated about terminology in integral linguistics is useful is that, in some studies, Eugenio Coseriu's general conception of terminologies and nomenclatures is mentioned as a

theory. As the scholar did not deal with the study of terminology, but only mentions it in order to establish some theoretical distinctions in the context of structural semantics, we think it is erroneous to consider that there is a theory of terminology in Coseriu's research.

The present paper aims to examine the main concepts and ideas of Eugenio Coseriu on terminology discussed by the author in several studies published between 1970- 1980. These studies are completed by a posthumous study, published in 2016. Our main objective is to make an inventory and to systematize Coserian ideas about terminology according to the articles in which they have been published. We also believe that a comprehensive analysis of these studies will allow us to underline the contribution of Eugenio Coseriu to terminology in general.

In order to fulfil the objectives of this research we need to answer the following questions: *In which articles does Coseriu state his ideas about terminology? What are the main Coserian views on terminology? Which of Eugenio Coseriu's statements about terminology come close to current theories of terminology?*

Our research continues a series of previous published papers on Eugenio Coseriu's works on translation and terminology (Varga, 2009, 2019, 2020) and it is intended to provide a comprehensive inventory of Coserian statements about this topic within the author's linguistic work.

The outcome of this endeavour will allow us to understand more accurately Eugenio Coseriu's statements about terminology and the context in which they were debated within the more general framework of his linguistic work. Furthermore, bearing in mind that Eugenio Coseriu clearly does not refer to terminology as a discipline, as it is commonly seen nowadays, we consider that it is important to find out which ideas of the great scholar come close to modern theories of terminology.

Methodology of work

In order to achieve the objectives of the current research, a methodology of work has been developed to allow us to make a complete and systematized inventory of Eugenio Coseriu's ideas on terminology. This methodology involves a complex research process that has been developed in several stages that will be described in detail in this section.

The first stage of the research consists of creating the corpus as a source of quantitative and qualitative data allowing the analysis of terminology mentions in the Coserian texts. In spite of its small size, the corpus is not easy to build, as the texts in which Eugenio Coseriu discusses terminology are difficult to find. In order to ensure the accuracy of data used in our research, a detailed description of the corpus and of its qualitative and quantitative data has been provided in the following section.

The texts within the corpus have been arranged in the chronological order of their publication. Then, these texts were read and analysed, which allowed us to extract the statements related to terminologies, nomenclatures and terms.

The ideas extracted from each text have been structured in the form of a list and have been noted according to their appearance in the texts. The recurrent statements were also repeated in the list we created. This allows us to observe which statements are more frequently mentioned in Coserian texts. Also, the ideas extracted are not exact quotations from the Coserian works. They have been summarised to allow comparison with other statements in modern theories of terminology.

Then, the initial list of terminology concepts spotted in Coseriu's studies is compared with concepts currently used in different theories of terminology such as *General Theory of Terminology* (Wüster 1979), *Communicational Theory of*

Terminology (Cabré 1999), and *Sociocognitive terminology* (Temmerman 2000). This comparison allows us to observe from a quantitative and qualitative point of view all Coserian statements on terminology. Therefore, it will be possible to state whether Coserian views have a common perspective with the theories of terminology as a discipline.

The findings of our research will be detailed in the conclusions section of this paper. They will allow us to state based on qualitative and quantitative data which of the Coserian ideas about terminology are closer to modern theories of terminology and how relevant they are.

Corpus description

Corpora are widely used for quantitative and qualitative analysis of linguistic data in a broad range of fields. They allow the observation of certain linguistic phenomena, the systematic analysis of linguistic patterns, and the thematic identification of fragments within a large amount of texts. Corpora provide the researcher with more insights into the frequency and distribution of linguistic features, allowing for an accurate interpretation of the data set. In the current research, corpus analysis provides the possibility of total accountability of Eugenio Coseriu's statements related to terminology.

The corpus created to analyse Coserian ideas about terminology is small, but highly thematic and specific. It was created following the criteria of *representativeness*, *balance*, and *topic* (John Sinclair 2005).

The corpus consists of 3 studies, published in Spanish between 1970-1980 in different volumes: *Introducción al estudio estructural del léxico* (Coseriu, 1977a), *El lenguaje y la comprensión de la existencia del hombre actual* (Coseriu, 1977b), and *Palabras, cosas y términos* (Coseriu, 1987). A fourth

Coserian study mentioning terminology was posthumously published: *Semántica y metodología* (Coseriu, 2016), edited by Benjamín García'Hernández and Jairo Javier García Sánchez.

All the files composing the corpus were stored as PDF files, in a dedicated folder. The corpus consists of 33.931 words and 77 pages of texts written by Eugenio Coseriu in Spanish and published from 1977 to 2016. The exploration of the corpus allowed us to identify and extract a list of 53 statements on terminology. For more detailed quantitative data regarding each text in the corpus, see the following table:

Title	Year of publication	No. of words	No. of pages
<i>Introducción al estudio estructural del léxico</i>	1977	15048	29
<i>El lenguaje y la comprensión de la existencia del hombre actual</i>	1977	11592	32
<i>Palabras, cosas y términos</i>	1987	4631	6
<i>Semantica y metodologia</i>	2016	2660	10

All the texts are linguistic studies, published in academic volumes with a high level of specialisation of terminology.

Eugenio Coseriu on terminology

This section will present the results of the corpus analysis, namely the complete list of the Coserian ideas identified after the exploration of the corpus. The ideas are summarised in the order of their appearance in the text. The texts are arranged in the chronological order of their publication. The main topic of each text is described before mentioning the list of terminological

references. All terminological statements must be understood within the theoretical framework of integral linguistics.

Introducción al estudio estructural del léxico (Coseriu, 1977a) is the most quoted Coserian study on terminology. The main topic of discussion is the problematic of structural semantics. Within this topic, terminology is referred only as a necessary theoretical distinction, being mentioned in several pages of the study (see pages 96-105).

The article begins with an important distinction, Coseriu mentioning that the structural study of the vocabulary excludes the study of elements such as: *proper names*, *numerals*, and *terminology*. This statement that has given rise to misinterpretation was explained later in the study *Palabras, cosas y términos*. The following ideas about terminology were identified in this study:

- a) Scientific and technical terminologies are different from the general vocabulary;
- b) Terminologies represent the use of the language for different classifications of reality / sections of reality;
- c) Partially, terminologies are not structured, they are only nomenclatures;
- d) Terminological oppositions are exclusive (each term is unique in a classification);
- e) The terms are not linguistically structured within a specialized field, therefore there is no point in searching the linguistic structure of terms;
- f) The evolution of terms is influenced by the evolution of science, not by the evolution of language;
- g) Terminologies are subidiomatic (they refer to a limited context within an idiomatic community) and interidiomatic (they refer to the same context in different idiomatic communities);

- h) Structured terminologies are not structured according to linguistic norms but according to the requirements of science and technology;
- i) Terminologies are not semantic classifications but objective classifications of reality;
- j) Words are substitutes for objects (the meaning coincides with the designation);
- k) The significata of terminologies is known to the extent that the sciences are known, not to the extent that language is known;
- l) Terminologies belong to specific universes of discourse and can only be defined in relation to them;
- m) Popular terminologies and nomenclatures imply a traditional knowledge of non-linguistic character;
- n) Popular classifications may be different from scientific classifications but they are a form of knowledge;
- o) It is difficult to distinguish terminology;
- p) Language consists of a linguistically structured lexicon and a nomenclatural and terminological lexicon;
- q) A term can turn into a common word and vice versa;
- r) “*Grado de tecnicismo*” – level of specialisation of terms.

El lenguaje y la comprensión de la existencia del hombre actual (1977b, 41-54) is a study debating the relationship between language and the understanding of the modern man. The study aims to answer the question: To what extent can a correct understanding of language contribute to the understanding of man's existence today?

In this study, the author talks about the differences between language and scientific language and states that the latter is a possibility of language. The article describes the nature of terms and scientific language. Below are statements related to terminology found in the text:

- a) Every language is the basis and instrument of objective knowledge of the world;
- b) Science is a possibility of language, an objectively motivated structure;
- c) The language of science/technology is one of the possibilities of language;
- d) [Footnote] If everyday language is content with general, less precise answers, linked to an immediate or very concrete context, scientific language asks questions and expects concrete answers;
- e) Language classes/oppositions are inclusive, term classes/oppositions are exclusive (the oppositions they enter into are inclusive for words and exclusive for terms);
- f) Ordinary words can turn into terms;
- g) Scientific language is just a special use of ordinary language => ordinary language is not just an earlier phase;
- h) Science uses language but studies and analyses objects designated as such and its utterances are about those objects. Ordinary language does not provide data about the objects themselves, it can only represent them;
- i) The symbols of technical languages (mathematics) are not of a linguistic nature, they are abbreviations;
- j) The "technicalisation" of languages – (languages contain more and more technicisms/terms) is a phenomenon that has always existed in linguistic traditions.

Palabras, cosas y términos (1987, 175-185) is a study in which Eugenio Coseriu takes up the argument about “words - things – terms” because, as he mentions at the beginning of his study, some scholars seem to have misunderstood his distinctions about terminology. Two studies are mentioned, the first discussed being that of H.J. Niederehe, in which the author considers Eugenio Coseriu's statement that terminology is not part of

semantics to be wrong. Eugenio Coseriu points out the misinterpretation of his statement and again clarifies his point of view. In the second part of the article, the author discusses G Bossong's assertion that does not agree with the Coserian claim that in terminology meaning coincides with designation.

The list of mentions of terminology identified in this study is as follows:

- a) Terminologies are not included in structural semantics but are not excluded from semantics.
- b) In order to have solid foundations, structural lexicology must recognise its limitations and leave aside the study of terminologies and nomenclatures;
- c) A technical term can be converted into a common word and vice versa.
- d) In terminology, the meaning coincides with the designation.
- e) Mentions the presence of terms outside the scientific field, this includes fields such as: social, economic, industrial techniques, popular sciences and techniques.
- f) Not all scientific terms are defined (some are fully or partially defined) although they are definable.
- g) Terms are defined with respect to the "things" designated, whereas language meanings are defined by structural semantics.
- h) "Objective delimitation" = specialized language, "intuitive delimitation" = general language;
- i) Scientific and technical delimitations and linguistic delimitations are made on different levels.

Semántica y metodología (2016), the text published posthumously and edited by Benjamín García Hernández and Jairo Javier García Sánchez, in a volume published by Peter Lang in 2016, takes as its starting point an idea put forward by Bernard

C. Heyl in *New Bearings in Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1943, Yale University Press and published in 1944 by Oxford University Press. Based on the ideas put forward by Bernard C. Heyl as a starting point, Eugenio Coseriu takes up the discussion of the semantic aspects presented in the work and considers that they should be further developed.

In this article the author states that a radical inadequacy of the human sciences has not been so far satisfactorily highlighted, namely the problems of meaning and terminology. The following ideas about terminology were gathered in this study:

- a) the features of scientific communication = terms and their meanings;
- b) the concept of "semantic insufficiency" - involves the problem of meaning and terminology;
- c) In everyday communication semantic errors are not serious, but are not at all admissible in the scientific field;
- d) In the field of science, semantic errors are much more frequent in the humane sciences than in the exact sciences;
- e) Traditional meanings are much more present in the exact sciences and concepts, even if defined differently will always have the same semantic content. The reason is that exact sciences are the result of observation, experience and conventions, while the spiritual sciences are the result of individual speculations;
- f) Only in technical languages does a term have a definite meaning, based on tacit or explicit convention;
- g) The terms do not relate directly to objects but to concepts, to individual images of objects;
- h) In the spiritual sciences, a specialised language, semantic errors are not allowed, but on the other hand, terms do not have a usage established by convention;

- i) In scientific communication it is important to define terms before using them in order to avoid semantic errors;
- j) Before using a term, it is imperative that it be defined, which is methodologically very important;
- k) In specialised languages tacit conventions must be established for mutual understanding in the scientific field.

Ideas approaching the theories of terminology

Given the different perspectives from which terminology is dealt with in Coserian studies and in current terminology theories, we consider that a comparison between these theories is necessary in order to have a clear overview of Coserian statements that come close to these theories. This means not only that Eugenio Coseriu had very clear views on terminology but also that they are relevant nowadays.

The corpus analysis has resulted in the identification of 18 statements that approach the theories of terminology as a discipline. This confirms that Eugenio Coseriu's statements about terminology are consistent and up-to-date. Furthermore, these statements have been grouped thematically in order to have a more accurate perspective on them and to avoid repetition.

The first Coserian statement about terminology that we intend to discuss is the one that has generated misinterpretations, as a result of which some terminology specialists have expressed the belief that Eugenio Coseriu excluded terminology from the scope of linguistics and linguists. The following statement is at issue:

Las terminologías científicas y técnicas no pertenecen al lenguaje ni, por consiguiente, a las estructuraciones léxicas del mismo modo que las "palabras usuales": constituyen utilizaciones del lenguaje para clasificaciones diferentes (y, en principio, autónomas) de la

*realidad o de ciertas secciones de la realidad*¹ (Coseriu, 1977a, 96).

In this quotation the author states that scientific and technical terminologies are different from general language, a basic idea in theories of terminology as a discipline. The distinction between *general language* and *specialised language* is common to all theories of terminology as a discipline and is one of the principles mentioned recurrently since the earliest studies of terminology.

The items which are characterised by special reference within a discipline are the "terms" of that discipline, and collectively they form its "terminology"; those which function in general reference over a variety of sublanguages are simply called "words" and their totality the "vocabulary" (Sager, 1990: 19).

Another Coserian statement addresses *the subidiomatic* (they refer to a limited context within an idiomatic community) and *interidiomatic* (they refer to the same context in different idiomatic communities) *character* of terminologies. Once again, this approach is very close to the perspective of terminology as a discipline. This idea has also been argued by Teresa Cabré in the theoretical framework of the *Communicative Theory of Terminology*:

Defined as the process of compiling, describing, processing and presenting the terms of special subject fields in one or more languages, terminology is not an end in itself, but addresses social needs and attempts to optimize communication among specialists

¹ Scientific and technical terminologies do not belong to language and, therefore, to lexical structures in the same way as "common words": they constitute uses of language for different (and, in general, autonomous) classifications of reality or of certain sections of reality (our translation).

and professionals by providing assistance either directly or to translators or to committees concerned with the standardization of a language (Cabré, 1999:10).

As the text shows, by their very nature, specialised languages are only used in very precisely defined contexts and, due to their *interidiomatic character*, can ensure communication between *different linguistic communities* by means of *terminological equivalences* and *specialised translation*.

In the same line of thought, the definition of *specialised / special language* in the *Handbook of Terminology* (Pavel&Nolet, 2001, 115) also refers to the *subidiomatic character* of terminologies:

specialized language / special language: Natural language used by a community of subject specialists in a particular field of knowledge (Pavel&Nolet, 2001: 115).

Another observation about terminology that comes close to the main stream theories of terminology nowadays is Coseriu's statement that "*it is difficult to distinguish terminology*". This statement is in line with the *Communicative Theory of Terminology*, according to which:

Terms and words are similar and different at the same time. [...] From a linguistic point of view, a word is a unit characterized by having a phonetic (and graphic) form, a simple or complex morphological structure, grammatical features, and a meaning that describes the class to which a specific object belongs. A term is also a unit presenting the same characteristics (Cabré, 1998: 35).

or expressed differently within the same theoretical framework:

The difference between general language (in the sense of language common to all users) and special language is difficult to establish. (Cabré, 1998: 71)

Further on, the *Communicative Theory of Terminology* proceeds to describe the characteristics of terms in order to establish the necessary distinctions between terms and ordinary words using a theoretical framework which is specific to it. Coserian argumentation in this regard takes place within the theoretical framework of integral linguistics.

Two other Coserian statements about terminologies and nomenclatures come very close to theories of terminology as a discipline. These are the statements “*Language consists of a linguistically structured lexicon and a nomenclatural and terminological lexicon.*”, “*Scientific language is just a special use of ordinary language,* and “*The language of science/technology is one of the possibilities of language*”. In the light of terminology as a discipline, there are several theoretical viewpoints on the relationship between language and specialised languages. Coserian statements in this regard are very close to the most widespread theoretical approach in terminology to date, according to Teresa Cabré:

[...] general language and special languages are two intersecting sets that, together, form the broader set of the language in its entirety [...](Cabré, 1998: 226).

Another recurrent assumption in Cosserian studies is the idea that: “*Terms can turn into words and words can turn into terms.*” We may find this assertion in the *Communicative Theory of Terminology*, stated as follows:

[...] between these two subsets [general language and special languages – our comment] there are continuous exchanges in both directions (Cabré, 1998: 226).

The concept mentioned by Eugenio Coseriu as “*Grado de tecnicismo*” is referred to in the Communicative Theory of Terminology as “*degree of specialisation*” and is a feature of scientific communication. Thus, based on a classification by Rondeau (1983), Teresa Cabré asserts the existence of several levels of abstraction of terms:

These terminologies can reflect various degrees of specialization, depending on the type of subject and the level of abstraction being dealt with (Cabré, 1998:70).

Terminology theories describe these levels of specialization in much more detail, and the level of specialization is always related to a particular specialized textual genre.

One of the statements with the highest frequency in the Coserian corpus analysed by us is the one referring to the fact that in the scientific field, unlike everyday communication, communication is objective and based on conventions mutually established in a particular field of expertise. This prevents semantic errors and ensures effective communication in the scientific domain: “In scientific communication it is important to define terms before using them in order to avoid semantic errors.”

The same principle is stated in the Communicative Theory of Terminology, with the difference that here it is specified that, ideally, in terminology each concept should be designated by a single term:

There is general agreement that special communication demands a higher level of precision than that required in general communication.

Communication without ambiguity would require each designation to correspond to a single concept and each concept could only be designated by a single term. This is clearly not the case for general language, in which words are usually polysemous and meanings can be expressed by several alternatives that are synonymous to one another (Cabr , 1998: 195).

The last statement about terminology identified in the corpus is a very important one because it is included in the General Theory of Terminology from where it was eventually taken up by the Communicative Theory of Terminology. It is a principle that still underlies terminology research in the present day. Eugenio Coseriu states that: "The terms do not relate directly to objects but to concepts, to individual images of objects." and which refers to Felber's (1999) study in which the relationship between object-concept-terms is extensively described as a fundamental element of terminological research.

As it can be seen, among Eugenio Coseriu's statements related to terminology there are quite a few very relevant ones that are in line with the fundamental precepts of the theories of terminology as a discipline. This is yet another argument in favour of the relevance of Coserian views on terminology and specialised communication.

Conclusions

Following the analysis of the corpus of texts in which Eugenio Coseriu explains his theoretical view on terminology, we believe that we have achieved the objectives of our research and that we can answer with qualitative and quantitative data the questions stated in the introduction of this study.

Thus, at the moment it can be stated that there are a number of 4 Coserian studies dealing with terminology. We cannot claim that the inventory of texts is a comprehensive one, because the work of research and editing of Eugenio Coseriu's unpublished texts continues in the Eugenio Coseriu Archives in Tübingen. It is possible that in the coming years, new, as yet unedited, studies will be published, some of which may also contain references to terminology and/or scientific communication.

For the moment, what can be stated from the analysis of the corpus built up to date is that, of the 4 studies mentioned, the one containing the most references to terminology is *Introducción al estudio estructural del léxico*, which contains a total of 18 theoretical ideas on terminology. This can also be considered the most important Coserian study on terminology as it represents the largest theoretical contribution in this field. The other texts, in order of the number of ideas on terminology they contain, are: *Semántica y metodología*, with 11 ideas; *El lenguaje y la comprensión de la existencia del hombre actual*, which contains 10 ideas; and *Palabras, cosas y términos*, which contains 9 ideas.

Overall, 48 ideas about terminology were identified within the corpus. Some of these ideas are close to the principles of theories of terminology as a discipline currently used in terminology research. A total of 18 of these were identified and have been noted and grouped thematically to avoid recurrence. Comparative analysis of the Coserian ideas with those of *General Terminology Theory*, *Communicative Terminology Theory* and *Sociocognitive Terminology* allowed us to illustrate that these principles are consistent with the mainstream theories of modern terminology.

Other ideas are specific to integral linguistics and are not mentioned in other theories of terminology. Out of these, 30

statements on terminology have been identified, which we consider to be specific to integral linguistics.

The corpus analysis also requires us to check the frequency of the Coseriu statements related to terminology. Thus, the idea with the highest frequency is: "*In scientific communication it is important to define terms before using them in order to avoid semantic errors*", with 4 occurrences in the corpus, all of them being included in the study *Semantica y metodologia* (Coseriu 2016). The idea with the highest recurrence and with the best distribution within the corpus is: "*A term can turn into a common word and vice versa*", this statement being mentioned with slight variations by Eugenio Coseriu in three of his studies, namely: *Introducción al estudio estructural del léxico*, *El lenguaje y la comprensión de la existencia del hombre actual*, and *Palabras, cosas y términos*.

We hope that these insights resulting from the exploration of the corpus of Coseriu texts have contributed with convincing arguments to a better understanding of Eugenio Coseriu's theoretical perspective on terminology. We also hope to have provided convincing arguments in support of the idea that by no means did Eugenio Coseriu exclude terminology from the field of linguistics and that, as the great linguist himself points out in *Palabras, cosas y términos* (Coseriu 1987), that view was merely a misunderstanding on the part of a number of linguists.

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*II. Towards an Integral Study of Text
and Discourse: Developments on
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Surrounding Field (*los entornos*), Meaning and Multimodality: Possibilities of Eugenio Coseriu's Text Linguistics

Clemilton Lopes PINHEIRO

Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil

Juzelly Fernandes Barreto MOREIRA

Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of
Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil

Abstract: In the conceptual apparatus of Eugenio Coseriu's text linguistics, the relationship between the theory of surrounding fields and the practice of text procedures when constructing meaning is well marked. This leads us to understand that the surrounding fields guide the entire text, giving *meaning* to it, which is objectified by the text procedures. Seen in these terms, the analyses of surrounding fields and text procedures work in conjunction in the hermeneutics of meaning. In this work we propose an analytical device in which surrounding fields and text procedures are utilized to interpret meaning in texts. Furthermore, we expanded the analytical scope of the verbal text for the multimodal text. In order to exemplify the device application, we analyzed a multimodal text: a Calvin and Hobbes comic strip by cartoonist Bill Watterson. This research, thus, aims to contribute to the implementation of the task of transmission, systematization and expansion of Eugenio Coseriu's work.

Keywords: Coserian linguistics, discourse, meaning, text linguistics, surrounding fields (*entornos*)

Introduction

In this work, we consider the text linguistics proposed by Eugenio Coseriu, which is based upon the perspective in which language is organized into three autonomous levels: 1) the universal level, or the level of speaking in general; 2) the historical level of

languages; and 3) the individual level of the text. The author situates text linguistics in the third level. According to Coseriu, this type of linguistics is, essentially, the linguistics of meaning, whose task consists in interpreting texts/discourses in search for meaning. The text/discourse is an act or a series of connected linguistic acts of a speaker in a certain situation, which ranges from the expression “good morning” to a novel, for instance¹.

According to Coseriu (2007: 246), this type of linguistics is still in “draft” stage, and, as a consequence, it requires expansion and further development. In our view, one of the questions being considered in such deep research are the surrounding fields and their relationship with text procedures that will shape an analytical framework of text linguistics as a textual commentary and explanation, in other words, a type of elucidation of text grammar. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect upon the relations that may be established between the surrounding fields and the practice of text procedures to explain how they can be utilized in favor of a heuristic analysis of meaning.

Thus, we aim to propose a design of an analytical framework which demonstrates systematically the relationship of cooperation established between the procedures and the surrounding fields in favor of the construction of meaning in a text. In this regard, the analytical framework considers, primarily, the recovery of the surrounding fields in the text and the identification of text procedures that enable to interpret meaning. Since this analytical framework aims to be an instrument of text interpretation, and as texts currently include other semiotic elements, other than the verbal ones, we see the relevance of incorporating multimodality within this framework.

¹ The terms *text* and *discourse* are term variants of the same concept: the content of the individual level of language.

As an exercise of empirical demonstration of how one can operate this framework, we analyzed a multimodal text: a Calvin and Hobbes comic strip by cartoonist Bill Watterson. The meaning of this text is, therefore, targeted by the text and imagistic procedures, guided by the conditions of the circumstances of the act of speaking: the surrounding fields.

Theoretical and analytical framework of text linguistics

In his famous article *Determinación y entorno. Dos problemas de una lingüística del hablar*, first published in 1955 (Coseriu, 1969), Eugenio Coseriu establishes the relevance of knowledge concerning the surrounding fields. In a subsequent work (2007), he also refers to other authors' works. According to him, although these authors have made further progress in the research on surrounding fields, their improvements are still insufficient:

Such attempts of classifying the surrounding fields related to the act of speaking are important, but still insufficient. If one wishes to examine accurately and fully understand how the signs operate in the text, it is necessary to establish further distinctions. In "Determinación y entorno", from a theoretical point of view, one can find the necessary instruments to accomplish such goal (cf Coseriu, 2007: 219; our translation).

Coseriu, therefore, presents his theory concerning surrounding fields as an essential tool that ought not to be ignored by those who aim to "fully understand how the signs operate in the text" (cf idem, our translation). Despite the fact that his studies point in that direction, Coseriu does not expand such discussion, being restricted to the presentation of a conceptual framework of surrounding fields, without providing a systematic explanation

that should direct us on how his *modus operandi* works in practice, in the task of constructing meaning of a text².

Thus, it seems reasonable for us to pose the following question: how are we to apply this theoretical framework in order to operationalize text interpretation?


We maintain that the text linguistics postulated by Coseriu (1981; 2007) provides sufficient elements for us to reflect on the idea that surrounding fields are determining factors in the emergence of meaning; therefore, we aim to detail how participant they are, in conjunction with text procedures, in the construction of each text's own content.

We shall start from Coserian postulates: a) surrounding fields are the circumstances caused by the act of speaking which guide and give meaning to the entire discourse (cf Coseriu, 1969; my translation); and b) text procedures are descriptive elements in text interpretation, which are responsible for the objectification of meaning of a text (cf Coseriu, 2007).

As we observe these postulates, we can notice that, despite the fact that Coseriu has presented them in an isolated and independent way in his works, it is possible for us to establish a converging relationship between them, which, at a certain moment, both direct their own role to the construction of meaning. The figure below better illustrates this argument:

² Kabatek (2018) points out that, although Coseriu has presented, in *Determinación y entorno*, a theory of nominal determination and the concept of surrounding fields, a systematic study of scope and limitations of such work is still missing today.

