

## Pragmatics of identity pronouns

Rom. ACELAȘI versus ÎNSUȘI — Lat. IDEM versus IPSE

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In spite of the rich literature about the history of demonstrative pronouns in Romance, the evolution of the «pronouns of identity» is far from being accounted for in a satisfactory way. If one examines the interchanges between IPSE and IDEM, between IPSE and reflexive pronouns, between IPSE and other demonstrative pronouns, various ticklish questions arise:

(1) Are IDEM and IPSE demonstrative pronouns, as the Latin grammars used to list them? If the morphology of IDEM and IPSE is similar to the demonstratives, the semantics and the syntax of «identity pronouns» often are presented in connection with ALIUS, an indefinite pronoun. For example, in LEUMANN et al. (1965, II: 189) IPSE is translated as «this and not another» (*er und kein anderer*); in Oudot (1964) IDEM and ALIUS are presented under Chapter XX, *Identité et Diversité*, etc. Romance corresponding forms such as Fr. MÊME or Rom. ÎNSUȘI are not considered demonstrative at all.

(2) If demonstratives may also pronominalize a NP under the condition of referential identity, what semantic features characterize IDEM?

(3) What kind of «opposition» does IPSE express? According to ERNOUT-THOMAS (1959:189), IPSE «est proprement un intensif, qui s'emploie avec une idée d'opposition latente».

(4) Is there any explanation for the fact that IDEM may be replaced by other demonstratives? See for example (i) *Movetur eo timore quo nostrum unusquisque?* Ciceron, *Pro M. Fonteio*, 12. 27 «Does he feel the same fear as we do» (cf. Fr. translation by OUDOT, 1964: 471 «Epreuve-t-il la même crainte que nous?»).

(5) How can one explain the fact that IPSE has lost its oppositional meaning, and has become a personal pronoun in several Romance languages

(such as Italian, Romanian, etc.)? ERNOUT-THOMAS (1959:191) have pointed out that «IPSE, à partir des tours HIC IPSE, ILE IPSE, ISTE IPSE, se rapprochait de IDEM» — see for ex. (ii) *ista ipse lege quae...*, Ciceron, *R. Am.* 125. But why IDEM vanished and IPSE (-METIPSE) became the expression of both meanings? If everybody agrees as to the fact that IDEM expresses an «identity», it seems rather difficult to find a semantic definition which would assign such a feature to IPSE; see, however, Coseriu who points out that IPSE marks «the identity of a person with himself», as NP-s containing a personal pronoun show: *ego ipse, tu ipse*, etc. (see also ABEL, 1971:27).

How would one explain the presence of a reflexive morpheme in the corresponding Romanian forms, such as ACELAȘI (ILLE + ȘI) or INSUȘI (IPSE + ȘI), where -ȘI is the unstressed form (SIBI) of the dative reflexive?

We do not claim that we are in a position to thoroughly answer these questions, but we do believe that several pragmatic reasons might be found in order to account for most of them. Demonstratives are highly linked to the variations in the Speech Acts and their function as «shifters» already has been fully described (see Jakobson, 1963, Benveniste, 1966, etc.). We would like to add a new dimension, i.e., the expectation level, which —in our opinion— might be able to account for the difference between «true demonstratives», on the one hand, and «identity pronouns», on the other.

The expectation is a part of the shared knowledge which, unlike presupposition or entailment, does not satisfy the criterion of uncontradictability. For example, an expectation of the sentence (iii) *I would be very happy if I could take a trip to Venus* is (iv) *I am not very happy*. But (iv) may be cancelled by an after-thought, as (v) shows: (v) *I would be very happy if I could take a trip to Venus, but I am happy anyway, don't worry...* In negative sentences, there always is a cancelled expectation: see for ex. (vi) *I do not love you and I cannot marry you*, which has the expectation «you think I love you and, consequently, you expect me to marry you», and I know what you are expecting me to do (see details in Manoliu-Manea, 1979). As LEECH (1977:322) has suggested,

«expectation relations are not to be found in the abstract logical system of language but rather in the pragmatics of communication, along with thematic ordering, information focus, etc.»

### 1. Semantic structure of «identity».

One of our first assumptions is that Latin grammarians are not wrong and the morphologic resemblances are not hazardous and normally rest upon special semantic links. Demonstratives are means of identification, while the so-called indefinite pronouns (including ALIUS), as means of

quantification, reject any identification. In this opposition IDEM, IPSE and ALIUS play a peculiar role.

Since it is easier to analyze the pragmatic level of a native, alive language and since Romanian is one of the few Romance languages which have recreated the difference between «IDEM» and «IPSE» developing two different expressions (ACELAȘI versus INSUȘI)<sup>1</sup>, we shall consider first the functions and meanings of the Romanian pronouns of identity.