FIGURE 1 – Relationship between the concepts of *surrounding fields* and *text procedures*



Source: Authors

In summary, one can say that, if we keep the Coserian thesis that surrounding fields guide and give meaning to the entire text and *this meaning* is objectified by text procedures, this leads us to think that surrounding fields and text procedures work collaboratively in order to perform the central task of the Coserian text linguistics: text interpretation.

Coseriu (2007) resumes previous works concerning surrounding fields and presents an extremely detailed and systematic framework. In addressing such an issue, he states that texts can only mean and be interpreted beyond what he says, beyond language materiality, thanks to the complementary non-

verbal expressive activities, which are mainly the circumstances of the act of speaking, or the surrounding fields. Coseriu (1969; 2007) proposes the existence of four surrounding fields: *situation*, *region*, *context*, and *universe of speech*.

Situation are “the circumstances and the relationships of place and time that are produced by the very act of speaking” (cf Coseriu, 2007: 220; our translation). The *region* is defined based on space “whose limits in which a sign works in certain systems of signification” (cf idem: 214; our translation). The region surrounding field is subdivided into “zone”, “sphere”, and “vicinity”.

Context can be verbal or extraverbal. Extraverbal context consists of other subtypes: physical (“pertaining to things visible to the speaker or things to which the sign is immediately inherent”), empirical (“pertaining to objects and circumstances which are known to the interlocutors at a specific time and place”), and natural (“which means the whole world which is known to us as verbal context”) (cf. idem: 224; our translation). Such contexts equally compose the encyclopedic knowledge and are defined according to the subject.

Finally, the *universes of speech* compose “the universal system of meanings to which a speech (or an utterance) belongs and from which its validity and meaning are derived” (cf idem: 221; our translation). The texts represent not only different universes (religion, science, and mythology, etc.), but also their knowledge and value-based systems.

The text procedures of meaning construction, according to Coseriu (2007), are instruments responsible for objectifying meaning of a text. According to this Coserian perspective, the path that leads to hermeneutics of meaning necessarily involves the particular and unique identification of each text.


Thus, we may say that text procedures function as a type of master key in the process of meaning construction, since the way in which the particular content of a text is composed depends on the specific combination of procedures presented in each text.

Therefore, in Coserian terms, one cannot promote further investigation regarding meaning construction in any way isolated or independent from the investigation of the procedures which may be present in the text, for it is these procedures which support meaning being objectified, thus also providing the key to its interpretation (Moreira, 2019; Pinheiro, 2019).

As we validate the link between surrounding fields and text procedures, we can conclude that the path that leads to hermeneutics of meaning involves the identification of the text procedures which objectify the meaning and the recognition of the surrounding fields which guide it.

Following this thread, we will attempt to explain how these Coserian constructs can be mobilized in favor of a heuristic analysis of meaning in the text, through a proposal of systematization of the performance of both surrounding fields and text procedures. The framework below (Figure 2) summarizes this proposal in which each element of the theory of the Coserian text linguistics is inserted and properly placed.

FIGURE 2– Analytical framework for text linguistics



Source: Authors

Let us begin with the circle which is found exactly at the center of the framework. It portrays meaning and has been intentionally placed at the center for it represents the central core of Coseriu's text linguistics. This role of axis assigned to meaning was clearly established by the author, since Coseriu himself presents, in a recurring way, text linguistics as a type of linguistics of meaning.

As the elements closer to the central axis, we have the text procedures⁴, which are seen orbiting around with arrows pointing to the direction of meaning, doing justice to the postulate that meaning is objectified by text procedures (cf Coseriu, 2007).

The circle assigned to illustrate the axis represents a type of layer located between the circle of meaning and the circumstances of the act of speaking. It is situated in the most external part of the figure based on the Coseriu's warning that surrounding fields are not the text itself, but the circumstances of the act of speaking that guide such text.

Considering the proposition that what is effectively said is less than what is indicated and understood (cf Coseriu, 1969), we decided to ornate this circle of the circumstances with some surrounding fields equipped with arrows which point both inside and outside the text, since we understand that they function as co-optators of the aspects that are present in the scenario in which every act of speaking occurs and are able to influence its meaning.

Within this perspective, the arrows that point towards the core indicate the precise direction of the surrounding fields towards the center of the text. Inside the text, these surrounding fields act upon the postulate in such a way that it becomes greatly expanded and irreversible, as rightly observed by Coseriu. Once the surrounding fields act within the text, they also, necessarily, act within the text procedures.

On that basis, we understand that an analytical heuristic to interpret meaning must consider that the surrounding fields produce a type of centripetal force toward the text procedures, and it calibrates the direction of such descriptive instruments, in order

⁴ The presence of four procedures in the framework does not absolutely mean that we are suggesting that there is a fixed number of procedures in a text.


for them to be able to objectify meaning in accordance with the circumstances that permeate the text.

Ultimately, whenever we interpret the meaning of a text, the procedures which have been used in order for such interpretation to be established have functioned due to the unique combination of certain aspects present in the scenario of such act of speaking in which the text concerned is inserted.

In a schematic and purely illustrative way, it means that the presence of the X, Y, and Z surrounding fields is a precondition for the Z, W, and K procedures to exist in the text, objectifying the H meaning, and if any one of the variants which is attached to the procedures or the surrounding fields is changed, the H meaning will no longer exist (since it was formed from the particular arrangement between the X, Y, and Z surroundings fields and the Z, W, and K procedures) and a new meaning will be immediately composed, according to the instructions and objectifications coming from the new variants.

This is Coseriu's reality (2007: 276), as he states that "the meaning emerges from the various relationships of the signs in a text" (our translation). That is to say that the meaning is not only objectified by a descriptive instrument (text procedures), but by the cooperation between text procedures and surrounding fields. This argument is summarized in the following flowchart (Figure 3):

FIGURE 3: Proposal to develop the concept of *meaning*



Source: Authors

The text linguistics in which this framework is outlined is, according to Coseriu (2007), a science of the individual level of the act of speaking whose primary function is to explain the meaning of each text, or the hermeneutics of meaning. The text is, therefore, conceived as a phenomenon from the individual level of language.

Coseriu's concept of language is limited to the articulate language; therefore, the concept of the text with which his proposal of text linguistics is operated is also limited to the verbal

text. However, considering the way how texts are produced, one can notice that they include other semiotic elements, besides the verbal ones. Both verbal and non-verbal text procedures can function in the process of constructing textual meaning, as they can also be utilized in the process of interpreting multimodal texts in which verbal and non-verbal elements are present. Cavalcante and Custódio Filho (2010), for instance, point out that it is necessary to consider multimodality in text studies:

We maintain that researchers must assume the entire complexity of the textual object and propose analyses which account for such multiplicity, considering that, although being non-verbal, the varied semiotic manifestations or the multiple processes involved in situations of interaction without the verbal one undergo a linguistic treatment of interpretation; this would be the most consistent decision with the panorama currently outlined in text studies (Cavalcante and Custódio Filho, 2010: 65; our translation).

In this regard, the necessity of an investigation that may consider all or a large part of the aspects which are inherent to the individual, dynamic, and multifaceted nature of the text essentially involves multimodality. If the non-verbal aspects also occur, amongst other factors, in order to construct the meaning of a text, its multimodal characteristic shall theoretically and methodologically outline its study.

Thus, to accept the extension of the text limits cannot be faced as a concession, but as a compromise to seriously discuss the challenges imposed by the uses, even if it is meant to recognize the (temporary) absence of theoretical apparatus to treat certain situations (Cavalcante and Custódio Filho, 2010: 65; our translation).

Bentes, Ramos, and Alves Filho (2010) also touch upon the question of multimodality and point out to the multimodal nature of texts as one of the essential “challenging” objects to understand the processes of textual constitution and use.


Therefore, in our view, the inclusion of multimodality within the scope of matters regarding Text Linguistics implies: - a necessary extension of the concept of a text, to incorporate non-verbal elements (images, color, etc.) into this text; - the use of analytical devices originated from the field of text studies, which enables us to work with such signs (Bentes, Ramos, and Alves Filho, 2010: 398; our translation).

We defend the idea that the analytical framework which we propose based on Coseriu’s text linguistics has enough space to contain non-verbal elements. A multimodal text (a cartoon, a comic strip, for instance) is constructed in the same circumstances of the act of speaking (the surrounding fields) as a verbal text. The text procedures that objectify the meaning may be verbal (given by language) or non-verbal (given by imagistic elements).

Elucidation of the grammar of a text

In this section we aim to demonstrate the empirical scope of the theoretical and analytical framework of text linguistics, as we presented in the previous section, based on the commentary of an example of a multimodal text: a comic strip by Bill Watterson (Figure 4). We will begin with the presentation of the surrounding fields, then we will cover the text procedures to finally exhibit the meanings. We emphasize that the process of construction of meaning occurs simultaneously and symbiotically during the act of speaking. The demonstration of each separate stage is only a methodological necessity.

Figure 4: *Calvin and Hobbes* by Bill Watterson



Source: *Calvin and Hobbes* by Bill Watterson for May 20, 1992 - GoComics (last access on March 12, 2021)

We shall begin with the extraverbal context, that is, the group of all the circumstances of speech. Since we are working with a verbal-imagery text, the term should be adapted to extraverbal-imagery context. Bill Watterson's comic strips were first published in the newspaper, some of them were compiled in books later; nowadays, many of them are available on the internet. Therefore, the physical context of the strip of our analysis can be partially recovered: the strip's first publication is clear (May 20, 1992), but the places and variety of platforms are innumerable, for Bill Watterson's strips have been published in a variety of newspapers around the world. Likewise, the practical context, that is, the specific circumstance of the production and, mainly, the reception of the strip (the discourse context) cannot be completely recovered since it may be varied: a newspaper, a book, or an internet page can be accessed and read anywhere, anytime by anyone.

The number of states of things known by the readers of the strip, at any given moment and place, represent the empirical

context: it is a comic strip which contains a series of other strips and was published by Bill Watterson. Calvin and Hobbes' story can be an object already known by a number of readers, or merely a random strip to readers who may not be familiar with the characters' story. Such state of things is inserted in the totality of all possible empirical contexts, that is, the whole familiar empirical universe. One knows that there are newspapers, books, websites, and that such sources contain a specific type of story which is characterized by a verbal written text or illustration. This is the natural context.

The knowledge concerning Bill Watterson's comic strips as well as the specific information about Calvin (a six-year-old boy full of personality) and Hobbes (a wise and sarcastic tiger) represent a cultural tradition of a certain group of people. Such cultural tradition contains the cultural context of the strip. Finally, the historical context of the strip cannot be simply recovered, that is, the peculiar or universal facts which specified the production of the strip are not easily available. One is able to recover a particular circumstance through the verb-imagery context: the existence of the worldwide Pulitzer Prize, only granted to individuals whose works of excellence are present in the areas of Journalism, Literature, and Musical Composition. The Pulitzer is mentioned by Hobbes in the fourth and last frame.

It is important to point out that, according to Coseriu (2007), the non-linguistic circumstances which are noticed or known by the speakers who surround them are not entirely present in the written text, that is, the written language does not contain all the extraverbal contexts. In the same way, the images do not contain all contexts. Thus, the extraverbal-imagery context present in the strip, as we have just presented, was partially recovered, and, sometimes, based on the verb-imagery context.

The verbal or discourse context, according to Coseriu, is one of the possible relationships between a sign in a text and other signs in the same text. The extension which we made in this study to a multimodal text leads to an enhancement of this notion. Therefore, we started to consider the verb-imagery context in order to analyze not only the sign, but the image, as well. Thus, the verb-imagery context is the surrounding field of the strip we analyzed. The individual frames are arranged one next to the other, within a sequential logic, which forms a series of verb-imagery sequences. Each of these sequences is the verb-imagery context from both the previous and the following ones. In the first frame, for instance, the piece of information “this is the worst assignment ever!” and the image of the two characters have an immediate link with the piece of information “I’m supposed to think up a story, write it and illustrate it by tomorrow” and the images of the second frame. The immediate verb-imagery context is established in this relationship. In the fourth frame, in Calvin’s speech, the word “story” appears, recovering anaphorically the word “explanation”, used by Hobbes (whose image is absent) in the third frame. Therefore, the third frame constitutes the mediate verb-imagery context for the fourth frame. Both cases are also examples of positive verbal context. However, there is a data set accessed by allusion, insinuation, suggestion, and inference which constitutes the negative verb-imagery context, or the elements that are not explicitly mentioned or displayed but might be known to the reader. This is the negative verb-imagery context. In the third frame, for instance, there are no details, either verbal or imagistic, of the “explanation” of the “incident”, not even the image of Hobbes’ features filled with joy, although they can be imagined. In the list of such contexts, the idiomatic context should still be considered, that is, all the English speakers’ idiomatic knowledge.

The immediate situation surrounding field cannot be recovered, that is, it is not possible to specify the effective circumstances in which the act (be it linguistic or imagistic) was originated. At some point, somewhere, Bill Watterson created and illustrated a short dialogue between two characters to be seen and read by a non-specific audience. In this case, the situation is necessarily a mediate one and, for this reason, the effective circumstances are constructed by the reader of the strip: the story has its own here and now, not coincident with the here and now of the very act of writing and drawing.

The region surrounding field, or the space within whose limits the signs and the images of the strip work together, cannot be precisely defined. In terms of production, it is known that Bill Watterson was born in Washington, D.C. and raised in Ohio. In this case, we can establish a rather general isogloss line which covers the spoken English in the United States, which is part of the “zone”, a subdivision of the region surrounding field, next to “sphere” and “vicinity”. These two subtypes of the region surrounding field, in turn, can only be generically specified: it is known that the cartoonist’s linguistic and cultural horizon is the state of Ohio where he lived and studied.

Finally, the universe of speech surrounding field of the strip, or its reference system, is the world of artistic creation and journalism.

Let us turn now to the specification of the (verb-imagery) procedures mobilized in the strip which are relevant to interpret its meaning (the actual content), considering the surrounding fields we have just recovered. As Coseriu (2007) points out, there are levels of determination of meaning, that is, there are partial meanings in some parts of the text which articulate with one another to form the global meaning. In the case of the strip, we identified partial meanings which articulate with one another to

form the global meaning. The instruments for interpretation (the verb-imagery procedures) follow the same reasoning.

The first procedure shown as relevant are the images of the two characters. The boy, sitting at the table on which we can see a sheet of paper and a pencil, shows astonishment in both facial and body expressions in the first frame; indignation in the second frame; and anger in the fourth frame. In addition to the boy's facial and body expression in the fourth frame, the verbal expression is in bold. The boy is absent in the third frame; the tiger, or the second character, is the focus of attention here. In addition, we identified the use of the boy's exaggerated statements which distort the school assignment he must do: "the worst assignment ever!", "this is impossible!", "this was the unvarnished truth". Such (verb-imagery) procedures, together with the surrounding fields, aim to identify a partial meaning: Calvin is dissatisfied with his homework (which is to write a story).

Hobbes, the tiger, in the first frame, shows facial expression of attentive listening, which gradually configurates, frame by frame, curiosity, happiness, and determination. Additionally, we should consider his moderate statements based on real life observations: "explanation of the noodle incident", "you deserved a Pulitzer". Based on these procedures, we can identify the minimization of the situation with a different meaning.

The verbal expression in the fourth frame is marked by an encapsulating anaphora: "that" summarizes the previous information. It is a procedure from which a meaning emerges: there is an oppositional link between the facts narrated by Hobbes and Calvin's defensive stance.

This opposition established in the text can also be understood as a procedure, which leads to another meaning: Calvin's despair is nothing but dramatization, and does not deserve serious

consideration, since he is, in fact, a veteran in the art of creating stories. It is all a strategy to avoid his school assignment. This situation is modulated by humor.

Therefore, the articulation of such meanings leads to the global meaning of the text: it is a reflection about a conflict of opinions in a situation which incompatible versions collide. One point of view is the construction of a new reality, more comfortable and convenient to certain interests and conduct slip. It is the point of view of rebellion (Calvin). The other point of view is that of the ethical conscience (Hobbes). The articulation of both opposing points of view reaches an ironic climax.

According to the theoretical framework on which we based, this meaning was objectified by the text-imagery procedures which, in turn, were calibrated by the surroundings fields. Concerning the one-dimensional exposition imposed upon us by writing, it is not possible to demonstrate the precise relationship amongst procedures, surrounding fields, and meaning.


However, it is necessary to point out that each procedure was somehow more detailed in the framework of surrounding fields we presented, that is, the circumstances of production (partly from the receiving) of this particular strip. The opposition between “I can’t tell a story.” and “You deserved a Pulitzer.”, for instance, leads to the specific meanings of rebellion and ethical conscience, for it is considered in the extraverbal-imagery context of Calvin and Hobbes’ world. In a different text, more detailed in a different surrounding field, this same procedure would be mobilized to another meaning. This way, the images of a boy and a tiger are procedures which, only in this framework of surrounding fields, lead us to identify a Calvin and Hobbes story as the particular content of this strip. In a different framework of surrounding fields, the content would only be a boy and a tiger, and its content

(the producer’s intention) could be identified only with a question: “What does a dialogue between a boy and a tiger mean?”

Thus, if this framework of the surrounding fields of the strip were disregarded, and a framework of surrounding fields fairly limited were considered, for instance, a different meaning would be identified: a joke about a rebellious child who will not do his homework assignment. The small or scant recovery of the surrounding fields leads, therefore, to a meaning closer to the signification and designation.

The following framework (Figure 5) exemplifies, in a simplified way, the simultaneous and symbiotic action between certain surrounding fields and specific procedures in order to guide the meaning we identified in the comic strip.

Figure 5: Text procedures and surrounding fields



Source: Authors

It is our responsibility to highlight that, in the exercise which we have just analyzed, we only considered a few text procedures (the easiest ones to handle) and, therefore, the meanings that are articulated due to such procedures. Other procedures and meaning articulations may certainly be identified, which can also act in the identification of the global meaning of a text. To offer but one example of other possibilities of procedures and meanings, we mentioned the image of the tiger as a character which adopts human behavior. One may ask: what type of content (intention, attitude) does the speaker mean to present through this expression? This is, indeed, an imagistic procedure, whose meaning can only be identified in the framework of the surrounding fields of the comic strip.

Conclusion

In this work, we aimed to return to the text linguistics proposed by Eugenio Coseriu, bearing in mind its several development possibilities. Particularly, our interest, amongst the different tasks of such text linguistics, is in the effective investigation related to the description and interpretation of a certain text: its grammar. According to Coseriu, such proposal does not anticipate “the elaboration and a proceeding for the interpretation of a text of general validity”, that is, a proceeding that provides “the exact interpretation of any text upon its simple application scientifically correct”. What one expects, in fact, is “the elaboration of a catalogue of general possibilities available for the construction of meaning” (Coseriu, 2007: 247; our translation).

In this regard, we proposed an analytical framework based on what one can operate empirically with and the possibilities of the emergence of meaning. Based on this framework, we operated a short empirical demonstration: the analysis of the meaning of a comic strip by Bill Watterson. It is expected that this analytical

proposal should be valid and its scope tested with a great variety of examples in future works, and seen not as a comprehension technique, but as a type of “comprehension learning”. We believe that such “comprehension learning” is, to some extent, a contribution the dissemination, systematization, and extension of Eugenio Coseriu’s work.

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Some Textual Functions of Metaphors in the Novel *Luntrea lui Caron* by Lucian Blaga

Lolita ZAGAEVSCHI CORNELIUS
Kent, United Kingdom

Abstract: This paper considers some aspects of metaphor as a creative process at the level of text, based on E. Coseriu's integral linguistics of text and the theory of metaphor developed by M. Borcilă on the basis of integral linguistics and inspired by elements of Lucian Blaga's views on metaphor.

We apply the typology of metaphors as outlined by M. Borcilă in an approach based on integral textual semantics, with an initial distinction between *metaphor in language* (I) and *metaphor in text* (II), followed by a distinction between two types of metaphor of textual 'sense': *signifying* or *linguistic* (IIA) and *trans-signifying* or *trans-linguistic* (IIB).

Based on the ideas of 'text constitution' and 'sense articulation' we propose that some *trans-linguistic* metaphors in Blaga's novel *Charon's Boat* (*Luntrea lui Caron*) may function at different levels of 'sense articulation': (a) as elements of 'text constitution' (as 'individual', 'local' metaphors), and (b) as textual devices or strategies of 'sense articulation'.

Keywords: Eugenio Coseriu, Mircea Borcilă, integral text linguistics, metaphor, 'sense articulation'

1. The integral perspective on metaphor

Our research of text functions of metaphors in the novel *Charon's Boat* (*Luntrea lui Caron*)¹ is based, primarily, on the study of *textual sense*, as understood in integral linguistics, developed by Eugenio Coseriu. This theoretic framework provides the

¹ For a comprehensive presentation and discussion of the theoretical framework, as well as more detailed analyses, see Zagaevschi Cornelius 2005.

foundation for the theory of metaphor as activity, as *speech in metaphoric mode*, developed by the linguist and poetician from Cluj, professor Mircea Borcilă, by, firstly, understanding language as a *fundamentally creative cognitive activity*, and secondly, by postulating *the functional autonomy of the level of textual sense*. In his conception of *metaphor* from an integral perspective, using elements of Lucian Blaga's outlook on metaphor², M. Borcilă outlines a complex structural-functional view of the double domain of functioning of the metaphor: (1) the *linguistic* domain and (2) the *trans-linguistic*, cultural domain.³

In this view, *speech in metaphoric mode*, in its major outlines, includes *creativity in language* and extends into *cultural creativity* in its maximal sense. *Linguistic creativity* will include the '**signifying**'⁴ or **linguistic metaphor** and the whole dimension of language as *enérgeia*, creation of significations and (re)filling linguistic concepts with intuitive content at every moment of speech, constituting a specific form of creativity in language. The process by which the linguistic 'horizon' is overcome towards and into the domain of cultural (poetic) – '*trans-linguistic*' – creativity will always start from within this sphere of linguistic significations and is, therefore, logically 'post-linguistic', rather than 'pre-linguistic'. The approach of the integral study of textual sense will follow the process of sense articulation or sense-construction starting from the text units, which are already

² Blaga 1969b.

³ Borcilă 1995a, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002.

⁴ The term '*signifying*' indicates its correlation with *signification* as the type of meaning which corresponds to the historical level of language in Coseriu's triadic model of the levels of language. For the English version see Tămăianu-Morita 2016: 169.

(objectively) constituted, and constructed from *significations* and *designations*.

Metaphoric creativity viewed from the integral perspective can manifest itself at each of the three levels of language: the historical level of a certain language, the universal level of speech in general, and the individual level of text or discourse⁵. Here we have attempted to look at *metaphors in text*, with their specific way of functioning, distinct from *metaphors in a historical language* - as metaphors in the tradition of a certain language - and *metaphors at the level of speech in general*.⁶ M. Borcilă considers that some approaches in the study of metaphor which view it from the angle of indirect reference to the ‘world’ (by establishing an analogy between the two terms of the metaphor) are, in fact, situated at the *universal* level of language, of speech in general, and represent studies of metaphors from the *designation* point of view.⁷

The function of the universal level of language is to orient towards the designation of a certain segment of reality, while the individual level of text/discourse will aim towards world interpretation and, in its maximal form – ‘world’ creation. We will consider the metaphors at historical and universal levels of language as ‘pretextual’ or **metaphors in language** (type **I**), and we assume that they constitute themselves into ‘material’ or ‘expression’ for textual sense units or categories. **Metaphors in text** (type **II**) create textual sense, their function is not to

⁵ Coseriu 1999.

⁶ On the distinction between metaphors at the historical and universal levels, or what Coseriu terms “metaforas motivadas linguisticamente” (achieved through lexical incorrectitude) and “metaforas motivadas extralinguisticamente” (that defy the norms of our knowledge of extralinguistic reality), see Coseriu 1991a: 160-161 and 1991b: 207; also Coseriu 1989.

⁷ Borcilă 1997, 2002.

designate a new shade of experience, that hasn't been expressed before (a function that would belong to the metaphors in language), but to interpret the world and to reveal a side of it that refers to the 'mode of experience' and, in its maximal form, to create 'worlds'.

Metaphors in language (**I**) describe (re-describe) the world, while metaphors of textual sense (**II**) "say something about the world" (the 'text world'). Metaphors of sense are viewed as exponential manifestation of cultural creativity in and through language, and as such they are subdivided into two categories: the *signifying (linguistic)* metaphor (type **IIA**), which functions according to the same principles as the metaphors in language, and the *trans-signifying (trans-linguistic)* metaphor (type **IIB**) which functions according to the 'poetic' principle, that leads the metaphoric process towards a transgression of everyday experience into a new possible 'horizon'.⁸ This new 'horizon' does not keep the experiential world as a reference point, but leaves it behind and creates a new system. In poetic texts this system will be a creation of universal possibilities of being.⁹ According to M. Borcilă, the 'conversion' of significations and designations 'in language' into signifiers for a textual sense that goes beyond them (Coseriu's *double semiotic relation* in text/discourse¹⁰) supports the inclusion of the radical aspect of *semantic transgression* of the experiential horizon that characterizes the 'mechanism' of metaphoric creation in poetic texts.¹¹

⁸ Borcilă 1987a, 1995a, 1995b, 1997.

⁹ See Blaga's distinction between the "plasticizing" (depicting) and "revelatory" metaphors in Blaga 1969b.

¹⁰ Coseriu 1997; see also Tămăianu-Morita 2016.

¹¹ Borcilă 1997: 161, also 1995a.

The study of the textual functioning of the *trans-linguistic/trans-signifying* metaphor in a text is made possible by opening up the domain of investigation from the linguistics of the text towards a semantics of the text, as proposed by M. Borcilă. Text linguistics does not propose to study the poetic text in its aspects of radical and absolute creation, but as a place of maximal manifestation of language.¹² It starts from *text constitution* and aims to explore the premises of sense articulation in general. It is *poetics* (in Borcilă's acceptance¹³) which will follow the development of a poetic text, through specific semantic strategies, in the semantic space of world creation. The space where these two meet is offered by an *integral text semantics*, which aims "to capture the impact of the process of poesis at a maximal level of the possibilities of textual sense".¹⁴

2. Sense articulation and the levels of sense

Coseriu's theory of *sense articulation*, as a component of text linguistics, includes the possibility of an architectural organization of levels of textual sense¹⁵, conceived by analogy with the internal organization of the historical level of particular languages in Coseriu's triadic model of language levels. We applied his suggestion with regards to some text elements that, although scattered throughout the text, can still be contiguous in a certain dimension of textual sense, by looking at a possible 'text isotopy'

¹² Tămăianu 2001: 178, note 31.

¹³ Borcilă 1994, 1997.

¹⁴ Borcilă 1994: 34, translation mine.