*1.1 Identity as a denial of an expected non-identity.* Let us consider the following sentences:

(vii) Rom. *Răspunde mereu același student (deși aș vrea să răspundă studenți diferiți)* «the same student always answers (despite the fact that I would like to have different students' answers). Sentence (vii) denies the fact that we expect, i.e., «the student who speaks at time n is not the one who answers at time n + 1», in symbolic logic terms:

$$(a) E_x (A_{n(x)}) \cdot E_y (A_{n+1(y)}) \cdot (x = y),$$

i.e., «there is a person x, who answers at time n, and there is a person y, who answers at time n + 1, and x and y are identical». But, as we have already pointed out, the «proper meaning» (a)<sup>2</sup> has the expectation (a')  $x \neq y$ , i.e., x and y are not the same person. In other contexts, the compared terms are two states of mind or two physical conditions of the same person or object, as shown by (viii) *M-am întâlnit ieri cu Radu. Era același om bun și vesel, numai că puțin îmbătrânit; viața nu reușise să-i schimbe firea*, «I met R. yesterday. He was the same kind and joyful man, only a little aged; the life has not succeeded in changing his character». The proper meaning of (viii) thus states that «Radu's character at the time n + 1 is identical to Radu's character at the time n», and the expectation is «the life has changed him».

A similar function has Lat. IDEM in contexts such as: (ix) ... *eadem loco* (...) *quasi ea pecunia legata non esset*, Cicero, *Leg. 2*, 53, «...in the same position as the money had not been bequeathed»; cf. also (x) *eosdem quos reliqui portus capere non poterunt*, Caesar, *B. G. 4*, 36, 4, «they could not reach the same harbors as the others».

We therefore can assume that Rom. ACELAȘI, as well as Lat. IDEM—at least in some contexts— have a special function in the denial acts; they deny an expected non-identity of the arguments.

<sup>1</sup> In other areas, for example, the distinction under discussion has preserved a common morpheme, IPSE (-METIPSE) and developed a positional device; *le même homme* «the same person» —*l'homme même* «the man himself», which might be related to the topicalized argument— see Manoliu-Manea: *Identity and Topic* (unpubl. mss.).

<sup>2</sup> For the difference between proper meaning and other semantic information see Sgall (1975).

*1.2 Identity and Emphasis.* In the Romanian grammars there always has been a special chapter concerning the «pronoun of reinforcement» (*pronume de întărire*). For example, according to *Gramatica Academiei R. S. România* (I: 154), «*însuși* însoțește un substantiv sau un pronume cu scopul de a preciza obiectul determinat» («it accompanies a substantive or a pronoun in order to specify the determined object»). But, which demonstrative pronoun does not have the same function? In fact this definition does not state any semantic feature which could account for the specific difference between ÎNSUȘI and other means of specification.

Let us consider sentence (xi) *M-am întâlnit cu însuși împăratul* «I have met the emperor himself». Meeting an emperor is not a usual fact. We normally expect not to meet the emperor down the street. In logical terms, the expectation of (xi) is (b) «the one I have met is not the emperor», which I am denying by using the «reinforcement pronoun», *însuși*. In other words, ÎNSUȘI expresses the fact that the value I have picked out from the domain of my argument x (the persons I could possibly meet) is not the one I was supposed to. ÎNSUȘI denies the normal expectation which establishes a relation of non correferentiality (virtually unlikely) between two values of the same domain. The meaning of (xi) does not state that the person I met was the emperor, which is expressed by (xii) *M-am întâlnit cu împăratul*; ÎNSUȘI in fact establishes a relation between two possible worlds: the world of my expectations, which does not include the value «emperor», and the world of real events, which does include this value.

Let us consider another sentence, such as (xiii) *Deși nu se simțea prea bine, a dus el însuși scrisoarea la poștă* (nu a vrut să lase pe altcineva), «although he did not feel good, he mailed this letter by himself (litt. «... he went to the post office himself»), he did not want anybody else to do it». The expectation of (xiii) is (c) «since he did not feel good, somebody else should have mailed the letter». In other words, EL ÎNSUȘI denies (c) by pointing out that «the one who mailed the letter was the one who was not supposed to do it».

Therefore, both *același* and *însuși* assert an identity by denying a non-identity, but they differ as to the terms of this relation. ACELAȘI also brings in the information that «the person or the object referred to is not the one who (which) was expected to be the argument of the corresponding predicate», but it also expresses the fact that this person (or object) is identical to someone (or something) to whom (to which) the predicate has applied at a different time ( $n + 1$ ).