¹⁵ "Spitzer dice in verità, di tanto in tanto, che certi fatti, constatati in un punto del testo, sono contigui da un nesso essenziale con altri fatti che compaiono in un punto completamente diverso del testo. [...] Sarebbe giunto altrimenti a riconoscere che una dimensione del senso, che compare nel testo, non necessariamente coincide con il senso dell'intero testo o addirittura dell'intera opera dell'autore." Coseriu 1997: 153-154.

in the phenomenology of the metaphor of **the journey** in the novel *Charon's Boat (Luntrea lui Caron)* by Lucian Blaga.¹⁶ Some aspects of our findings will be shared here. In our opinion, the identification of the levels of sense articulation in a specific poetic text benefits considerably from the study of textual functions of metaphors (including metaphor as *textual device* which functions at higher levels of sense articulation), because metaphoric text phenomena, especially the *trans-signifying* ones could present sense values activated simultaneously at different sense levels, and becoming access points, 'bridging' elements or 'semantic connectors' between these levels. The issue of the nature and identification of the levels of textual sense construction will be equally difficult to the issue of postulating a unitary 'discovery procedure' or algorithm for sense interpretation. Textual sense is constructed/articulated differently in different types of text¹⁷, and its internal organisation is not homogenous across different text types. Thus, in a poetic text it may fulfil its highest degree of possibilities through 'world creation'. In our study of the novel *Charon's Boat (Luntrea lui Caron)*, when discussing how metaphors were instrumental in configuring certain higher levels of sense, we applied the methodology offered by the *theory of discursive poesis* in poetic texts, as developed by M. Borcilă, inspired by Blaga's ideas, and on the foundations of integral linguistics¹⁸, in connection with the idea of *levels of textual coherence*¹⁹ as certain levels of sense articulation.

¹⁶ Zagaevschi Cornelius 2005: 235-278.

¹⁷ On types of texts in an integralist framework: Tămăianu 2001, also Tămăianu-Morita 2017.

¹⁸ Borcilă 1995a.

¹⁹ Borcilă 1987b.

3. Textual functions of metaphor

The *double semiotic relation* in text, which asserts that significations and designations in a text constitute a second-degree signifier for the specific content that is *textual sense*, allows the assumption that any element/unit of *text constitution* (as textual signifier) which contributes to textual sense construction will have a *textual function*. Textual functions will be identified by their value of textual sense, while their ‘material’ manifestation in the text constitution will be dependent on their function and may not have a specific expression. The same element of text constitution may have different functions in different situations, for example, different sense values of the metaphor of **the journey** in the novel (see below), while a certain value of sense may have different expressions in text, for example, *the passage of time* or, what Blaga calls in the novel “tangible time” can be expressed through a *new presence* (the giant walnut tree grown in Leonte’s courtyard – element of the textual designation), *an absence* (the chestnut tree from childhood that was now missing), but also through *an expression like “cenușa la tâmplă”* [the ashes at my temples], etc. We propose that the manner in which a certain type of metaphors (the *trans-linguistic* metaphor) get involved in sense construction, as important textual sense ‘nodes’, has a major contribution to the intuitive identification of the type of the text present. This refers mostly to the metaphors detectable directly in the text constitution, and not so much to metaphor as a *textual device* that functions at a higher level of sense articulation.

From our text analysis we were able to **distinguish two types of textual functioning of metaphors**: (A) as a *‘metaphoric occurrence’, detectable in the text constitution*, and (B) as *textual device perceptible at higher levels of sense articulation*. The first type is closer to the textual functions in a narrow sense,

as defined and exemplified in the integral text linguistics²⁰, while the second type is consubstantial with the global-textual semantic strategies discussed by poetics and is instrumental in configuring the textual sense on a larger scale. We shall briefly present only functions of the first type here.

Metaphoric text functions of type **A** include instances of *linguistic* (or *signifying*) metaphors, similar to Blaga's 'plasticising' (depicting) metaphors, which would serve to replace the infinite string of words that would be needed to adequately describe a concrete thing through language.²¹ Examples are: "«Ni se macină sufletele, zi cu zi, și noapte cu noapte între pietrele de moară ale imperialismelor», zic, «dar încercăm să uităm»".²² "Femeia e într-adevăr femeia amăruie, așa cum mi se arătase în joaca târzie a după-amiezii".²³

Also of type **A** are some instances of *trans-linguistic* (or *trans-signifying*) metaphors, which have more far-reaching effects of textual sense.²⁴ Often, they are symbolic-mythical metaphors which have a special significance in Blaga's work, for ex.: **the journey/road, the return, the smile, the song**. They way that they figure the textual sense of the segments where they appear, guiding the construction of sense and extending into other sections of text, can be followed mostly by analysing a larger segment of text and we shall not offer it here. However, we would

²⁰ Coseriu 1997: 72-73.

²¹ Blaga 1969b: 276.

²² "«Our souls are being ground down, day by day, night by night, by the millstones of the imperialisms», I say, «but we try to forget»"; Blaga 1990: 41, translation mine.

²³ "The woman is indeed the bitter-sweet woman, as she has shown herself to me in the late games of the afternoon"; *ibidem*: 323-324, translation mine.

²⁴ In fact, in Zagaevschi Cornelius 2005, we named the former subtype **A1** and the latter subtype **A2**.

like to name some possible textual functions of these *trans-linguistic* metaphors: ‘**verticalization**’ of sense, that is, the discovery of a symbolic dimension of a sense value attributed to a concrete thing or character of the text (like the examples for the “passage of time” above); **symbolic description of a character** as a metaphoric construction of characters in text (example: the character of Ana Rareș, especially in chapter XVII), and **configuration of the sense of a segment of text** (metaphors as ‘nuclear nodes’).²⁵

We observe that, in principle, the ability to connect ‘vertically’ two or more levels of sense construction, generating a plurality of sense values, typical for metaphor, as well as the ‘horizontal’ connections that link its occurrences (either repeated, or functionally equivalent) in the text constitution, assign metaphor a special status among textual functions, confirming its affinity with the essentially creative nature of language activity and cultural creation in general.

4. The Journey and The Return

The novel *Charon’s Boat* (*Luntrea lui Caron*) is a tale of **the journey – destiny**, with the variant **return-destiny retrieved**. Here, **destiny** will mean: the destiny of the nation, of a historical human being “under the times” [*sub vremi*], destiny lost, severed, removed from time and suspended “out of time” [*răstimp*]. This *motif* reappears as the reading of the novel progresses, in a more obvious or veiled form, depending on the attention of the reader to the significant elements, carriers of textual sense.

We didn’t start our investigation with the intention of following the manifestations of the metaphor of **the return** in the text, but were guided to it by the abundance of clues, which

²⁵ Zagaevschi Cornelius 2005: 165-176.

pointed to the importance of this metaphor in the global economy of the text. They attracted our attention during the second reading of the text, as part of the explanatory approach to follow the development of the textual sense, intuitively grasped at the first reading of the novel. During this stage we tried to identify the text units generating textual sense and their mode of functioning in the configuration of the textual sense. Among these we will briefly mention here several instances: at the beginning of the novel, the retreat from the Russian army is *seen* as a return to ‘prehistory’,²⁶ the retreat of the philosopher Leonte Pătrașcu to Câmpul Frumoasei, among his books and metaphysics, is also *seen* as a return to his personal past (the village of childhood), but also as one beyond the destiny of a single man (the destiny of a people); and finally, in the last part of the novel, the trip to Grădiște, to which Axente Creangă persuades Ana Rareș to join them, is, again, *seen as* a return, this time, to the ultimate source of the nation’s spirit and of the organic-mythical creativity of the poet.

It could be argued that **destiny** is imagined metaphorically, in this novel, as a *journey*, in the (linear) dimension of its temporal actualization and in agreement with the universal (designational) metaphor *life is a journey*. However, we think that in the novel the stress falls not so much on the more general and impersonal metaphor **destiny is a journey**, but rather on the solution given by a specific human being (a poet and philosopher) confronted with the pressures of ‘history’,²⁷ a human being who tries to retrieve his destiny guided by his ‘instinct’ of the **return**.

To give two examples:

²⁶ As understood by the character Leonte Pătrașcu in the novel, and conceptualized by Lucian Blaga in his works of philosophy: *Evoluție și involuție*, in Blaga 1969a.

²⁷ In Blaga’s sense, see above.

(1) At crucial moments of his life, Leonte has often been tempted by the *instinct of the “return”*. His last return could have varied meanings. It could be a *return from history to the still living prehistory of the village*, but it could also be a *return to the nonbeing before birth*. Longing for the return can be deciphered as longing for no longer being. For a while now Leonte was subject to this *longing for a return, in which one could guess a longing to be no more*. (Blaga 1990:196)

(2) Love likes to *return to the archaic*. And we *return*. We *return to a distant past*, feeling strongly that we would gladly bear even the conditions of a freedom severed from the roots to allow the blooming of the passion unlocked in us. (Blaga 1990:105)²⁸

In the first example what comes through strongly is that **the return is death** and **death is the way**, and that this is the way chosen by Leonte. It is a **symbolic** return, to the non-being before birth. In the second example also, we understand a clearly symbolic return: not a return in time, but to a certain ‘world’: the archaic world of the village and of sublimated passion. In both examples the background knowledge of the experiential world will be superseded in a symbolic interpretation of these metaphors which offer the reader the two ways, two solutions of **the return**.

It is to be noted that some of the metaphors of the **journey** and of the **return** in the text could be interpreted by referring them to the specific **cultural-mythological context** or background.²⁹ This context is sedimented through tradition and becomes so culturally conventionalized that although the

²⁸ In both examples translation and italics mine.

²⁹ “In myth, legend, fairy tale, song or dream, the symbolic significance of the journey will depend on a series of factors connected to its orientation with regards to the cardinal points [North/South etc], to a certain centre, to the direction to the right or left.” Evseev 1997: 127, translation mine.

metaphors contradict ‘normal’ sensory experience, they are still easily and non-conditionally accepted (that is, not felt as instances of *incongruence*). In some instances, the metaphors of the **journey** in the novel are indeed consolidated through a connection to the mythical (mythological) context/background. Yet there are instances when that is not sufficient.³⁰ If we look again at the second example from above, the metaphor of **the return**, in contrast with the mythical background (a subtype, conventionalized through tradition, of the universe of discourse of the *fantasy*³¹), suspends the meanings attributed by it and presents itself as a new and autonomous (with regards to that background) unit of sense. We should say that these values of textual sense of **the return** are supported by conceptualization in the philosophical works of the author, Lucian Blaga, and these connections are actualized as *evocative functions* during text interpretation. In this situation **the return** will no longer be considered a particular case of the metaphor of **the journey**, but becomes a metaphor specific to this text. Not all occurrences of **the journey** will be sufficiently explained by referring to the traditional mythical background. There will often remain a certain textual sense value, unique to the text, which contributes to the deep articulation of the textual sense.

5. Conclusions

In the novel we find that metaphors like **journey, way, return, crossroads, descent, exit**, support and shape the construction of

³⁰ “Of great symbolic importance is the problem of the direction of movement. A journey forward has a positive meaning of evolution, affirmation and creation. A journey back is regression, surrender, failure, from where stems the belief that if you return in your journey, it will bring bad luck”. *Ibidem*, translation mine.

³¹ Coseriu 2002.

sense in a particular way. It is not possible for us to elaborate here, due to space restrictions, but we have shown an analysis of these instances, grouped by chapters, elsewhere.³² What interested us and what we tried to follow was the *textual sense value* of each of these metaphoric occurrences identified in text, with their corresponding functions; therefore, the perspective is predominantly a functional one.

We were able to distinguish 3 areas or layers of ‘isotopy’ of metaphors of the **journey**, which were functionally distinct:

- 1 ***The journey of life***, which accounts for the great part of occurrences, as it is a high-frequency element originating from the universal level of speech in general and participating as textual function **A** in the configuration of ‘surface’-levels of sense construction;
- 2 ***Journey – predetermined destiny*** (*predestined path*) in accordance with the Romanian cultural mythological context, with few pure occurrences, but contaminating semantically more examples from the other two categories, and predominantly with a textual function **A**; this is the layer of sense values that makes use of the “mythical weight of the words”, in Blaga’s terms; and finally,
- 3 ***the journey of the individual***, a domain of semantic configuration specific to this novel, with elements of a higher frequency in the last third of the text and a preferred textual functioning of type **A** (with *trans-linguistic* metaphors), with an opening towards **B**.

It is harder to outline an ‘isotopy’ of the sense values for **the return**, because this element has fewer occurrences than **the**

³² Zagaevschi Cornelius 2005: 242-271.

journey, and, with the notable exception of **the return to 'prehistory'** from the first two chapters, the other occurrences do not necessarily fit into a homogenous field of sense values. They seem to function, in principle, as solutions for **the journey of the individual**, at a similar level of textual sense construction.

With regards to its 'mechanism', although **the return** may appear, from the point of view of the *source*, to be a specific case of the metaphor of **the journey**, in fact, it shows itself as a distinct text unit, which functions in its own way. It doesn't fit completely into any of the three sense value layers/areas of **the journey** outlined above, and although it is strongly connected with them, it establishes itself into an autonomous metaphor.

From the point of view of their contribution to the in-depth configuration of the levels of textual sense, we could say that the metaphor of **the journey** presents itself in the following way:

- as a 'revived' element from the universal level of speech in general - *journey of life* – it manifests predominantly at a surface level of sense construction, with a purely instrumental, depicting value;
- at an intermediary level, represented by combined variants of *the journey of life* with the *symbolic but conventionalized journey (the predestined path)*, with all its attributes from the mythological folklore context;
- at a deep level of sense articulation, *the journey* is hard to dissociate from *the return* and is presented, predominantly as a variant of *the journey of the individual (individual path)*, metaphor specific to the text, sometimes connected to the traditional

predestined path, and, especially, to the different aspects of Blaga's philosophical work.³³

The practical difficulty of dissociating between the metaphors of **the journey** and **the return** at the deepest level of sense construction is due to their complex semantic connections which we could summarize in the following way: **the return** may appear independently as a *trans-signifying metaphor*, mythic-symbolic, with its own textual sense values, but sometimes the very sense of **the journey** is a symbolic **return**. So, for example, in the last pages of the novel, we find instances of **the journey** as **exit, exodus** (in the form of **ascent**) into another spiritual-existential dimension of the poet, an **ascension-return to the original spiritual source of the nation and of the poet-creator**. The novel ends, fittingly, with a poem - *Grădiștea* – a suitable medium for a high concentration of symbolic metaphors, from which we will quote a relevant fragment at the end of the present analysis:

The high ascent to the threshold of a God
on the mountain crest, is very hard.
Hand in hand and in step with you –
I would never lose the way
through hazels and bushes of blueberry.

³³ We have on several occasions referred to Blaga's acceptance of some concepts from his essays on the philosophy of culture, in order to support and clarify the importance of certain textual sense values of metaphors discussed. This reflects one of Coseriu's **evocative functions**: "the relation with signs from other texts of the author", his *Oeuvre* (Coseriu 1997: 82). We consider that, in this case, these (and other) evocative relations are *secondary* for the constitution of the metaphors in the novel, because **the journey** and **the return** are not necessarily established symbols in Blaga's other works, in the same way that are, for example, *light* [lumina], *blood* [sângele], *sleep* [sommul] etc., so the former 'create sense' in the novel mainly through the novel itself and its structure.

We'd stumble from time to time, but never get lost.
 On the sacred crests, in the blue, we'd be guided by
 a cloud on high, below – the green moss
 and the slender, tall beeches that still store
 in their shape, a vivid memory
 of great columns from times past. [...]

 Is it also given to us to reach the crest one day?
 (Blaga 2001: 442-443)

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A glass filled with liquid, where the left side is blue and the right side is red and yellow, with a splash of red liquid on top. The background is black.

*III. History and Epistemology of
Integral Linguistics*

III. History and Epistemology of Integral Linguistics

Precursores de Coseriu: contribución de B. de Aldrete a la filología románica
(Coseriu's Predecessors: B. de Aldrete's Contribution to the Historical Study of Romance Languages)

Marina KOSSARIK

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Abstract: Romance linguistics was one of E. Coseriu's primary fields of research; all along his life Coseriu illustrated and tested his theoretical concepts using Romance languages as a touchstone. Likewise, one of Coseriu's early predecessors, the Spanish Renaissance philologist B. de Aldrete, came up with a number of innovative ideas concerning the historicity of language, regular changes in phonetics and transformations in morphology, divergencies among closely related languages, etymology, sociolinguistic factors (such as language contacts and cultural integration) in linguogenesis, the importance of early written texts for documenting language change, as well as other concepts, and used the example of Romance languages – the Ibero-Romance ones in particular – to support his theoretical insights. B. de Aldrete's treatise (1606) is also an early example of the scientific practice of citing previous research and giving references to numerous sources.

Keywords: Romance philology, Romance linguistics, history of Spanish, linguistic historiography, history of linguistics

Introducción

El creador de una concepción innovadora, la lingüística coseriana, que reunió diversas actitudes hacia la lengua (diacrónica y sincrónica, sistémica y funcional), estaba, al mismo tiempo, estrechamente relacionado con la tradición románica. Y no es

nada casual el interés de Coseriu por autores renacentistas: Oliveira (Coseriu 1975, Coseriu 1981), Vives (Coseriu 1971). Como tal, ello interesa el análisis de otros textos que desempeñaron un papel importante en la consolidación de la tradición lingüística románica, entre los cuales el tratado *Del Origen y principio de la lengua castellana o romance que oi se usa en España*¹ de Bernardo de Aldrete, canónigo cordobés (Aldrete 1606).

La obra se crea en la época cuando se describen muchas lenguas, ante todo vernáculas, que se consolidan como nacionales, y en el proceso se afianzan conceptos lingüísticos nuevos, se diversifican los principios de la descripción de la lengua, se engendran disciplinas especiales, lo que lleva a la consolidación de la lingüística como ciencia madura (Kossarik 2003, Kossarik 2015, Kossarik 2017).

El libro de Aldrete, que se aprecia de maneras diferentes, a veces contrarias², ha sido estudiado desde varias posiciones. Según la temática, en primer lugar lo caracterizan como la primera obra de la historia de lengua (Kukenheim 1932, Alonso 1938, Bahner 1966, Lapesa 1981, Gauger 1986, Ridruejo 1992). Pero su contenido sobrepasa los límites de la descripción de la historia del español. El libro se investiga como una de las primeras obras en el ámbito de la política lingüística (Guitarte 1984, Binotti 1992, 1995, 2000, Nieto Jiménez 1995, Woolard 2003, Lledó-Guillem 2015, Negre 2016). Analizando la aportación de Aldrete a la

¹ Aldrete recurre a varias denominaciones de la lengua (“castellano”, “romance”, “lengua vulgar”, “nuestra lengua”). En este artículo usamos la denominación ‘español’. En cuanto a este aspecto de la obra de Aldrete véase Molina Redondo, 1968, Косарик 2020.

² No se discuten aquí opiniones políticas (incluyendo glottopolíticas), socioculturales etc. de Aldrete, sólo se analiza su comprensión de la lingüística histórica romance. – M. K.

problemática de la lingüística general, Molina Redondo (1968: 184-185) nota la atención de Aldrete puesta en el estudio de las lenguas románicas: “Aldrete sienta un interés más amplio que los filólogos anteriores, lo que le llevará [...] primero, a considerar las otras lenguas romances junto al castellano, esbozando ya la lingüística románica”, pero no desarrolla el tema. Lo amplifica, en el artículo dedicado a la comparación de los tratados de Aldrete y el italiano Cittadini, Ward (1993), que marca aspectos importantes para la lingüística románica. Sin embargo, el tema merece un desarrollo adicional.

El propio Aldrete no explicita la tarea de escribir una composición sobre la lingüística romance; su objetivo es exponer el principio, la formación y las etapas de existencia del español. No obstante, los temas españoles y, más amplio, iberorrománicos se estudian en el contexto común románico, con una atención especial a los temas románicos generales, por lo que la obra de Aldrete da un vasto material para investigar el origen de la filología románica.

El tratado consta de tres libros cuyos temas principales son: España en el Imperio Romano, la llegada de germanos, la conquista árabe y la Reconquista, el establecimiento y la consolidación del estado, algunos aspectos de la situación lingüística en la Península Ibérica contemporánea y la difusión del español en el Nuevo Mundo, los cambios en la lengua: del latín al español (fonética, morfología, fuentes del léxico español)³.

I. Historia de la lengua – modelo y contenido de la descripción

1. La historia externa

a) La España prerromana

³ El orden del análisis en este artículo historiográfico no siempre sigue exactamente el orden de la exposición de la temática en el monumento lingüístico del siglo XVII.

Una observación de Aldrete que precede al tratado acentúa una estrecha conexión entre la historia del país y la lengua.

Romance [...] fe derivò de la lengua Latina, ò Romana, i della tuuo su principio, i nombre. [...] muchos años en España fue vulgar la legua Latina [...] Con la venida de los Vandalos , i Godos, como se mudò el imperio, tambien la lengua, pero no del todo, fino facando della la vulgar (Aldrete 1606: 6).

El autor escribe sobre la conquista romana y las tribus aborígenes, pero de las lenguas de sustrato escribe ya pasando a la historia interna, a los cambios del latín, lo que es lógico desde el punto de vista de la filología románica. Enumera lenguas y áreas de pueblos nativos —vascos, cántabros, celtas, íberos, celtíberos, turdetanos (Aldrete 1606: 227-229), menciona a los lusitanos y arévacos tocando cuestiones de toponimia (Aldrete 1606: 298-299). No presenta ningunos datos sobre la fonética o morfología del sustrato, pero escribe sobre los topónimos prerrománicos y romanizados, siendo probablemente el primero (?) en emplear este término relacionado a un concepto clave de la filología románica.

I nosotros no defendemos tan gran mudança, i la alteracion en la lengua, como la ai en los lugares. De mas de que, aun los que oi los tienen fon romaniçados al talle de las de mas palabras Latinas, de Toletum, dizemos Toledo, de Corduba, Cordoua de Malaca Malaga; de Pallantia Palencia &c, Muchos ai que en este tiempo an tenido tres nombres, i lo que mas es la prouincia principal Turdetania, Boetica, i Andalucia (Aldrete 1606: 228).

Aunque está centrado en España, el filólogo atiende a otras zonas de Romanía, en primer lugar, a Italia: escribe sobre los contactos de las tribus de España y Sicilia; tampoco se ve desatendida Galia (Aldrete 1606: 232-241, 72-78).

Describiendo el curso de la conquista romana (comienza con la competencia de Roma y Cartago, inicialmente fuera de la península), Aldrete resalta que la supeditación fue mucho más lenta, en el Norte, donde fueron precisas legiones romanas, muestra minuciosamente la división administrativa, el estatuto y la cantidad de municipios y colonias romanos y latinos, así como los pueblos de la población autóctona (Aldrete 1606: 7-37).

b) La problemática de la filología románica en la descripción de la historia del español

Antes de pasar a la exposición de la historia del español propiamente dicha, el filólogo español presta mucha atención a todo un conjunto de problemas ligados al latín: su apología, el papel del latín como lengua del estado – el aspecto de una especial importancia para Aldrete (Aldrete 1606: 42-53), la divulgación del latín en Italia y fuera de sus límites, el grado de la romanización y el carácter del latín en las provincias, la política lingüística de Roma. Aldrete escribe sobre la difusión del latín fuera de su territorio inicial, Lacio, y el desplazamiento de las lenguas de otros pueblos, primero de los territorios próximos (el etrusco de Toscana, el osco de Campania, el griego de Calabria), luego de todo el territorio de la península Apenina como resultado de la lucha duradera (el autor alude a las guerras en Italia incluso a las de Aníbal), considera la difusión del latín en las provincias, atendiendo especialmente a los medios de la expulsión de las lenguas nativas: el uso exclusivo del latín en la comunicación oficial, en procedimientos legales (Aldrete 1606: 53-56). La cuestión del latín como la lengua de cultura se toca en varios capítulos del tratado. Para el lingüista español del inicio del siglo XVII, en el auge del imperio Habsburgo, en las condiciones de la expansión del español fuera de España, estas cuestiones son muy

actuales, y Aldrete traza paralelismos entre los papeles del español y el latín en el Imperio Romano.

Al centra su atención en el área galo-románica, Aldrete esboza la situación sociolingüística que ahí se forma. Escribe sobre la división en provincias, refleja las diferencias en la cronología y en el grado de romanización de varias partes de Galia, señalando una durable conservación de la lengua celta y subrayando las relaciones con Roma y el conocimiento, especialmente en Aquitánica y Narbonense, de la tradición latina literaria, retórica y gramatical, y afirma el indudable origen latino de la lengua francesa. Refiere la conquista de Galia por los francos y la posterior pérdida de la lengua germánica, menciona las relaciones del reino franco con Roma durante el reinado de Carlomagno, los juramentos de Estrasburgo (Aldrete 1606: 71-82), llevando la historia hasta el inicio de la escritura francesa.

Como vemos, la atención que el filólogo español dirige a la problemática general románica no se limita a la época del Imperio romano. He aquí un ejemplo más: una nota sobre el estado de la lengua en Italia después de la conquista gótica.

ciento, i cinquenta años despues que los Godos entraron en Italia [...] en aquel tiempo auia la lengua Latina hecho tan grande quebra en la gente vulgar, fi bien la gente noble, i docta la procurauan de confervar (Aldrete 1606: 154-155).

Para la comprensión del papel de B. de Aldrete en la formación de la lingüística románica como una disciplina general, que sirve de base para el estudio lenguas romances concretas, es muy importante el hecho de que el autor considera necesario el hecho de prevenir a sus lectores mediante una profunda observación de ciertas cuestiones sobre la filología románica: la difusión del latín, la romanización, la política lingüística de Roma

la pormenorizada descripción de la historia del español.

c) España en el Imperio Romano

El tratado describe la conquista romana y el proceso de la pacificación de la península Ibérica, la división administrativa (provincias España Citerior y Ulterior, más tarde, Tarraconense, Cartaginense, Lusitania, Galicia, Boetica), la romanización desigual, mucho más tardía en el norte montañoso que en la Bética: “no se recibió igualmente la lengua Latina en España, porque no se pacificaron ni acomodaron todos a un tiempo con el nuevo traje i lengua [...]. La primera que lo recibió todo fue nuestra Andalucía [...]. La parte que más tarde siguió lo que los demás fue la septentrional hacia las montañas” (Aldrete 1606: 99). Un monumento de la epigrafía latina, que el filólogo coloca en su libro, ilustra la situación de bilingüismo inicial de la población greco- y latinohablante de una polis, ex-colonia griega en España (Aldrete 1606: 93).

El historiador testimonia escrupulosamente la creciente influencia de Roma (aparecen numerosas colonias romanas y latinas, la ciudadanía se otorga a muchos nativos, el latín se difunde en los territorios rurales), provee una vasta lista de destacadas personalidades hispano-romanas (literatos, lingüistas, emperadores) (Aldrete 1606: 104-127), dejando patente de este modo el grado muy avanzado de romanización de la península Ibérica.

todos los Romanos la tuvieron [la lengua Latina] por vulgar [lengua materna], i lo mismo todos aquellos que se preciaron deste nombre, i fueron con el trato i comunicacion passándose a vivir con ellos [...] i se acomodaua al uso de sus leyes, i gozauan de priuilegios de ciudadanos Romanos, i tambien los que eran naturales de Roma o de Italia i passauan apoblar en las prouincias. En las que tenían mas

paz i menos impedimentos crefcia efto cada dia mas, hafta llegar algunas a perder la lengua antigua quedandofe con la Romana (Aldrete 1606: 84). fiendolo los Eſpañoles fe reduxeron a las coſtumbres, lengua, derecho, i juridiçion de los Romanos (Aldrete 1606: 94).

Según Aldrete, el latín persiste en España después de la conquista germánica a causa de adoptarse como lengua materna (Aldrete 1606: 85).

d) España después de la caída de Roma. Conquista árabe y Reconquista. Zonas lingüísticas en la Península Ibérica

Aldrete da una información general sobre los germanos en el Imperio Romano. En lo que a España se refiere, sólo comunica que no había resistencia, indica las zonas que los germanos ocupan, relaciona la pérdida de la lengua de los germanos con su bajo nivel cultural.

Salieron mui mal con la lengua Latina eſta gente, mas dada a las armas, que a las letras (Aldrete 1606: 153). Aunque los Godos fueron muchos años ſeñores de Eſpaña, como tambien de Italia, i Frãcia, fiendo gente mas belicoſa, i ſenzilla, que ambicioſa, procuraron antes cõferuar la lengua Latina que eſtender la ſuia propria, pero por ſu poca policia, i el grande primor, que eſta tiene, la vinieron a eſtragar i corromper (Aldrete 1606: 360).

Al concentrarse en las cuestiones de sociolingüística, el autor refleja la situación de diglosia: el empleo exclusivo del latín en la forma escrita mientras que el romance, que estaba formándose, prevalecía en el lenguaje oral.

en aquel tiempo, i muchos figlos despues, no se escriuio por letra en aquel Romance, de que se iua forjando el que ahora ufamos corrompido de la lengua Latina, fino todo lo que se daua por escrito era en Latin (Aldrete 1606: 142). Fuero Juzgo [...] leies que los Godos Reies de España hicieron [...] se escriuieron en Latin (Aldrete 1606: 159).

Aldrete enfatiza la unidad lingüística de la Península Ibérica en la época visigótica (Aldrete 1606: 164).

En el marco de la etapa de la conquista árabe es la situación sociolingüística la que otra vez está en el centro de la atención de Aldrete, quien resalta la diferenciación del norte cristiano, donde continúa la formación del romance, del sur, donde prevalece el árabe, conservando los cristianos el habla romance (Aldrete 1606: 142-143).

El filólogo evidencia el significado de los primeros siglos después de la caída del Imperio Romano, los períodos del Reino Visigodo y de la Reconquista, así como el tiempo de formación del romance, o castellano, aunque todavía una lengua no escrita, considerada una forma de latín corrompido: “Romance Latin corrompido [...] en aquel tiempo, i muchos figlos despues, no se escriuio por letra en aquel Romance, de que se iua forjando el ahora ufamos corrompido de la lengua Latina” (Aldrete 1606: 142); “tiempos, en que la lengua Latina iua corrompida” (Aldrete 1606: 157), y fija el momento del nacimiento de la escritura castellana, al mencionar la traducción de la Biblia, *Siete Partidas*, *Crónica General de España* en el reinado de Alfonso X el Sabio (Aldrete 1606: 156). Atribuye la constitución de las áreas de las lenguas ibero-románicas (portugués, catalán, castellano) a la época de la Reconquista (Aldrete 1606: 143, 164-165); resalta la diferencia entre el catalán y el castellano, indica sus áreas territoriales menciona también el vasco; explica las peculiaridades del catalán y del portugués por los contactos

lingüísticos con los franceses que participaron en la Reconquista: “En Cataluña, para la conquista para la conquista de aquel principado, le ayudaron los Españoles del socorro de Francia, [...] el Romance se mezcló con la lengua Francesa, de que se resultó aquella lengua muy semejante, y poco diferente de la de Lengadoc, o Narbonense, de donde a quella tiene parte de su origen [...] en Portugal ai otra lengua [...] mezcla de la Francefa” (Aldrete 1606: 165-166).

2. *La historia interna. Del latín al castellano: fonética, morfología, léxico*

Presentadas las condiciones de la formación de la lengua, Aldrete atiende los cambios en el latín en el período de los godos: “Romance, de que se iua forjando el que ahora usamos corrompido de la lengua Latina” (Aldrete 1606: 142).

Partiendo de la causa de los cambios lingüísticos en el caso de los contactos entre lenguas, el filólogo español inicia la investigación del tema en el suelo latino y escribe, con referencias a autores clásicos y a Isidoro de Sevilla sobre las mudanzas en el latín del Imperio, ya sensibles en el I siglo d. C, tanto en Roma, como en sus provincias.

Aunque los Romanos por todo su Imperio introduxeron su lengua, pero esto fue con alguna mengua, y quebra de su elegancia y pureza; porque tambien recibieron vocablos peregrinos, y Dionisio Alicarnaseo no se hartaua de admirar, que auiendo sido tantas las gentes, que auian entrado en Roma, totalmente no se vuisse hecho barbara [...], que recibio mucho daño en la lengua [...]. Y Cornelio Tacito, que fue ciento y veinte años despues de Ciceron, confieffa lo mucho, que auia perdido del antiguo lustre, y pureza. Y dixo muy bien San Isidro, que cada vna de las gentes, que fueron fugetas al Imperio, lleuò a Roma los vicios, y faltas de su lengua, y costumbres (Aldrete 1606: 150-151).

Después de la caída del Imperio son los contactos de bárbaros y de latinoablantes que causan, según Aldrete, las transformaciones del latín, que resultan en la creación de lenguas romances.

Con la venida de los Godos, i otras barbaras naciones a Italia, i a las provincias del Imperio, los vencidos se viieron de acomodar a la lengua de los vencedores, los quales desearon, i procuraron aprender la Latina, que se les dio mui mal, i la corrompieron, i vnos, i otros cada vno por diuerfo camino, vinieron a dar principio a la lengua Italiana, i Castellana (Aldrete 1606: 151).

El autor del tratado *Del Origen y principio de la lengua castellana* expone cambios fonéticos regulares del paso del latín al español: “dicciones Latinas, que tienen au, las boluieron en, o, aurum, [...] autumnus, [...] caulis, [...] Taurus. De los quales dezimos [...] oro, [...] otoño, [...] coles, [...] Toro (Aldrete 1606: 205-206), esporádicamente presenta hechos del italiano, del francés y explica las similitudes debidas al origen común en la lengua latina (Aldrete 1606: 210-212), anticipando de este modo la idea de las leyes fonéticas, básica para la fonética histórica, y las correspondencias regulares entre las lenguas relacionadas genéticamente. Esto aproxima al filólogo español a sus predecesores, autores de las descripciones de las lenguas italiana, francesa, portuguesa: *Il Cesano de la lingua toscana*, escrito en los años 20 del siglo XVI, publicado en 1555, y *Il Polito* 1525 de Tolomei (Жолудева 2016); *In linguam Gallicam Isagoge*, de Dubois, 1531 (Fournier & Colombat 2007, Михайлова 2019); *Orthographia*, 1576, и *Origem da lingoa portuguesa* 1606, de Nunes de Leão (Kossarik 2015, 2018b).

Marcando modificaciones fonéticas, Aldrete, que considera cambios morfológicos, así como lexicales, rasgos típicos de las

lenguas romances (Aldrete 1606: 255), ejemplifica unos procesos fonéticos con paralelismo, causado por su origen común, de formas pronominales españolas, italianas y francesas: “Dize se vn mismo origen a todos, por que en los cafos todos correspondemos a los Latinos, i allí dezimos , io, mi, nos, i nosotros, el Italiano io, me, Noi, i Noi altri, el Frances, ie, moi, Nous” (Aldrete 1606: 214).

Aldrete concede una enorme atención a las fuentes del léxico español. Enfatiza el origen latino de la mayor parte del vocabulario, mostrándolo con ejemplos más o menos evidentes, dependiendo de los procesos fonéticos (persona, mundo, nuestro) (Aldrete 1606: 196-197). Valorando la función de préstamos en el enriquecimiento de la lengua, reconoce el papel especial de los helenismos y compara la implantación de los mismos en el vocabulario latino con la realización del léxico romance.

Lo mismo pafsa oi en el Romance, que admitimos vocablos Latinos de nueuo o de otras lenguas, o por que faltan en la nuestra los propios, o porque buscamos, que aia en ella maior abundancia dellos [...]. Despues de ia perficionada admitia de nueuo vocablos conofcidamente Griegos, quando le faltauan los propios (Aldrete 1606: 260-261).

En cuanto a los germanismos, el filólogo relaciona modificaciones del godo y del latín con el bajo nivel civilizacional de los godos (Aldrete 1606: 360) y piensa que esto dificulta identificar germanismos en el romance (Aldrete 1606: 361-362). En lo que se refiere al árabe, el tratado contiene dos listas de préstamos: arabismos en el romance y romanismos en el árabe — Aldrete escribe que el proceso es bilateral (Aldrete 1606: 362-363). La presencia de hebraísmos en la toponimia de la Península Ibérica se niega categóricamente (Aldrete 1606: 305-342, v. la discusión en Lemso 1995).

La toponimia ocupa un lugar especial en la obra de Aldrete. El autor propone explicaciones de topónimos ligados a la historia de España, Italia, Grecia, a la mitología clásica, la historia bíblica, pero muchas de ellas son erróneas. El filólogo español no da el paso que da el autor del tratado del origen de la lengua portuguesa, D. Nunes de Leão, cuyas explicaciones están basadas en los tres componentes (la historia externa, procesos fonéticos y la semántica léxica); es esta composición la que lleva al historiador portugués a la creación de la obra que conforma la base de la etimología científica (Kossarik 2018b).

II. Aspectos teóricos y metodológicos de la lingüística románica

1. Nominaciones de la lengua. Historicismo lingüístico. Comparación de lenguas románicas. Mantenimiento de la tradición textual, filológica

En el tratado está presente todo un conjunto de cuestiones generales de la filología romance.

Aldrete aplica al español varias nominaciones (el término *español* no se aplica a la lengua): *castellano*, *lengua castellana*, *nuestra lengua*, *lengua nuestra*, a veces denomina el español de su época *romance*. En el título del tratado vemos “lengua castellana o romance que oi se se usa en España”. Pero el término *romance* tiene también otro significado. Aldrete explica su aparición por la necesidad de distinguir la lengua germana de los conquistadores godos y la lengua de la población romanizada de las provincias hispanicas del antiguo Imperio Romano.

Romance [...] se derivó de la lengua Latina, ò Romana, i della tuuo su principio, i nombre (Aldrete 1606: 6). Es tan parecida, i femejante la lengua Castellana a la Latina su madre [...] i en ambas concurren todas las partes de legitima filiación. [...] Lo primero el

nombre de Romance testifica esto, el qual se le pufo a distincion de la Gotica. [...] los Romanos se distinguian de los Godos, i en España no auia otra distincion sin hazer memoria del nombre de Españoles, porque todos eran Romanos (Aldrete 1606: 186).

Cuando los godos pierden su lengua y pasan al romance, se establece la oposición *latín* ↔ *romance*. Aldrete predominantemente relaciona el termo *romance* con la etapa inicial de la historia del español, que sigue después de la caída del Imperio Romano, y destaca el uso del término *romance* en *Siete Partidas*.

Forçoso, i neccßario à fido para mi intento prouar que en España fue vulgar la lengua Latina [...]. Aora defeo [...] profeguir lo començado, facando de lo dicho los efectos, que fueron principio, i origen del Romance (Aldrete 1606: 150). Este nombre de Romance, por la lengua Castellana, le hallamos mui ordinariamente en las leies de Partidas (Aldrete 1606: 186).

De este modo vemos vacilaciones y concurrencia en la denominación de la lengua; el sistema terminológico aún no está constituido, pero el tratado de Aldrete nos da un material para observar la formación de unos conceptos lingüísticos innovadores.

La diferenciación de dos nociones (todavía sin acuñar en la época) —*romance* como el habla de la etapa inicial de la formación de una nueva lengua del latín y *romance* “que oi se usa en España”, esto es, español, castellano⁴, una lengua románica concreta ya formada— posibilita relacionar el término *romance* no sólo con una lengua formada del latín en el área hispánica), sino a otras lenguas unidas con el origen común, cuyo parentesco

⁴ No tocamos aquí la cuestión de actuales diferencias del uso de estas denominaciones porque Aldrete no toca este aspecto.

determina sus paralelismos. De ese modo se crea la base conceptual y terminológica para la noción de las lenguas romances, o románicas (grupo de lenguas, descendientes del latín).

En el tratado de Aldrete el concepto de las lenguas románicas parece ya formado, revelándolo el título de un capítulo: “Muestraffe, que la lengua Latina no està del todo en nuestro Romance destruida” (Aldrete 1606: 186), que enfatiza el parentesco de “nuestro romance”, o castellano, con el latín. La descripción refleja la proximidad sistémica del español, el italiano y el francés, explicada por la descendencia del latín (número de nombres, expresión de los significados de casos, similitud de los sistemas verbales románicos y el latino) al tiempo que el lingüista marca ciertas distinciones fonéticas, gramaticales y léxicas entre tres lenguas románicas:

como las mismas gentes fueron las que vinieron a Italia, Francia, i España, allí casi igual introduxeron la gramatica, que tiene mui poca diferencia en todas tres prouincias, de manera que no es fola i particular de España, porque generalmente hablando es vna. Los nombres en todas tres lenguas tienen folas dos terminaciones vna de singular, i otra de plural, los casos se distinguen por particulas, o preposiciones, que les añaden. Los verbos en sus conjugaciones imitan mucho las Latinas. Lo que mas distingue estas tres lenguas, que de la copia, i abudancia de la Latina, vna tomo vnos vocablos, i otra otros, vnos en vna significacion, i otros en otra, vnos admite por metafora, otros por traslacion, lo qual no siguió la otra, vna recibio vocablos de los que tenían aquellas gentes, otra no. De los verbos hicieron nombres nuevos, i de las particulas, i otras dicciones compusieron nuevos verbos, vna en la pronouciacion quitò letras, otra las añadió, vna las mudò, otra las conseruò, vna hizo lo que era breue largo, otra al conrario de lo largo breue. Finalmente como los caminos para diuidirse, i apartarse son muchos, allí los vuo para diferenciarfe estas lenguas, pero en todas

se reconoce el origen de donde deciden, mas o menos manifiesto, segun le corresponde mas, o menos le parece (Aldrete 1606: 189-190).

El lingüista español se ocupa del problema importante para la filología románica: de qué latín provienen las lenguas romances, considerando su fuente el lenguaje coloquial, el registro vulgar de la gente sencilla, o sea el latín vulgar, negando la influencia del latín literario en las condiciones del declive de la educación en la época. El autor caracteriza el latín medieval.

se iua perdiendo la lengua Latina, i començaua el Romance, teniendo su principio en la gente popular, i ordinaria, de donde cundio, i se estendio por todos. Lo qual fue mui apressa, por auer se dexado en aquellos siglos, i casi acabado los estudios delas buenas letras, como se vee en los libros, que de aquellos tiempos tenemos. En los quales, alli en lo que se trata, como en el estilo, i modos de hablar se echa de ver con llaneza (Aldrete 1606: 158-159).

La formación de estos conceptos permite pensar que, al mismo tiempo, se está constituyendo la noción de etapas de las lenguas románicas, y el tratado lo evidencia: Aldrete presenta las siguientes etapas: 1. la romana (atendiendo también a la prerromana); 2. la de la formación del sistema lingüístico romance; 3. la de la consolidación de la lengua romance concreta. En el umbral de la segunda y la tercera etapa surge y se establece la escritura romana. Este cuadro que vemos en el modelo de la descripción de la obra de Aldrete anticipa la idea de la periodización de la historia de las lenguas románicas.

En este sentido tenemos una denominación más del tratado es *Lengua Vulgar*, que Aldrete comprende como *lengua materna* (empleando también el sinónimo *nuestra lengua*) y que el lingüista considera aplicable a cualquier lengua (latina, castellana,

griega, etc.).

La comparación entre cómo se emplean los términos *romance* y *lingua vulgar* en la obra de Aldrete con las definiciones del Diccionario RAE (1ª edición,⁵ y 23ª edición⁶) revela la proximidad del autor del inicio del siglo XVII a la comprensión actual de estos términos, haciéndonos apreciar el papel de Aldrete en la formación de la lingüística románica.

Del Origen y principio de la lengua castellana es una de las primeras descripciones históricas de una lengua concreta. Y Aldrete no sólo explicita la idea de cambio histórico, sino que pertenece a los pocos autores de la época que consideran el historicismo como característica universal de la lengua (Kossarik 2015: 189-192).

La lengua vulgar naturalmēte con el tiempo se envejece, i muda, i en ciento o docientos años se trueca de manera, que muchas palauras della no se entienden, como si fueran vocablos de lengua peregrina, ou estrangera (Aldrete 1606: 176). De la lengua Francefa, i mas a la larga de la Tudefca lo prueua bien Iufto Lipfio [...]. Efto mismo experimentamos en nueftra lengua cada dia, i lo vemos en los libros, que de cien años atras se escriuieron, que mientras mas antiguos parecen, quando se leen, de otra lengua. Muchos de los vocablos no entendemos con propiedad lo que fignifican, fino por lo que precede, o se figue venimos en algun conocimiento dellos. Los modos de decir, el estilo es otro, del que oi se vfa, i aun los tiempos de los verbos son algunos diferentes. [...]

⁵ Romance s.m. Nuestro idioma o lengua vulgar. Llámase así por tener su origen en los romanos. Latín. *Lingua Vernacula*.

⁶ Del lat. *Romanice* 'en el idioma de los romanos'.

1. adj. Perteneciente o relativo a las lenguas romances. Léxico romance.
2. m. Lengua derivada del latín, como el español, el catalán, el gallego, el italiano, el francés etc.
3. m. La lengua española, en oposición al latín o a otras lenguas no romances.

Para muestra desto en nuestra lengua Castellana pondre algunos pocos de muchos, que pudiera, sacados del Fuero Juzgo, de las Partidas, Historia del Rei Don Alonfo, i del Infante Don Manuel (Aldrete 1606: 178).

Un rasgo innovador del tratado histórico español es que, además de manifiesto el parentesco de la lengua materna con el latín, el autor se aproxima a la idea de la descripción comparativa de lenguas románicas a nivel gramatical, destacando la especial importancia de la gramática para la lengua: “qualquiera lengua tiene dos partes principales [...] los vocablos, i la Gramatica, aquellos son como la materia, i esta como la forma” (Aldrete 1606: 255).

Después de demostrar el origen latino de la mayor parte del vocabulario español, con la finalidad de acentuar la proximidad del español y del italiano, y de los dos al latín, Aldrete analiza bastante consecuentemente el sistema morfológico del latín: paradigmas nominales, pronominales y verbales (el tipógrafo usa diferentes tipos de letras). La descripción revela la comprensión universalista de la categoría del caso (cf. Косарик 2013: 81-90); el autor comenta las diferencias de la categoría del número en las tres lenguas.

Auiendo visto pues como los vocablos Españoles decien de los Latinos, tambien es justo trate algo de la Gramatica. Porque la semejança, que entrefi tienen las gramatica Castellana con la Italiana, i ambas con la Latina, no se puede mejor ver, que declinãdo algunos nombres, i conjugando algun verbo de todas tres lenguas, porque por esta via se vendra en maior conocimiento lo que tienen de semejança, i en lo que se apartan, para esto puse aqui lo vno, i lo otro. Con diferentes letras. La primera es Latina, la segunda Española, la tercera italiana.

Nominatiuo Genitiuo Datiuo

Acufatiuo	Vocatiuo	Ablatiuo	
<i>Poeta,</i>	<i>Poetae,</i>	<i>poetae,</i>	<i>Poetam,</i>
ò <i>Poeta,</i>	à <i>Poeta,</i>		
el Poeta,	del Poeta	al Poeta,	el
Poeta,	ò Poeta,	del Poeta,	
il poeta,	del poeta,	al poeta,	il poeta
o poeta,	dal poeta. [...]		
<i>Ego,</i>	<i>Mei,</i>	<i>Mihi vel mi,</i>	<i>Me,</i>
<i>a Me,</i>			
io,	de Mi,	a Mi,	Me,
de Mi,			
io,	di me,	a Me,	me,
da me [...]			

affi Castellanos, como Italianos se distinguen los casos por los artículos, porque todos los casos son semejantes; lo que nos diferenciamos es en el plural, que nosotros siempre lo acabamos en S, i ellos en I. Primera conjugacion.

Indicatiuo

Prefens *Amo, amas, amat, amamus, amatis, amant.*

Amo, amas, ama, amamos, amais, aman.

Amo, ami, ama, amiamo, amate, amano. [...]

Plufquam *Amaueram, amaueras, amauerat, amaueramus, amaueratis, amauerant.*

perf. Auia amado, auias amado, auiamos amado, auiais amado, auian amado.

Haueuo amato, haueui amato, haueua amato, haueuamo amato, haueuate amato, haueuano amato (Aldrete 1606: 255-256).

Aldrete destaca que la gramática española no es “particular”, es “una” con la italiana a causa del origen simultáneo y similar en el latín: “Con que claramente se vee, que no es particular la gramatica Castellana fino vnoa con la Italiana i nacida quando ella, i como ella de vna mesma madre la lengua Latina. Pondre otro exemplo en la oracion” (Aldrete 1606: 258-259).

La proximidad de las lenguas se ilustra con textos paralelos

de una oración en latín, español (denominado aquí *romance*), italiano y también catalán y portugués. De este modo Aldrete, en su tratado histórico, compara el latín y las lenguas románicas a varios niveles: fonético, morfológico, lexical y textual.

El surgimiento de dos tendencias en la descripción de la lengua —1. comparativa (tipológica), basada en las ideas de la gramática universal, y 2. histórica, en la cual los cambios lingüísticos se comprenden como el rasgo universal de las lenguas— es una innovación importante de la lingüística renacentista (Kossarik 2017, 2018a). La unión de las dos tendencias en la obra de Aldrete, creando la base de la gramática comparativa de lenguas románicas, marca un impulso relevante para el desarrollo de la filología romance.

Sin embargo, tenemos que señalar que el filólogo español no se desentiende de la visión jerárquica de lenguas: con frecuencia compara con el latín solamente el español y el italiano, esporádicamente se dirige al francés y no da información de otros romances, solo mencionadas en el tratado.

Según Aldrete, son muy fuertes los vínculos entre la lengua y su escritura: “Recibiendo vna nacion otra lengua, con ella viene, que admita juntamente la letra con que se escriue, i se pierde el lenguaje, pierde tambien la forma de la letra, con que lo escriuia” (Aldrete 1606: 241), el desaparecimiento de la escritura pudiendo explicarse no más que con el desaparecimiento de la lengua. A Aldrete le interesan la grafía, las particularidades de los alfabetos latino y griego, sus grafemas y la fonética romance (Aldrete 1606: 241-244).

El filólogo español ve en los textos testigos de las situaciones lingüísticas, del estado de la lengua. Presenta en su tratado ejemplos de la epigrafía prerromana, de los principios de la historia del castellano. Un texto de la epigrafía latina refleja la situación de bilingüismo de la época de la romanización (Aldrete

1606: 93). Aldrete aprecia textos latinos de la época visigótica como la única fuente de información sobre los cambios que se dan en la lengua en ese período: “en los quales hallamos con claridad los indicios, i muestras de la lengua, que se vfaua Latina corrompida, qual oi la ufamos, i della no se hallan rastros mas antiguos” (Aldrete 1606: 154). Expone textos paralelos (latino, romance) de un epitafio del siglo XIII: “en la capilla Real de Seuilla al Santo Rei Don Fernando” (Aldrete 1606: 183-184); cita de *Siete Partidas* (Aldrete 1606: 186). Interesa la tentativa del autor de recurrir a los datos de un acontecimiento histórico, a los datos de un monumento epigráfico para la atribución cronológica de hechos de la historia de la lengua (Aldrete 1606: 342, 345).

La obra de Aldrete revela su profundo conocimiento de la tradición precedente. Se dirige a un círculo muy amplio de filósofos, escritores, poetas, historiadores, Padres de la Iglesia, teólogos, retóricos, gramáticos y lexicógrafos clásicos, medievales, renacentistas, ofrece muchas citas, menciona a más de 100 autores con escrupulosas referencias en los márgenes del tratado.

Un aspecto todavía más importante para la formación de la filología científica es la atención a la problemática sociolingüística. Aldrete presta atención a la variación territorial, social y funcional de la lengua española. Escribe sobre el habla ejemplar de la corte y de la universidad, que difieren de los dialectos, alude a zonas dialectales, resalta diferencias entre el habla rural, el habla oral y la escrita.

De los diuerfos modos de hablar, que son particulares en la lengua
Castellana

[...] estos [dialectos] [...] consisten en vna cierta propiedad en el hablar, [...] i admitido por los, que hablan bien en ella, o por lo menos al vfo de la tierra, aunque no sea el mas elegante. Por lo qual los de vna misma prouincia, hablando vna misma lengua, siendo de

diferentes partes, se conocen, i distinguen entre sí por los varios modos de dezir, con que se habla diuersamente en cada lugar, bien que la lengua sea toda vna. [...] estos modos de hablar son diuersos en vna misma conforme la variedad, i diversidad de los lugares; i tambien consta que son muy accidentales en la lengua, la qual no depende dellos. Algunos de estos son mas uniuersales, porque generalmente han sido admitidos por su buen agrado [...] i con el uso se hacen propios, porque se dicen con vocablo, i gramatica de nuestra lengua [...]. Los que andan en la Corte, i estudian en uniuersidades tienen desto gran experiencia, porque concurriendo a estas partes mucha gente de diuersas partes, i que habla vna misma lengua Castellana, en poco tiempo con alguna conuertencia se conoce, qual es de Castilla la vieja, qual de la Nueva, quien es de Estramadura, quien de Andalucia, i el tiempo que a que reside en la corte, o uniuersidad, por solo el modo de hablar. [...] la gente de la ciudad se diferencia de la del campo, pero aun entre los mismos de la ciudad [...], i entre los del campo, se conoce qual es de vn barrio, i qual de otro, qual de la Campiña, i qual de la Sierra. Por que allí como es grande la variedad, que ay en las condiciones de los hombres [...] así tambien en la variedad de la lengua, que con ser una misma, por ella como por la vista se conoce quien habla, o cuyos son los escritos, que se leen (Aldrete 1606: 190–192).