Including the expectation (a'), the meaning of (vii) may be reformulated as follows:

$$(a'') \quad E_x (A_{n(x)}) \cdot (x = \text{student}) \cdot E_y (A_{n+1(y)}) \cdot (y = \text{student}) \cdot (\sim (x \neq y))$$

where E represents the existential quantifier /there is/, A means «answer»; the point symbolises the conjunction ET «and...and», and ~ represents the negation.

The meaning of sentence (xi) corresponds to the following formula:

$$(b'') E_x (M_{(t,x)}) \cdot (\sim (x \neq \text{emperor})),$$

where M represents the predicate «meet».

The same type of expectation may be found in Latin utterances including IPSE. See for ex. (xiv) *ualuae (...) se ipsae aperuerunt*, Ciceron, *Diu. I.* «the door opened by itself» — one usually (at least at that time) thinks that a door does not open by itself. Cf. also (xv) *ego tui Bruti rem sic ago ut suam ipse non ageret*, Ciceron, *At. 5. 8. 4* «I take care of Brutus' business in such a way as he himself would not take care of his (business)». We normally expect that nobody but the interested person (in this case, Brutus) can take the best care of his own business.

*1.3 Denying an identity.* In the same framework, the «difference» pronouns, such as Rom. ALTUL (ALTCINEVA, ALTCEVA) «other» (other person, other thing) may be described as denying an expected identity:

See for ex. (xvi) *A plecat Ion? — Nu, altcinerva (a plecat în locul lui)*. «Did John leave? — No (he did not leave), somebody else (left in his place)».

In symbolic logic terms, the meaning of (xvi) may be stated as follows:

$$(xvi.a) E_x (\text{Left}_x) \cdot (\sim (x = \text{John})).$$

In this case, ALTCINEVA is opposed rather to INSUȘI than to ACELAȘI. But let us now compare

$$(vii) \text{Răspunde mereu același student}$$

and

$$(xvii) \text{Răspunde mereu alt student «another student always answers»,}$$

which is ambiguous in the following way:

(a) It may state that «each time I ask, a student I do not expect to answer does answer», and

(b) the student who answers at time n is different from the student who answers at time n + 1, and so on...».

Meaning (a) accounts for the fact that ALT is the counterpart of INSUȘI:

$$(xvii.a) E_x (A_{(t,x)}) \cdot (\sim (x = \text{the student I expect to answer})).$$

In the (b) meaning, ALT is the counterpart of ACELAȘI, i.e., it expresses that «there is a person x, who answers at time n, and there is a person y, who answers at time n + 1, and x and y are not identical». In short,

$$(xvii.b) E_x(A_{n(x)}) \cdot E_y(A_{(n+1)}) \cdot (x \neq y).$$

The last term of (xvii.b) might be also stated as

$$(\sim (x = y))$$

i.e., it is not true that x and y are identical.

It is rather hard, however, to claim that ALTUL «other» always expresses a denial of identity.

Let us consider Rom. (xviii) *Vrei pepene sau altceva?* «Do you prefer watermelon or something else?» — *Dă-mi mai bine o piersică* «I would prefer to have a peach». I would say that, in this particular case, *altceva* is not a denial, but a negative statement, as it did not cancel any expectation: I can give you a watermelon, but I do not expect you to take it; you have the choice, you can have a piece of watermelon or something which is not a watermelon.

Therefore, the «non identity» pronouns may syncretize both the meaning of «IDEM» and the meaning of «IPSE». It is an interesting phenomenon which might suggest that in some socio-cultural contexts, the same morpheme may also syncretize the meaning of an «identity pronoun» and the meaning of a «reinforcement pronoun». See for ex. Lat. IPSE used as IDEM in *Peregr. Aeth.* 4, 5: (xix) *non ipsa parte exire habebamus qua intraueramus* «we have to get out not through the same side we had got in». If for the personal pronouns and the demonstrative pronouns the correferentiality is a condition of pronominalization, for the identity pronouns, the correferentiality is more than that; it is also a part of the asserted information.

## 2. Pragmatic reasons for linguistic change.

2.1 Since the «reinforcement pronouns» assert a correferentiality by denying any other virtual concurrent, it seems that the most natural way to classify them would be the inclusion in *the means of emphasis* (see George Lakoff's definition of focus, in Lakoff, 1971). In this case, it is not impossible to understand the loss of the denial power» of IPSE. A universal device of «reinforcement» adds bound or free morphemes to the old ones, as shown by the composite forms of Vulg. Lat. *nobismet ipsis, ipsismet ipsis, metipsimus*, etc. (see LÖFSTED, 1956, II: 138). In the meantime, the «weakened» IPSE could be assimilated to other means of text reference, as shown by the so-called confusion between IPSE and ILLE, HIC, IS. On the other hand, IPSE (and its reinforced forms), as marks of an «op-

position», might have been interpreted as more powerful in denying a «non-identity» and took over IDEM's functions, as the disappearance of IDEM suggests.