Aldrete incluye en el tratado dedicado a la historia de la lengua la problemática ligada a las lenguas iberorrománicas de fuera de España, principalmente la difusión del español en América, trazando paralelos con la romanización de la época de Roma.

Crecio con esto la lengua Latina en las prouincias, si bien notan pura i elegante como en Roma, donde ella era natural [...]. Lo mismo sucede oy en el Romance, que sin duda se da mejor a los de Toledo, que a los de otras partes, i mucho menos fuera de España, Pues ya sí es aprendido por arte, sin tener trato con Español, de todo punto parece otro lenguaje (Aldrete 1606: 56).

Conclusión

El análisis del tratado *Del Origen y principio de la lengua castellana o romance que oi se usa en España* de B. de Aldrete permite marcar unas importantes características de este monumento lingüístico.

1. La exposición de la historia del español está estrechamente relacionada con la historia del país y con la del pueblo. El autor presta una grande atención a la historia externa, especialmente a su etapa inicial. En todas las etapas se tocan elementos significativos para la situación sociolingüística. Aldrete explicita la idea de cambios en la lengua, viendo su causa principal en contactos lingüísticos. El autor se aproxima a la idea de la periodización de la historia de la lengua.

2. Tras exhibir la historia externa, Aldrete pasa a la historia interna. En la descripción de la fonética el autor del tratado sigue a los lingüistas del Renacimiento, que anticipan la fonética histórica, revelando procesos fonéticos regulares, comparando la fonética de las lenguas románicas, unidas por el origen latino común. El lingüista español compara unos cambios comunes en la morfología nominal y verbal de lenguas románicas. Aldrete atiende a las fuentes del léxico español, pero aún no consigue aproximarse a los principios de la etimología científica.

3. El autor de la obra dedicada a la historia del español, una lengua románica concreta, coloca su historia en un amplio contexto románico. Considera la historicidad como un rasgo lingüístico universal. En el tratado se ensaya un modelo de la descripción de las lenguas románicas, combinando las actitudes histórica y tipológica. Así se traza la base de la gramática comparativa de las lenguas románicas, marcando un punto de partida para la formación de la lingüística románica moderna.

4. El tratado testimonia el proceso de creación de los conceptos

lenguas románicas y romanización; Aldrete explicita la comprensión de estos fenómenos, atiende a los aspectos sociolingüísticos del latín e indica de que tipo de latín provienen los romances, muestra el significado de los primeros siglos después de la caída del Imperio Romano para la formación de las lenguas románicas, .

5. La profunda obra de Aldrete contiene una vasta “constituyente filológica” —profundo conocimiento e interés por la escritura, la tradición textual. Es notoria la atención del autor a referencias y a correctas citas de numerosas fuentes.

De este modo, el tratado de Aldrete hace mucho para elaborar el modelo moderno de la descripción histórica de la lengua y contribuye al máximo a la formación de la filología románica como ciencia madura, siendo *de facto* la primera obra que abarca toda su problemática.

Para el historiógrafo parece muy importante la unión, en un texto del inicio del siglo XVII, de la problemática de diacronía, sincronía, variación lingüística, cuya conexión inseparable constituye la base de la lingüística coseriana.

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On the Philosophical-Scientific Edifice of Coserian Linguistic Theory. An Epistemological Analysis of “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar”*

Araceli LÓPEZ SERENA
University of Seville, Spain

Abstract: Despite conceiving epistemological principles as the most important element in a science and strongly defending the indissolubility between the linguistic and philosophical dimensions of theorization, Eugenio Coseriu expressed a great number of his epistemological convictions only as mere comments scattered across different writings. For this reason, it is not always easy to realize which aspects of his linguistic thinking, which argumentation procedures and which key categorizations and concepts in his linguistic theorization originated from issues of a philosophical nature – especially as far as philosophy of linguistics is specifically concerned. In this respect, the present paper aims to identify the

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philosophical-scientific foundations underlying “Logicismo y antilogicismo en la gramática” (“Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar”). In doing so, I intend to show that this work is not a mere linguistic study, but an essential approach to unravel the epistemological principles around which the whole philosophical-scientific edifice of Coserian linguistic theory is structured.

Keywords: philosophy of linguistics, Eugenio Coseriu, linguistic theory, hermeneutics, “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar”

1. Introduction

Despite not having ever succeeded in writing any *Lessons in Philosophy of Linguistics* as such, Eugenio Coseriu conceived epistemological principles as the most important element in a science.⁷ There undoubtedly lies the reason why, on the one hand, he even asserted – citing Amado Alonso – that “when it comes to knowing, what matters is the scientific quality of knowledge, apart from whether it leads us to a yes or a no” (Coseriu 1953[1977]: 262; my translation), and on the other hand, he bitterly complained in a contribution to a volume on *Latin American and Caribbean Linguistics* – translated into Spanish as “Panorama de la lingüística latinoamericana (1840-1965)” (“Panorama of Latin American Linguistics (1840-1965)”) – about the little interest in these issues shown by Latin American and Brazilian linguistics through the following words:

theoretical and critical discussions are relatively rare in I Am [Ibero America]: facts and opinions are discussed on the basis of theories already there, *but unusually not theories as such and their epistemological foundations* (Coseriu 1968: 36; my italics).

⁷See López Serena (2009), now collected with slight modifications in López Serena (2019a, chap. 2).

As for the reasons which might have led the Romanian linguist to prefer expressing his epistemological convictions as comments scattered across nearly all of his writings instead of choosing to articulate them in a single monograph, my guess (see López Serena (2009 and 2019a, chap. 2) is that his choice largely has to do with the ancillary status inevitably assigned to philosophy of linguistics. This relates to its nature as a second-level theorization with regard to theory of language (see § 3.1 below), general linguistics, or historical linguistics, as well as discourse or text linguistics, all of them established by Coseriu as distinct parts of his *integral linguistics* (see Copceag 1981, Loureda 2007).

The purpose behind my decision to dedicate that 2009 work to Coseriu's philosophical-scientific thinking was precisely to make it easier for contemporary readers to access Coserian epistemological principles, which had been almost neglected until then due to their dispersed exposition. Another three recent publications of mine (López Serena 2019a, chap. 3; 2019b; forthcoming) aim to highlight the role of meeting point between philosophy and linguistics that Coseriu's writings play so often as one of the idiosyncratic characteristics of his scientific thinking.

In fact, Coseriu sees such a close interconnection between the linguistic and philosophical spheres that he even stated once, against those who defended "the autonomy of linguistics with respect to philosophy, "that" such an autonomy is impossible, and seeking it is *per se* a contradiction in terms" (Coseriu 1988³: 199; my translation).

Totally at odds with those whom this author describes as "(people) craving for an *improper autonomy*" vis-à-vis philosophy (Coseriu 1988³: 217, No. 63; my translation, my italics), his own

linguistic works repeatedly refer to what he calls “philosophy of language problems.” As he himself points out, these problems

are treated [...] particularly in *Forma y sustancia* (*Form and Substance*), in *Logicismo y antilogicismo* (*Logicism and Antilogicism*), in “Determinación y entorno” (“Determination and Environment”), and in *Sincronía, diacronía e historia* (*Synchrony, Diachrony and History*)... (Cosieriu 1968: 50).

Given the indissoluble connection between the linguistic and philosophical dimensions of theorization which characterized his approach to language, my intention in López Serena (2019a, chap. 3; 2019b; forthcoming) was to check which aspects of Cosieriu’s linguistic thinking, which argumentation procedures, and which key categorizations and concepts in his linguistic theorization originated from issues of a philosophical nature, especially in what specifically concerns philosophy of linguistics rather than philosophy of language.

For that purpose, I analyzed two of the works to which he actually referred his readers in this regard: *Sincronía, diacronía e historia* (*Synchrony, Diachrony, and History*) and *Forma y sustancia en los sonidos del lenguaje* (*Form and Substance in the Sounds of Language*). Along these same research lines, my contribution to this monographic journal issue focuses on identifying the philosophical-scientific foundations underlying “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar”.

The same as when I examined *Synchrony, Diachrony, and History* together with “Form and Substance in the Sounds of Language”, my goal in this new approach consists in showing that none of these works are mere(ly) linguistic studies; instead, they constitute essential approaches to unravel the epistemological

principles around which the whole philosophical-scientific edifice of Coserian linguistic theory is structured.

Nevertheless, unlike what was done in those previous works, where the analysis of each specific publication authored by Coseriu took place after a detailed explanation of the philosophical-scientific foundations underlying his thinking, things will now be done the other way around. Seeking to make it as clear as possible that epistemological issues do not receive explicit attention in most of Coseriu's works, what follows in § 2 will help me outline the fundamental characteristics of the content provided through "Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar", laying special emphasis on the parts where this article refers to some philosophical-scientific issue, and leaving for the end (§ 3) the explanation of the place that corresponds to such issues within the philosophical-scientific edifice of Coserian linguistic theory.

A distinction will be drawn as follows between logicist mistakes (see § 2.1) and antilogicist mistakes (see also § 2.2) in this respect.

2. Logicist and Antilogicist Mistakes in "Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar"

"Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar," one of his shortest – but by no means less dense – articles, allowed Eugenio Coseriu to review the mistakes caused by certain *logicist* and *antilogicist* positions when linguistically approaching a number of specific grammatical issues. As he actually stresses in the conclusions drawn from this work,

'logicism' and 'antilogicism' are not organized doctrines or individual positions of one scholar or another, neither can anyone think of labeling a particular scholar as entirely 'logicist' or entirely 'antilogicist' (...). These are generic

positions, of common mistakes that affect linguistic and grammatical studies. Such errors are hinted at even in highly valuable works, which precisely makes it advisable both to identify them and to remove them (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 259; my translation).

In accordance with the distinction already mentioned above (see § 1) that Coseriu himself drew between historical linguistics, general linguistics, and theory of language (see López Serena forthcoming), this article represents a contribution which takes the third of these contexts as its object of analysis. By doing so, “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar” becomes a metatheoretical – and accordingly philosophical-scientific – approach. As explained by its actual author, “[t]he purpose of defining the concepts underpinning grammar, and particularly verbal and grammatical categories, belongs to the section of linguistic theory which has been traditionally referred to as ‘logical grammar’ or ‘general grammar’” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 235; my translation).

The discussion about how such concepts are defined goes beyond the boundaries of linguistic theory, though, or expressed differently, it has a metatheoretical nature – to which must be added another factor which likewise justifies the philosophical stance adopted in this paper. As highlighted in § 1, for Coseriu, theory of language cannot be separated from philosophy; hence why, even if we decided to see “Logicism and Antilogicism” as a linguistic theory work, it should not come as a surprise for us to check that the arguments presented in various points of that article are either completely philosophical or epistemological or philosophical-scientific.

As denounced by Coseriu, logical or general grammar – the purpose of which consists in defining the concepts and categories

required to undertake the grammatical description of any language –has committed serious mistakes throughout history “precisely due to its ‘logicism’ and to its aspirations to reach a misconceived generality” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 235; my translation). In view of the above, the Romanian linguist deems it “necessary (...) to try and identify the essential errors of linguistic logicism, thus seeking to specify how they can be removed without repeating the antilogicist errors” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 238; my translation).

The objective pursued with the present article relates neither to the errors of logicism nor to those of antilogicist, its focus being placed instead on Coseriu’s decision to resort to arguments of a philosophical-scientific nature in this work about logicist and antilogicist errors.

For this reason, the following subsections will only succinctly outline the specific logicist and antilogicist mistakes that aroused the interest of the author to whose thinking this volume is dedicated. After that, I will highlight the extent to which the rationale behind the analysis of those errors, and their consideration, precisely, as errors, is built on issues associated with philosophy of linguistics, the understanding of which may be hindered by the fact that such philosophical issues are not exhaustively expounded in the specific work at hand.

2.1. Logicist Errors

The first logicist error highlighted by Coseriu lies “in the consideration of language as an object of a logical nature; or rather as a product of logical thinking” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 238; my translation) or, to put it in another way, “the identification between meaning and logic” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 239; my translation).

According to Coseriu, this mistake can be solved by clearly distinguishing language, which “as such, is simply *semantic*

logos: meaningful expression, in which there is neither truth nor falseness, since the latter only arise in affirmation and negation, in the *apophantic logos*” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 238-239; my translation) from the apophantic logos which consequently happens after language and is not identical to it. From a philosophical-scientific standpoint, and in relation to the hermeneutic conception of linguistics which characterizes Coseriu, what calls our attention is the fact that the consideration below serves as the basis to stress the inconsistency of this denounced confusion:

- (1) *addressing the problemat the finality level, the one inherent to language (since the latter constitutes an expression of freedom)*, the mistake lies in the confusion between the purpose belonging to the object essence – to linguistic activity itself, regardless of any subsequent determinations – which is also the significant finality, and the ancillary kind of purpose typically associated with one act or another. This second finality does not belong to the essence of the language object; instead it identifies with the purpose of the linguistic subject within a specific act and, despite the possibility of it being logical, this finality may be esthetic or practical as well (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 239; my translation; my italics)⁸.

For readers not familiar with the principles of the philosophy of hermeneutic science, the idea that the problem has to be

⁸ The citations of philosophical-scientific relevance will be systematically listed through these pages – as in this case – thus making it easier to refer to them in the final section of this article (§ 3), focused on their contextualization within the framework of the philosophical-scientific edifice of Coserian linguistic theory.

considered from the finality perspective – because this is the typical level of language – along with the accompanying argument that such a statement derives from viewing language as an expression of freedom, will either sound trivial or make this passage more difficult to understand. Hence the need to read it, as will be done in § 3 later on, in the light of a thorough knowledge about the complete philosophical-scientific edifice of Coseriu linguistic theory.

The second logicist error about which Coseriu warns us

is the placement of ‘logicity’ (=semanticity) in the ‘system,’ in abstract language, for instance, by attributing certain categorial meanings to specific ‘forms’ and assuming that the same meaning is always going to correspond to the same form, or that the value simply verified as the most frequent one will be the constant value of the form considered (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 242; my translation).

Coseriu illustrates this mistake as follows:

It is what happens when an attempt is made to attribute the adjectival value to a form like *blanco* [white], not in some specific use, but “in the Spanish language,” or when it is stated that, if *blanco* [white] is a noun in a specific utilization, that would somehow be “contrary to logic” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 242; my translation).

We will not stop to consider this particular mistake because, during its examination, Coseriu does not mention any of the philosophical-scientific principles that are crucial in his thinking. However, curiously enough, he does make a statement that will surely be of interest to analyze the notion of traditionality which underlies the currently fashionable approach to discursive

traditions. Indeed, for Coseriu, making this second logicist mistake

implies being unaware that a “language” is not an autonomous reality, but one structured on the basis of speaking and that the “norm” is not a fixed, immutable system, but a mere average, since the senses that it comprises are traditional, and “many traditions exist” (J. Dewey, *Logic. The Theory of Inquiry*) (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 243; my translation).

The same holds true for the third of the logicist errors that he denounces – confusing “the logical” (=semantic) and the ontological spheres, i.e. the meanings and the signified things” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 244; my translation). In relation to this mistake, the only outstanding consideration made is an extremely brief reference to the need to distinguish between subject of study (or study matter) and object of study (or study object), albeit not in these terms, but in those of the opposition between *Wirklichkeit* and *reale Wirklichkeit*. In this regard, he refers back to the Spanish translation of Husserl (1922[1993]): “we must not confuse thought reality (*Wirklichkeit*) with natural reality (*reale Wirklichkeit*)” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 245; my translation).

Lastly, following Coseriu,

[to] the three already mentioned mistakes is often added another: trying to find the same categories – the same “logical thinking” – in every language. This error materializes, in the theoretical field, in the proposal for an “ideal logical language”, of which historical languages would be more or less imperfect copies,(...) and, at times, as the identification of that “ideal language” with a specific historical language, e.g. Greek or Latin.(...) And in the practical field, the same

errors become visible in the application of the categories present in one language to other languages which own different categories (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 245; my translation).

2.2. *Antilogicist Errors*

For the purposes of this work, the reasoning used to refute antilogicist errors, to which Coseriu pays attention after having examined the logicist ones, is far more substantial. Firstly, Coseriu stresses how

[to] the logicist error of considering language as a result of logical thinking, extreme antilogicism opposes (...) the mistake of regarding it as “illogical,” “contrary to logic,” “away from rational thinking” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 246; my translation).

Once more, Coseriu only refers to this in passing when he mentions the key epistemological distinction between subject of study or study matter (i.e. phenomic reality) and object of study (i.e. theoretical-methodological construction). He does so by stating that “language is not ‘illogical,’ but only prior to logical thinking”; in other words, it constitutes a “*semantic logos* which presents subsequent determinations in speech acts.” Hence why, “apart from semantic, it is additionally *fantastic* (poetry), *apophantic* (logical expression) or *pragmatic* (practical expression)” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 246; original italics; see § 2.1). In connection with this he adds the following:

- (2) *semanticity* is the constant and defining feature of language; however, *pure semanticity* never occurs in practice and is only separated for research-related

reasons (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 247; my translation; original italics).

Expressed differently, Coseriu's distinction between pure (or primary) semanticity and secondary semanticities – the latter being subordinated to poetic, logical or pragmatic purposes – highlights that, at the level of the subject of study or specific reality, semanticity always appears in association with one of these secondary semanticities. Despite the above, methodologically speaking, the linguist must postulate a pure semanticity detached from those subsequent purposes. However, when doing that, the linguist needs to be aware that (s)he is abstracting – and therefore building – an object of study which has ontologically stopped belonging to the phenomic reality that exists prior to research and is independent from it.

Even though the construction of objects of study makes it necessary to create entities which exclusively exist in methodological terms, for Coseriu, already in relation to a second antilogicist error – that of disregarding verbal categories, describing them as mere conventions – it deserves to be highlighted that the verbal categories with which grammar works “are not conventions, but speaking realities” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 247). In his opinion,

- (3) [e]stablishing a verbal category does not depend on a mere arbitrary decision, such as, for example, determining the date on which the Middle Ages ‘begin.’ The Middle Age limits do not exist before and independently from our decision, since this is a concept established through a convention, at the research process level. Instead, verbal categories are realities of language which exist independently from our decision to separate them and to define them (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 247; my translation).

As will be seen in § 3, the determination according to which verbal categories match speaking realities which must be checked within the very reality of linguistic use appeals to another of the philosophical-scientific principles most deeply rooted in Coseriu: the need to adapt to object reality. Before reaching that moment, it is necessary for us to stop at an epistemological passage still framed within this second antilogicist error: that of relegating verbal categories to the status of examples of theoretical-methodological arbitrariness.

My interest in this passage has to do with the fact that it emphasizes a differentiation of levels which is essential in philosophy of science: the distinction between the level of reality (language in the case of our discipline); the level corresponding to the discipline which undertakes the study of such reality (on this occasion, linguistics, which naturally includes the context of grammar, the one explicitly mentioned by Coseriu in the article under study here); and the level of metatheoretical or philosophical-scientific reflection. It reads like this:

- (4) The separation of verbal categories is not analogous to the distinction drawn, for example, between morphology and syntax either. Distinctions of the latter kind find themselves on another level: they refer to grammar, not to language. Morphology and syntax do not exist prior to the formal definition by means of which these concepts are structured; they are not speaking realities, but schemata of that *speaking about speaking* which grammar is – in other words, schemes of a *metalanguage*. The discussions about this do not belong to linguistic theory (theory of *language*), but to theory of *linguistics*; they are actually epistemological discussions. And they often turn out to be pointless,

since a metalanguage may assume different structures depending on the objects of study, and it may even become what has been decided that it should be, provided that it stays coherent and proves exhaustive concerning the aims that it pursues (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 248; my translation; original italics).

A fourth antilogicist error detected by Coseriu consists in the identification of categories “with the formal schemes into which they materialize” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 249). In his approach, Coseriu once again claims that language essentially has to do with a meaning finality (see § 2.1). However, on this occasion, despite doing it in a footnote, he does briefly mention the epistemological consequences derived from this verification:

- (5) *The fact that language finds itself at the finality level simultaneously implies the impossibility to interpret it in causalist terms, i.e. as (physical) stimuli and (physical) reactions (“responses”)* (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 250, n. 39; my translation; my italics).

And he also makes this warning:

- (6) It is true that meaning cannot be “observed,” that it does not have the same objectivity as (physical) things and (physical) events. However, this by no means implies that it can be ignored or interpreted in physicist terms. Quite the opposite, it implies that meaning lies at another research level where external observation turns out to be completely improper and inadequate. Indeed, language simultaneously belongs to nature and to the mind, to the world and to the interiority of conscience, and what we can “observe” is not *language*, but *mere*

language, or expressed differently, the physical aspect of language (...) (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 251; original italics; my translation).

One of the antilogicist errors that Coseriu sees as “one of the strangest corollaries which antilogicism deduces from the alleged alogicity of language” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 252) once more refers to the confusion between the theory of language sphere and that associated with theory of linguistics, which was brought up when dealing with citation number 4 above. Coseriu quotes the following statement by Karl Vossler in this regard:

Only logic knows about hierarchically organized concepts and can attest either a restriction or an extension of concepts. However, language is not logical and can consequently not undergo a logical treatment. Language does not have any concepts, but intuitions, each one of which has its individuality and a momentary value – and wants to be judged by itself. It will be immediately possible to coordinate the actual observations and conclusions to highlight what is similar and common. However, a scientific disposition will never be found; looking for it would be useless (Vossler [1904]1929: 52, after Coseriu 1956[1967]: 252; my translation).

In his comment, Coseriu adduces the following:

- (7) Vossler confuses here the level of language and that of linguistics and establishes an impossible opposition between language on one side, and logic and science on another, as if they were things situated at the same level: the “scientific disposition” is not to be found in language, but in linguistics. Every science is logical for

its status as a *science*, and not for being the science of a *logical object* (...). Even the study of an “irrational” object – if it is a study and not contemplation – necessarily has a rational nature. Even admitting that language may not have “concepts” (...), this does not mean that linguistics will not have them either (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 252-253; my translation; original italics).

Apart from denouncing the confusion between the theory of language and theory of linguistics spheres in some antilogicist approaches, Coseriu also deems it essential to avoid the confusion between theory of language and historical or descriptive linguistics, as well as between linguistic theory, general linguistics, and historical or descriptive linguistics, all of them issues which, for reasons of space,⁹ will be left aside from these pages, where our attention will exclusively focus on a final passage of “Logicism and Antilogicism.”

According to Coseriu, the “second antilogicist error¹⁰ is not a trivial one, since it points at the truth that the linguistic language is not a conventional language, a simple code, like artificial languages” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 254); it has an “essentially historical” nature (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 255). In fact, from his point of view,

- (8) the logicist error concealed an important intuition too: precisely that of the “objectivity” (or rather, “intersubjectivity”) of meaning (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 255).

⁹ About this, see López Serena (forthcoming).

¹⁰ It is the mistake of “thinking that we cannot reasonably ask ourselves what a particular meaning mode is (verb, noun, etc.), precisely because those values cannot be permanently attributed to the same forms” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 253).

3. Epistemological Contextualization

Reading “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar” from a philosophical-scientific perspective allows us to identify the presence of some of the epistemological foundations underpinning the articulation of the hermeneutic conception of linguistics as a human science which underlies all Coserian approaches both to language and to language science.

An attempt will be made below to highlight the place that these foundations occupy in the philosophical-scientific edifice of Coserian linguistic theory.

3.1. The Distinction between Subject of Study and Object of Study and between the Levels of Phenomic Reality, of Linguistics, and of Philosophy of Linguistic Science

The first point which deserves to be addressed for its general scope is the one that has to do with the actual awareness systematically shown by Coseriu in relation to the fact that some issues concern philosophy of science and others have to do with linguistics. Or, as he expresses in citation number 7, referring to the mistake made by Vossler precisely because he did not respect that distinction, the awareness about the existence of a language level (associated with linguistics) and a linguistics level (the analysis of which would correspond to philosophy of linguistics).

As can be seen in Figure 1, inspired by the distinction between first- and second-order types of knowledge advocated by Díez and Moulines (1999), linguistics is the branch of knowledge that studies language, whereas philosophy of linguistics or specifically linguistic epistemology is the philosophy branch entrusted with examining the scientific investigation of language and its product, scientific knowledge about language. Hence why

philosophy of linguistics necessarily stands at a higher – and accordingly different – abstraction level than that of linguistics:

	SCIENCE IN GENERAL	LINGUISTICS
Level 2: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE	<i>being able to explain the foundations underlying the construction of theories</i>	<i>being able to explain the foundations underlying the construction of specifically linguistic theories</i>
Level 1: SCIENCE	<i>being able to theorize</i>	<i>being able to theorize on linguistic phenomena</i>
Level 0: SUBJECT OF STUDY	<i>being able to satisfactorily perform a specific activity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>being able to speak in general</i> • <i>being able to speak at least one language</i> • <i>being able to speak in different types of circumstances and using various types of discourses</i>

Table 1. The Three Knowledge Levels for the Distinction between Subject of Study, Science, and Philosophy of Science (López Serena 2019a: 15)

The differentiations contained in Figure 1 become essential to draw a distinction not only between the level of linguistics and that of philosophy of linguistics but also between subject of study and object of study.

Despite not using the terms subject of study (or study *matter*) and *object* of study in “Logicism and Antilogicism,” Coseriu does take advantage of the concepts comprising these terms in his

argumentation; hence the distinction made in citation number 2 of § 2.2 between *semanticity* as “a constant and defining feature of language” – a feature which consequently belongs to the subject of study– and *pure semanticity*, which “occurs in practice and is only separated for research-related reasons”; or expressed differently, it does not form part of the phenomic reality or matter, but of the science level, which builds this notion of pure semanticity as an object of study.

In parallel, the passage offered as citation number 4 allows us to check that the distinction between the theoretical level and the metatheoretical level of reflection is also present in his thinking (levels 1 and 2 in Figure 1). The “speaking about speaking” which Coseriu identifies in that citation both with grammar and with language creation would belong to the theoretical or scientific level. Grammar forms part of the domain of what he himself refers to – in that citation too – as “theory of *language*,” a context which Coseriu differentiates – even terminologically – from the metatheoretical one, for which he uses – again in that same citation – the expression “theory of *linguistics*.”