2.2 As we have already pointed out, Romanian has a peculiar position, since the «added reinforcement» is a reflexive dative. The relationship between emphatic pronouns and reflexives goes back to the Indo-European functions. As ERNOUT-THOMAS (1959:184) have pointed out, the Latin reflexive still preserves its etymological meaning of «himself» (Fr. translation *soi-même*) in certain combinations; its possessive counterpart, *suus*, may be sometimes translated by «his own» (Fr. «son propre»). Confusions which arise between SE and IPSE in Vulgar Latin are mere consequences of their common semantic functions. The fortune of the dative reflexive as an «emphatic bound-morpheme» in old Romanian was far more important. -ȘI as an emphasis means, was used even in connection with the first and second persons, added to a stressed reflexive form (cf. (xx) *luați vă aminte voi sine cu sine*, C. Pr. 44 «pay attention you yourselves to yourselves (litt. you yourselves with themselves»), or even to personal pronouns (*mineș(i)* «me myself, *tineș(i)* «you yourself», *loruș(i)* «to them themselves», *noiș(i)* «to us ourselves», etc. — see DENSUȘIANU, 1961, II: 118-19). In fact, -ȘI became an analog of Lat. *-met* and was extended to IPSE (*insu-*), which was about to become a mere personal pronoun (see the contemporary form *dînsul* «he»), as well as to demonstratives, (cf. *acesta* and *acestaș*, CC<sup>2</sup> 240; *celoraș*, C. Pr. 63 «to the same persons».

— see DENSUȘIANU, 1961, II: 121), in the same way as IPSE was added to HIC, IS or ILLE in colloquial Latin. Whatever the archaic meaning of SE was preserved or a new function of the reflexive (actualizing one of the various possibilities predicted by its semantic structure) developed, the outstanding frequency and diversity of the reflexive pronouns in Romanian might account for the way -ȘI (< SIBI) became an emphasis means in this area.

The fact that a dative was preferred cannot be beyond its topicalizing power (as Hymann & Zimmer, 1976, have pointed out, dative is more marked as to the topicalization and focalization processes than any other oblique case) and the predominance of [+ Human], as well as the development of an «interest value» in the dative micro-semantic area (cf. the emphatic dative in Romanian: for ex. in (xxi) *de ce nu mi-te scoli cînd trebuie?* «why don't you get up when you have to?!» *-mi*, the dative of I, is not to be translated — it involves the speaker in the event).

In contemporary Romanian, ACELAȘI seems to have the same destiny as Lat. IDEM, since, in colloquial aspects, another morpheme, TOT, is preferred:

Cf. (xxii) *Orice i-aș spune, el tot aia* (— *aceea*) *face*  
«Whatever I tell him, he is doing the same thing»

and

(xxiii) «*Orice i-aş spune el face acelaşi lucru*»

see also

(xxiv) *Tot cu el te ții?! N-ai mai găsit altul?*  
 «You date the same guy, don't you?! Didn't you find another?»

The status of TOT is more adverbial than pronominal, since it is invariable (*tot aceea*, feminine, *tot acela*, masculine, *tot aceia*, plural masculine, etc.) and precedes the prepositional phrase (see (xxiv) *tot cu el*, litt. «same with him» = «with the same person»).

### Conclusions.

1. The identity pronouns and the «reinforcement» pronouns are in fact means of denial. They deny an expected non-identity. In order to assert an identity, other morphemes are normally used: cf. for ex. Rom. *la fel* (see for ex. (xxv) *rochia aceea este la fel cu cealaltă* «this dress is identical to the other» — a special intonation may assign a denial meaning to this utterance, too), *identic*, *similar*, etc.

2. True demonstratives and personal pronouns pronominalize under the condition of correferentiality, but they do not assert nor deny a correferentiality. The denial of a non-identity also rests upon the condition of correferentiality. This semantic relationship may account for the fact that the last ones are compounds of the former ones: cf. Lat. IPSE from IS + -PSE(?), IDEM from IS + -DEM; Rom. *acelaşi* from *acela* «that» + *şi* (< *sibi*), *însuşi*, from *însu* (a personal pronoun) + *şi*, etc.

3. As a means of denial they obey the general rules governing the evolution of expressive morphemes. Under certain socio-cultural conditions (such as the colloquial, familiar speech), their expressive power might weaken and, consequently, other means come into the picture intensifying or even eliminating them completely.

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