3.2. The Principle of Adaptation to the Subject of Study and the Maxims of the Philosophy of Hermeneutic Science

The distinction between subject of study and object of study which is systematically made in “Logicism and Antilogicism” does not prevent Coseriu from denying that the entities postulated at the level of linguistic science, i.e. at the level of which the object of study forms part, are conventional or resulting from arbitrary decisions (see citation number 3 in § 2.2). Quite the opposite, in his view, they must be established in such a way that they correspond to language realities, in other words, to what is effectively attested in matter or phenomic reality. This approach has to do with one of the fundamental premises of the philosophy

of science that Coseriu adheres to, according to which, as he himself expresses in a publication written after “Logicism and Antilogicism,”

[i]f a conception of science and the corresponding method force us to ignore precisely the essential and defining features of an object [= subject of study], *we must opt for the object* [= subject of study] (Coseriu 1981: 118; my translation; my italics; the clarifications in square brackets are also mine).

In fact, Coseriu’s decision to choose philosophical-scientific convictions of a hermeneutic nature has to do with his commitment to respect the ontology that is typical of language reality.

As I already explained elsewhere (López Serena 2019a: chap. 1), the term *hermeneutics*— whose Greek etymon refers to the action of translating, interpreting or making something intelligible — arises, in the history of human sciences, with regard to textual interpretation, above all of the Holy Scriptures, but also of some legal documents.

Special attention must be paid in this respect to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), the first scholar to propose a general theory of interpretation, following which textual hermeneutics consisted in a combination between the knowledge of the most relevant linguistic and historical facts and the ability to mentally reconstruct the shaping of the text in question.

Based on Schleiermacher, and through the figures of J. G. Droysen (1808-1884) and, especially, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), a conviction became widespread according to which the type of knowledge involved in interpretation was radically different from the one typical of natural sciences.

In order to set that contrast, Dilthey coined the terms of the well-known opposition between *Verstehen* (understanding) and *Erklären* (explanation). The latter, linked to observation, constitutes the task inherent to natural sciences, whereas the former – understanding or *Verstehen* – is characteristic of human sciences or of those related to the spirit (*Geisteswissenschaften*), insofar as our knowledge about historical, social, and cultural events – the context specific to *Geisteswissenschaften* – necessarily entails the concurrence of interpretation.

In its attempt to defend the existence of a specific type of knowledge for *Geisteswissenschaften* which differs from that of natural sciences, hermeneutics confronts the methodological monism typically associated with positivist epistemology, which advocates a methodological unification of sciences based on three key postulates:

- i) the (same) scientific method can be applied in all the fields of knowledge on which we wish to obtain the best and most justified possible information;
- ii) this unitary scientific method ideally matches the paradigm of physical sciences;
- iii) bearing this in mind, causal explanations must be provided for facts from any scientific field.

As opposed to this methodological monism typically linked to the philosophy of positivist science, hermeneutic epistemology stresses the need to draw a clear-cut separation between human sciences and natural sciences for the reasons listed in Figure 2 below:

THERE ARE FOUR BASIC REASONS FOR WHICH IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN HUMAN SCIENCES AND NATURAL SCIENCES:	
(i)	<p>the evidently <i>uneven nature of their respective objects of study</i>. Thus, while human phenomena have an essentially normative (social) status– the rules of which it is perfectly possible to violate – natural laws are necessary. The counterexamples in them are not conceived as violations of rules, but as a refutation of the laws themselves. Therefore, this opposition arguably relies on:</p> <p>a) the universal character of natural phenomena (α) subject to <i>causality</i> and <i>necessity</i> laws (β) and which can consequently be subject to <i>prediction</i>,</p> <p>in contrast to</p> <p>b) the socio-historical or normative status of human condition, which prioritizes (α) the <i>freedom</i> or self-determination to abide by or violate the rules (β) and <i>finalist explanations</i>, rather than causalist ones;</p>
(ii)	<p>the <i>different relationship between researcher and research object</i> in one and the other type of science: independent in natural sciences and coincident in the human ones, where human beings simultaneously act as the researchers and the subjects of study or research;</p>
(iii)	<p>the <i>different procedure (epistemic act)</i> required to achieve knowledge: <i>observation</i> in natural sciences and <i>intuition</i> when it comes to human sciences;</p>
(iv)	<p>the <i>certainty</i> of linguistic knowledge as opposed to the uncertainty regarding knowledge which characterizes natural sciences.</p>

Table 2. Factors which Determine the Opposition between Natural Sciences and Human Sciences (López Serena 2019a: 24)

Therefore, according to those who defend the hermeneutic position, the different nature of the subjects and objects of study associated with natural sciences and human sciences, as well as the different relationship that the researcher establishes with those objects in both types of sciences, necessarily means that a dissimilar kind of explanation will also (have to) be used in each one of these contexts. Thus, whereas the establishment of the *causal* relationship existing between two physical facts makes it necessary to resort to external *observation*, when it comes to human actions, the relationships – of *finality* rather than causal – which link such actions to the reasons underlying their implementation are internally – directly – experienced, insofar as the understanding of other people’s actions is based on similar own actions.

In the light of the considerations above, it finally becomes intelligible why, in the citation highlighted as number 1 in § 2.1, Coseriu considers “the problem” that he is dealing with in that moment “at the finality level– i.e. the one inherent to language (since the latter constitutes an expression of freedom).” It is not easy to detect what Coseriu exactly means with ‘freedom’ and ‘finality,’ unless we take into account that, in his conception of linguistics as a human science (and from the perspective of philosophy of hermeneutic science, as shown in item (i) of Figure 2), the socio-historical or normative status of everything that relates to human sciences forces us to recognize that (α) *freedom* or self-determination prevail in this context; and that (β) it becomes necessary to use *finalist* explanations, instead of causalist ones. This last idea, the rejection of the causalist approach, also appears in “Logicism and Antilogicism” – as shown in citation 5 of section § 2.2., which contained the following statement – : “The fact that language lies at the finality level implies at the same time the impossibility to interpret it in causalist terms.”

The social ontology of language prevents the epistemic act of approaching certain aspects of language from relying on observation – as it happens in natural sciences. For that reason, Coseriu points out in the citation identified with number 6 that “meaning cannot ‘be observed,’ that it does not have the same type of objectivity that is typical of physical things and events,” but also that “this by no means implies that it can be ignored or interpreted in physicist terms”; instead, it “implies that meaning lies at another research level where external observation turns out to be entirely improper or inadequate.” López Serena (2019a: 27-28) reminds us that in many of his works (see, for example, Itkonen 2003), Esa Itkonen assumes the tripartite division established by Popper – as reflected in Figure 3 – between the “worlds” (i) of physical states and facts; (ii) of psychological states and facts; and (iii) of social concepts and norms, after which Itkonen also stresses that, as opposed to observation, which concerns the first of these three worlds, the investigation about the world of social concepts and rules requires the participation of intuition.

ONTOLOGICAL LEVELS	EPISTEMIC ACTS
w-1: world of physical states and facts	observation
w-2: world of psychological states and facts	introspection
w-3: world of social concepts and norms	intuition

Table 3. Popper’s Three Ontological Levels and the Three Types of Epistemic Acts Distinguished by Itkonen (López Serena 2019a: 28)

Despite not considering the world of social concepts and norms in relation to language in citation number 6 extracted from “Logicism and Antilogism,” Coseriu does take into account worlds 1 and 2 from Figure 3, by stating that “language simultaneously belongs to nature and to the mind, to the world

and to the interiority of conscience, and what we can “observe” is not *language*, but *mere language*, or expressed differently, the physical aspect of language^(...)” (Coseriu 1956[1967]: 251; original italics; my translation).

All the same, the social status of language acquires relevance in the passage identified as number 10 – the last one from the work examined here considered worthy of analysis – once again concerning the issue of meaning, with respect to which citation number 6 already warned that it cannot be subject to observation. Citation number 10 refers to the “‘objectivity’ (or rather, ‘intersubjectivity’) of meaning,” something which of course cannot possibly be said about the world of psychological states and facts, or with regard to the world of the “interiority of conscience” about which Coseriu spoke in citation number 6. Instead, it obligatorily derives from the social nature of language, insofar as only social objects –and not mental ones, which are by definition individual, and thus subjective –can be the object of intersubjective knowledge.

4. Final Considerations

The metatheoretical analysis of “Logicism and Antilogicism” carried out through the preceding pages has served to confirm that Coseriu usually expressed his epistemological convictions as comments scattered across his writings (see § 1). Very often, this way of doing things does not even imply that such epistemological convictions were made explicit, at least in footnotes; and this can represent an insurmountable obstacle for anyone who approaches this author’s work without enough philosophical-scientific knowledge. As highlighted in the introduction of this new approach to Coserian linguistic-philosophical thinking, this idiosyncratic characteristic of his publications led me to consider the need to dedicate a whole series

of works to make it easier for contemporary readers to access Coserian epistemological principles. After all, due to their dispersed exposition, those principles have been generally neglected in the very few works within the field of contemporary linguistics that still deal with the Romanian scholar's contributions. These pages will in principle also prove difficult for readers who are familiar neither with Coseriu's linguistic-philosophical edifice nor with the foundations of philosophy of hermeneutic science. Hence my advice, if possible, to read this paper in the light of the bibliographic references that have been provided in its different sections. As a matter of fact, the number of references has been deliberately kept low precisely to ensure that they will prove really useful for everyone interested in broadening their knowledge about this domain.

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A Matter of Principle concerning Integral Linguistics: Man as a Cultural Being

Cristian PAȘCALĂU

Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Abstract: Integral linguistics resides on an inner, fundamental truth that has to be revealed and justified. The leap from intuition to reflexivity is subtly designated by Eugenio Coseriu in terms of “grain of truth” (which implies knowing and understanding a theory from within, in order for researchers to be able to emphasize its strong points, its sustainable cores of knowledge, and, at the same time, its weak points). All disciplinary fields are governed by the limits of their concept, therefore contemplating them needs to be done on philosophical grounds. In this respect, we revisit Coseriu’s doctrine regarding linguistics as a science that states man as its central point of reference. We aim to discuss one of the most challenging ideas Coseriu developed in this respect, namely that human consciousness emerges through language and unfolds intuitive knowledge, as opposed to the biological perspectives that derive consciousness from instincts, perceptions or sensory representations.

Keywords: language, integral linguistics, intuitive knowledge, meaning, humanistic science.

1. Preliminary Remarks

As a counterpart to the numerous reductionist theories that place linguistics in the field of exact sciences, the Romanian linguist Eugeniu Coseriu’s position sets another course of affairs: the accuracy of linguistics as a humanistic discipline (i.e. which regards man and his activity of language) is given precisely by the understanding of its object of study as a free and finalist activity in respect to the biological level. The exact sciences are able, to some extent, to determine what the physical and the biological

conditions that made human language possible are, but they do not tend to explain how the spiritual dimension or creativity works and language breaks out freely in man. The expansion of consciousness that led to the creation of meanings represents the pivotal point of human cultural development, the ontological leap from nature to culture, by virtue of which man creates his entire spiritual universe, through which he detaches himself from the biological level of his existence. The subject matter of linguistics must therefore be circumscribed by establishing clear investigative criteria and judiciously setting research objectives according to this philosophical frame.

On this account, the ‘grain of truth’ as the core of scientific theories can be understood by valuing the concept of tradition, which embraces two dimensions throughout Coseriu’s work. Firstly, the concept of tradition is applicable to the investigation of language by implicitly rejecting dogmas and prejudices in the fields of research. We agree that the grain of truth, as the nucleus for the intuition/reflexivity ratio, represents a relative truth, susceptible to changes. If we take language as an object of study for linguistics, the identification of language as an object requires capturing the essence of the object, as far as possible, “in all its necessary connections” (Coseriu 1992a: 11), i.e. basic identity conditions and defining traits, as well as in all connections through which an explanatory theory regarding the object can be developed. Thus situated, language as a cultural fact goes beyond the naturalistic-biological perspective, in so far as the biological level provides the necessary, but far from sufficient conditions for man’s development as a cultural being. Moreover, by extension, the explanation of language as a cultural, inner, free, and finalist activity is absolutely necessary.

At the same time, the tradition in linguistic science means assuming a justified knowledge of the object, by circumscribing,

if possible, the entire developments and mutations in thought that have strengthened the conceptual foundation of theories about language. In this second dimension, tradition encompasses the assumption of a line of thought (philosophical, scientific) whose intuitions on the realities inherent in the sphere of language developed even since the golden age of the ancient Greek philosophy. Eugeniu Coseriu's integral doctrine, in its philosophical background, is the sum of a coherent interpretation by reference to a plethora of philosophers and theorists of language, adopting an intellectual lineage from Greek antiquity to the 20th century. See, in this respect, Coseriu (1977). The Romanian linguist evokes, in each of his inaugural speeches, the visionary works of: Husserl (the concept of 'original science'; Aristotle, Croce, William James (the recognition of the universal in the particular); Leibniz and Hegel (the intuitive and reflexive/justified knowledge); Vico (justified delineation of cultural objects, semantic universals as unitary objects); Kant (the world of freedom and finality); Humboldt (the distinction of *energeia* as creative activity / *ergon* as product of this activity, the distinction between form and substance applied to language); Blaga (the distinction between 'plasticizing' metaphor / 'revealing' metaphor and the concept of 'mystery' as creative activity). Inspired by the philosophical work of Plato, Augustine, Wittgenstein, or Cassirer, Coseriu set the foundation of linguistics as a cultural science. Borcilă (2016: 19-27) explores several crucial cores in Coseriu's work: (1) the foundation and the legitimate epistemological status of linguistics among humanistic disciplines; (2) the reconstruction of linguistics, starting from a radical reversal of the perspective of the investigation in this discipline; (3) the redefinition both in extension and comprehension of the object of this discipline as 'the signifying function' and 'the linguistic competence'; (4) stating the

objectives and the fundamental domains of investigation of the linguistic science. Coseriu's contributions encompass solutions to some crucial problematic areas of the discipline thus re-founded, by clearly pinpointing the differences in conception in relation to other current trends in linguistics, such as structuralism and generative grammar.

Given these preliminary remarks, in this study we aim to discuss Coseriu's view on language as a unitary object of linguistic research and specific human cultural activity (in fact, language is the basis for all cultural facts). In this respect, we sketch out an overview of man as a biological and cultural being, briefly revisiting the problem of intuitive knowledge, in order to emphasize the major role of integral linguistics in providing philosophical grounds and humanistic cultural outcomes in the research of language. For a comprehensive reading on this subject matter, see Tămăianu-Morita (2002), Vilcu C. (2010) and Oancea & Obrocea (2019).

2. Man and the Cultural Level of his Existence

Linguistics as a humanistic, cultural science states man at its central point of reference, therefore a philosophical-anthropological approach could bring light on the question "What is a human being?". This question has generated many controversies over time and, more than often, crises in knowledge. In this respect, see also Zaner (1966: 55-68), who proposes, on Platonic bases, a phenomenological anthropology, namely "a *logos* of the *phenomenon of anthropos*, which has its source and its «subject matter» in the concerned questing for the being of man-in-quest of himself" (Zaner 1966: 68); in other words, Zaner searches the essence of man in man's "ontological priority" (Zaner 1966: 64) for examining and scrutinizing himself and the conditions of his existence.

In this section, we provide our own perspective on man regarding his biological apparatus and his cultural consciousness, loosely based on Aristotle (1935: 8-203, 208-277 and 281-307). A mere critical examination of reality shows that there are two distinct dimensions in which it can be perceived by humans: a concrete one, perceptible by the senses (we can call it the material dimension), and an abstract one, which is not perceptible by the senses (we can call it cultural dimension). These two dimensions separate in man two totally distinct levels: the biological (somatic and sensory) level and the cultural level.

The biological level represents the expression of the physical life in itself, or, in other words, the material dimension of the being. As substantial relational expression (cells and sensitive analyzers operate on purely biophysical bases), the body forms the level of concrete-material life.

The cultural level, on the other hand, refers to an abstract or immaterial manifestation, reflecting the ontological leap from the level of purely biological, instinctual life to an elevated hypostasis of the human being, which engages another type of being, totally different from the sensory one. Any abstract expression always refers to a form of human manifestation which is not perceptible by the senses, being related to the world of ideas, that is, the level of abstract-notional, significant (meaningful) life.

Even though these two different channels of perception (the sensory level and the intuitive level) are radically different as ways of manifestation and working mechanism, nevertheless they work in relational complementarity. In this sense, the first condition of the human newborn is to rise from his own scattering into a conscious unit with self-worth, i.e. to achieve the great leap from the relatively chaotic stage of somatic-sensory life to the cosmos of psychological, spiritual life.

The sensory level of man as a biological being presupposes the concrete and instinctual experience of the contact that he faces with the inner or outer biophysical reality through the intercession of his five senses. This process generates a lot of experiences such as: pain, hunger, thirst etc. The conjugated complex of the five senses) is the singular and exclusive expression of superior animals and of the human child from its unconscious phase to the formation of language. Once language is mastered, the sensations become shaped by meanings. The sensory amount produced from all sensations arising from the intercession of these five senses forms the perceptive channel of a physical nature, i.e. the first system of relating to reality. The level of manifestation is expressed to the same extent, with the inherent peculiarities, by all the superior animals that are endowed with a sensory apparatus similar to the human one. The importance of the sensory system lies in its phenomenal assimilation of reality through the five wavelengths of sensory responses. This process highlights the great difference between the vegetal life and the core of the sensory adapted life.

Basically, the sensory system is the maximum extension of organic development as a result of the contact between the multi-perceptual sensory apparatus and the range of specific qualities located in the extremely polymorphic area of nature. The level of the sensory system viewed in isolation, as presented in the newborn child, represents the phenomenon of sensory emancipation from the somatic biological level, although with its further remaining completely shackled in itself (the unconscious self). The five senses, just like fine instrumental strings, vibrate permanently under the influence of the natural environment. Their perceptible echoes are imprinted on the immense repositories of unconscious memory. Various iterations of these relationships, starting from the earliest days of existence, create skills and

fundamental patterns of human behavior. Any person's gestures and idiosyncrasies are generated within the framework of the strict individual experience, from a mixture of sensitive or motor responses.

The process of transforming this organic order into a spiritual one, to man fully developed as human being, involves a necessary modeling, a continuous education. Walking, speaking, various other practices, everyday conduct are the result of a complex combination of an automatic and uncontrollable component, confined to the sensitive design, and a conscious and free component, confined to the spirit. In man, the only occasion when the sensory system bears the burden of causality and reacts completely in isolation, without the presence of the spirit, is the period between birth and the emergence of language, i.e. until man becomes linguistically conscious. From this moment on, another existential level of being is activated, i.e. the spirit, which provides man freedom and the means to escape his biological chains of causality. In this respect, Martínez del Castillo (2004: 131-133) rejects all the linguistic theories that are rooted on biological bases for explaining the human activity of language.

On the other hand, the meaningful level of man as a cultural being represents the framework of the conscious and free living in a cultural environment, the form of manifestation of the conscious self. Due to the fact that, in the case of the spirit, verbal stimuli replace the material ones, language is the second system of relating to reality (in fact, of constructing a semiotic, symbolic reality), which has become primordial for man. Through language, the subject has an inner experience of conscious invoice, which fulfills through ideas. This is the essential reason why the emergence of the human spirit is closely and exclusively linked to language.

In spirit, man takes full control over his reactions. This control consists in the possibility of filtering his responses even to the point that they would be radically changed. In this regard, one can talk about a spirit-appropriateness to exercise a conscious differentiation in relation to each sensory response, with noticeable effects on several behavioral patterns: totally unchanged conscious deployment (normal reflex); conscious postponement (delayed reflex); adaptive conscious change (modified reflex); conscious, total and definitive cancellation (cancelled reflex).

In this way, man masters the unique ability to respond completely differently to any stimulus coming from the external or the internal physical-organic world. The possibility to respond in a completely different way than natural impulses would require, by freely replacing, changing, or cancelling according to spiritual principles, constitutes the basis of man's cultural consciousness.

Through language, the human being detaches itself from the automatic shackles of his inner and outer materiality and moves onto the space of abstractions, of ideas, settling the edifice of consciousness, the seat of universal human values (such as the Platonic notions of 'truth', 'good', and 'beauty'). The abstract content of our world is built at the level of the spirit, underpinning the never ending expansion of culture. The spirit makes it possible for the human being to transcend both the restricted, immediate space and the empirical momentary experiences, granting complete access to conscious memory, to imaginative contemplation towards the future, to knowledge. Thus, human being decants its values by permanently relating to a leap between concrete and abstract, reality and meta-reality, things and signs, sensory multiplicity and conceptual unity, and, last but not least, accidental facts and intuitive essence. Man, as the sum of the universal values created, primarily, in his mind, becomes a

historical being, engaging his intention, will, and retrospection in creative, free, finalist, and responsible activities.

We can summarize the features of both the biological and the cultural level of man in the following table:

BIOLOGICAL LEVEL	CULTURAL LEVEL
Physiological processes are determined by concrete relationships (e.g. direct-sensory perception of a sunset)	Psychological processes are determined by abstract relationships (e.g. indirect-intuitive perception, through notional mediation, of a sunset)
Concrete psychological resonance determined by the sensory contact of the human being with his inner nature and with the external environment, through the five senses (visual apparatus, hearing, tactile and painful receptors, olfactory and taste apparatus)	Abstract psychological resonance developed from the intuitive creation of the human being's inner essence and essence of the external environment through language (= words and gestures in their capacity of abstract conventional signs)
From any contact between man and his inner or outer nature, three types of reflex reactions/responses result: (1) unconscious perceptual contact reaction (feeling); (2) unconscious affective response reaction (emotion); (3) unconscious motor response reaction (action)	The conceptual levels of language determine within the human nervous system three specific fundamental manifestations: (1) conscious perceptual contact reaction (thinking); (2) conscious affective response reaction (feeling); (3) conscious motor response reaction (will)
The interweaving of these three fundamental types of reflex	Thinking, feeling, and will produce the entire spectrum of

trigger the range of all life experiences in biological frame	the specific cultural experience of human consciousness
Sensory level implies natural expression innate, instinctual, automatic, uncontrollable by itself, limited spatially temporally, governed by sensory multiplicity (through segmentations operated at the level of the senses)	The semantic level implies educationally developed, conscious, and free-creative expression, which is adjustable by virtue of its own mechanisms, discarding space and time, acquiring inner conceptual spiritual unity
Natural-hereditary basis that is exercised effectively and automatically since birth (= the absolutely conditioned nature of manifestation of the senses, triggering causal behavior)	Cultural basis, which is exercised potentially only through language (= formation of the spirit with the help of signs in the human linguistic environment)
Automatic experiences through concrete contact, governed by senses	Free creative manifestation through abstract contact, in which man is able to generate contents and representations that are not linked with senses

Table 1. Features of the Biological and the Cultural Level of Man

It is worth remembering, in this sense, the qualitative distinction that Aristotle makes between simple noises and meaningful sounds (1962: 117), and, on another level, the idea that the function and the medium shape the organ, thus finality shapes causality in the sense that human beings are driven by intentionality, projective stances, meaningful/conceptual purposes (all these interpretations are extrapolated from Aristotle 1935: 8-203). In this respect, if we compare, for example, the birdsong to

the human song, we can see that, while birds sing instinctively, man does it consciously, creatively, intentionally, symbolically. Coseriu (1986: 21-23, 53-59, 136-137) clearly states that human language radically differs from the animal language, as the latter does not emerge in the way of a symbolic projective activity; on the contrary, the animal language functions only as a signaling mode for the immediate needs of the animals, thus a causal stimuli-response system: “en efecto, el lenguaje animal corresponde, según parece, a una excitación física o fisiológica, a una reacción vital de carácter elemental, y que no implica ninguna operación simbolizante” (Coseriu 1986: 23). Moreover, the act of animal communication fails in granting a dimension of alterity, since “en realidad, no se «comunica» nada, sino que el animal ajusta sureacción a otra reacción” (Coseriu 1991: 15), which is entirely linked to a biological pattern of instinctual behavior. The basis of man’s creative and cognitive subjectivity is language. Extrapolating, language as the first cultural manifestation can be defined as the inner activity of man, in which human thought finds its formative truth. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the combined effort of the will, reason and intuition to transcend the stage of multiplicity of phenomena that governs the sensitive world. If the senses operate as physical or biological incentives, the basis of true knowledge will be language, in which meanings are potential models of conceptual unity and synergic functionality of semantic (symbolic) substance in necessary correlation with material signs.

The philosophical humanistic perspective opened by the generation of thinkers from Antiquity places man and human values above all else, at the center of the universe and focusing in particular on the free manifestation of the human personality as a creative individuality. Confidence in the creative possibilities of man places him as a subject, as a supreme value, as an end in itself, not as a means or instrument. The relationship between

subject and object, along with that between subject and subject, constantly shape the mental creative efforts of man, the perpetual spiritual energy through which man enters the competition of self-exceeding his primary biological condition. If, in animals, the whole sensory system acts as a vital principle, leading to instinctive innate behavior, which is based on purely sensory stimuli (conditioned reflexes), in humans, the sensitive system is intertwined with his consciousness. The latter represents the ability to know, to reason, to abstract, to manifest his creative freedom and the power of intuition – all reflected in the subjectivity of being who constantly attempts to shape the world through meanings. The symbolic form is the essential element in this imaginary configuration, which is for Cassirer the explanatory medium of significant mutations, operated in the horizon of linguistic representations. Cassirer argues that symbols give cultural specificity in direct relation to the concept and the problem of the meaningful sense of humanity:

No longer in a mere physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net. No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium. His situation is the same in the theoretical as in the practical sphere. Even here man does not live in a world of hard facts, or according to his immediate needs and desires. He lives rather in the midst of

imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusionings, in his fantasies and dreams. «What disturbs and alarms man», said Epictetus, «are not the things, but his opinions and fancies about the things». (Cassirer 1953: 43)

The ‘symbolic forms’ of culture also express in an exemplary way the destiny which has been reserved for man in his permanently reassumed creative acts. We clearly understand the extent of the German philosopher’s conception regarding culture and man as a cultural being. In this equation, the spiritual energy of man is projected in forms shifting between the possibilities of sense given in/through language and the major cultural endeavors (science, philosophy, art, religion), oriented towards understanding things, knowledge, interpretation, creativity, and faith. The so-called leap from nature to culture is to be rendered, in fact, as a primordial knowledge encapsulated in meanings. After all, culture is the sum of all phenomena that relate, first of all, to semantic contents of our consciousness, not to biological factors. As a basis for culture, language is constituted as a revelatory tension between alterity and radical creativity, in fields shaped by semantic finality. Transcending the boundaries of our biological roots operates upon the effectiveness and possibilities of human knowledge. Culture is created through revelatory transfiguration and constant transcending the horizon of the experiential world in the pursuit for creativity and major cultural achievements.

3. Language as Inner Activity of Man

If we discard the ways in which language is treated like a mere object or instrument enacted for communication and perlocutionary purposes, it will appear clearer that its semantic and creative dimension grasps the core of language as inner and

primary activity of man. This in fact explains what Humboldt called the internal form of language, which stands for the level of substance in the language (= meanings, content of thought, ideas), i.e. the basic structuring of the world through language in a community of speakers. The worldview comprises two aspects: (1) the principle by which languages develop in their semantic structure; (2) the conceptualization of the world by each community of speakers (concepts are intuitive captures, irreducible syntheses between sound and idea). If the shape of the language means that the articulated sound is brought to the peak of the expression of thought, the substance of the language can be defined only by reference to other substances (other visions, ideas, etc.). Humboldt states that we cannot speak of a substance as a product, but rather of a permanent production, “something that eternally produces itself, where the laws of production are determined, but the scope and even to some extent, the nature of the product remain totally unspecified.” (1988: 58)

According to Coseriu’s doctrine (1986: 68), which postulates to say things how they are (“la tarea de todacienciaes la de «decir las cosas como son». Porello, la condición básica de la actividad científicaes la objetividad: la adecuación al correspondiente objeto”), language is conceived as an intuitive, semantic activity. Linguistic competence must be clearly differentiated from the biological faculty of speaking. The latter is theorized in Saussure (1995: 25-26). Intuition, as the primary moment of knowledge, implies not only the perception of the real as a cosmos of objects, but also the possibility of grasping essences of these objects. As products of a creative act, objects do not, by themselves, have an autonomous existence, independent of human subjectivity. Taking into account the distinction Aristotle made between matter and form, objects possess both an external dimension (*hylé*, materiality) and an internal one (*morphé*, shape). Only the

material aspect is given autonomously in relation to subjectivity; the object, however, is always the product (result) of a formative act, whereby materiality becomes the support of a form. Thus, what appears like an external configuration is not the product of the creative activity of language, but only its material vector.

The original science of speakers is an accumulation of intuitive skills, whereby the given world is recreated in consciousness, by meanings, i.e. by intuitive-eidetic contents, which are subsequently projected in the form of a virtual reality, essential for the cultural plane of human condition. Intuitive competences are primary steps of knowledge, the only original objective sources of knowledge, on which theoretical (logical, mathematical, philosophical), artistic, or religious knowledge is based. Within the subject-object relationship, the formless totality that exceeds human consciousness is created by segments of essence. At the level of the subject-subject relationship, these essences become cultural values assumed within the tradition of creating in a certain historically determined linguistic community. In Coseriu's terms: "El hablar, incluso el hablar creador, está dirigido a otros sujetos: la palabra creada está destinada desde el comienzo a valer tanto para el sujeto creador como para los demás sujetos que comparten la misma tradición histórica" (1985: 48-49). Viewed from this point, language is creation of meanings with the recognition of the universal plane (essence) on an individual level (particular facts). *Mutatis mutandis*, linguistic science, whose object of investigation is language, implies the same relationship between universality and particular facts, the same recognition of essence in the concrete facts brought under investigation.

In this respect, it is of great interest to emphasize the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, which shapes not only the entire methodological apparatus of linguistics as a

humanistic science, but also defines the activity of language as such. According to various definitions, objectivity operationalizes everything that exists, in material shape, outside the human consciousness (matter as such, natural entities and elements, physical or biological phenomena). In this respect, we can conclude with no difficulty that objectivity is a convention, more or less arbitrary, due to our impossibility to perceive and understand what is beyond our consciousness if language did not exist. It is only through our own linguistic subjectivity and semantic creativity, i.e. through our own content of consciousness shared with other speakers that we manage to intellectually perceive anything (or, more adequately said, everything outside our consciousness makes sense for us precisely in the process linguistic internalization). By naming things as objects or phenomena, human beings tear apart the formless reality, creating their own conscious reality through language (through meanings or concepts). In fact, human beings use meanings as anchors to reach and fill the void of nonlinguistic medium. This process takes place in a linguistically formatted, symbolic, cultural environment. The void outside human consciousness is filled in and made intelligible through concepts that establish a vast construct with cultural value, specific and relevant strictly according to human language, thinking, understanding, and creativity. Ever since Greek Antiquity, the titans of the philosophy of language have questioned, in various ways, the relationship between our imaginative and intellectual dimension of language and the raw, formless material universe. To understand the importance of human language and cultural environment, it is worthy to keep in mind, among others, the Platonic dichotomy sensitive/intelligible realm (Plato 1991: 187-213). The sensitive world perceptible through senses and the intelligible world, which is created in the intellect through concepts, is methodologically

separated by a fundamental difference in functionality. For instance, the duality of physical sun (outer consciousness) / conceptual sun (inner consciousness) is revelatory to show how the mind conceptualizes an entire cosmos of ideas in which the symbolic, semantic schemes of things are informed, stored, conveyed in significant structures that transcend the accidental levels of physical or biological phenomena. Man recreates nature in a significant cosmos of conceptual values. The inner sun gives significant substance to the external one, validates its establishment as a natural object in the physical world. In the absence of human consciousness, the physical sun would remain a formless thing, without meaning or conceptual background. Of course, validation is done in, through and for our consciousness as such, in an approach of cognitive enlightenment through the formless void of matter.

Moreover, language can be defined by taking into account two dimensions. The first dimension is projected by the virtual meanings as considered in their primary capacity of pure ideas, objective as such, located before the possibility of establishing such relationships as existence/nonexistence, truth/falseness, creative/noncreative and having as their sole function increate linguistic, cultural, positive values. Conceptualizing nonexistence, for instance, implies the necessary interference with existence (to fulfill its signifying function, 'nothing' is conceptualized as 'something', being wrapped from within language into meaningful patterns such as substance, unity, essence of being, and designed by reference to categories (space, temporality, relationship, quality, etc.). In this way, nonexistence is considered infinite, eternal, absolute, transcendent, etc., i.e. it receives a sum of traits by virtue of signifying function. The second dimension of language is the activity of combining the units of meaning (virtual meanings), and claims the intuition of such polarities as

existence/nonexistence or truth/falseness. This second dimension of language fulfills the designative function, in such forms as logical judgment, theoretical justification, persuasion, etc.

By transcending the linguistic perspectives that are rooted in biological frames, Coseriu summarizes the main philosophical strings defining man as a cultural being. Given this approach, it is Coseriu's crucial endeavor to state, throughout his entire work, that language projects the energy of human consciousness in forms that grasp possibilities of creating sense and culture (science, philosophy, art, and religion altogether). After all, culture is primarily based on semantic (spiritual) contents. Culture is constituted as a meaningful tension in fields that are governed by semantic, creative, and subjective values, giving the effectiveness and the possibilities of human knowledge. Man is constantly transfiguring the empirical data (i.e. the horizon of the experiential world) so he could impose sense and order in the universe.

Coseriu became famous for linking cultural endeavors to some conditions deeply rooted in the human being, but which still remain outside the physiological level. The perpetual dynamics of creation are shaped not so much by reason in the classical sense, but especially by the internal configuration of the intuitive structures that lead to the design of a vision upon the world. The Coserian conception of language implies its understanding as a cultural object belonging to the human universe, and, therefore, definable in relation to the dimension of freedom (not 'necessity') and that of the intention of the human subject, the creator of its own language (i.e., in this second sense, language is not subject to causal determinations, but is justified only on the basis of the significant intention of the speaker). This distinction (language/'things') in terms of the reality of the facts as such obviously corresponds to a difference of perspective in terms of

science. Coseriu states clearly a separation of the sciences of culture from the natural sciences (in a broad sense):

(...) a los intentos declarados o no declarados del positivismo viejo y nuevo de reducir toda ciencia a ciencia física, hay que oponer la fundamental diversidad entre los hechos naturales y los hechos culturales y, por lo tanto, entre las ciencias físicas y las ciencias humanas. (Coseriu 1978: 193)

The world of culture is a world of man and, to the extent that man assumes it, it is an inner world, a world of its own, language being, in this sense, a cultural activity, a creative activity of cultural values (meanings). Thus, since man is the subject of this activity, Coseriu argues that meaning (as a value created in/through the linguistic act) must not be understood as a natural object, external to human consciousness, but, on the contrary, as the primary basis of human traits, due to the fact that man ‘as a human being’ exists only in a universe of meaning, in a significant universe:

El lenguaje puede definirse como el primer aparecer – como nacimiento – de lo humano y como apertura de las posibilidades propias del hombre. En efecto, el lenguaje es el primer presentarse de la conciencia humana como tal (puesto que no hay conciencia vacía y puesto que sólo mediante su objetivación la conciencia se deslinda a sí misma, al reconocerse como otra cosa que «el mundo»)." (Coseriu 1991: 64)

That is precisely the reason why “una concepción realmente positiva (y no «positivista») acerca del lenguaje debe advertir y recordar constantemente que el lenguaje pertenece al dominio de la libertad y de la finalidad y que, por consiguiente, los hechos lingüísticos no pueden interpretarse y explicarse en términos causales. (Coseriu 1978: 194)

Language as a significant act constitutes the fundamental possibility for the human being to exist in a cultural horizon, in which culture is primarily constructed in/through the creative and the meaningful effort of man. If the architecture of the given world is a material one, in which objects are chained by relationships of necessity and causality, human architecture is, according to Coseriu, a significant architecture (of freedom and intention) and must be accordingly understood:

La comprensión del hombre (...) debe comenzar por la comprensión del lenguaje, puesto que lo humano comienza precisamente por el lenguaje. (...) el lenguaje determina en primer lugar al hombre como tal y lo hace a ser como hombre. (...) el lenguaje (...) es la función por excelencia de la humanidad (del «ser hombre»); pero es sólo el primer escalón de lo humano y sólo posibilita escalones ulteriores, con los cuales, sin embargo, no se identifica. (1991: 63)

It becomes clear why the so-called problem of linguistic change, among other theoretical issues, can be solved, from this angle, as an internal determination, as an internal dynamism of language; linguistic innovation cannot be understood outside the linguistic tradition as such, but precisely as a new fact, 'innovative' in relation to tradition. If or when assumed, the innovation could become, in turn, tradition. Linguistic tradition implies the assumption of the entire cultural-historical background of a community of speakers in its own historical development. In the case of linguistic contacts, other communities of speakers may provide sources of innovations so that tradition underwent changes to the extent that 'foreign' beliefs, values, or worldviews were assimilated and, in time, were no longer felt, as in the early stages of their adoption, as innovations, but subsumed as facts of tradition by the current generations. Such mutations are not,

however, mutations of substance, as they concern only the stylistic adaptation as dynamic collective factor. This is one more reason to consider language and worldview categories as human-specific structures, from which all cultural figments are impregnated and recalled to delineate man's leap beyond the concrete world of sensations into the cultural environment. Consciousness is inseparable from language in the way meanings function as primary formative acts of cultural creation.

4. An Overview of Coseriu's Meta-Theoretical Confrontations with the Emergent Structural and Generative Trends in the Science of Language

The primacy of Coseriu's approach on linguistics as a humanistic science is noticeable when confronting at the level of the basic concepts on which Saussure and Chomsky relied their linguistic conceptions. Saussure and Chomsky are, of course, two major contributors who made a significant breakthrough in the field of contemporary linguistics. Nevertheless, the contribution of integral linguistics appears clearer, from the very first moment of a comparative approach, to the extent that Coseriu made a huge turning point regarding language. The main coordinate that enables us to perceive Coseriu's conceptual frame transcended structural linguistics aims the object of research. In order to grasp a fit object of research, Saussure proposed two basic antinomies: *langue*/*parole* and *synchrony*/*diachrony*. Therefore, the Swiss linguist argues that the object of linguistic research is '*langue*', understood as a system of signs in which the unities are delineated exclusively on a differential principle. As a social product, *langue* is just a sum of imprints stored in each brain (1995: 30). Being conceived as external to and independent from the individual, the linguistic system is also static, synchronic, and immutable by its own nature. Linguistic change takes place only at the level of

parole and is causally determined by events that lack internal coherence and are isolated from the system (1995: 25/30).

According to Saussure, several diachronic events may influence the system of langue, but he clearly states that the system has no effective role in producing the diachronic facts of language. In this respect, Coseriu (1978) argues that the structural linguistics has several inaccurate prerequisites, among which we state the following: the object of linguistic research is reduced to the idiomatic competence, which leads to a partial notion of language; langue is superposed on a state of langue, the latter being understood as a methodological synchronic projection; langue is reduced to a closed, autarchic system. Moreover, the confusion between the object and the effective research leads to opposing the descriptive study (which is necessarily synchronic) to the reality of the object being investigated (which is essentially historical). Tracing the roots of Durkheimian sociology at the core of Saussure's conception opens the road for situating language in the brain of the mass, as a social product. This misconception leads to consider language only as an abstract and logic device, a result of deductions made by researchers for their own purposes.

Under these circumstances, Coseriu argues that the linguistic change should not be accounted (as the entire Saussurean tradition does) as an external fact to language. Rather, it should be considered as an essential aspect of language, as emphasizing the existence of language through the effective reality of speaking. Moreover, the dynamics of languages should be interpreted from a historical perspective, because it is history that provides explanatory means for systematization and development of language. In Coseriu's view, the connection between evolution and continuity serves to conceive language as an historical object. In this process, the static and the dynamic dimensions are not to be opposed, as they are two moments of the same phenomenon:

Un objeto histórico es tal solo si es, al mismo tiempo, permanencia y sucesión. (...) La lengua se hace, pero su hacerse es un «hacerse histórico», y no cotidiano: es un hacerse en un marco de permanencia y continuidad. (1978: 283)

In the matter of simultaneity and succession at Saussure, see also Peñalver Simo (1970: 230). A development on lexical-semantic bases of the structural analysis is made in Coseriu (1981). An extensive debate on Saussure's contribution for integral linguistics is made in Coseriu (2004: 11-16).

Regarding the definition of language as object of linguistic research, the basic principles of generative grammar derive from Chomsky's distinction between 'competence' and 'performance'. Unlike Saussure, who conceives language as a 'system of signs', for Chomsky (2002: 13; 49-60), language is an entire (finite or infinite) set of sentences, a dynamic system governed by rules and logical procedures. For Chomsky, the competence is the intuitive knowledge that the speaker expresses in relation to his own language and, therefore, constitutes the primal object of linguistic research (Chomsky 1978: 9-11). Within the linguistic competence, a distinction is made between the phonetic component and the semantic component, from this point of view any phrase being eligible for a double structural description (Chomsky 1978: 16-18). A generative linguist may propose an interpretation for the deep structure of a sentence and a phonic representation for the surface structure. On the other hand, performance is the deployment of language in concrete discursive contexts. Symmetrically, the distinction of 'grammaticalness/adequacy' establishes the rules of the sentence at the level of competence and performance. Adequacy is a notion that goes beyond grammaticalness, as sentences can be grammatically correct

without fulfilling the condition of adequacy and comprehensibility. Coseriu adopts a rather different perspective, at least regarding two issues. Firstly, the binomial grammaticalness/adequacy cannot be related to that of competence/performance, due to several reasons: on one hand, both grammaticalness and adequacy are parts of the original science of the speakers, hence they pertain to the linguistic competence; on the other hand, both grammaticalness and adequacy apply to the performance of language, i.e. to the various contexts in which language is utilized. Secondly, although generative grammar is based on Humboldt's conception, the distinction between what is universal and what is historical-traditional in relationship to the ideal speaker's competence is clearly discarded. Coseriu argues that Chomsky did not make a clear distinction between a particular language and the individual language activity, i.e. between the specificity of historical languages and the individual intuitive activity of each native speaker. Another misconception is the confusion between intuition as speaker's primal knowledge and the reflexive knowledge involved in the scientific research:

la lingüística es un saber sobre un saber, un saber reflexivo que tiene un saber intuitivo o técnico como objeto. El primer cometido de la lingüística consiste, por tanto, en formular expresamente el saber lingüístico; el segundo cometido es justificarlo (Coseriu1992b: 252).

For an extensive debate on generative grammar, language regarded as result of instincts, and the integral solution to Chomsky's viewpoint, see Martínez del Castillo (2006) and Vîlcu D. (2019).

Nevertheless, the most challenging turn in defining language that integral linguistics brought to light is the concept of *energeia*. This concept enables a whole different conception regarding language as intuitive activity of creating contents of consciousness (i.e. meanings), on the basis of an imperceptible a priori synthesis. The essential role of Coseriu's integral linguistics is having proposed a definition of language as a unitary object of research. Symmetrically, in a post-Kantian and neo-Humboldtian perspective in the science of language, the fact that Coseriu considered its essence in terms of unity and synthesis is the most significant contribution that was ever brought in this field. Coseriu opposes this conception to the dualist conceptions, which proved useless to convey any unitary and coherent explanation to linguistic facts. The integral linguistics pinpoints that the act of speaking is totally different from what Saussure and Chomsky named parole or performance, i.e. a mere actualization of the linguistic system. For Coseriu, the act of speaking as a creative activity conveys language unity and, therefore, language is a whole in which parole and langue are inseparable and constitute two sequences of the same phenomenon.

The results of this foundational endeavor served to construct a contemporary theory of language. In this analytical development, the first axis Coseriu developed is that of the signifying function and the synergy of linguistic levels: the universal level, the historical level, and the individual level. Corresponding to these three levels of linguistic activity Coseriu defines three types of linguistic competence. At this point of the definition in extension of the object of study, the contribution of integral linguistics is decisive. Thus, by defining very precisely three types of linguistic competence: elocutional competence, idiomatic competence, and expressive competence (= universal speech technique, historical idiomatic technique, and the technique of sense articulation), by a

(re)foundation of the conception of idiomatic competence, as well as by defining the type of semantic content corresponding to each competence: designation (universal), signified/meaning (idiomatic), sense (individual), the integral science of language provides a strong conceptual and methodological foundation not only for linguistic research, but also for achieving a unifying perspective on man as a cultural being.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this study, we proposed a preliminary descriptive model in order to put in contrast the biological features of man with his cultural traits, pointing out the primacy of language (and especially meaning construction through language) in the creation of culture. We later on focused on some of the philosophical-theoretical concepts that were, to an overwhelming extent, prerequisites and, at the same time, constant benchmarks in the construction of the project of integral linguistics. Coseriu's legacy, in this respect, is tremendous, as it values the understanding of language as a specific human cultural creative activity, rising conceptual and methodological-applicative counterparts to reductionist theories that regard language as a mere communication tool, an instinctive and preconceived device governed by logical rules and procedures, or as a static system, externally imposed to human consciousness. In order to grasp the primacy of a humanistic perspective in the science of language, as defined by Coseriu, we briefly revisited the Structural and the Generativist trends in their emergence point, focusing on Coseriu's own meta-theoretical confrontations with these trends as they existed at the time, namely Saussure's and Chomsky's basic theoretical principles and methods of research.

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***Book Reviews and Performance
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Exploring Hybridity: Kanno Yôko, Takarazuka Revue and the Subversive Dynamics of (Soft) Power in Late-Modern Japan

Maria GRAJDIAN

Hiroshima University, Japan

Since its inception in 1914, the extremely popular Takarazuka Revue, the Japanese all-female musical theater in Osaka's North-West, has proven throughout the decades both a faithful mirror of the Japanese society and a fine compass of its tendencies, subtly providing impulses for the future. This paper focuses on the dynamics of entertainment in the interplay of power and seduction as creatively displayed in Takarazuka Revue's show *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* from early 2021: its most particular feature is the music partially composed by Kanno Yôko 菅野 よう子.

Born in 1964, Kanno Yôko is a Japanese composer, arranger and musician best known for her work on the soundtracks for numerous video games, animation movies and TV series, live-action movies, and mass-media advertisements. Both Kanno Yôko's compositional style and vision and her close cooperation with the band The Seatbelt¹ actively contributed to the emergence of refreshing musical worlds within the framework of the Japanese visual industries, which led subsequently to the

¹ The Seatbelts was a Japanese blues and jazz band led by composer and instrumentalist Kanno Yôko, active between 1998-2004 and since 2020; it performed the entire soundtrack of the TV animation series *Cowboy Bebop* and produced a total of seven albums and one live DVD. Their style is very diverse and ranges from straightforward big band jazz, blues, acoustic ballads, hard rock, country, funk to electronic, hip-hop and experimental compositions.

formation and development of a new identity structure based on cultural artifacts in late modernity, given the increasing popularity of Japanese everyday cultures worldwide.

As already proven in the animation productions *Magnetic Rose* (『彼女の想いで』 *Kanojo no omoide*, literally “Her Memories”, animation short-movie, director: Ôtomo Katsuhiro 大友克洋, 1995), *Cowboy Bebop* (『カウボーイビバップ』 *Kaubôï Bibappu*, TV animation series, director: Watanabe Shin'ichirô 渡辺 信一郎, 1998) or *Wolf's Rain* (『WOLF'S RAIN』, TV animation series, director: Okamura Tensai 岡村 天齋, 2003), among many others, of which *Cowboy Bebop* is unanimously regarded both by fans and by experts as encompassing the best music soundtrack of all times, in *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels*, Kanno Yôko gloriously employs a great variety of tunes and compositional techniques as well as stylistic strategies to convey subtle interactions of longing and belonging, ecstasy and rage, love and betrayal, envy, indifference and passion, while painstakingly building up irresistible tensions between the instances involved in the performative process: actresses, administrators, audiences. In line with Robert Greene's pragmatic elaborations in his seminal works² on the interchangeability of subject and object within the balance of power and seduction, entertainment appears as an interactive game, governed by the pursuit of joy in overcoming challenges and finding ingenious solutions, evading the apparently processual linearity between “producers” and “consumers”. The way Takarazuka Revue's ideologues integrate this strategic thinking in their public policy becomes, ultimately, the way they relate to

² Greene, Robert: *The 48 Laws of Power*, New York: Penguin Books, 1998; *The Art of Seduction*, New York: Penguin Books, 2001; *The Laws of Human Nature*, London: Profile Books, 2018.

audiences and educate them to come back, eternally, faithfully, for more reinforcement of the same familiar existential models.

In a phenomenological approach to Takarazuka Revue's *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels*, the current analysis proceeds in three steps: firstly, the brief overview of Takarazuka Revue as a symbolical institution in culturally corporative Japan, followed, secondly, by the general presentation of *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels*'s performative context and, rounded-up, thirdly, by critical insights into its historical and systematic concatenations. Methodologically, we take into account the multiple layers of the Takarazuka Revue's administration and self-orchestration such as performance politics, the economic supervision of brand-related consumption, the socio-cultural management of actresses and fandom (fans and fan communities) as well as the performances themselves and their meta-narrative relevance. The sources consist of extensive archive research of Japanese documents and interviews with Japanese producers and composers as well as with Japanese and Western consumers.

Takarazuka Revue (宝塚歌劇 *Takarazuka Kageki*) is a highly popular musical all-female theater in Japan – a dynamic institution with a strictly stratified corporative structure. Founded in 1914 by Kobayashi Ichizô (小林一三, 1873-1957), one of the most important entrepreneurs in prewar Japan, as part of an economic-political project to develop the North-Western area of Osaka within the rapidly emerging industrialized society, Takarazuka Revue (Company) developed swiftly from the initial small organization of 16 teenage girls who had their first performance at a theater converted from an indoor swimming pool in a building attached to the main hot-spring resort, into an increasingly successful enterprise carrying various denominations throughout the decades, until 1940, when it became Takarazuka Revue Company (宝塚歌劇団 *Takarazuka Kagekidan*) – the name under

which it is currently registered.³ Since 1919, the exclusive, very competitive two-years Takarazuka Music School (宝塚音楽学校 *Takarazuka Ongaku Gakkô*) has delivered yearly 40 (female) graduates who have joined the team of ca. 350 actresses performing on Takarazuka Revue's stage. Similarly to Takarazuka Revue (Company), Takarazuka Music School changed its official denomination several times since its outset, its current one dating from 1946. In tandem with *otokoyaku*'s (男役, female impersonators of male roles in Takarazuka Revue) representation of masculinity on Takarazuka Revue's stage and public advertisement, *musumeyaku* 娘役 (literally: "daughter-role" with the subliminal image of "maiden") refers to female impersonators of female roles in Takarazuka Revue. Both *otokoyaku* and *musumeyaku* are subsumed to the category of "actress", while their designation within the Takarazuka Revue Company and its related contexts is *seito* (生徒 pupil) or *takarasienne* タカラシエンヌ, introduced by the director Shirai Tetsuzô (白井鐵造, 1900-1983), who compared the cute Takarazuka Revue actresses with the beautiful Parisiennes at Moulin Rouge.⁴ Within the extremely strict hierarchy of Takarazuka Revue's educational and

³ Tsuganesawa, Toshihiro (1991): *Takarazuka Kageki senryaku: Kobayashi Ichizô no seikatsu-bunkaron* [The Takarazuka Revue Strategy: Ichizô Kobayashi's Existence Culturology], Tokyo: Kôdansha, pp. 22-36; Watanabe, Hiroshi (1999): *Takarazuka Kageki no hen'yô to Nihon kindai* [Takarazuka Revue's Metamorphose and the Japanese Modernity], Tokyo: Shinshokan, pp. 29-33.

⁴ Iwahori, Yasumitsu (1972): *Isai Kobayashi Ichiô no shôhō: Sono taishû shikô no rejû keiei shuhô* [The Specific Business Strategy of the Genial Ichizô Kobayashi: His Mass-Oriented Leisure Enterprise Methods], Tokyo: Hyôgensha, pp. 56-87; Ueda, Yoshitsugu (1976): *Takarazuka ongaku gakkô* [The Takarazuka Music School], Osaka: Yomiuri-Life, pp. 35-42.

performance system, the concept “golden combination” refers to the *otokoyaku-musumeyaku* pair (in Takarazuka Revue jargon: “topstar[s]”) at the top of each of the five actively performing ensembles. It is important to mention that, while the acting staff is exclusively female, the administrative staff is to a great extent male, and was exclusively male from Takarazuka Revue’s inception to 1999. As to be shown further below, this clear-cut separation of functions has been playing a fundamental role in Takarazuka Revue’s evolution and its preoccupation with orchestrating masculinity at the core of the Japanese social stratification in the mysterious, ambivalent, athletic stature of the *otokoyaku* throughout its history.

Originally scheduled to run from 17th July to 17th August 2020 at Takarazuka Grand Theater and from 4th September to 11th October 2020 at Tokyo Takarazuka Theater, and staged, after its cancellation during the coronavirus crisis, at Takarazuka Grand Theater from 1st January to 8th February 2021, and at Tokyo Takarazuka Theater from 26th February to 11th April 2021, *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* (『シルクロード～盗賊と宝石』 *Shiruku Rôdo: Tôzoku and hôseki*) is the second part of a typical Takarazuka Revue performance consisting of two segments: one segment is a theatrical-musical play, with coherent plot and proper characters, and one segment is an exuberant show without a real narrative line, but instead with spectacular display of choreographic and choral scenes juxtaposed with individual demonstrations of singing and dancing virtuosity – all compounded by sparkling orchestral tunes with dazzling, vertigo-inducing stage architectures, gorgeous – and quickly changing – costumes as well as hairstyles. A gradual culmination process leads towards the classical finale with the line-dance (or rocket-dance) of several actresses, the rigorous group dancing reuniting the entire ensemble, the “golden combination”’s impressive duo-

ballet and the final parade in which all performers of that respective performance descend the big staircase – one of the hallmarks of Takarazuka Revue’s stage – in a cascade-like choreographic design on the major tunes of the show while greeting audiences with elegance, gratitude and joy.

The first part of the performance - in which *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* was the second section - dealt with the life and creation of Ludwig van Beethoven and was meant to celebrate the 250th birthday of the larger-than-life composer, who was born on 17th December 1770. In the “musical sinfonia” *fff – Fortississimo* (『*fff – フォルテ イッシッシモ*』 *fff – Forutisshishshimo* –), the Snow Troupe’s Nozomi Fûto 望海 風斗 as Ludwig van Beethoven and Maaya Kiho 真彩 希帆 as a Mysterious Woman, who both challenge and inspire the composer, deliver a visually and musically impressive reconstruction of the tumultuous era at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe, backed by the ca. 75 members of the ensemble. (The “Mysterious Woman” has no particular historical attestation, but unmistakably carries subliminal elements of Maetel, the female lead-character in *Galaxy Express 999* 『銀河鉄道 999』 *Ginga tetsudô surî nain*, Matsumoto Reiji’s 松本零士 hugely popular Japanese comics and TV animation series belonging to the *shônen* space-opera genre aimed at teenage boys in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.) What will become even more obvious in *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* is, however, the careful choice of this specific troupe among the five performing troupes (the other four being flower, moon, star and cosmos) to portray on-stage the ideological upheaval which led to what is nowadays celebrated as modernity: inaugurated in 1924, simultaneously with the opening of the first Takarazuka Grand Theater, the Snow Troupe (雪組 *yuki-gumi*) is considered the upholder of Japanese traditional dance and musical

plays for the whole company, which rather tends towards Western material in more than two thirds of its performances; it also has the reputation of being the vanguard of classical Japanese drama.⁵ On this backdrop, the fact that it premiered in Japan, in 1996, Michael Kunze's and Sylvester Levay's Vienna-original musical from 1992 *Elisabeth: The Rondo of Love and Death* (『エリザベート：愛と死の輪舞』 *Erizabêto: Ai to shi no rondo*) has symbolical underpinnings, with (cultural) “appropriation” and “Japanisation” being at the top of the main concepts. Coincidentally, 25 years after *Elisabeth: The Rondo of Love and Death*'s sensational success with Takarazuka Revue, which resulted in numerous re-stagings throughout the years both as cross-gender and as mixed-gender performances under Tôhō's patronage⁶, Austria's capital turns once again into the center of the

⁵ Kotake, Satoshi (2003): *Takarazuka Academia*, Tokyo: Seikyûsha, pp. 12-17.

⁶ Created in 1932 by Kobayashi Ichizô, the founder of Takarazuka Revue and of Hankyû Railway, as *Tokyo-Takarazuka Theater Company Ltd.* (株式会社東京宝塚劇場 *Kabushiki gaisha Tôkyô Takarazuka Gekijô*), Tôhō Co., Ltd., is a Japanese movie, theater production and distribution company with its headquarters in Chiyoda, Tokyo. Tôhō is one of the four members of the Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan (MPPAJ), and is the largest of Japan's top Big Four movies studios. Outside Japan, Tôhō is known as “Toho”, the producer and distributor of many *kaijû* (怪獣, monster) movies, with Godzilla being its most famous character, which featured in 36 of the company's movies so far, together with Rodan, Mothra, King Ghidorah and Mechagodzilla being regarded as “Toho's Big Five” due to their repeated appearances in numerous works released throughout the decades. Movies by cult-directors such as Kurosawa Akira, Ozu Yasujirô, Mizoguchi Kenji, Kobayashi Masaki were released, (co-) produced and/or distributed by Tôhō as well as many animation blockbusters, e.g., Studio Ghibli's *Princess Mononoke* (1997) and *Spirited Away* (2001) directed by Miyazaki Hayao, Studio Chizu's *The Wolf Children Ame and Yuki* (2012), *The Boy and the Beast* (2015), *Mirai from the Future* (2018) directed by Hosoda Mamoru, and further cult-animation movies: *Steamboy* (2004, director: Otomo Katsuhirô), *Ghost in the Shell 2:*

quest for identity of a man who will metamorphose into a symbol of the genius-artist, forsaken and ridiculed by contemporaries, but visionary in his exacerbated sensitivity, complex mental-emotional formation and crushing loneliness. In the explosive instability of Beethoven's appearance as embodied by topstar-*otokoyaku* Nozomi Fûtô, Hippocrates' *ars longa, vita brevis* meets *mono no aware* もののあわれ, the Japanese existential paradigm commonly translated as "the pathos of things" which intrinsically connects beauty with inexorable ephemerality.

What has started as the ideology of existential impermanence in Beethoven's fragile emotionality and volatile temperament contrasting with the solidity of his musical legacy finds its aesthetic counterpart in *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* with its lavish display of *joie-de-vivre*: Kanno Yôko composes roughly one third of the show, with the in-house composers Ôta Takeshi 太田 健 and Takahashi Megumi 高橋 恵 delivering the remaining two thirds; they also conduct the orchestra during the recordings which replace the customary live performance due to preventive measures taken by Takarazuka Revue Company to diminish the number of people involved on-stage. Described by the performance programme as "revue arabesque", *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* draws first and foremost on Takarazuka Revue's decades-old tradition of mixing up wildly the greatest variety of

Innocence (2004, director: Oshii Mamoru), *Your Name?* (2016, director: Shinkai Makoto) in recent years.

Currently, Tôhô belongs to Hankyû-Hanshin-Tôhô Group, a typical Japanese *keiretsu* (系列, association of businesses), which includes three categories of companies: Hankyû-Hanshin Holdings (railways, hotels, real-estate; among others, Takarazuka Revue Company and affiliated enterprises as well as Hanshin Tigers, a Japanese professional baseball team playing in the Central League, are included), H2O Retailing (department stores) and Tôhô (theatre – as buildings and as performances, movies/animation and cinema locations).

musical styles, in a rainbow-like spectrum: from heavy-metal to ethno-pop, from Western classics to Eastern modalisms, from jazz and blues to folk music. To this, Kanno Yôko adds her own brand of hybridizing strategies: as expressed during an interview in 2006 with Maria Grajdian, rather than being a conscious choice towards eclecticism, hers is a compositional attitude which reflects every composer's emotional dilemma in late-modern Japan, relying, on the one hand, on one's own cultural heritage, and striving, on the other hand, for international recognition due to economic factors. Moreover, Kanno adopts a syncretic approach with emphasis on the alternation between the visual and the auditive levels, which gave her the edge in the Japanese animation and video games industry in the past: in the previously mentioned interview in 2006, Kanno Yôko repeatedly refers to the fact that she always does her best to adapt her compositional vision to the overall-design of the leading director, without ever losing sight of the function of music as a counterpart to images. "Syncretism" means in this case a generous communication between different expression levels within the artwork, and less a conscious juxtaposition of representational techniques within the artistic discourse.

It might not have been the Takarazuka Revue's administrators' intention that the performance encompassing *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* and *fff – Fortississimo* would become a turning point in the history of the company – and potentially in the history of Japan's mass media and entertainment industry: what appears as simply a typical *sayonara kôen* (サヨナラ公演, farewell performance) of a popular "golden combination" of the conventionally conservative Snow Troupe metamorphosed into the spear-head of a fresh paradigm reflecting the new normal and the new era about to arise in and from the chaos of the coronavirus global crisis. The ambivalent instrumentalization of phenomena of

popular culture with the purpose of reinvigorating the classical Japan-reputation in times of the ubiquitous Cool Japan symptomatics has (in)famously and consistently brought to the forefront of the producers' and consumers' perception the idea that Takarazuka Revue, like *manga*, *anime*, video games – as genres, as expression modes, as identification mechanisms – mediate, facilitate, propagate glimpses into Japan as the reputed monolith of modernity, thus revealing insights into tomorrow's world. In *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels*, Kanno Yôko keeps an ironic approach towards cultural artifacts by disclosing in full honesty the ideological clichés and aesthetical stereotypes dominating the artistic discourses while at the same time playfully tackling the problematics of self and other as mutual reflections leading, eventually, to mutual transcendences – within a pragmatic pursuit for authentic compositional development. This compositional endeavor includes, in addition, the creative repetition of musical structures under the sign of cultural differences: that is, the transformative quoting within the compositional process, in which irony is the foundation and sincerity is the super-structure – in a paraphrase of Marxist parlance –, results, ultimately, in the economic success of cultural products, compounded by social impact and political relevance. The employment of ideological clichés and aesthetical stereotypes becomes a fundamental means within the marketing process implying a creative game with familiar structures with the simultaneous use of alienating patterns in unexpected contexts as well as stylistic permutations and non-conformist combinations.

At the ideological and aesthetic crossroads between orientalism, eclecticism and nostalgia, Kanno Yôko's so-called "gendered sincerity", repeatedly highlighted both by fans and by experts of Japanese popular products, clashes once again against stylistic pragmatism, providing astonishing market-relevant

insights: what Takarazuka Revue has done for decades – at least since the world-premiere of its hugely acclaimed *The Rose of Versailles* (『ベルサイユのばら』 *Berusaiyu no bara*, 1974, based on the equally immensely popular *shôjo* manga [少女漫画, comics for female teenagers in Japan] of the same title by Ikeda Riyoko [池田理代子, born 1947], published by Shûeisha between 1972-1973 and 2013-2018) –, Japan is starting to diligently probe into now: it no longer defends itself against the clichés and the contradictions imposed upon it by outer factors, but rather self-confidently absorbs these very clichés and contradictions, and creates its own new identity, according to late-modern standards and ideals. This new identity paradigm combines neo-traditionalism and anti-orientalism as well as the infamous intellectualization of lifestyles and everyday cultures.

It is both pointless and futile to try to resist the power of seduction supplied by the endless repetition of familiar patterns, both visually and auditive, to imagine that they are evil or ugly. Within the mechanical system of the entertainment industry, the power relationships between producers and consumers, between performers and audiences yield, at a closer look, the practical tools in extrapolating theoretical concatenations to real-life actions with successful results: like business management, the management of emotions pertains acumens into the seductive power of education and indoctrination which bypasses the rational processes of distance and re-calculation. In the extremely ruthless psychology of Japan's cultural consumption, only two elements could revitalize the postwar humiliation: the repeated acknowledgement of the failure of the American dream due to the loss of faith and the intensive reiteration of family as core-entirety of the society within the framework of a seemingly progressive wrapping of national ideals. Takarazuka Revue's *otokoyaku* has

been proving a vital mechanism in this process of reformulating history and geography.

Eventually, *Silk Road: Bandits and Jewels* reiterates prewar *Mon Paris*' imperialist ethos and its overtly paternalist message from 1927, embedded within a thick emotional fabric of *otokoyaku*'s cool reticence and *musumeyaku*'s cute submission, which transcend the cliché of the disempowered human being into a hero of longing and, paradoxically, belonging. In cognitive consonance with *fff* – *Fortississimo*, generosity and spiritual enlightenment underscore, according to the axiological ideal promoted by Takarazuka Revue, the re-evaluation of humanity from a competitive undertaking towards a playful togetherness: the desire to situate itself (Takarazuka Revue Company) and as such Japan at the credible center of a new world order transpires from deep within and inoculates itself into the audiences' subconscious. Beneath this stylistic cacophony, ideological inconsistency and aesthetic contradictions, Takarazuka Revue as a historical phenomenon arises as a romantic world – and first of all, a world full of longing for romantics, with the *takarasienne* as a *Lichtgestalt*, an athletic, slender “angel of light” profiled on the background of a rigorous, disciplined lifestyle as the pathway to individual fulfillment and national supremacy.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Ana AGUD is Bachelor and Ph.D in Classical Philology and Professor of Indoeuropean Linguistics in Salamanca, a Grant Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and she is also a Disciple of Eugenio Coseriu in Linguistics, of Josef Simon in Philosophy and of Bernfried Schlerath in Indo-Iranistics.

In addition, she is the author of a "Historia y teoría de los casos" (History and Theory of Cases, 1981), of two commented translations (into Spanish and German) of the Indian Upanishad, of a book "Introduction to old Indian philosophy", of a handbook of the Gothic Language, as well as of a recent book about "The poems of being and non being and their languages along history", a plurilingual anthology of texts in verse reaching from the Rigvedic «Nasadiya sukta» to the Spanish poet Antonio Machado, all translated from their original languages (Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, English and German) and commented on by her. She has written articles about General and Theoretical Linguistics, Philosophy of Language and of Linguistics, Indian Literature and Philosophy, cultural, literary and philosophical comparative studies, and in addition conducted research on music and language, as well as on aesthetic theory. She has also published many translations of German Philosophy (Gadamer, Humboldt, Josef Simon, Habermas and others), and she has translated several classical Indian texts into Spanish, as well as other kinds of texts from and into other languages. In the last years she has mainly translated poetical texts, mostly German and Sanskrit ones.

She is about to publish her most recent book about a "Critical Theory of Linguistics", devoted to a systematic critical analysis of the development of Linguistic Theory along the two last centuries, from the point of view of the German "critical Philosophy", above

all Kant, Hegel, Humboldt and Nietzsche, also including references to Indian grammarians.

anaagud@usal.es

Giovanni GOBBER teaches linguistics at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan. His research interests are theoretical issues on language foundation as well as empirical descriptions of language contacts with a comparison of structures from different languages in Central and Eastern Europe, both in a functional and a historical perspective.

giovanni.gobber@unicatt.it

Maria GRAJDIAN is Associate Professor of Media Studies & Cultural Anthropology at Hiroshima University, Graduate School of Integrated Arts and Sciences (Hiroshima/Japan). She holds a Ph.D. in musicology from Hanover University of Media, Music and Drama, Germany. Her research and teaching focus on Japanese contemporary culture (Takarazuka Revue, Studio Ghibli, Murakami Haruki), history of knowledge (Japanese encyclopaedias) and the dynamics of identity in late modernity. Recent publications include numerous research articles in academic journals as well as books, e.g., *After Identity: Three Essays on the Musicality of Life* and *Cyberspaces of Loneliness: Love, Masculinity, Japan* (both 2019, ProUniversitaria Press), *Takahata Isao* and *Post-Cold-War Japanese Animation: Five Directors and Their Visions* (both 2021, ProUniversitaria Press).

grajdian@hiroshima-u.ac.jp

Keita IKARASHI is Associate Professor at Nagaoka University of Technology, Japan. He holds a PhD in linguistics from the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Research areas: semantics,

pragmatics, text linguistics (with special focus on picturebooks). Latest publications: “Beyond Mere Clarification: The Statement-Initial *Not That*-Construction” (with P. Maher, *Journal of English Grammar and Usage* 27, 2020), “Ehon niokeru Meesiku de Owaru Bun to Yomite no Siza no Kankee” [Relationship between Nominal Sentences and the Viewpoint of the Reader in Picturebooks] (*TAME nikansuru Tagengo Kenkyuu to Ninti Moodo* [Multilingual Studies and Cognitive Modes about TAME], 2020), “Syuuzigimonbun ni Arawareru *I Ask You* ga Ninka Sareru Sikumi nituite” [A License Condition on *I Ask You* in Rhetorical Questions] (with A. Sakamoto, *Journal of English Grammar and Usage* 26, 2019).

ikarashi.k61@gmail.com

Marina KOSSARIK is tenured professor, Head of the Department of Romance Linguistics at Moscow University, where she is reading courses in Romance Philology and Comparative Grammar of Romance Languages and teaching theoretical, historical and practical lessons in the Portuguese language. She holds a BA from the Faculty of Philology at Lomonosov Moscow State University in Spanish language and literature and is one of the first Russian Portugalists. Her research interests are mainly in the history of linguistics. She is the author of a number of publications on the role of the Renaissance in the formation of the modern science of language, on the contribution of the Pyrenean (mainly Portuguese) tradition to the approval of the ideas of the norm, on universal and private grammar, the history of the

language, linguodidactics, discourse in the descriptions of Latin, Romance languages, in missionary grammars.

olissipo@yandex.ru

Araceli LÓPEZ SERENA is professor for Spanish linguistics at the University of Seville (Spain). After graduating in Spanish philology from the same university in 1999, she began her doctoral studies at the University of Munich under the supervision of Wulf Oesterreicher. She obtained her PhD degree in 2005, with a thesis directed by Antonio Narbona and dedicated to the study of the literary recreation of colloquial Spanish, the first part of which already shows the seeds of her interest, not only in linguistic variation and theory, but also in the philosophy of science. Author of two monographs, she has coordinated several collective volumes and published numerous articles in the fields of Coserian-inspired Linguistics of Varieties and linguistic metatheory, in which the imprint of Eugenio Coseriu's thought is clearly perceptible. She has been a visiting professor or researcher at the universities of Passau, Tübingen, Freie Berlin and Heidelberg (in Germany), NYU New York (United States) or Paris 8 (France), and has given plenary lectures in several European and American countries, including Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Peru and Brazil. Her research focuses on two main areas, in which Eugenio Coseriu's proposals have played a key role: the philosophy of linguistics and the theoretical modelling of linguistic variation.

cheilop@us.es

Juzelly Fernandes Barreto MOREIRA holds a Master's degree in Study Languages from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil), where she is also conducting research as doctoral student. She is currently teaching Portuguese at the Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil) and has in addition single-authored *Estilo, texto e sentido* (IFRN, 2019). Her academic concerns are focused on research in text linguistics.

juzelly@gmail.com

Ryohei NAYA is Assistant Professor at the University of Tsukuba, Japan, from which he received a PhD in Linguistics. His research interests lie in morphology, especially word-formation in English and Japanese. His main publications include *Deverbal Noun-Forming Processes in English* (English Linguistics 33(1), 2016), *Semi-lexical Categories and Word-Formation: A Case Study in Japanese Mimetic Compounds* (with Keita Ikarashi, English Linguistics 33(2), 2017), and *Syntactic and Semantic Factors behind Head Transparency in English Compounds* (English Linguistics 36(2), 2020).

naya.ryohei.kb@u.tsukuba.ac.jp

Among his research interests, **Vincenzo ORIOLES** deals with language contact and bilingualism, status of the languages, history of linguistic thinking, ancient pre-Roman languages. As a principal investigator, he coordinated a Project on the subject of "Metalanguage of Linguistics. Models and Applications". He has also developed a research focus about Italian Language in the world as a local coordinator of a research unit involved in a FIRB (Fund for Investment in Basic Research) Program. He wrote

numerous essays on a wide range of topics. In particular he published a monograph on Russian loanwords in the Italian language (*I russismi nella lingua italiana*, 2006), a collection of lexical essays (*Percorsi di parole*, 2006, 2nd ed.), a volume of contributions on minority languages (*Le minoranze linguistiche*, 2003) and the revisited Italian edition of Uriel Weinreich, *Languages in Contact (Lingue in contatto*, 2008). He is editor of the Journal *Incontri Linguistici* (Pisa and Roma, Fabrizio Serra), editor or co-editor of book series such as "Lingue, culture e testi" and "Lingue, linguaggi, metalinguaggio" (Roma, Il Calamo), "Valori identitari e imprenditorialità" (Udine, Forum), "Lezioni di linguistica e comunicazione" (Alessandria, Edizioni dell'Orso), "Il Mediterraneo Plurilingue" (Alessandria, Edizioni dell'Orso).

vincenzo.orioles@uniud.it

Cristian PAȘCALĂU is a university assistant in the Department of Romanian Language and General Linguistics of the Faculty of Letters at Babeș-Bolyai University. He published several studies on cultural semiotics and the universes of discourse and translated into Romanian J.G. Martínez del Castillo's book *La lingüística del decir: el logos semántico y el logos apofántico (Lingvistica rostirii: logosul semantic și logosul apofantic*, Argonaut & Scriptor, 2011). His academic interests include linguistics and philosophy of language, cultural semiotics, lexicology and semantics.

babelrealm@yahoo.com

Clemilton Lopes PINHEIRO holds a PhD in Philology and Portuguese Linguistics from the Júlio de Mesquita Filho University (Brazil), and completed post-doctoral training at both

the University Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III (France) and the University of Tübingen (Germany). He is a professor of Linguistics at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil). His academic concerns are focused on research in text linguistics, history of linguistic ideas, areas in which he has published numerous articles in scientific journals and collective volumes.

clemiltonpinheiro@hotmail.com

Michelle RODRÍGUEZ CHIW is currently teaching at the University of Guadalajara. She has presented at conferences such as the CoLiCo by the UNAM and at the 7th International Congress of Coserian Linguistics by the University of Cadiz. Her research areas are the concept of norm in linguistics and normativity, historical and comparative linguistics in Iberian languages and pragmatic studies of political discourse.

mdrchiw@gmail.com

Emma TAMÁIANU-MORITA is currently Professor of Linguistics at Kindai University (Faculty of International Studies), in Osaka, Japan, where she teaches courses in the fields of Communication Studies, Cultural semiotics, Intercultural communication, Translation Studies. She started her academic career in 1990 at Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania (Chair of General Linguistics and Semiotics), and from 2009 to 2016 she worked as Professor of Linguistics at Akita University, Japan. Her principal fields of research are text linguistics, with special focus on the issue of text typology, contrastive linguistics and translation studies (using textual material mainly from English, Japanese, Romanian and Spanish), cultural semiotics. Among her main publications are four single-authored books, four co-authored books, one translated book, one edited volume, over

70 scientific papers, as well as several translations of linguistic studies. She presented numerous papers at international conferences in Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Romania and Switzerland.

etamaian@yahoo.com

Cristina VARGA is senior lecturer at Faculté des Humanités, de l'Université Catholique de l'Ouest in Angers and assistant professor in the Modern Languages Department at Universitatea "Babeş-Bolyai" in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where she teaches *New Technologies Applied to Translation, Computer Assisted Translation Tools, Corpus for translators, Localization, Audiovisual translation (subtitling), and Terminology*. Since 2011 she has been teaching *Subtitling* for the Master in Literary and Audiovisual Translation at Barcelona School of Management of Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. Cristina Varga holds a PhD from Universitatea "Babeş-Bolyai" in Cluj-Napoca and Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, with the thesis *Knowledge Transmission in Cyberspace. Discourse Analysis of Professional Web Forums as Internet Subgenre*. She has had an extended teaching experience abroad (France, Belgium, and Spain). Her areas of work and research include: discourse analysis, corpus-based linguistics, machine translation, computer assisted translation, terminology, audiovisual translation and localization.

cristina.varga@gmail.com

Lolita ZAGAEVSCHI CORNELIUS was an assistant lecturer at the Department of General Linguistics and Semiotics of the Faculty of Letters at "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania (2000-2005). During this time she was a member of the

Center of Integral Studies affiliated to DGLS. In 2005 she completed her PhD on *Metaphoric Functions in the Novel "Luntrea lui Caron" by Lucian Blaga*, under the guidance of Prof M.Borcila, at the "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Her areas of interest include: metaphor studies, integral linguistics, text linguistics. She is currently working at Libraries, Registration & Archives, Kent County Council, United Kingdom.
lolita.cornelius@yahoo.com

INDEX OF KEYWORDS, TOPICS AND TOPIC-RELATED SUBJECTS

- (articulated) typology **118-135**
 ‘local’ metaphor **181-198**
 ‘sense articulation’ **181-198**
 ‘text’ constitution **181-198**
 “grain of truth” **257-285**
 “Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar” **229-256**
 act **104-117**
 Aldrette, B. J de **201-228**
 biological perspectives **257-285**
 Blaga, Lucian **181-198**
 Borcilă, Mircea **181-198**
 Calvin and Hobbes **159-180**
 comic strip **159-180**
 comprehensive inventory **136-156**
 contextual motivation **67-103**
 creativity **55-66, 181-198**
 cultural integration **201-228**
 early written texts **201-228**
 epistemological principles **229-256**
 etymology **201-228**
 factual speech **25-50**
 fragmentation (of modern linguistic research) **25-50**
 functionalism **55-66**
 hermeneutics **229-256**
 historical level **67-103**
 historicity of language **201-228**
 historicity **25-50**
 history of linguistics **118-135, 201-228**
 human consciousness **257-285**
 humanistic science **257-285**
 Ibero-Romance languages **201-228**
 idiomatic knowledge **67-103**
 incorrectness **67-103**
 individual constitution (of linguistic problems and objects) **25-50**
 individual level **67-103**
 individuality **25-50**
 instincts **257-285**
 integral linguistics **25-50, 136-156, 257-285**
 integral text linguistics/semantics **181-198**
 integration vs disintegration **25-50**
 intuitive knowledge **257-285**
 Jakobson, Roman
 Japanese **67-103**
 key categorizations/concepts **229-256**
 language change **201-228**
 language contacts **201-228**
 Lara, Luis Fernando **104-117**
 Lexical Integrity Principle **67-103**
 lexical semantics **55-66**
 linguistic attitudes **104-117**
 linguistic criticism **25-50**
 linguistic historiography **201-228**
 linguogenesis **201-228**
 logician **118-135**
Luntrea lui Caron **181-198**

meaning (hermeneutics of) **159-180**
 meaning **257-285**
 metalanguage **118-135**
 morphology **201-228**
 multicultural fields **104-117**
 multimodal text **159-180**
 norm **55-66, 67-103, 104-117**
 perceptions **257-285**
 philosophical reflection **25-50**
 philosophical-scientific edifice (of Coserian linguistic theory) **229-256**
 phonetics **201-228**
 phrasal compounds **67-103**
 product **104-117**
 reflexiveness **118-135**
 reflexivity **257-285**
 Romance philology/linguistics **201-228**
 sensory representations **257-285**
 sociolinguistic factors **201-228**
 sociolinguistics **104-117**
 Spanish (history of) **201-228**
 Spanish Renaissance **201-228**
 surrounding fields (*entornos*) (theory of) **159-180**
 suspension(sublation) **67-103**
 syntax **67-103**
 system **55-66, 67-103, 104-117**
 terminological three-way distribution **118-135**
 terminology (creation of) **136-156**
 terminology (theory of) **136-156**
 text linguistics **159-180**
 text procedures (practice of) **159-180**
 trans-linguistic **181-198**
 trans-signifying **181-198**
 usage **55-66**
 verbal text **159-180**
 Watterson, Bill **159-180**
 word formation **55-66**